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Introduction From The Editor
The Link has chronicled the connection between the term Apartheid and the Israeli Occupation for years, including in 2007 when Jimmy Carter’s book first made waves. While some weary at what they see as an endless debate over semantics, we reprise the topic as our 2022 opener given the mounting pile of evidence and the recent year’s developments (including a report Amnesty International just released as we went to press).
Through the clear-eyed lens of a seasoned journalist, we hope this issue of The Link will shine more light (and less heat) on a subject that we believe is anything but semantic. Our commitment remains to provide American readers with a better understanding of the Middle East, including the institutionalized racism that continues to afflict it in the 21st century.
To that end, The Link enthusiastically welcomes The Guardian’s Chris McGreal and his long and intimate acquaintance with the three sides of this triangle– Johannesburg, Jerusalem and Washing-ton. McGreal is a trusted interlocutor and consummate professional who draws on a wide range of fact and testimony in his reporting.
Among McGreal’s many references, we’re glad to be reminded of the Canadian initiative, “Israel-Apartheid Week”. Among many others, that effort is chronicled in detail by the Palestine Poster Project Archive, the world’s largest collection of Palestine- centered graphic arts; we are grateful for PPPA’s permission to sample from their archive for this edition. [PPPA is widely recognized for its role in preserving and celebrating the cultural heritage that is reflected in the over 15,000 posters they’ve archived since 1900. We look forward to sharing more from this treasure trove in future issues (www. PalestinePosterProject.org).
Along similar lines, we greatly appreciate Zapiro’s (South Africa’s acclaimed cartoonist/satirist) permission to publish his 2014 cartoon on this issue’s cover; we think it sums up the issue quite succinctly. (For those who don’t know his work, Zapiro’s pen is sharper and mightier than any number of swords. Treat yourself: https://www.zapiro.com/.)
At the close of this edition, we offer a brief remembrance of a former Board member, friend, and loyal supporter of AMEU, Henry C. Clifford, Jr. On page 15 of our PDF version John Mahoney shares his appreciation.
Lastly, a recent conversation with a longtime supporter in Chicago recalls a slogan that once echoed on Robben Island, South Africa’s infamous prison. ‘Each One Teach One’ underscored the importance of shared learning in our global quest to be better. One way our friend in Chicago has put that belief into practice over the years is by taking maximum advantage of our backpage offer, and endowing dozens of gift subscriptions to The Link. At $20 each, those gift subscriptions are one way AMEU extends its reach, farther and wider. So, if you haven’t done so recently, consider using that back page tearsheet and share us with a local library, a Congressperson, or a neighbor. We’ll send your gift recipient a one-year subscription to The Link, along with a copy of “Burning Issues”, our 440-page anthology of some of our best Link issues in the archives. To submit names and make payment on-line, go to our website, http://ameu.org/, and use the Donate button; be sure to let us know if you would prefer your gift to be anonymous.
Nicholas Griffin
Executive Director
Apartheid…Israel’s Inconvenient Truth
In 2006, Jimmy Carter published his bestselling book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, to wide acclaim and a vicious campaign to discredit the former US president.
Most of the criticism did not challenge Carter’s assessment that Israel’s actions in the occupied territories amounted to colonization and domination of the Palestinians, or his conclusion that it amounted to a system of South African-style apartheid. Instead, the former president’s critics put their efforts into questioning his motives in writing the book. The critics moved directly to smear the 39th American president as an anti-Semite.
The Anti-Defamation League called Carter a “bigot”. Pro-Israel pressure groups placed ads in The New York Times accusing him of facilitating those who “pursue Israel’s annihilation”. Others claimed he was “blinded by an anti-Israel animus”. Universities declined to let him speak and senior Democrats disavowed their former president’s views.
Never mind that it was Carter who brokered the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, a factor in the Nobel committee awarding him the 2002 peace prize. Or that Israeli politicians, including former cabinet ministers, said his assessment reflected what many Israelis thought. Carter’s crime was, as he himself recognized, to speak out on a subject about which open discussion had long been circumscribed in the US. “The many controversial issues concerning Palestine and the path to peace for Israel are intensely debated among Israelis and throughout other nations—but not in the United States,” Carter wrote in the Los Angeles Times, as the orchestrated backlash against him gained momentum.
“For the last 30 years, I have witnessed and experienced the severe restraints on any free and balanced discussion of the facts. This reluctance to criticize any policies of the Israeli government is because of the extraordinary lobbying efforts of the American-Israel Political Action Committee and the absence of any significant contrary voices. It would be almost politically suicidal for members of Congress to espouse a balanced position between Israel and Palestine, to suggest that Israel comply with international law or to speak in defense of justice or human rights for Palestinians.” [Ed: President Carter meant the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.]
Of all the issues, none was more sensitive and off-limits than suggesting Israel practiced a form of apartheid, with its implications of racism and associations to the extensive and intricate web of oppression created by white South Africa to subjugate the black majority. Many of Carter’s critics preferred to see Israel’s Jewish population as the victim of Arab aggression, not the oppressor of Palestinians, and to gloss over the role of occupation and Jewish settlements.
As if to prove Carter’s point, Nancy Pelosi, who was about to become speaker of the House of Representatives when his book was published, pointedly distanced the Democratic Party from the former president’s views. A New York Times article about the reaction to the book quoted Jewish and pro-Israel organizations attacking Carter’s motives, but did not include a single view from a Palestinian.
Fifteen years later, in the spring of 2021, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a lengthy report accusing Israel of committing the crime of apartheid under two international conventions. The New York-based group’s detailed assessment, A Threshold Crossed, Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution, did not say much that wasn’t already known about longstanding Israeli policies to maintain “Jewish control” over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the three million Palestinians who live there.
“In pursuit of this goal, authorities have dispossessed, confined, forcibly separated, and subjugated Palestinians by virtue of their identity to varying degrees of intensity,” HRW said. “In certain areas, as described in this report, these deprivations are so severe that they amount to the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution.”
Palestinian rights groups, such as Al-Haq, have documented the same history of forced removals, house demolitions, land expropriations, and institutionalized discrimination for years. Israeli organizations have echoed those assessments of the impact of Jewish settlements and the separation barrier on Palestinians and their prospects for a viable independence.
Indeed, months before HRW published its report, Israel’s most prominent human rights group, B’Tselem, delivered its own indictment with a title that pulled no punches: A Regime of Jewish Supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This Is Apartheid.
In 2020, Yesh Din was the first major Israeli human rights organization to break the taboo and bluntly call the occupation by its name. “The conclusion of this legal opinion is that the crime against humanity of apartheid is being committed in the West Bank. The perpetrators are Israelis, and the victims are Palestinians,” the group said in a report.
In February 2022, Amnesty International added its voice with a report that said apartheid extended beyond the occupied Palestinian territories and to Israel itself. The report, Israel’s Apartheid against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime against Humanity, said “whether they live in Gaza, East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, or Israel itself, Palestinians are treated as an inferior racial group and systematically deprived of their rights”.
But the HRW report nonetheless marked a milestone: after years of sidestepping, the US’s foremost human rights group had pinned the apartheid label to Israel’s actions. HRW said the decision was prompted, as the title of its report reflects, by a definitive change in the relationship between Israel and the occupied territories.
Omar Shakir, HRW’s Israel and Palestine director and author of the report, said Israel’s longest serving prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, stripped away any lingering illusions that the occupation is a temporary measure on the path to a Palestinian state.
“What has changed? The pace of building settlements and infrastructure connecting Israel proper to the settlements—I’m talking about roads, water networks, electricity—has rapidly increased,” he said. “In addition, the Israeli government has stopped playing the game of pretense. Netanyahu directly said in 2018, 2019, and 2020, that we in- tend to rule the West Bank in perpetuity, that Palestinians will remain our subjects. So the fig leaf for peace process was erased. Then in 2018, the Israeli government passed the nation-state law, which enshrined as a constitutional value that certain key rights are only reserved to Jewish people, that Israel was a state of the Jewish people, and not all the people that live there.”
But the path to HRW pinning the apartheid label to the occupation was not just a matter of identifying a shift in Israeli policies and actions. For years, pro-Israel pressure groups disparaged parallels between Israel and the white South African regime, which they argued were extreme and proceeded to discredit those who drew them.
In the US there was also a political cost. John Kerry, the then US secretary of state, was forced to apologize after he dared to warn in 2014 that Israel risked becoming an apartheid state if it didn’t end the occupation. Still, the apology was given in a manner which said that he regretted the political backlash not the thought. It was a view reportedly shared by President Barack Obama, who alluded to parallels between the Palestinian situation and the civil rights struggle in the US southern states.
Sarah Leah Whitson, the former director of HRW’s Middle East division who worked on the report, told me she spent years pushing for the group to describe Israeli actions as apartheid.
“Did it take over a decade to get there? Yeah, it did. Did it take much internal debate, to put it politely, and a great deal of hand wringing over how this would impact the organization not just in terms of funding, but in terms of our credibility and capacity to work on other countries? Were we going to be dismissed? Were we going to lose our standing? Were the Israel fanatics going to attack the organization so harshly that we would lose our footing? Those are legitimate considerations for any organization that works on 100 countries. Do you risk it all for Israel-Palestine? That was a genuinely held fear.” When the report was released, the worst of those fears were not realized. That in itself marked another milestone. There was a backlash against HRW from some of the usual quarters, including the Israeli government. “The mendacious apartheid slur is indicative of an organization that has been plagued for years by systemic anti-Israel bias,” Mark Regev, a senior adviser to Israel’s then prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, told The New York Times.
Those accusations were echoed by some pro-Israel groups. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations called the report “disgraceful” and said it was intended to “demonize, delegitimize and apply double standards to the State of Israel”—a formulation used by the former Israeli government minister Natan Sharansky to identify anti-Semitism.
The American Jewish Committee said the allegations of apartheid were “outrageous” and a “hatchet job” as part of HRW’s longstanding “anti-Israel campaign”. B’nai B’rith International, another pro-Israel group, fell back on a predictable line that Israel’s critics were “singling out” the Jewish state for criticism—a charge that implies anti-Semitic motives but holds little water when HRW is critical of governments on every continent.
But even beyond those whose business it is to defend Israel no matter what, there was less pushback than might have been expected. Relatively few Republican members of Congress joined the public condemnation of Human Rights Watch. The US State Department was restrained, simply saying that it “is not the view of this administration that Israel’s actions constitute apartheid” but without attempting to deny the facts laid out by HRW or discredit the group.
“It surprised all of us,” said Sari Bashi, an Israeli lawyer who worked on the report. “We thought there would be a much stronger reaction against it. I wouldn’t say that the conversation has shifted, I would say it’s shifting.”
The Palestinian political analyst Yousef Munayyer, former director of the US Campaign for Palestinian Rights, thought the reaction to the report more revealing than the report itself. “The fact that it didn’t have the same kind of pushback is a marker of the change that’s taking place,” he said.
That change is multifaceted and has been in the making for years. In part it’s a generational shift in perspective driven by a growing recognition that Israeli governments, particularly Net- anyahu’s, have used the—at best moribund—peace process as half-hearted and increasingly laughable cover for colonization of the West Bank.
Criticism of Israel has also accelerated recently, in the US in particular, in the wake of the social earthquake caused by the police murder of George Floyd in 2020, the subsequent surge in support for Black Lives Matter and a wider embrace of civil rights issues. With that has come a broader perception of the Palestinian cause as a struggle for social justice against an oppressive power and away from framing of the conflict as competing claims for the same territory.
That shift can also be seen within the US Jewish community, as some Jewish Americans, who once stayed silent for fear of being seen as disloyal to Israel, are increasingly willing to voice their concerns.
Apologists for Israeli government policies have long sought to portray parallels with apartheid as marginal and extreme and therefore unworthy of consideration and debate. But those comparisons have been drawn since the early years of the Jewish state’s foundation. As one of the architects of apartheid, South Africa’s prime minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, put it bluntly in 1961: “The Jews took Is from the Arabs after the Arabs had lived there for a thousand years. Israel, like South Africa, is an apartheid state.”
In 1976, Yitzhak Rabin, then in his first term as prime minister, warned against extended occupation and the fledgling Jewish settler movement dragging Israel into annexing the West Bank. “I don’t think it’s possible to contain over the long term, if we don’t want to get to apartheid, a million and a half (West Bank) Arabs inside a Jewish state,” he told an Israeli television journalist.
More than three decades later, two of Rabin’s successors as prime minister, Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert, echoed his warning. “As long as in this territory west of the Jordan river there is only one political entity called Israel it is going to be either non-Jewish or non-democratic,” Barak said in 2010. “If this bloc of millions of Palestinians cannot vote, that will be an apartheid state.”
Three years earlier, after yet another round of failed peace talks in the US, Olmert cautioned that continued Israeli control of Palestinian territory would reshape the campaign for Palestinian rights. “If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses, and we face a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights, then, as soon as that happens, the state of Israel is finished,” he said.
Shulamit Aloni, only the second woman to serve as an Israeli cabinet minister after Golda Meir and leader of the opposition in the Israeli parliament in the late 1980s, once told me about meeting the South African prime minister, John Vorster, on his visit to Jerusalem in 1976. “Vorster was on a tour in the West Bank and he said that Israel does apartheid much better than he does with apartheid in South Africa. I heard him say it,” she said. In 2007, The Link republished an article Aloni wrote for Israel’s biggest selling newspaper Yediot Ahronot in which she defended Carter. “The US Jewish establishment’s onslaught on former President Jimmy Carter is based on him daring to tell the truth which is known to all: through its army, the government of Israel practices a brutal form of Apartheid in the territory it occupies,” she wrote.
A string of Israeli officials has agreed. Two decades ago, former attorney general Michael Ben-Yair wrote that Israel “established an apartheid regime in the occupied territories immediately following their capture” in 1967. Ami Ayalon, the former head of Israel’s Shin Bet intelligence service, has said his country already has ‘apartheid characteristics’.
Israel’s former ambassador to South Africa, Alon Liel, told me 15 years ago that his government practiced apartheid in the occupied territories and that the suffering of the Palestinians is as great as that of black South Africans under white rule. AB Yehoshua, one of Israel’s greatest living writers, joined the fray in 2020: “The cancer today is apartheid in the West Bank,” he told a conference. “This apartheid is digging more and more deeply into Israeli society and impacting Israel’s humanity.”
Some South Africans saw it too. The former archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, who died in December, went further and said that Israeli violence against Palestinians—routine and largely invisible to the outside world, except when it flares to a full-on assault against Gaza over Hamas rocket barrages or suicide bombings—is worse than anything the black community suffered at the hands of the apartheid military. “I know firsthand that Israel has created an apartheid reality within its borders and through its occupation. The parallels to my own beloved South Africa are painfully stark indeed,” he said.
For all that, very little of this conversation was heard in the US for many years. Whatever backing there was in Washington for the old South Africa, few were prepared to defend it as more than a bulwark against communism. Its white Afrikaner rulers could only dream about the kind of bedrock support shown for Israel on Capitol Hill and at the White House, and the influence of lobbyists for the Jewish state.
As Carter noted, powerful pro-Israel organizations, led by the lobby group AIPAC, for many years confined political debate about Israel and used their influence to create largely unquestioning support for the Jewish state in Congress—to the point that the US delivers $3.8 billion a year in aid to Israel, with almost no scrutiny or conditions.
Mostly absent from this discussion were the Palestinians themselves who have long characterized the occupation as a form of apartheid and described it as a continuation of Israel’s expulsion and displacement of about 700,000 Palestinians from their homes in 1948, known as the Nakba.
One measure of apartheid is that the people whose fate is being decided are marginalized from the debate and only permitted to speak within parameters decided by others. In the US, discussion of Israel’s actions is frequently led by those who claim a close connection to the country because they are Jewish but often are not Israeli citizens, do not live there and frequently know far less about the situation than they claim. Some have a Disneyfied view of Israel rooted in its foundation myths.
One who does not is the American former editor of the solidly pro-Israel The New Republic, Peter Beinart, who used to be influential as a liberal Zionist and staunch defender of Israel who now favors a single country with equal rights for Israelis and Palestinian. Beinart has written that until recently “the mainstream American conversation about Israel-Palestine—the one you watch on cable television and read on the opinion pages—has been a conversation among political Zionists”, a conversation that excludes Palestinians.
Professor Maha Nasser of the University of Arizona found that of nearly 2,500 opinion articles about Palestinians in The New York Times over the past 50 years, less than two percent were written by Palestinians. The Washington Post was even worse. Nasser said that pretty much the only Palestinian with a voice in the US media was the late Edward Said, a professor at Columbia University. For all that, she noted that while Said’s criticisms of the Oslo accords appeared in newspapers around the world, The New York Times did not run a single column by him on that particular issue.
Israeli leaders could generally expect an easy ride from the US press. When Netanyahu appeared on CBS’s Face the Nation during the 2014 Gaza war, the program’s host, Bob Schieffer, led him through one sympathetic question after another before describing the Israeli prime minister’s justifications for the attack as “very understandable”. When Schieffer finally asked Netanyahu about the deaths of hundreds of Palestinian civilians, it was only to wonder if they presented a public relations problem in “the battle for world opinion”
Schieffer wrapped up by quoting prime minster Golda Meir’s line that Israelis can never forgive Arabs “for forcing us to kill their children”.
The belated but growing acceptance of the legitimacy of describing Israeli policies as a form of apartheid has come about in large part because a growing body of Zionists in the US and Israel, and human rights groups in both countries, have publicly embraced the description. But credible Palestinian human rights organizations have been making the comparison for years, and have largely been ignored or dismissed as partisan.
“It’s less about what they said and more about who was saying it,” said Munayyer, the former director of the US Campaign for Palestinian Rights. “Palestinians have been screaming this at the top of their lungs but that’s part of what apartheid is – the voices of those who are marginalized by the system are automatically discounted because the system exists. It’s frustrating to have to deal with that but it’s unfortunately part of the reality we find ourselves in.”
The grip of the Israel lobby and a circumspect press has been eroded by the rise of alternative sources of information in the US. Greater access to foreign television news stations, such as the BBC and Al Jazeera, alongside the rest of alternative news and social media sites have exposed Israeli actions to a much wider audience.
Access to scrutiny of Israel’s increasing belligerence and right-wing rhetoric alongside video of the bombing of apartment blocks in Gaza, the forced removal of Palestinian families from their homes in Jerusalem, and Jewish settler violence against Arabs, has played an important part in reshaping views of Israel.
“People can see for themselves what’s happening in a way they didn’t before,” said Whitson. “It’s made it harder, particularly in the United States, for the emotional defenders of Israel, who’ve had this mythology about Israel and the kibbutz and sowing the land and this sort of fantasy of what Israel’s like, confronted with the reality of what they see in front of their faces, and what everyone sees in front of their faces.”
Along with that has come a significant shift in conversation in the US – most recently driven by the impact of Black Lives Matter but also shaped by evolving views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in universities.
During the Palestinian uprising of the early 2000s, the second intifada, I asked a senior Israeli foreign ministry official what he saw as the greatest challenge in maintaining the support of friendly foreign governments. Gideon Meir had been part of the team that negotiated Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, served in the embassy in London where he became friendly with a young Tony Blair before he was prime minister, and in later years went on to become ambassador to Italy. But his concern was not about the views of Israel’s Arab and European allies.
Meir said there was only one country Israel could rely on and that was the US. He thought that Washington’s support for the Jewish state would remain solid enough among an older generation of Americans and therefore the political class for a few years, but he worried about the long term consequences of rising criticism of Israel in the universities.
Meir saw that the narrative was shifting among American students away from the framing favored by pro-Israel lobby groups of the only democracy in the Middle East fighting for its existence against Arab hate and suicide bombers. Increasingly, discussion about Israel/Palestine on college campuses was cast in the language of civil rights and liberation movements.
Israel Apartheid Week was launched in Toronto in 2005 and rapidly spread to universities across North America and Europe. Its success at putting Palestine on the student agenda is reflected in the push back against the campaign, including attempts to ban it as anti-Semitic at some US and UK universities.
The generation that so worried Meir is now in its 30s and opinion polls show he was right to be concerned. Although twice as many Americans sympathise with Israel than the Palestinians, the gap has narrowed considerably in recent years. Polls show a majority of Democrats want Washington to pressure Israel to take the creating of a Palestinian state seriously.
That shift has in part been brought about by a change in how the conflict is viewed. The terrible images of the aftermath of Palestinian suicide bombings during the Second Intifada, which allowed then prime minister Ariel Sharon to cast Israel as a victim of the same brand of terrorism visited on the US on 9/11, are ancient history to most Americans born after about 1990.
Instead they were raised on the waves of Israeli destruction in Gaza when rockets, bombs and shells wiped out entire families, levelled schools and hospitals, and killed Palestinians in disproportionate numbers. The 2014 assault on Gaza, when Israel responded to Hamas rockets that killed three Israeli teenagers with airstrikes and ground incursions that killed more than 2,000 Palestinians, solidified the view of a militarized state unleashing destruction against a largely defenseless population.
As a result, Israel’s longstanding narrative of a small nation perpetually on guard against the surrounding foes – an image that remains powerful with an older generation that remembers the wars of 1967 and 1973 – is less effective by the year among Americans and Europeans who have seen the Jewish state only in a position of power and domination.
Similarly, Israel’s claim to be the only democracy in the Middle East, by trumpeting that its Arab citizens have the right to vote, was severely dented by the passing of the nation state law in 2018 which enshrined Jewish supremacy over those same Arab citizens.
Three years later, some of the sting was taken out of criticism of the HRW report by a backlash in Israeli Arab towns against attempts to forcibly remove Palestinian families from East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. Even as pro-Israel groups proclaimed that the Jewish state respected equal rights for all of its citizens, Arab residents of Lod, a Tel Aviv suburb, were taking to the streets to protest against pervasive institutional discrimination. Videos of the protests swept social media as the demonstrations spread to other cities amid stone throwing and arson, and beatings of both Arabs and Jews.
“You had the events on the ground in May which just seemed to emphasise the point of all of the reports because you saw what was going on in Jerusalem, what was going on in Gaza, and also what was going on throughout all of Israel,” said Munayyer. “Events on the ground really validated the report.”
Very often, those events were seen through videos and reports produced by Palestinians and distributed on social media, bypassing the traditional gatekeepers in the US press. With them came commentary that characterized the forced removals from Sheikh Jarrah and broader state violence against Palestinians as a continuation of the expulsion of Arabs at the birth of Israel in 1948 – a narrative that connects with the increased focus on social justice.
The breaking of the taboo on comparisons with South Africa has helped drive the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign modelled on the hugely successful global boycott campaign run by the Anti-Apartheid Movement from the 1960s.
BDS was founded by Palestinian civil society groups in 2005, a year after the International Court of Justice declared that the West Bank wall and fence, which has the effect of confiscating Palestinian land, is a breach of international law. The movement has grown significantly on university campuses, and gained traction with some trade unions and political parties.
The campaign has some way to go to match the success of the Anti-Apartheid Movement as it became one of the great social causes of its age. By the mid-1980s, one in four Britons said they were boycotting South Africa. Mobilization against apartheid in US universities, churches and through local coalitions was instrumental in forcing businesses to pull out and, in a serious blow to the white regime, foreign banks to withdraw financing for the country’s loans.
But BDS is making a mark that worries Israel. The campaign has had some visible successes, including the recent decision by the ice cream maker Ben & Jerry to end sales in the settlements. It has pressured investors into breaking ties with companies doing business with Israel’s security establishment or in the settlements.
In echoes of the cultural boycott of South Africa, actors and film-makers have refused to play in Israel. Some called for the Eurovision Song Contest to be withdrawn from Tel Aviv in 2019, and the New Zealand singer Lorde cancelled a concert in the city four years ago after fans urged her to join the artistic boycott of Israel.
BDS is also pressuring soccer’s governing body, FIFA, to expel Israel, so far without success. But Argentina cancelled a World Cup warm-up match with Israel after the players voted to boycott the game. The appearance of Palestinian flags at English Premier League matches suggests there is support for such action.
Although Israel disparages BDS as a fringe campaign, it’s clearly worried about its potential to build support, particularly among Europeans. An effective boycott could cost Israel billions of dollars a year. In 2015, the Washington-based Rand Corporation estimated that a sustained BDS campaign could reduce the Israeli GDP by 2 percent.
But BDS faces far more effective resistance than the Anti-Apartheid Movement ever did. Israel and its supporters have sought to head off the boycott movement before it gains greater momentum with laws recently promulgated in 32 out of 50 state legislatures to discourage and explicitly penalize support for BDS.
At the same time as a younger generation of Americans is reframing the conflict away from non-existent peace negotiations and toward civil rights, views of Israel have been shifting within America’s Jewish community. A survey of Jewish voters in the US last year (2021) found that 25% agreed that “Israel is an apartheid state” while a similar number disagreed with the statement but said it is not anti-Semitic to make the claim. In the poll by the Jewish Electorate Institute, 34% agreed that “Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is similar to racism in the United States”.
A Pew survey in May found that a younger generation of American Jews was less willing than its elders to make excuses for the Israeli government and more prepared to back BDS.
In the spring of 2021, as Gaza once again came under assault, nearly 100 rabbinic and other religious students at leading American Jewish colleges regarded as a crucible of future community leaders signed a letter decrying a double standard over standing up to racial injustice.
“This year, American Jews have been part of a racial reckoning in our community. Our institutions have been reflecting and asking, ‘How are we complicit with racial violence?’ Jewish communities, large and small, have had teach-ins and workshops, held vigils, and commissioned studies. And yet, so many of those same institutions are silent when abuse of power and racist violence erupts in Israel and Palestine,” the letter said.
The students lamented a tendency to focus on the long history of persecution of Jews while ignoring the realities of Israeli Jewish power and the responsibilities that come with it.
“Our political advocacy too often puts forth a narrative of victimization, but supports violent suppression of human rights and enables apartheid in the Palestinian territories, and the threat of annexation,” the letter said.
Shifting perspectives on Israel in the US are matched, and to some degree influenced by, a greater willingness by some in the Jewish state to face reality. Yesh Din was the first major Israeli human rights organization to break the taboo when in 2020 it described the occupation as apartheid and therefore a crime against humanity. “The crime is committed because the Israeli occupation is no “ordinary” occupation regime (or a regime of domination and oppression), but one that comes with a gargantuan colonization project that has created a community of citizens of the occupying power in the occupied territory. The crime is committed because, in addition to colonizing the occupied territory, the occupying power has also gone to great lengths to cement its domination over the occupied residents and ensure their inferior status,” its report said.
Yesh Din dismantled a core defense brandished by Israeli governments to influence American public opinion in particular by claiming that the occupation is not a permanent condition and will end when a deal on two states is reached. The rights group said that claim falls apart in the face of clear evidence that Israel’s policies in the West Bank are designed to cement domination of the Palestinians and the supremacy of Jewish settlers.
The author of the Yesh Din paper was the renowned Israeli human rights lawyer, Michael Sfard. By his own account, he spent years rejecting parallels with apartheid. But in 2021 Sfard wrote in The Guardian that he changed his mind in large part because his understanding of the relationship between Israel and the occupied territories shifted.
Sfard said that like many Israelis he bought into the idea of two entities. There was Israel, the imperfect democracy that discriminated against its Arab minority but then minorities in many democratic countries face discrimination. And then there was the occupation of Palestinian land which Sfard, in common with most of his compatriots, excused as a temporary condition. In the end though, the intent of “Israel’s colossal colonization project in the West Bank” had become undeniable: “It is occupation, obviously, but not only occupation.” He said he came to realize that the governing principle of the West Bank was “Jewish supremacy and Palestinian subjugation”.
Few can say they were not forewarned about the direction of travel under Netanyahu, who was prime minister for a total of 15 years. He opposed the Oslo Accords even before they were signed in 1993 and spent the next three decades subverting them, even if at times he paid lip service to two states to keep the illusion alive and stave off American diplomatic pressure.
Netanyahu did as much as any leading politician to create the climate in which an assassin’s bullet killed the author of the Oslo deal, Yitzhak Rabin, in 1995. Once he became prime minister for the first time less than a year later, Netanyahu set about finishing off what the assassin had started – the solidification of Jewish domination of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and within Israel’s own recognized borders.
Danny Danon, Israel’s recent ambassador to the UN and former chair of Netanyahu’s Likud party, openly opposes a Palestinian state and once told me that the then prime minister didn’t believe in it either. “I want the majority of the land with the minimum amount of Palestinians,” Danon told me in 2012.
Netanyahu threw his support behind the change to Israel’s basic law, in effect its constitution, that defined the county as ‘the nation state of one people only – the Jewish people – and of no other people’. His powerful right-wing economy minister, Naftali Bennett, backed the amendment by saying that Israel should have ‘zero tolerance’ for the aspirations of the Arab population. “I will do everything in my power to make sure [the Palestinians] never get a state,” he told The New Yorker in 2013.
Bennett is now Israel’s prime minister. His ultranationalist finance minister, Avigdor Lieberman, advocates stripping his country’s Arab population of Israeli citizenship. Bennett’s close political ally and interior minister, Ayelet Shaked, was an architect of the nation state law and pushed for effective annexation of parts of the West Bank.
Netanyahu continued to pay lip service to a negotiated two-state solution as a diplomatic fig leaf for US support for Israel. But the reality was hard to ignore for Daniel Seidemann, an Israeli lawyer, who has spent decades exposing the iniquities of Israeli rule in occupied East Jerusalem most recently through an NGO he founded, Terrestrial Jerusalem.
During the 2000s, whenever I asked him about parallels with apartheid, Seidemann resisted them. Like a lot of Israelis, Seidemann told himself the occupation came about through self-defense, and was temporary. It would end when agreement was reached to create a Palestinian state.
Then in May 2020 Seidemann retweeted a photograph of a group of Israeli officials sitting around a map discussing which parts of the West Bank to annex. He wrote, “For many years I resisted using the term “apartheid” in the context of occupation. I regret having to use it now, but there is no choice but to do so.”
Seidemann told me that he long sidestepped the comparison because he thought it was more frequently used for polemical attacks on Israel than to illuminate the realities of the oppression of Palestinians. He still has reservations. He remains convinced that the occupation is not driven by attitudes of racial superiority even though he acknowledges there is systematic racism.
“Having said that, and having bristled for a long period of time, I have no alternative but to increasingly not only concede but to use the apartheid paradigm in explaining what’s happening, particularly in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,” he said.
“Part of what has changed is that the occupation isn’t temporary. Occupation is being perpetuated. When occupation becomes permanent, and you have one geographical place with laws for one and laws for another, the comfort zone between that situation and apartheid narrows dangerously. We now have a situation which not only exists but by policy, by design, is being perpetuated; that within one geographical space there are those with political rights and those without them. That is not only disturbing, it raises the specter of apartheid.”
“There is no status quo because occupation requires increasingly repressive and nationalistic measures in order to sustain itself. Israel engages in policies which were unthinkable 10 years ago.”
Seidemann’s thinking on the part played by racism has also shifted. Israeli cabinet ministers now openly talk of ethnic cleansing and use racist terms in a way they were sensitive to two decades ago.
“Racism is becoming more of a factor in this conflict because so much of occupation is associated with our equivalent of a Trumpian right. We have our own version of white supremacy. I don’t think that informs everything but it’s certainly part of it. All of these things add up to, ‘How can you avoid the analogy?’” said Seidemann.
Yossi Sarid is another among a number of former Israeli cabinet ministers who have drawn the apartheid parallel. “What acts like apartheid, is run like apartheid and harasses like apartheid, is not a duck – it is apartheid,” the former education minister said in 2008. “It is entirely clear why the word apartheid terrifies us so. What should frighten us, however, is not the description of reality, but reality itself.” Still, it is the use of the word that continues to terrify Israeli officials, and for good reason.
Israel’s foreign minister, Yair Lapid, in assessing the diplomatic challenges he faces in 2022, warned of the “real threat” that international organizations, including the UN, will formally accuse it of practicing apartheid “with potential for significant damage. We think that in the coming year, there will be debate that is unprecedented in its venom and in its radioactivity around the words ‘Israel is an apartheid state,” he told a press briefing. “There is a real danger that a UN body will say Israel is an apartheid regime.”
Israel is facing twin investigations by the UN Human Rights Council and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Lapid said he expects one of them to call Israel an apartheid state when they issue reports later this year. The Palestinians have also asked the International Court of Justice in The Hague to rule that Israel practices apartheid and that its policies are racist. Lapid warned that the accusations of apartheid, and the diplomatic pressure they bring, are only likely to strengthen in the absence of meaningful negotiations to bring about a Palestinian state.
But Israel’s concern goes beyond the diplomatic and political. Human Rights Watch astutely avoided making direct comparisons with South Africa and instead framed its report around two international legal definitions of the crime of apartheid. The 1973 apartheid convention defines apartheid as a crime against humanity when it involves “inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them”
The 1998 Rome statute of the International Criminal Court defines apartheid as inhumane acts “committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime.” HRW has noted that its report does not call Israel an “apartheid state” because it does not have a meaning under international law any more than the term “genocide state”. Instead the group said individuals are responsible for committing the crime of apartheid as part of state policy.
Last year (2021), the then ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, announced she would proceed with an investigation of alleged war crimes in the Palestinian territories since 2014. The opening of a full investigation followed five years of preliminary examination by the prosecutor’s office after which Bensouda said she was satisfied that “there was a reasonable basis to believe that war crimes have been or are being committed in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip”.
The prosecutor’s office said it believed the Israeli military committed war crimes in its 2014 assault on Gaza through “disproportionate attacks” and “willful killing”. The office said it also found evidence to justify investigating Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups for war crimes including “intentionally directing attacks against civilians”, using human shields, and killings and torture.
A second part to the investigation is, perhaps, far more threatening. The ICC prosecutor’s office said there is evidence that the decades-long settlement enterprise is a war crime in breach of the ban on transferring civilian populations from the occupying power into the occupied territories. Both the Geneva Conventions and the ICC’s own statute ban the practice because, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Germany used it during the Second World War to “colonize” territories it occupied.
Accusations of crimes committed in the heat of battle can perhaps be explained away as the result of urgent decision making, bad intelligence and military necessity. But the move of nearly 400,000 Israeli citizens into more than 120 Jewish settlements in the West Bank– leaving aside occupied East Jerusalem– is a long-term project of successive governments that has involved extensive planning and thousands of officials. In addition, about 300,000 Israelis live in a dozen settlements inside East Jerusalem. The settlement project required land seizures, expropriation of resources such as water, and the forced removal of Palestinians from their homes, installing 700,000 settlers on occupied territory.
Although the ICC investigation will focus only on Israeli actions since 2014, the continued expansion and administration of the settlements involves an array of government departments as well as the military. Politicians setting policy, officials implementing it and members of the army imposing military law on the Palestinians in support of the settlers potentially face indictment. That could expose them to arrest and trial at The Hague if they travel to Europe or other parts of the world that are signatories to the ICC statute.
Israel would also face the challenge of having its entire settlement enterprise declared a war crime which would strengthen the hand of those arguing for international sanctions.
The ICC investigation alarms Israel’s leaders because the US cannot simply wield a veto as it does at the UN Security Council. Still, the probe hangs in the balance following the appointment of a new prosecutor, the British lawyer Karim Khan. He has not commented on whether he will proceed with it but Israel has taken heart from Khan’s decision to “deprioritize” a probe into the actions of US forces in Afghanistan.
The Israeli government has also sought to hinder investigation and exposure of its policies by going after human rights groups. In 2019 it expelled Omar Shakir, who had been based in Jerusalem for HRW, claiming he supported BDS. In October 2021, Israel designated six Palestinian civil society groups as terrorist organizations and banned them in a move widely interpreted as an attempt to suppress criticism and cut off foreign financial support. They included Al-Haq, one of the most respected Palestinian human rights groups. Israel has repeatedly failed to provide much promised evidence to back up its claim that the organizations were linked to terrorism.
For all of the pressure on Israel, and the shifting attitudes in the US, support for the Jewish state in Washington remains solid if not unchallenged. After the ICC launched its probe, a group of US Senators signed a letter urging the White House to try and block “politically motivated investigations” of Israel. The Senators described the occupied territories as “disputed”, said the ICC had no jurisdiction and claimed that the court’s involvement “would further hinder the path to peace”. Two-thirds of US Senators signed the letter including Kamala Harris, now the US Vice President.
That consensus has held on issues such as moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem under President Donald Trump, and maintaining Israel as the largest recipient of American aid and with no strings attached.
HRW’s Sarah Whitson said fractures are appearing in the Washington consensus but there is little sign they will bring about a dramatic shift in policy any time soon. “While the public narrative has shifted, while it’s clear from multiple surveys that increasing numbers of Americans see Israel as an apartheid state and don’t want the United States to provide military support, and they see Israel as the primary belligerent actor, there is such a massive disconnect between the shift in the public, even the shift in the [foreign policy] ‘blob’, and US government policies,” she said. “What’s been the most difficult, therapy-inducing, thing for some of those people who committed their lives to the Oslo process and a two-state solution is to come to terms with the reality that that’s completely failed. And not only has it failed, but that the apartheid has become more entrenched. But you have a long standing feature where those policymakers closest to the situation in many cases know how screwed up it is but will not shift their policies and positions.”
Still, there was real damage done by Netanyahu who played a part in fracturing the bipartisan consensus on Israel by breaking the longstanding Israeli dictum of always keeping the White House onside. He did not hide his hostility to Obama, treating him with a public contempt that would have been unthinkable by an Israeli leader toward an American president in years past. Netanyahu publicly aligned with the Republican leadership in Congress in opposition to the US and European deal with Iran to halt its nuclear weapons research, and after Obama pressured the Israeli leader to take Palestinian aspirations seriously. Then the Israeli leader openly sided with Trump.
Netanyahu’s embrace of Trump’s peace plan in January 2020, cooked up without Palestinian input, provided further evidence of the Israeli leader’s thirst for land over a negotiated agreement with the Palestinians. The plan was widely denounced, including by some leading Democrats, as a smokescreen for annexation by Israel of significant parts of the West Bank which would create a series of Palestinian enclaves reminiscent of the patchwork of bantustans across South Africa. Netanyahu praised it as “the deal of the century” and announced plans to immediately annex the Jordan Valley and Jewish settlements, although he was quickly forced to backtrack by an embarrassed White House.
The fracturing of the bipartisan consensus eased the way for three Democratic members of Congress – Rashida Tlaib, Ilhan Omar and Alexandria Ocasio Cortez – to accuse Israel of being an apartheid state and to back the boycott movement. Senior Democrats were unhappy with the congresswomen but also felt obliged to speak up on behalf of Tlaib, who is of Palestinian descent, and Omar after they were barred from visiting Israel in 2019 after Trump appealed for them to be kept out.
Tlaib used the incident to tie Israeli policies to Trump. “Racism and the politics of hate is thriving in Israel and the American people should fear what this will mean for the relationship between our two nations. If you truly believe in democracy, then the close alignment of Netanyahu with Trump’s hate agenda must prompt a re-evaluation of our unwavering support for the State of Israel,” Tlaib said in 2021.
For all the animosity, Obama agreed to a deal that increased US aid to Israel to $38 billion over 10 years. Nonetheless, a debate has emerged in Washington about the scale of US aid to Israel with attempts by some members of Congress to set conditions, including that the money cannot be used to further Israel’s annexation of Palestinian territory or fund the destruction of Palestinian homes.
The scale of the challenge in shifting policy was demonstrated by the pro-Israel lobby’s mobilization of more than 300 Representatives and Senators to sign a letter backing the continuation of financial support for Israel without conditions. A solid majority of Democrats in Congress also backed a resolution condemning the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions movement.
Still, the Israelis remain worried about the direction of the debate, including increased framing of the occupation as apartheid. The director general of its foreign ministry, Alon Ushpiz, earlier this year said that protecting bipartisan support for Israel in the US is a primary goal for 2022.
Seidemann, who travelled to Washington to gauge US policy on Israel in late 2021, said that’s a reflection of Bennett’s concern about whether the Jewish state will be able to count on America having its back. “It’s because of great concern at losing the younger generation, losing the Democratic Party,” he said. “The sands are shifting in the United States, in the Congress, in public opinion, and in the American Jewish community, and the apartheid discourse is part of it. There is a center but that center is not going to hold.”
In his Link issue of September-October 2017, Thomas Suarez begins his article “The Cult of the Zionists” with these words: “In the late 1800s, after centuries in which bigots strove to keep Jews as a race apart, a new movement sought to institutionalize this tribalism by corralling all Jews into a single vast ghetto on other peoples’ land.”
More recently, in his January-March 2021 Link “The Decolonization of Palestine,” Jeff Halper cites a position paper issued by Jewish Voice for Peace, now one of the largest Jewish organizations in the United States; it reads: “We unequivocally oppose Zionism because it… is a settler-colonial movement, establishing an apartheid state where Jews have more rights than others.”
Many of our Link issues —and all 54 volumes are on our website www.ameu.com — are based on books, as were Suarez’s and Halper’s. But others, such as Audeh Rantisi’s, are first-hand accounts that can only be found in AMEU’s Link Archive. I have singled out a few of these bound witnesses that unmask the cruel face of Zionism.
“The Lydda Death March” by Audeh Rantisi and Charles Amash
Volume 33, Issue 3, July August 2000
He was 11 when they came. It was mid-July, and hot. Three soldiers banged on the door and, in English, ordered them out. His family was Christian, and with hundreds of other Christians living in town, they headed to St. George’s Church.
They never made it. At a turn in the road just before the church, the soldiers ordered the confused villagers, now including Muslims, down a road that ended at a narrow gate that led to the mountains.
About a mile outside the gate they came to a vegetable farm, its entrance framed by a large gate, atop of which sat soldiers with machine guns firing over their heads, prodding them on through the gate. Audeh Rantisi did not know it at the time, but Lydda’s death march had begun.
What happened next was recorded by him in our July-August 2000 issue of The Link.
Inside the gate, soldiers ordered everyone to throw their valuables onto a blanket they had placed on the ground, including money, jewelry, wristwatches, pens, even wedding rings. When Amin Hanhan, married for only six weeks refused, one of the soldiers lifted his rifle and shot him. “Go to Abdullah,” the soldiers shouted, meaning the Palestinian territory under Jordanian control, a march of some 25 to 30 miles over rough terrain.
In the early hours of day two, soldiers on horseback came riding at them screaming for the 4,000 mostly women and children to get moving.
By day three, many had staggered and fallen by the wayside, either dead or dying in the scorching heat. Scores of pregnant women miscarried, their babies left for jackals to eat. Audeh can still see one infant beside the road sucking the breast of its dead mother. The survivors trudged on in the shadeless heat tormented by thirst to the point that some drank their own urine.
By day four, Audeh’s family arrived in Ramallah with only the clothes on their back. Their life as refugees had begun.
Included in this issue is the eye-witness account of the death march by Charles Amash, then 16, who confirms much of Rantisi’s account.
“The Jews of Iraq” by Naeim Giladi
Volume 31, Issue 2, April-May, 1998
The expulsion of families from Lydda was repeated in over 950 Palestinian towns and villages, resulting in some 800,000 refugees. This also left thousands of acres of cultivated land unattended. Zionist leaders were faced with two problems: one, to make certain the Palestinians did not return to their ancestral land and, two, to get Jewish laborers to take over the cultivation. Naeim Giladi knew the answer to both problems, being himself part of the answer.
A New York City rabbi first told me of Naeim who, by 1997, was living with his family in Whitestone, New York. I phoned him to arrange an interview and he graciously invited me, along with Link staff volunteers Jane Adas and Bob Norberg, to visit him at his home.
When we arrived we were anxious to do the interview, but Naeim insisted we have a lunch specially prepared by his wife. “It is our Arab custom,” he said, laying his out-stretched hand over his heart, “My wife and I speak Arabic at home.” When we did do the interview — following dessert and Arabic coffee — we thanked him for his family’s hospitality and for sharing his extraordinary life story: his membership in the Zionist underground in Iraq; his imprisonment and escape from the military camp of Abu-Ghraib; his experience as an “Oriental” Jew in the new state of Israel and his life in America.
As for discouraging Palestinian farmers from returning to their farms, Naeim would learn upon arrival in Israel of the state’s use of bacteriological warfare: In 1948, after Zionist forces emptied Palestinian villages of their populations, they poisoned the water wells to ensure their owners could not return . Naeim cites Uri Mileshtin, an official historian for the Israeli Defense Forces, who reported that Moshe Dayan, a division commander at the time, gave orders in 1948 to remove Arabs from their villages, bulldoze their homes, and render their water unusable by emptying cans of typhus and dysentery bacteria into the wells.
And as for finding Jewish workers to till the stolen soil, Zionists looked to Jews from Arab countries. The problem was how to convince them to leave their homeland; the answer: Terrorize them.
Some 125,000 Jews left Iraq for Israel in the late 1940s into 1952, most because they had been put into a panic by what Naeim later would learn were Zionist bombings of Jewish businesses and synagogues, followed by leaflets urging the frightened Jews to leave for Israel. Naeim, then a teenager, bought the lie and moved.
Once in Israel he was sent to al-Majdal (later renamed Ashkelon), a Palestinian town some 9 miles from Gaza. Here he was charged with forcing the indigenous inhabitants out of Israel into Gaza, then under Egyptian control, thus making it possible for Israel to establish its farmers’ city, now worked by “Oriental” Jews. It was an order he refused to obey.
Naeim married, had children, and continued to challenge the state’s ethnic policies. Then, when his son reached the age when he had to enlist in the Israeli army, Naeim took his family to America. He could have opted for dual U.S.-Israeli citizenship. He said no, he no longer wanted Israeli citizenship.
When we met with him in Whitestone, he was working as a night watchman and, unable to find a publisher willing to print his eye-witness account of Zionist atrocities. He eventually self published his book under the title Ben-Gurion’s Scandals. See Wikipedia, which also notes his Link article. Naeim died in 2010.
“The End of Poetry” by Ron Kelley
Volume 31, Issue 4, September-October, 1998
Early in 1998, I received a phone call from a cable TV producer in Manhattan. He asked if I’d like to see a documentary on the Bedouin of Israel. It’s rather extraordinary, he said.
The day after viewing Ron Kelley’s documentary, I phoned him at his home in Michigan and invited him to tell his story to our Link readers. He agreed in the hope that “the article can draw a little attention to the problem at hand.”
The problem at hand, it turned out, was the ravaging of a people and their way of life.
Kelley, then 47, a professional photographer with a degree in anthropology, first encountered the Bedouin in 1992 as a Fulbright scholar at Ben Gurion University in Be’er Sheva, Israel. What he saw there — the uprooting of a desert people — convinced him to bring a Hi-8 video camera into Israel and to embark on a clandestine project beyond his Fulbright one. When he returned to the States he had 120 hours of surreptitiously recorded videotape on which he spent $20,000 and countless hours turning it into a documentary on the Bedouin to show to U.S. networks. But nobody cared: not PBS, not ABC, not an “Arab-Jewish peace” foundation, and surprisingly, not many Arab and Muslim Americans whom he contacted.
What does the documentary reveal? It notes that, In 1948, the new Zionist state of Israel made the audacious claim that ALL the Negev desert was Jewish owned. The problem then for Israel was what to do with the Bedouin who called the Negev home? The short-term solution, it turned out, was to move as many as possible en masse to a reservation area in the northeastern Negev, where they were isolated under military rule until 1966, unable to leave the area without special passes. Nor were they permitted to buy land in the reservation as only Jews could own the land. Some tried to regain their desert homes in court but, as Kelley notes, of the 3,000 lawsuits filed by the Bedouin over a period of two decades, not one Bedouin had ever won a land claim.
Israel’s long-term solution was centered on seven governmentally created “industrial” towns, places segregated by law for Arabs only. Yet, even here, the land — considered part of the “Jewish People’s” perpetual inheritance — cannot be owned outright by the Bedouin, who can only lease plots for specified periods of time.
While Kelley was filming, approximately half of the 90,000 Bedouin in the Negev had been corralled in the government sanctioned reservations. The other half lived in the desert, where they had to contend with the Green Patrol, an independent paramilitary police unit whose major function was to harass and persecute the indigenous Bedouin. This, as Kelley documents, includes the ravaging of their homes, destruction of their crops, killing of their livestock, and the beating of men, women, and children.
AMEU made an arrangement with Ron to distribute his 2-hour long video-cassette “The Bedouin of Israel,” at a cost of $30 each. Not sure how many we would sell, we decided to buy them in lots of 20. When — and if — we ran out of the first lot, Ron gave us the phone number of his mother, who would run off another lot. To the best of my recollection we sold well over 100 cassettes, including some to human rights organizations. Then, one day, when we phoned to reorder another 20 copies, the number was no longer in service. It was the last we ever heard from Ron or his mother. And, anticipating a resupply of VCRs, we had sold our last one, and were left without a single copy of the video documentary. Only his Link article survives.
“Epiphany at Beit Jala” by Donald Neff
Volume 28, Issue 5, December 1995
Donald Neff was a seasoned reporter when, in 1975, he went to Israel as Time magazine’s Jerusalem Bureau Chief. And, like most Americans, he came as an unwitting Zionist, who believed that the Jews deserved a secure state of their own, as the Nazi Holocaust had proved, and it followed that Israelis had a right to look out for their own safety.
It was a preconception that would be challenged in multiple ways: the way most Israeli Jews failed to see the degradation imposed upon Palestinians by Israeli rule; the charming young Israeli woman who had lost her home in Germany and now lived comfortably in a home that once belonged to a Palestinian family; the 1975 U. N. General Assembly resolution calling Zionism a form of racism and racial discrimination; the 1976 Koenig Report, co-authored by Israel Koenig, Northern District Commissioner of the Ministry of Interior, that outlined how Israel could rid itself of some of its Palestinian citizens; the 1977 publication by The London Sunday Times of a major expose about torture of Palestinian prisoners by Israeli security officials.
But Donald Neff’s final revelation — his epiphany — came in March 1978. These are his own words from his Link article:
It began with a telephone call from a freelance reporter, a courageous American…close to the Palestinian lawyer Ramonda Tawil. She reported she had heard reports that Israeli troops had conducted a cruel campaign throughout the West Bank against Palestinian youth. Many Palestinians had suffered broken bones, others had been beaten and some had had their heads shaved. Some of the victims were in Beit Jala hospital.
When I repeated the report to my staff, all of them Israelis, they reacted with horror and indignation. The whole group, a secretary, a teletype operator, two stringers, a photographer, and two other correspondents, cast doubt on the story. They all declared it was unthinkable because “that is what was done to us in the Holocaust.”
About this time one of my best friends, Freddie Weisgal, stopped by. He was the nephew of one of Zionism’s important theoreticians, Meyer Weisgal, and a former human rights fighter in the United State before moving to Israel after the 1967 war… He said something like, “Aw, come on, Don, you know Jews wouldn’t do anything like that.” He was agitated and indignant, which wasn’t all that unusual for him. But there was an underlying tension too…”All right,” I said to Freddie, “let’s go to Beit Jala and check it out.”
We drove in the chill gathering of darkness. We went into the small hospital and a young Palestinian doctor who spoke English soon appeared. Yes indeed, he said matter-of-factly, he had recently treated a number of students for broken bones. There were ten cases of broken arms and legs and many of the patients were still there, too seriously injured to leave. He took us to several rooms filled with boys in their mid-teens, an arm or leg, sometimes both, immobile under shining white plaster casts…They all said that for reasons unknown to them, Israeli troops had surrounded their two-story middle school while classes were underway. In several classrooms, on the second floor, the students were ordered to close all the windows. Then the troops exploded tear gas bombs and slammed shut the door, trapping the students with the noxious fumes. They panicked. In their rush to escape they fled from the rooms so fast that some of them went flying over the balcony to the asphalt and stony ground below.
About the third time we heard the same story, I noticed Freddie’s face. It was gray and stricken. He was shaking his head and wringing his gnarled hands. “Oh, man,” he said “this is too much. I’m getting out of here.” And he left, taking a bus back to Jerusalem. Afterwards, he never talked about Beit Jala.
My Israeli photographer, who had followed in his own car, was not looking much better. But he dutifully continued taking pictures of the injured boys…There could be no doubt about what had happened to them. Still, I wanted to see where the attack had occurred. The school was just up the hill. It was dark by now, but I had no trouble with a flashlight finding spent tear gas canisters with Hebrew lettering littering the ground…Now I was more determined to nail down the aspect of the story that had so upset my staff and astounded me: the cutting of hair. I had to admit to myself that I found it almost too bizarre to believe that Israelis would actually inflict on another people this most humiliating symbol of the Holocaust. On the other hand, my experience told me that Israeli hatred of Palestinians might make anything possible…
The next morning at Ramonda Tawil’s house I met several of the young men who had had their hair shorn. They had not been shaved but clumps of hair were missing from their heads as though roughly cut by a knife. They said they had been picked up by Israeli troops for no obvious reason and were ordered to do exercises and pick up litter and weeds, some of them through most of the night. They had heard that similar scenes had taken place all over the West Bank.
I returned to a sullen and nervous bureau where hanging in the air was the question of whether I was going to do a story. I announced I was.
Time gave the story prominent play and it evoked outrage by Israeli authorities and American Zionists…The atmosphere in Israel was even harsher…I was attacked to my face as an anti-Semite and shunned by some…Then a miraculous thing happened. Ezer Weizman, the father of Israel’s air force and an upright man, personally took the matter into his own hands. As defense minister, he appointed a commission to investigate the matter. It found the Beit Jala story true.
Shortly after that finding, Don left Israel amid worries about his personal well-being.
On return to the States he authored several highly acclaimed books on the Arab-Israeli confrontation.
Donald Neff died in 2015.
“On the Jericho Road” by James M. Wall
Volume 33, Issue 4, September-October, 2000
Jim Wall was but a few months into his tenure as editor of The Christian Century when, in 1973, he received an invitation from the American Jewish Committee (AJC) to take an all-expenses paid trip to Israel. At first he declined the offer, then accepted it on the condition he would pay his own expenses, while the AJC would arrange his travel, hotel accommodations, and itinerary.
In December 1973, he landed in Tel Aviv with, as he would later confess, absolutely no knowledge that the airport was built on the Palestinian town of Lydda, where the Death March occurred. What was impressed upon him throughout his AJC planned visit was the fear Israelis had of another Holocaust, this time by invading Arab armies, a Holocaust only they could prevent with a strong military force. Any fears the Palestinians might have about their future were unaddressed.
That, however, would change when the AJC arranged a meeting at the Holy Land Institute in Jerusalem. As Jim recalls it, he was surrounded by evangelical Christians who shared an intense loyalty to the Zionist state of Israel and who faulted him and The Christian Century for its hostility to Zionism prior to Israel’s becoming a state in 1948. At some point in the evening, an American Mennonite pastor, serving a three-year tour in Jerusalem, quietly approached Jim and asked if he could come by his hotel later that night “for a chat.” Jim agreed.
His name was LeRoy Friesen and when they met later that evening he told Jim he was hearing only one perspective. And he proposed that they travel together into the West Bank and up to the Golan Heights.
Jim agreed; and since he was paying his own way, the AJC host had no grounds to object.
What Jim experienced on his road to Jericho is best told in his own words:
LeRoy drove us in his VW coupe along the road to Jericho, the location for Jesus’s story about the Good Samaritan. Driving northward out of Jericho, we talked about the importance of the Jordan River valley in terms of both farming and security. We stopped along the highway to admire the fertile fields of Israeli crops that lay between us and the river.
We then left the highway and drove on a dirt road up a hill and stopped to talk with a Palestinian farmer, who was sitting in front of his house. I remember him as rather elderly, and I was struck by the resigned sadness in his manner. He pointed up the hill to his well, which reminded me of a Georgia sharecropper’s well, and we saw that it was connected to a pump that provided water to his modest-sized field.
Quite a distance farther up the hill was an Israeli well, surrounded by barbed wire and e
nclosed in a concrete casing. That well was much deeper, LeRoy explained, and pipes carried its water down the hill where we could see it spraying onto the Israeli fields in the Jordan Valley. I knew enough about aquifers to know that the deeper, more sophisticated Israeli well (its pipes buried beneath the soil) would soon render useless the farmer’ shallower well, with its open, above ground pipes.
What I saw that morning has shaped all of my subsequent understanding of the region. This was the strong dominating the weak: control, not sharing. Something was seriously wrong with this picture.
In that farmer’s sad, resigned face was my epiphany. The existential reality of injustice witnessed first-hand, as LeRoy knew, is a far more powerful teaching tool than injustice heard or read about.
Jim Wall would go on to make over 20 trips to the Holy Land, always insisting that half of the tour at least be with a Palestinian guide. He would serve as editor and publisher of The Christian Century until 1999, and later as a contributing editor from 2008 to 2017.
Jim honored AMEU by accepting membership on our Board of Directors and National Council, and by authoring two other Link articles, one in 2004 (“When Legend Becomes Fact”) and one in 2009 (“L’Affaire Freeman”).
It was while we were preparing this issue of The Link that we learned of his death this past March. Jim was an ordained Methodist minister, and he ended his “On the Jericho Road” article with these words: “The legacy of injustices between conquerors and conquered — catalogued at Camp David II as borders, refugees, settlements and Jerusalem — must sooner or later be morally and legally confronted, confessed and corrected.”
“People and the Land, Coming to a PBS Station Near You?” By Tom Hayes
Volume 30, Issue 5, November-December, 1997
Our Link articles run around 7,500 words over 16 pages. Only once have we extended it to 21,000 words over 24 pages. That was for Tom Hayes. An independent documentary film maker from Ohio, Tom had made two documentary films about Palestinians, “Native Sons” which he began filming in 1981, and “People and the Land” which he began in 1989. How he got the 27 crates containing nearly 20 miles of film footage shot in the Occupied Territories during the First Intifada past the Military Censor and the Passport Control Officer is a story in itself. Included in this footage was his focus on the number of children maimed by Israeli soldiers. From December 1987 through July 1993, 120,000 Palestinians were wounded, of whom 46,000 were under 16 years of age, leading to the speculation that the Army’s policy was not so much to kill as to maim the children as a way of pressuring their parents to leave their homeland.
But it’s the roadblocks he encountered here at home that are alarming. When a notice appeared in the Columbus Dispatch that he had made Native Sons, a documentary that focused on three Palestinian refugee families, he began receiving phone calls at all hours of the night, death threats against him and his then pregnant wife. He put wire mesh on the windows of his house to avoid a fire bombing. It didn’t help. Someone busted the window out. Next his phone line was cut. He talked to the police and told them about the documentary. They asked if he owned a gun. He began to feel like he was living in occupied territory.
When it later became known that Tom had received a grant from the George Gund Foundation for his Native Sons project, the Columbus Jewish Federation got a copy of the Gund proposal, which was not public record, and sent a barrage of correspondence to the Community Film Association (CFA), the group administering the Gund grant, trashing Tom and his film, and threatening to sue CFA board members for their personal assets.
CFA called Tom in to say that Dennis Aig, one of their board members, would be screening a rough cut of his film. Aig, who at the time was active with the Columbus Jewish Federation, ended his private screening in Tom’s cutting room yelling “You can’t say that!” A week later, CFA sent Tom a letter informing him that it found that he was engaging in propaganda and that he would forfeit a $20,000 grant he had received from the Ohio Arts Council (OAC). The CFA only agreed to honor its commitment after the OAC threatened to deny it funding in the future.
Tom also learned that the Ohio State University School of Fine Arts had booked a local theater for the premiere showing of Native Sons, only to be told later that the theater owner refused to show it. When the School of Fine Arts threatened to pull all its entries from his theater, the owner agreed to show Tom’s film.
Years later, when he was looking for funding for People and the Land, Tom got the nod from the Independent Television Service (ITVS), a service which Congress mandated be created through the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to help under-served minorities increase programming diversity on PBS. In July 1991, ITVS called Tom to say his film had been selected for funding, but first they had some questions. Above all, they wanted to know where he got every penny for shooting the film. 18 months later, ITVS agreed to give the grant, this time with the stipulation that no public information about the film would be released without Tom’s approval.
ITVS submitted People and the Land to PBS for national release in February 1997. Sometime after that Gayle Loeber, Director of Broadcast Marketing for ITVS, called to say that PBS had “declined the program.” Loeber said ITVS could still prepare press materials and arrange a satellite feed to all 283 PBS affiliate stations, what is called a soft feed. These stations, at the discretion of the individual program directors, can air any of the dozens of soft feeds they receive each week. The first press release draft omitted mention of the foreign aid issues that the film starts and ends with. ITVS said they would make Tom’s correction. What they did was delete his sentence: People and the Land carries this humanistic perspective into a look at U.S. involvement in the Israeli occupation comparing Israel aid figures with cuts in human service programs for American citizens — $5.5 billion dollars in aid to Israel, 5.7 billion in cuts to human service programs.”
Tom called ITVS. A staff member told him Jim Yee was the new Executive Director and that he had ordered the copy cut.
In May 1997, ITVS called to say some of the PBS stations wanted more information about the program and why they should air it. Tom agreed to answer them. What Tom was not told was that ITVS had requested Mark Rosenblum, founder of Americans for Peace Now, to review the film. Rosenblum concluded that the film was “approximately 20% accurate”, that “97% of Palestinians are ruled by Palestinian authorities”, and that “Jews had attained a majority status in Palestine by 1870.” His review was sent to every programming director in the PBS system.
The Link contacted Mr. Rosenblum to confirm his comments. He denied ever writing a “review” or having put any comments in writing for ITVS, although he did say he had expressed certain opinions orally to someone at ITVS. Told that ITVS had quoted him as saying the documentary People and the Land was “20 percent accurate”, he denied ever giving a percentage of accuracy. Likewise, he denied saying 97% of Palestinians are ruled by Palestinian authorities or that Jews had reached a majority status in Palestine by 1870.
The Link reached Suzanne Stenson, formerly of the ITVS staff, who said she had transcribed Mr. Rosenblum’s comments on a laptop computer during an hour-long phone call and that, prior to its dissemination to the PBS stations, the text quoting Mr. Rosenbaum was emailed to him for review at his personal and business addresses. No response to these emails was ever received, she said.
Still, thanks to grassroots organizing, People and the Land was shown on at least 23 PBS stations, and over 160 DVD cassettes of the documentary have been distributed by AMEU, a record number for us.
In 2014, Tom and his crew returned to Palestine to document The Wall, the checkpoints, the humiliations, the killings. Why, you might ask him, go back for yet more aggravation? “When you know the truth, the truth makes you a soldier” Tom might reply, a favorite quote of his from Mahatma Gandhi. [Tom’s third trip to Palestine is recorded in our Nov.-Dec. 2015 Link “Between Two Blue Lines.” Ed.]
“Save the Musht and the Land of Palestine,” by Rosina Hassoun
Vol. 26, No. 4: Oct.-Nov. 1993
Rosina Hassoun delivered the first of four papers on “The State of Palestine,” a panel sponsored by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee at its 1993 National Convention in Alexandria, Virginia. The other three presenters talked politics, everything from Israeli annexation of the Territories to Palestinian sovereignty over them. When the time came for questions, the 500-plus audience directed all its questions to the political analysts.
Then something unexpected happened. The session ended and the three analysts made their way out of the room. But not Rosina. She was surrounded by reporters and interviewers, as well as audience members fascinated by what she had to say. A half-hour later I managed to speak with her about writing a feature article for The Link.
Rosina speaks of paradigms, that is, of the images a people have of themselves and their land. Zionists, for example, see Palestine as a wasteland and a desert. For the World Zionist Organization, Palestine was “a land without a people for a people without a land.” Its aim was “to make the desert bloom.”
For the Zionist colonizers this dual image of wasteland and desert satisfied their three ideological imperatives: Ownership: Those who create something out of nothing get to keep it; Absorption: A wasteland offers a borderless capacity for colonization; and Exploitation: Jews, especially those from Europe, America and South Africa brought with them western attitudes towards resource usage, namely that resources are there for the taking. European and American Jews also brought western images of manicured lawns and swimming pools as part of their idealized lifestyles.
For Palestinians, their images of the land are traditionally those of: Motherhood: This paradigm of land as mother, found especially in their poetry, stems from the belief of Palestinians that they are descended from the multitudes of people who previously inhabited Palestine in an unbroken line dating back to the Canaanites and before; Fertility: This paradigm of fertile crescent or bread basket derives from the Palestinian system of food production founded on agricultural practices of planting citrus, olives, grains and vegetables with rock-terracing, practices that reflect ancient Nabatean and other early practices); Village: Palestinians developed relationships between the villages and cities for the flow of goods and services. This system led to the development of local dialects, costumes and village cultural distinctions.
Rosina spends the rest of her Link article showing how these paradigms apply to the different ways Palestinians and Israelis treat natural resources such as water, trees, and land. It is a fascinating exercise, and I encourage readers to go to our website and read pages 5-12 of her article. Her analysis is more relevant today than when she first presented it to that ADC audience back in 1993.
Which brings us to the Musht in the title of her article. It is a fish that swims in the Sea of Galilee, also called Christ’s fish or Saint Peter’s fish, and widely associated with the miracle of the loaves and fishes. It’s also a dying fish. Rosina concludes her article with these words:
In the end, saving the Musht may not be anyone’s priority. But sometimes, a small seemingly insignificant species acts as an indicator of the state of the environment. If it ceases to exist, a chain reaction ripples through the land.
The Musht may be sending us a warning that ecological collapse could come rapidly or sneak up slowly while everyone else is looking at other issues. While this generation of Arabs and Israelis fight over and negotiate the land, the environmental consequences of their actions may be destroying the very thing they both covet.
Update: Fishing stocks have continued to diminish in the Sea of Galilee due to overfishing and to a virus that infected the Musht. This led to a ban in April 2010 of commercial and recreational fishing in nesting and spawning grounds of the Musht.
Meanwhile Rosina, a doctoral student when she first sounded the alarm, has gone on to receive her PhD in Anthropology from Florida University, and is currently an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Saginaw Valley State University.
“When War Criminals Walk Free,” by Mads Gilbert, M.D.
Volume 45, Issue 5, December, 2012
Mads Gilbert heads the Clinic of Emergency Medicine at University Hospital of North Norway. In 2009, he was one of two foreign doctors in al-Shifa Hospital during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead assault on Gaza. “We waded in death, blood and amputated limbs,” he wrote in his Link article, noting that, far too often, the victims were children. Two of these children he wants us to get to know: Jumana and Amal.
We meet Jumana, a nine-month-old girl, lying on her back, almost unarousable following anesthesia, most of her left hand is amputated.
A nurse tells Dr. Gilbert the tiny girl was a member of the Samuni family from the impoverished quarters of al-Zaitoun in the southern outskirts of Gaza City. Another nurse adds that Israeli ground forces had herded about a hundred members of the extended family, including women, children and elderly into a warehouse, where they stayed overnight without food or drink. The next morning, Israeli forces bombed the building.
Gilbert doubted it. But it was true. An investigation into the massacre would confirm that soldiers from the Israeli armed forces had systematically planned and executed the killing of 21 members of the Samuni family. Jumana was one of the youngest survivors.
For three days following the shelling, the casualties were trapped in the destroyed warehouse along with the dead bodies. Only then did the Israelis allow rescue services to enter the building. One of those casualties was Amal Samuni, a 9-year-old Palestinian schoolgirl and Jumana’s cousin. Like Jumana, she had been forced into the warehouse with her father, mother and siblings. At one point, when her father and smallest brother opened the door to face the Israeli soldiers to tell them, in Hebrew, that the building was filled only with civilians, women and children, both were shot dead at close range.
It was during the early morning shelling that Amal was hit by something on her head. When the solders allowed her to go, she was rushed to al-Shifa Hospital where Dr. Gilbert cared for her. Her lips were cracked and dried, and her body severely dehydrated, and she looked more like an old lady than a young schoolgirl. But she survived.
After the wounded were evacuated, the army demolished the building with the dead bodies inside. It was only possible to remove them from under the debris after the army withdrew, some two weeks later.
But, before they withdrew, the soldiers scrawled their mission with graffiti on the walls of the Samuni family home, some in Hebrew, many in crude English: “Arabs need 2 die”, “Die you all”, “Make war not peace”, “1 is down, 999,999 to go”, “The Only Good Arab is a Dead Arab.”
The warehouse massacre cost the lives of at least 26 members of the Samuni family, including 10 children and seven women. The Israeli Army later concluded in its “investigation” that the killing of civilians “who did not take part in the fighting” was not done knowingly and directly, or out of haste and negligence “in a manner that would indicate criminal responsibility.”
Three years after the massacre — it was New Year’s 2012 — Dr. Gilbert returned to Gaza to see how his patients were doing, especially Jumana and Amal. Jumana, then going on four, was managing well with her two-fingered left hand. And Amal, 12, was doing well in school, although she has terrible headaches. Dr. Gilbert tells their family he is going on another speaking tour to U.S. and Canadian universities, and he asks what they would like him to say. One of the adults replied: “Tell them this: Your tax money is killing our people!”
Update: In October 2014, on his annual medical visit to Gaza, Dr. Gilbert was stopped at the Israeli Erez checkpoint and banned indefinitely from entering Gaza. The reason: He posed a “security risk.”
Zionism: What Is It?
The Lydda Death March, the bombing of Iraqi synagogues, the poisoning of Palestinian wells, the corralling of Bedouin Arabs, the gassing of Beit Jala school children, the bias against Palestinian farmers, the ecological scarring of a fertile land, the massacre in Gaza, the bias, here in the U.S. against telling the Palestinian side of the story — this is the legacy of Zionism.
Google defines Zionism as a movement originally for the re-establishment and now for the development and protection of a Jewish nation in what is now Israel.
Norman Finkelstein received his doctoral degree from Princeton University for his dissertation “The Theory of Zionism.” In his Link article for December 1992 he distinguishes two basic types of nationalism: liberal nationalism with roots in the French Revolution and ethnic nationalism with roots in German Romanticism.
Liberal nationalism has as its main pillar the citizen: the state is constituted by its citizens and between citizens is complete legal equality. Romantic nationalism’s main pillar is the ethnic nation: each state belongs to a particular ethnic nation, and the latter occupies a privileged position in the state.
Historians, according to Finkelstein, generally agree on the Germanic origins of Zionism. He cites the Israeli historian Anita Shapiro who writes “It was the Romantic-exclusivist brand of nationalism that contained certain ideas able to function as a basis for an elaborated notion of a Jewish nation and national movement.”
It was also the Germanic notions of nationalism that culminated in Nazism. Revealingly, the only Jews for whom Hitler reserved any praise in “Mein Kampf” were the Zionists, whose affirmation of the national character of the Jew conceded the central Nazi tenet that, not withstanding his citizenship, the Jew is no German.
The Romantic essence of the Israeli state, according to Finkelstein, was reaffirmed in 1989 by a High Court decision that any political party which advocated complete equality between Jew and Arab can be barred from fielding candidates in an election. And, more recently, in 2018, the Israeli Knesset approved the ‘nation-state’ bill that promotes Jewish-only settlements, downgrades Arab language status and limits the right to self-determination to Jews only.
Criticism of Zionism: Is It Anti-Semitic?
This is the question posed by Allan Brownfeld in our December 2017 Link. He notes that, for many years now, there has been a concerted effort to redefine “anti-Semitism” from its traditional meaning of hatred of Jews and Judaism, to criticism of Israel and opposition to Zionism. Brownfeld, the editor of ISSUES, the quarterly journal of the American Council for Judaism, devotes much of his Link article to reviewing the long history of Jewish criticism of Zionism. It includes:
In 1919, in response to Britain’s Balfour Declaration calling for a “Jewish homeland” in Palestine, a petition was presented to President Wilson entitled “A Statement to the Peace Conference.” It rejected Jewish nationalism and held against the founding of any state upon the basis of religion and/or race. Among its prominent Jewish signers were Jesse L. Straus, co-owner of Macy’s ,and Adolph Ochs, publisher of The New York Times.
In 1938, alluding to Nazism, Albert Einstein warned an audience of Zionist activists against the temptation to create a state imbued with “a narrow nationalism within our own ranks.”
In May 1948, in the midst of the hostilities that broke out after Israel unilaterally declared independence, Martin Buber despaired, “This sort of Zionism blasphemes the name of Zion; it is nothing more than one of the crude forms of nationalism.”
In his 1973 book “Israel: A Colonial-Settler State,” the French Jewish historian Maxime Rodinson wrote: “Wanting to create a purely Jewish or predominately Jewish state in Arab Palestine in the 20th century could not help but lead to a colonial-type situation and the development of a racist state of mind, and in the final analysis to a military confrontation.”
Brownfeld concludes that there is no historic basis for claiming that anti-Zionism is a form of anti-Semitism, and that the only purpose in making such a charge is to silence criticism of Israel and its policies.
To be sure, anti-Semitism exists and should be confronted whenever it raises its ugly head; but legitimate criticism of a colonial-settler movement is not anti-Semitism.
What Is Christian Zionism?
Christian Zionism is the belief of some Christians that the return of Jesus to the Promised Land is a sign of Christ’s immanent Second Coming, when true Christians will be raptured in the air, while the rest of mankind is slaughtered; 144,000 Jews will bow down before Christ and be saved, but the rest of Jewry will perish. Politically, they represent a significant bloc, with a potential 40 million followers in the U.S. and 70 million worldwide. Two Link issues offer insight into these believers:
“Christian Zionism” (November 1983) by O. Kelly Ingram, professor at the Divinity School of Duke University. This issue traces the roots of Christian Zionism back to 17th century England, and shows the influence it had on the signers of the Balfour Declaration.
“Beyond Armageddon” (October-November 1992) by Donald Wagner, then Director of Middle East Programs for Mercy Corps International. Wagner documents the growing influence of Christian Zionism among U.S. televangelists.
What Did The U.N. General Assembly Say About Zionism?
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3379 determined that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination. The resolution was based on four statements delivered to the General Assembly by Dr. Fayez Sayegh, a Palestinian intellectual employed by Kuwait. His 52-page documentation is available and downloadable on our website under AMEU Publications.
While working with Dr. Sayegh on editing his manuscript, I asked him what, apart from not being allowed to return to his homeland, was the hardest part of his exile. He thought for a moment, then replied: “The fact that my children don’t speak Arabic.”
In 1991, when Israel made revocation of Resolution 3379 a precondition of its entering the Madrid Peace Conference, the U.N., under fierce pressure from the U.S., complied.
To Conclude:
Many are responsible for AMEU’s Archive.
I think of the Rev. Humphrey Walz, a Presbyterian minister, who edited The Link for its first two years. After WWII Humphrey worked in New York for the resettlement of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust then, following 1948, he aided in the resettlement of Palestinian refugees.
I think of Grace Halsell, an acclaimed journalist, whose Journey to Jerusalem was one of the first books by a mainstream American journalist to report on what the Palestinians call their Catastrophe. Grace would go on to write four feature articles for The Link, and serve on AMEU’s Board of Directors for 18 years, until her death in 2000.
I think of Bob Norberg, the president of AMEU from 2005 to 2015. During that time he created AMEU’s website, and its digital archive going back to 1968. And today, each new issue of The Link is posted online by his son Jeffrey Norberg.
I think of Jane Adas, AMEU’s current president. In 1991, I received a postcard, signed “Jane Adas,” with the one sentence: “If you can use volunteer help, I’d be happy to come in a day each week.” Jane, it turned out, was Prof. Jane Adas of Rutgers University, one of the most knowledgeable people I know on the Palestine question. Five times she has put her body where her words are by spending three to nine week stints in Hebron with the Christian Peacemaker Teams, where she stood between Palestinians who live there and Jewish settlers who harass them in an attempt to steal more of their land. In 2001, she wrote a Link issue on her Hebron experience, “Inside H-2.” In 2009, Jane was one of the first Americans to get inside Gaza to see the devastation wrought by Israel’s Operation Cast Lead; see her 2009 Link article “Spinning Cast Lead.” Today, in addition to being AMEU’s third president, she is the proofreader par excellence of every Link issue. Never has a postcard heralded such a treasure.
When I was in high school, I read a book on the Holocaust. What I mostly recall is a comment by a woman survivor of Auschwitz who said that what pained her most deeply was the thought that nobody outside the camp would ever know the hell they were going through — much less care.
My hope is that Palestinians will see our Archive as a witness to their Catastrophe: that their suffering is known — and that we do care. ■
Welcome Nicholas Griffin
It is with the greatest pleasure that A.M.E.U. welcomes Nicholas Griffin as its next Executive Director.
Nicholas is an independent consultant who has worked with the U.N. Department of Public Information, the American University in Cairo, Youth Recreational Facilities in the West Bank, as well as projects in Algeria, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, and Niger.
He is a long-time supporter of A.M.E.U. and well acquainted with our institutional goals. Along with publishing and editorial experience, he brings a firm grasp of the digital age, its opportunities and challenges.
When I became executive director, some 43 years ago, someone told me: “Remember, in your job, as in life, money isn’t everything. But,“ he was quick to add, “it is way ahead of whatever comes third.” I told Nick we had a loyal band of donors that he could count on as he leads AMEU into a future of better Middle East Understanding.
Bearing in mind that Israel and the Palestine conflict are some of the most researched and discussed topics one may think of, it is quite striking to note the great lacuna of knowledge and understanding about the Israeli settler-colonial state and its cruel realities.
While people found the apartheid regime in South Africa easy to comprehend and oppose, old clichés and propaganda still control most of the public’s imagination about Israel, namely, that it is: a small state which successfully fought against larger Arab armies to gain its independence; a socialist society (the Kibbutz); a democracy where Arab citizens enjoy full rights; a state searching constantly for peace with its hostile neighbors; a secular, modern polity; a state of all Jews.
Starting from these misguided concepts promulgated by Israeli propaganda gets you nowhere.
Indeed, such muddling has only intensified through the use of the Working Definition on Anti-Semitism put out by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance as a political and ideological way for silencing the debate on Palestinian rights and Israeli wrongs by painting critics of Israel as dangerous anti-semites, especially if they happen to be Jewish or socialist, or both. The success of this deterring mechanism has raised the stakes with most politicians, public figures or intellectuals now terrified of criticizing Israel in any form or manner.
There is a clear need to assist decoding the Israeli enigma for Western readers, intoxicated and confused by a mixture of propagandistic mythologies, images of brutal attacks on Gaza and Lebanon, and media reports about the post-modern, (supposedly) post-Zionist, progressive Israel.
How does one speak about an advanced settler-colonial, apartheid society with its ultra-modern army, its system of exporting death, destruction and surveillance worldwide, its dependence on Jewish Halacha – a variant of a Sharia system, the extensive radicalization of the social structure, and a successful propaganda system, one of the most advanced in the new millennium, not to mention its use of hi-tech hardware and software for controlling millions of Palestinians lacking human or political rights for over five decades, and its seven decades of Emergency Regulations which have never lapsed?
How does one speak of Israel’s ability to use exceptionalism as if it were a mighty world power, when it is the most financially and militarily-supported nation by the US taxpayer?
Or how does one speak of Israel’s abuse of the Holocaust and of the history of anti-semitism in order to make itself immune from international law?
Israel has turned the people of the book into the people of the tank, gun, missile and drone. It has used biblical myths to construct an oppressive, ultra-modern military society. It has a history of endless wars and armed conflicts—more than any other modern nation. It has gained the support of both western liberal democracies and the most oppressive dictatorships and neo-fascist regimes of the new millennium.
What socio-political, conceptual lens would be the right one to focus the debate on this extraordinary polity: a twenty-first-century, ultra-modern Sparta operating a nineteenth-century model of racialized, militarized apartheid combined with dependence on pre-historical mythological foundations?
And the main question, mystifying many: How does Israel get away with it all?
The Israel Defense Forces
The first rule when analyzing such a complex phenomenon is not to limit oneself to describing symptoms, but to concentrate on its foundational tenets, causes, and the socio-political machinery for implementing these. I have chosen the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), because it is the most definitive, unique, and characteristic socio-political construction of Zionism. The IDF is the prime institution Zionism has perfected, the main machinery shaping and defining the Israeli society and state. To understand Israel, one has to understand the IDF – an army unlike the American, British, French, Russian, Chinese or any other national military force. As Israel is unlike most other states, the way to understanding the difference is not through the parallels with other modern states, but through its main characterizing dissimilarities, its typifying distance from most other nations.
There is a multitude of possible vantage points about Israel, each with its own inbuilt biases and pitfalls, its specific optical illusions. Many on the European left have traditionally seen Israel as a socialist society, where a strong Trades Union Federation, the Histradruth, was crucial in shaping society, as was the Kibbutz movement. It only takes realizing the Labor movement in Israel was the force that initiated the expulsion of two-thirds of all Palestinians in 1948, and that consistently denied their return despite numerous UN resolutions to that effect. That the Histadruth was the largest employer in Israel during its first two decades is also a telling detail flummoxing most Europeans with superficial knowledge of the society. That the Kibbutz movement actively supported apartheid, being open to Jews only and supplying the majority of the frontline officers and many of the soldiers in 1948 and later, might also supply a clue to the kind of socialism practiced. One cannot refrain from reflecting on the Whites’ Trades Union movement in apartheid South Africa, whose battle cry was – “White Workers of the World, Unite!”. Of course, this Israeli ‘left’ – such as it was – is a thing of the remote past; the Kibbutzim have been fully privatized, gaining ownership of land stolen from the Palestinians, and the grand Labor movement is no more, unlikely to even be represented in the next Israeli Knesset after the March 2021 election.
For many Israel is a sought-after tourist destination, offering sea, sun and sightseeing, avoiding the realities and contradictions of the colonial conflict. While tourism is always a distorting political optic, in the case of Israel it is doubly so; tourists are guaranteed not to be confronted in any meaningful way by the daily realities of the military occupation, the constant brutalities of the IDF towards the Palestinians, or the systematic denial of rights they experience. They may be served by an Arab Palestinian waiter, but are unlikely to recognize them as such, and even less likely to discuss daily realities of the occupation with them.
Many such tourists come to Israel through an interest in music, art or wildlife. In all such cases, they will be practically isolated from the ugly realities of militarized apartheid and the iniquities of the settler-colonial project. Another type of tourist is the academic coming for a conference or research symposium, in many cases paid for, at least partially, by the Israeli host. Thousands of academics visit Israel every year for such purposes, getting wined and dined, and experiencing the most sophisticated propaganda machine anywhere, some become willing ambassadors of the regime if they were not so before.
The Israeli academia is endowed by the Israeli government (and richly assisted by EU and US funds) with large sums allocated for inviting and hosting large conferences of professional associations from many countries. Israel recognizes the importance of converting and persuading scientists from every discipline, and is successfully implementing the task, adding influential opinion-formers to the ranks of its highly-placed supporters. It is well known that politicians of all hues enjoy preferential treatment and lavish funding – most US lawmakers are generously supported by pro-Israeli funding. Such important visitors are exposed to complex, carefully-planned propaganda events, designed to convert them to the Israeli political perspective. The success of such efforts is clear – the Israeli perspective is supported by all parts of the western world, and a great many other countries as well. That Israel spends enormous sums each year on such efforts is not a financial burden – Israel is the largest receiver of US and western financial support in history, as well as the largest per-capita receiver of foreign aid.
Such power relationships form long-term political realities in the west. Israel’s illegal, let alone immoral moves are, without exception, supported politically and financially by all western nations; its apartheid iniquities, as well as its war crimes in Gaza, Lebanon and elsewhere are immune not just from prosecution and juridical investigation, but also from the court of public opinion. The Glasgow Media Research Group has spent decades publishing much research work and two books, Bad News From Israel, and More Bad News From Israel, on how news reporting in the west is skewed to suit the Israeli perspective. Much work has been published about the workings of the Israeli Lobby, especially but not exclusively in Washington.
What Do Israelis Believe?
So far, we have concentrated on the view from abroad. But what do Israelis themselves believe are the most trusted institutions of their society? Here, pollsters have an easy task. Every poll on this topic came up with the same results during the last couple of decades. The 2019 poll of the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) demonstrates this most clearly:
It is also interesting to note the difference between the percentage of Jews and Arabs polled who have trust in the IDF. The same report quotes the results of the public trust in the statement: “The IDF is the People’s Army” – 76% of Jewish respondents agreed with this sentiment in 2019. The missing 24% group is mainly made up of Ultra-Orthodox Jews who refuse to serve due to religious reasons. The IDI saw no reason to ask Arabs the same question – a fascinating decision for an institution trumpeting what it defines as ‘Israeli democracy’.
It is clear that beyond the trust invested in the IDF by Israeli Jews, this public is even more supportive of the murderous attacks on Gaza and Lebanon, killing mainly civilian victims. In 2014, during the most brutal attacks on Gaza, 95% of Jewish Israelis supported the atrocities, according to a detailed report by Zack Beauchamp in Vox, July 31, 2014. Similar figures were attained during the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2008/9 and 2012 attacks on Gaza. What explains such incredible and unique support for brutal force used for committing war crimes and other illegal actions both in Palestine and elsewhere?
To answer this question I go back to the events before 1948, ones which formed the Israeli state that we know today.
In 1920, two crucial institutions were created by the Zionist movement – the Histadruth and the Hagana, the clandestine Zionist army that served as the main foundation of the IDF before 1948. The creation of this army came out of necessity, as any group of colonial settlers must expect forceful opposition by the indigenous population they intend to displace and expel. In a late colonial undertaking such as the Zionist project strong Arab opposition was to be expected, and was present early on, becoming entrenched as dispossession persisted and intensified. Hence, the setting up of an army to support the project was a foregone conclusion. Without the Hagana, and later, the IDF, the Zionist project could not have been realized.
Both the Histradruth and Hagana were large popular bodies with mass memberships. Ben-Gurion, leader of political Zionism in Palestine and later to become Israel’s first prime minister, realized that while he created an army and most of the other state institutions even before 1948, and the state itself in May 1948 – there was still no Hebrew Zionist nation. Of this lacuna he admits, as late as 1954, “We have a state, but there is no nation.” (See my book An Army Like No Other, p.73).
This is hardly surprising as most nations take long to be imagined and created, to be forged and made cohesive out of heterogeneous populations. The great diversity of the Jewish community in Palestine did not form a nation, and thus, a nation had to be hammered out of dissimilar communities, with their markedly dissimilar histories, languages, traditions and inclinations. This gigantic task of social engineering had to be achieved in record time, in very difficult circumstances. To carry out this task, a popular institution was required, one with a wide catchment of the Jewish population in Palestine. Ben-Gurion built the IDF to fulfill this function during the latter part of 1948, and it included almost every single able-bodied mature Jewish male, as well as many women – only the very young and the very old were excluded. As the biggest club in the country, the IDF was the ideal organization to create and form the nation. The members of this future nation spent most of 1948 in it, fighting the Palestinians and rump Arab armies which came to their assistance, demonstrating the shortcomings of the regimes which dispatched them to Palestine. The results of the armed conflict were pre-determined even before the war started.
The badly trained and weakly motivated invading armies were in many instances also badly equipped and poorly coordinated. The potentates who dispatched them had poor intelligence about the IDF and inclined towards armed conflict less by the need to save the Palestinians than by the wish to cut a daring figure on the Arab political stage. The Palestinians themselves did not have anything like a modern armed force – what there was of it was decimated by the British authorities during the Arab Rebellion of 1936-39, through the decisive British military advantage and brutal use of force. This ragbag of local militias and poorly trained Arab armies was faced by a united, modern well-trained force – many of the IDF soldiers gained battle experience serving in the British army during WW2; the IDF was stronger and larger than the combined Arab forces facing it. Despite the resistance both by Egyptian units and the Jordanian Arab Legion, who fought well and bravely, they failed to stop the IDF which, by the end of 1948, had taken over most of Palestine with substantial parts of North Sinai to boot. This rather striking success of the young IDF would be crucial in shaping both the army it would later become, as well as the nation this army has shaped and formed.
One of the important tools of creating and forging the nation was the Hebrew language – one which many of the recruits, having just arrived from the Displaced Persons Camps in Europe, did not speak beyond their prayer-book acquaintance. Teaching Hebrew became one of the tasks of the IDF continuing well into the 1960s, with female recruits teaching newcomers from the Arab world – none of whom could converse in Hebrew – the language of the new nation they were made to join. Ben-Gurion was extremely hostile to the two diasporic languages – Yiddish of European Jewry and Arabic of the Jews of Western Asia and North Africa. Measures were introduced, turning the two languages into ‘exiled tongues,’ and all state services were offered only in Hebrew to the incoming migrant Jews, who would soon double and then triple the original Jewish population of Israel. The young nation had to run before it learnt to walk, and this unmitigated social engineering brings to mind similar efforts in Europe during the 1930s, both by fascism and Nazism, as well as by communist Russia. The New Jew – the Israeli soldier – was hammered out of the despised Ghetto Jew, practically exterminated by the Nazi Holocaust, leaving behind the few young Jews who somehow survived the death camps, ending up in Israel. Both incoming communities – Arab Jews and Holocaust survivors – were made to understand that their past life was shameful, the silencing of their languages a potent symbol of the rejection of their past that was required and expected from them.
A crucial characteristic of the IDF, in comparison to other armies one may think of, is its total involvement in all parts of Israeli ‘civil’ society. In a sense, there is no real civil society in Israel. Whether one examines finance, industry, academia, health, research, media, culture, art and obviously – politics – one finds the systemic participation of the IDF, including the role it had in shaping modern Hebrew itself, especially Hebrew slang. From controlling media channels and press outlets, publishing, theatrical and dance troupes, academic institutions and research funding, to education at all levels – the IDF has played a crucial role in all registers of Israeli social life. It is impossible to think of another, contemporary army which comes close.
An Army Like No Other attempts to address this Hydra, to describe analytically its complex and developing history that shaped this unique settler-colonial society, one oddly and uncharacteristically emerging so late in colonial history, with earlier colonies in terminal decline.
The book introduces the peculiarities of the Israeli social, political, racial, intellectual, cultural, and economic project of military settler-colonialism; the IDF serves as the scaffolding supporting the modern Jewish Sparta, justifying and preserving its exclusivist Jewish apartheid. It is the only institution in which almost every Israeli Jew partakes and supports, with most deeply divided on most other social and political institutions and issues.
The IDF is Israel at it clearest, pure and simple.
The Material Realities of Military Conflict
The activities and practices of the IDF are not the results of an abstract, ideological structure – they are well-integrated into financial, industrial, academic and labor market realities of the Israeli state. Indeed, one may say they are the realities of the state, forming its material conditions of successful operation, its economic base.
What one does – Marx tells us – determines and shapes what one is, how one conceptualizes; material practice determines how we conceive options for action, how we perceive reality. By specializing in conflict, military oppression, denial of human rights, development of armaments, tactics and strategy of militarized control, methods of legal oppression, and the trading and exportation of such knowhow, Israel has become what it now is. The Israeli perceives the world though a gunsight. Israel is an army which has built itself a state, forming the nation in its image to serve its colonial aims.
The clearest evidence of this is the Israeli Military-Industrial-Complex. The IDF and companies connected with it form the largest industrial sector in Israel, responsible for the largest portion of income from exports, between $12 and 18 billion annually. Such figures should be understood as indicative only as much of the Israeli arms trade is not in the public domain, invisible even to research organizations such as SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute),that publish annual and periodic reports about international arms trade. Selling to more than 135 countries, Israel is one of the main arms dealers on the planet, always amongst the top ten.
Israel has turned armed conflict into a thriving industry. It made adversity into commercial success, building on the marketing phrase ‘tested in action’: in reality, tested on Arab and Muslem people, and especially, on Palestinian civilians. Israel has turned Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and some other countries into the largest testing grounds of modern armaments. The business model includes thousands of hi-tech companies set up by IDF ex-officers, who together with the nationalized armament and security companies are the largest sectoral employer in Israel.
All Israeli academic institutions enjoy substantial research funding disbursed by the IDF, the Defense Ministry, and the various security organizations. Such universities and colleges also run training programs for the IDF and related bodies. For example, The Hebrew University in Jerusalem includes a large army camp at the heart of its campus on Mount Scopus, with hundreds of soldiers studying and living there behind barbed wire. It is difficult to think of similar arrangements elsewhere in the world. The income from such activities ties the universities financially, politically and ideologically to the Israeli security apparatus.
As currently set up, the Israeli militarized financial system and industrial base are integral parts of a war economy. This destructive, violence-oriented economy is the mainstay of Israel’s prosperity. Since its inception, Israel has received more foreign support than any other country, mainly from the US and Germany. This has financed its wars, occupations, widespread destruction in countries of the region, and the lawlessness and continuous massacres of tens of thousands. It proved to be good business for Israel, as the hefty occupation costs are normally covered by the US and the EU. Unless this situation changes, there is no reason for Israel to change its tactics and strategy. An example is the Israeli-developed anti-missile system Iron Dome, that was financed by a special subvention from Washington. In the summer of 2020 it became known that the Israeli developer, Raphael Advanced Defense Systems, had entered into a joint venture agreement to establish an Iron Dome production facility in the US. In January 2021, we learned that the United States is expected to soon begin deploying the Israeli-manufactured Iron Dome missile defense system in its bases in the gulf states. Thus, the US is first investing huge sums, financing Israeli development of weapon systems, then paying Israel for the right to use the resulting product, and requesting permission to use it. Such arrangements are exclusive to Israel; the financial risks are born by Washington, and Israel enjoys the military, financial, economic and political windfall.
It is important to realize that such massive financial support is not offered as charity, but as payment for services rendered, or a guarantee towards future services. Some have called Israel a ‘US Aircraft-Carrier anchored in the Eastern Mediterranean’, which seems an apt description of its function in the region.
Thus, it would be churlish to claim, as some have done, that Israel is a mere client state rendering services for a fee. While the size difference implies a clear power-relationship, it is still true that some dogs may indeed be wagged by their tails – if not permanently, at least periodically. The Presidency of Donald Trump and even the last two years of President Obama’s tenure clearly demonstrate that Israel is far from a servile and insignificant partner, but one with its own agenda, which it succeeds in forcing upon larger and more powerful political entities such as the US and EU. The spectacle of Netanyahu berating Obama before the joint members of the House and Senate, in an attempt to spike the Iran Nuclear agreement, was certainly an object lesson; a state supported since its inception by incredibly generous US funding takes a position against the American President and US interests, trying to sway US elected representatives to support this brazen move. Certainly, we have not seen this before or after, and no other head of state is ever likely to ever try this trick, or be allowed to.
The recent normalization with the Arab world, the result of a Trump-Netanyahu initiative, is greatly adding to the potential clientele of the Israeli Military-Industrial-Complex. The gulf states are some of the richest anywhere, and very keen to purchase Israeli armaments and security technologies and training. We are likely to see the results over the next few years, as such arms deals are signed and delivered. Indeed, even countries which have refused for decades to recognize Israel, have been quietly buying Israeli arms. Azerbaijan, for example, between 2006 and 2019, bought arms for around $825 million from Israel, a fact that came to light as the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia revealed this long-term relationship. Many other Muslem countries buying arms from Israel have kept it a secret, for obvious reasons, as did Israel as part of the agreement. This is one of the reasons that the official figures of Israeli arms sales are accounting for about half of the real figures. Another reason is that Israel is reselling arms to third-world countries which it had purchased from the US or another western country, under agreement not to resell them. A number of such deals have been discovered, but no action has ever been taken against Israel. The reason is simple, the US frequently uses Israel to sell American technology to regimes with which it is not allowed to deal directly. One such famous secret deal was the Iran Contra Affair, when Israel sold US cruise missiles to Iran as part of a larger deal. Azerbaijan’s war against Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh was determined greatly by the autonomous Israeli drones Harpy 2, which destroyed numerous Armenian positions. This success immediately led India to order a large number of the drones.
Israeli arms deals are not limited to conventional weapons. In the 1970s Israel, Apartheid South Africa and Iran under the Shah shared nuclear technology. South Africa provided Israel with uranium for enrichment for use in nuclear installations, and Israel had assisted South Africa and Iran in developing nuclear devices. A huge flash recorded by satellites off the South African coast in 1979, was identified as a nuclear device exploded allegedly by Israel. Recently, India (under PM Modi) has become Israel’s largest arms buyer, and Israel has also become India’s largest supplier. Such relationships are much more than purely commercial: India, a rising power, has also become one of Israel’s most important supporters and backers. Thus, Israel has used arms sales as a political leverage ever since the early 1960s, which may explain why very few states are prepared to criticize Israel or vote against it at the UN General Assembly or the Security Council. Such behavior adds to Israel’s virtual impunity from accusations of war crimes, making it immune to international law, as very few countries are prepared to face Israel squarely, knowing that it will be, more often than not, automatically protected as the protégé of the US. Thus, Israel’s Military-Industrial-Complex is not just the financial support system of Israel but serves also as a political and diplomatic shield.
Is The IDF All That It’s Cracked Up To Be?
Of course, the many arms deals and the IDF vast training package marketed globally are predicated on the claimed supremacy of the IDF. Examining a long view of its history, this presumed supremacy becomes very questionable indeed. My book surveys the various major wars the IDF was involved in: 1948, 1956 against Egypt, 1967 against Egypt, Syria Iraq and Jordan, 1973 against Egypt and Syria, 1982 mainly against the PLO and Syrian forces in Lebanon, the First Intifada, 1987-1993, and 2006 against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the conclusion is that the IDF’s myths seem to be unjustified.
If Israel ‘won’ the first three listed wars, it was in very favorable conditions that it did so, and the chapters dealing with each of the conflicts carefully examine such imbalances. However, since 1973, the IDF cannot be described as winning any of the conflicts it has waged, either militarily or politically. The 1973 war, which the IDF did not initiate and was badly surprised by, was not only an operational failure, but a deep failure of intelligence, in both senses of the term. This led to the Israeli public questioning its ability to trust its political and military leadership. In some respects, this has remained the case ever since.
The first Lebanon war only deepened the crisis of trust with the crude lies which enabled Sharon to start a war he was unable to bring to a close. This was a war not just against the PLO in Lebanon, but also against the Syrian units there, and mostly against millions of civilians trapped in their capital city. The death toll of more than 20,000 civilians, mainly in Beirut, forms one of Israel’s worst war crimes, and involved it in holding on to South Lebanon for 18 years. Not one of its political leaders saw his way to ending the occupation, until Prime Minister Barak was forced into a hasty retreat in 2000, as tens of thousands of unarmed Lebanese virtually pushed the IDF out of its latifundia in Lebanon. Arguably, these thousands of Lebanese protesters have done a great favor to the IDF, enmeshed as it was in an illegal and irrational occupation which had no real political or security function, and involved constant war crimes, torture and great cost in human, materiel and financial terms.
But, despite this painful lesson in humility which the IDF and the political leadership seem to indicate they learned after 1973, when the combined Arab armies inflicted a terrible cost on the IDF, no real lessons were ingested. The reasons for this failure are complex and show up clearly during the 2006 war in Lebanon, as well in the numerous attacks on Gaza in 2008/9, 2012, and 2014.
The first element of change in 1973, was the fact that this war, difficult as it was for the IDF, marked a great change; it was its last in more than a generation waged against state armies. All conflicts since then were against civilian populations, be it in Lebanon, Gaza or the West Bank. The signing of peace agreements with Egypt and later with Jordan, meant the end of state conflict for the foreseeable future; Syria, which did not sign such an agreement, having been out-maneuvered in 1979 by Begin and Sadat, found itself isolated, unable to initiate military conflict with Israel, or protect itself from Israeli attacks. Thus, Israel achieved the utter removal of the surrounding states from the military conflict. Such states have abandoned the cause of the Palestinians, and hence gained respite from Israeli military threats and periodic attacks.
Israel found itself able to concentrate on its main mission – removing as many Palestinians from their land and homes and making life impossible for those who stayed. The main task of the IDF, as analyzed by Neve Gordon in his Israel’s Occupation (2008) became the legal, financial, regulatory and military control of the Palestinian territories overrun in 1967. This was unlike fighting state powers – the IDF had to mutate into a well-honed policing force, implementing the illegal occupation on a daily and continuous basis. No longer was the IDF fighting trained and armed soldiers in large theaters such as Sinai or the Golan Heights – it was involved in policing civilians in large conurbations and a multitude of villages and towns, destroying homes, uprooting millions of trees, and finally, building the most formidable wall of modern times, separating Palestinians from their land, and protecting the massive settler-colonial population with nearly 20% of Israel’s Jews living illegally in the occupied territory. Now there was no one to deter Israel from this dispossession – the Arab polities have removed themselves, a process cresting in the 2020 so-called Abraham Accords, leading to ‘normalization’ with most Arab countries, and leaving the Palestinians in inglorious isolation, with no clear course of action.
This process was initiated and enabled by the Oslo Accords in 1993, during which the PLO signed away its rights and obligations to free Palestine from occupation, as well as its struggle to achieve some form of political independence and self-determination.
The process of transformation starts even earlier when, in 1988, the PLO, having misread the First Intifada, abandoned its historical solution to the conflict, giving up on the one democratic, secular state solution, which depended on winding up the military conflict through the ending of Israeli Apartheid, and settling on total equality for all between the river and the sea, Israelis and Palestinians. It also involved the return of the refugees, if not to their actual homes, at least to their country. Such a return as part of a just solution was supported historically by the UN Resolution 194 of December 1948, which was an effort to correct the unjust Resolution 181 of November 1947 that had initiated the 1948 war and the Nakba by dividing Palestine unjustly, bowing down to Zionist and western pressure. By abandoning the One-State solution the PLO abandoned any hope of real justice in Palestine. Few understood that clearly at the time, the notable exception being Edward Said, whose insightful The End of the Peace Process (2000) had fathomed the depth of the PLO’s betrayal of the Palestinian people.
Despite’s Said’s clear analysis many have wishfully believed that the PLO did achieve a mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza, though this was never in the cards. What was achieved instead was the end of the PLO as an organ of genuine resistance and potential liberation, and its transformation into a security setup responsible for guaranteeing the Israeli occupation and settlement of Palestine. In so doing, it has wrestled the political initiative from the Palestinians who, in December 1987, rose up in the First Intifada against the iniquities of the Israeli occupation, causing Israel a great human, military, financial and political cost. Having failed to squash the Intifada despite the great brutality employed by the IDF, Israel badly needed a way out. Only the Oslo Accords brought the Intifada to an end, as the Palestinian population placed its hopes on the PA administration, only to be betrayed and bitterly disappointed.
So, while Oslo has frustrated any hopes Palestinians may have harbored for democracy, self-determination and just peace, it has delivered to the Israeli mini-empire a cheaper, manageable occupation. When Ehud Barak, who had been Chief of General Staff of the IDF during the Intifada, switched to politics and was elected prime minister in 1999, he carried forward the plan he initiated as leader of the IDF. The plan for a “small, smart army” was made possible after the removal of the Arab states from the conflict. Now, based on the achievements of the Oslo Accords, the PLO itself was removed as an opponent, instead becoming the security contractor in the Occupied Territories. No longer, claimed Barak, did the IDF need huge mobile forces, it should modernize using technologies of the coming millennium, such as drones, web scanning, high flying and satellite surveillance, and other intelligence-gathering means to limit the ability of enemies to surprise the IDF.
Part of this modernization was played by a bizarre development: the adoption of French post-structuralist theorists – mainly Deleuze, Guattari and Debord’s work on understanding modern spaces. This led to the thinking, strategies and tactics developed by a group of officers led by Aviv Kokhavi, commander of the murderous attack on Jenin in 2002 and recently appointed IDF Chief of the General Staff, and Brigadier General Shimon Naveh, the ‘intellectual father’ of this disturbing use of theoretical work in the service of brutal ethnic cleansing.
These new tactics used in order to subjugate Jenin and other centers of resistance during 2002 were based on their readings of theories of covert and liminal spaces, and held the key, they believed, for a small and smart army subjugating urban resistance forces – difficult to defeat by conventional army tactics. In Jenin such tactics, employed together with the brutal use of huge D9 Caterpillar bulldozers which flattened the camp causing hundreds of deaths, have helped the IDF to suppress the Second Intifada. It seemed that the time of the Barak’s model army has become a reality.
Interestingly, two factors have combined to arrest this scaling-down of the IDF. Barak’s premiership only lasted until 2001, when Arik Sharon easily defeated Barak, becoming Israel’s eleventh premier and one of its most popular, despite the many war crimes he was involved in, not least the 1982 war against the PLO in Lebanon. Indeed, with the gradual but decisive shift to the extreme right in Israel’s Jewish society, it seems that it was exactly such infamous actions which made him so popular. Sharon never supported the move towards a smaller, professional and technological army, perceiving the IDF through Ben-Gurion’s eyes: a national machinery for shaping and holding the nation together, the core of Israel’s Zionist existence. In that, he was close also to an earlier general-cum-politician, Moshe Dayan, who in the 1950s projected the future of Israel as a nation of eternal, Spartan warriors, never to let go of their weapons. For both of these warriors, fighting was the essence of being Israeli, and the very idea of peace was upsetting — the one trick never seriously tried by Israel.
With the construction of the Military-Industrial-Complex as Israel’s financial mainstay and the IDF as the most expensive institution in Israel, Sharon never considered a small army as an option. It so happened that a year after his departure to a hospital ward in vegetative state after a stroke, his replacement in the role, Ehud Olmert, took the decision to improve his ratings by a frontal attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the large formations so beloved of Israeli generals came into their own. This seemed to offer an object lesson for the IDF, though it missed it altogether.
The chief of staff at the time, General Dan Halutz, was also a follower of the notions developed by Naveh, Barak and Kokhavi, and believed that he could win the 2006 attack without physically endangering huge forces. As a former air-force chief, his strategy was to bomb Hezbollah out of existence, while also destroying the infrastructure of South Lebanon and Beirut. As Hezbollah was a small force, this was thought to offer a quick and efficient solution, without putting Israeli soldiers in harm’s way, yet eliminating Hezbollah.
Arguably, never before had an Israeli chief of staff experienced such a total upset of all his strategies. The agility and sophistication of Hezbollah, and its complex preparation for exactly such an operation meant that the attack was a deep failure. The infrastructure of Lebanon was indeed destroyed, like so many times before, with many civilians killed in urban areas, and more than a million refugees. But Hezbollah continued to fight with incredible skill and flexibility, dispatching medium and long-range missiles into Israel, disabling normal life, industry and education, with hundreds of thousands fleeing their homes, many dead and injured, and large damage across the north of Israel.
When, after a month of bombardments and shelling, the IDF was nowhere near winning its objectives, the decision was taken to abandon reliance on the air-force, missiles and drones, and to inject large formations into Lebanon to complete the mission.
By entering with over 100,000 soldiers and enormous armored formations, Israeli casualties quickly mounted, with Hezbollah fighting with skill against the large forces entangled in Lebanon’s narrow mountain roads, which turned into death traps for the Israeli Merkava tanks – advertised as the ‘most advanced in the world’, and ‘tested in action’. A fast US intervention was solicited to get Israel out of an impossible spot of its own making, in order to stop the rout, and the attacks by Hezbollah missiles onto population centers.
So What Are We To Conclude?
The assaults against Gaza between 2008 and 2014, by huge army formations, causing the death of thousands of civilians and widespread demolition of infrastructure and housing, proved again that the IDF’s model of engagement is based on destruction and mass murder of civilians, unable to win against small well-trained and highly-motivated resistance forces such as Hamas or Hezbollah. The IDF, reinforcing the errors of the US in Vietnam, is proficient at mass destruction, but unable to win its own declared objectives, which are more political than military.
While the IDF cannot, and indeed, did not offer a solution to the existential difficulties of the settler-colonial project of Zionism, it has unfortunately boosted the support of Israelis not just for the IDF, but for military solutions to political problems. This is the main danger the IDF currently stands for.
A similar conclusion faces anyone who examines the operations of the IDF as a militarized policing force for the subjugation of Palestine. Instead of merely managing the Palestinians, the IDF is employed as an ideological army of occupation, protecting and enlarging the settlement project, directed at making life insufferable for most Palestinians; in other words, the IDF is employed as an ethnic-cleansing apparatus, possibly leading to wide-ranging forced expulsion of the type used in 1948, when political and other conditions may be judged as favorable.
To bring the region to the brink of a breakdown, various modes combine to keep the West Bank and Gaza at a boiling point: frequent and brutal illegal house demolitions, pre-dawn attacks on towns and villages, numerous arrests and administrative detention without due process, destruction of schools, clinics and other public facilities, the uprooting and burning of millions of trees to scupper Palestinian agriculture, the use of the Apartheid Wall to cut off communities from each other and from their fields and arbors, and recently, even the destruction of specially-constructed COVID-19 testing and treatment facilities, while denying the vaccine to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, in contravention of the Geneva Conventions and international Law.
Israel works together with the repressive and undemocratic social forces in the Arab world, which have successfully defeated the so-called Arab Spring after 2011; it uses investment, tourism and arms sales as prizes for those regimes which collaborate with it, not to mention mediation on their behalf with the Trump regime in Washington. Israel is thus doing all that is humanly possible to dislodge the Palestinians from their land. This aim has never changed since the early days of Zionism in Palestine, and the IDF is crucial for its successful completion of the expulsion project. That it is now able to concentrate on this task, no longer bothered by Arab armies’ intervention on behalf of Palestine, is certainly an important boost for the settler-colonial effort. This is not fully realized by many western progressive groups, some who welcome the ‘normalization’ process as ‘peace’, rather than as part of the regressive coalition of anti-democratic forces in the region, directed at tighter control over repressed and oppressed populations.
A note of caution is in place here, nonetheless. We should not overlook the IDF’s destructive potential, part of which is, of course, the nuclear arsenal rumored to be over 200 devices with their airborne, missile and nuclear submarine delivery systems. While such devices may be impossible to use in Palestine, for obvious reasons, they are now certainly taken into account by Israel’s military leaders as they plan an attack on Iran while Biden is considering the revival – total or partial – of the Obama-negotiated Iran Nuclear deal of July 2015.
Indeed, the same General Kokhavi who excelled in destroying the Jenin refugee camp in 2002, is now commander of the IDF. His intentions were clarified as he spoke days after Biden’s inauguration. He found it acceptable and necessary to warn Israel’s main political, financial and military supporter that he is ready to act if Biden fails the test: “Israel’s military chief Tuesday warned the Biden administration against rejoining the 2015 Iran nuclear deal even if it toughens its terms, adding he’s ordered his forces to step up preparations for possible offensive action against Iran during the coming year.” (The Independent, 26 January, 2021) Biden will be badly-advised to ignore such threats from an Israeli administration conditioned by the last President to expect just about anything it demanded.
Both Israel and the US clearly realize and appreciate the fact that Iran is currently unable and unwilling to go all the way and produce nuclear weapons. It has used this ruse to get the strategic agreement with the US, so as to improve its economic performance and bring about the end of sanctions.
The danger is not the non-existent, unlikely Iranian bomb, but the very real nuclear power called Israel, whose devices stay beyond international control and monitoring. This special allowance for Israel’s breaking all rules in the book, part of its wide-ranging impunity, is what is at stake. Instead of forcing Israel into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the only step which makes political and security sense, the US continues to provide it with political, military and financial protection against any criticism or international action. We know that the Biden administration is unlikely to reverse this policy of collusion with Israel’s disregard to international law, but the recent challenge by Israel to Washington is one which may force a showdown between the two allies-in-crime against Palestine.
It may well be that Israel’s constant requirement for a substantial enemy as a national-unification stratagem, one which has driven its policies for over seven decades, has now compelled it into a tight corner in its relationship with the new president in Washington, and a confrontation which Biden cannot lose without also losing credibility. Knowing the tenacity with which Israel defends its absolute right for attack anywhere, we should all be mindful of the terrible dangers ahead. The fragility of the new administration in Washington may offer Netanyahu a temptation he is unable to resist. ■
The times, they are a-changin’, even when it comes to the interminable Israeli-Palestinian “conflict.” On January 5, 2018, The New York Times ran a piece entitled: “As the 2-State Solution Loses Steam, a 1-State Solution Gains Traction.” Mustafa Barghouti, a prominent Palestinian political figure, noted: “It’s dominating the discussion.” Even mainstream Zionists (if they are honest with themselves) see the writing on the wall. As Peter Beinart wrote recently, “I have begun to wonder, for the first time in my life, whether the price of a state that favors Jews over Palestinians is too high. The painful truth is that the project to which liberal Zionists like myself have devoted ourselves for decades – a state for Palestinians separated from a state for Jews – has failed. The traditional two-state solution no longer offers a compelling alternative to Israel’s current path. It is time for liberal Zionists to abandon the goal of Jewish-Palestinian separation and embrace the goal of Jewish-Palestinian equality.” Soon after, he published a piece in The New York Times (July 8, 2020) entitled: “I No Longer Believe in a Jewish State.”
Jewish Voice for Peace, one of the largest Jewish organization in the United States, issued an explicitly anti-Zionist position paper in 2019. Entitled “Our Approach to Zionism,” it states: “Jewish Voice for Peace is guided by a vision of justice, equality and freedom for all people. We unequivocally oppose Zionism because it is counter to those ideals…. While it had many strains historically, the Zionism that took hold and stands today is a settler-colonial movement, establishing an apartheid state where Jews have more rights than others. Our own history teaches us how dangerous this can be.”
For all this, the Israeli-Palestinian “conflict” continues to appear irresolvable. By making itself militarily useful to the world’s hegemons (especially the US), forging alliances with the autocratic elites of the region, employing skillful lobbying, strategically manipulating the Holocaust and accusations of anti-Semitism to its purposes and deploying massive financial resources to burnish its image, Israel has succeeded in normalizing its control over all of historic Palestine while politically marginalizing the Palestinians. But the “two-state solution” has always been merely a cynical tool of conflict management; it was never intended to genuinely resolve the “conflict.” Indeed, it hides the very reality that we are not dealing with a conflict at all, but with a case of settler colonialism that can only be resolved through decolonization. Recasting the “Israel-Palestine Conflict” as Zionist settler colonialism releases that power of decolonization to get to a just post-colonial situation in a way that conflict resolution, negotiations and technical compromises cannot.
Settler Colonialism: What We Need To Know
Sometimes, the very name you give to a phenomenon determines how it is understood and what can be done about it. Since 1948, we have spoken of the “Arab-Israeli Conflict.” This term well describes the six major wars Israel has fought with its Arab neighbors: the 1948 War of Independence, the Sinai Campaign of 1956, the 1967 war, the 1973 war between Israel and Egypt, and the two wars fought in Lebanon (1982, 2006). It may also apply to “informal” wars between Israel and its Muslim neighbors, the “war of attrition” waged between Egypt and Israel from 1967 to 1973 being a case in point, or the slew of “dirty wars” involving special operations units, targeted assassinations, sabotage, cyber-attacks, terrorism and regime change. Since 1987, when the first Intifada catapulted Israel’s long-standing occupation into public view, we speak also of an “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” That has given rise to all the futile diplomacy, negotiations, peace plans and “peace processes” with which we are so familiar.
The terms “war” or “conflict” conceal a deeper struggle, however: the colonization of Palestine by the Zionist movement, culminating in a state of Israel ruling over the entirety of the country. To be sure, colonization generates conflict. But “conflict” did not simply erupt for one reason or another. Jews, in fact, had lived in peace with the local Arab population for centuries, if not millennia. Zionism shattered this historic relationship.
Driven by persecution and the rise of nationalism in Europe, it was European Jews with little knowledge of Palestine and its peoples who launched a movement of Jewish “return” to its ancestral homeland, the Land of Israel, after a national absence of 2000 years. In their newly minted nationalist ideology, they were the returning natives. In their eyes, the Arabs of Palestine were mere background. They had no national claims or even cultural identity of their own. Palestine was, as the famous Zionist phrase put it, “a land without a people.” The European Zionists knew the land was peopled, of course. But to them the Arabs did not amount to “a people” in the national sense of the term. They were just a collection of natives – though not the Natives, a status the Jewish claimants reserved for themselves. They played no role in the Zionist story. Having no national existence or claims of their own, the Arabs were to be removed, confined or eliminated so as to make way for the country’s “real” owners.
This form of conquest – for that is what it was – took the form of settler colonialism. Zionists felt a deep sense of historical, religious and national connection to the Land of Israel. But in claiming Palestine for themselves alone and rejecting the society they found there, they chose to come as settlers – or more precisely, their choice of settler colonialism rested on formative elements in both Jewish and European societies, such as the notion of biblical “chosenness” and a Divinely sanctioned ownership of the Land; a self- and externally enforced ethno-national existence in the European “Diaspora”: embeddedness in the rise of European nationalism, primarily the “tribal” nationalism of Eastern Europe and European experiences of settler colonialism (particularly of Germans in Slavic lands); immediate pressures of economic and religious persecution; and more, which we will discuss presently.
The upshot is that Zionists intended to displace the local population, not integrate into it as immigrants would. And displacement is by definition a violent process: Zionist ideology justifying the displacement of the indigenous population. The “logic” of settler colonialism worked itself through nationalist ideology. Early Zionist leaders presented the “conflict” as one ethno-religious nationalism against another so as to deflect attention from settler colonialism, garner the support of the Jewish people and stifle diasporic Jewish opposition. They also used arguments of self-defense to win support of non-Zionist Jews, especially allies in Britain and the US. As the only legitimate national group, the Zionists reduced “the Arabs” into a faceless, dismissible enemy Other. Zionist ideologues like David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir knowingly altered the framework from one of settler colonialism to that of conflict between an aggressive (and foreign) Arab “Goliath” and the peace-loving (native) Jewish “David.”
Whatever its justification, the Zionist takeover of Palestine resembled other instances where foreign settlers, armed with a sense of entitlement, conquered a vulnerable country. The European conquest of North America from the Native Americans is perhaps the best-known case of settler colonialism, not to ignore the settlement of Spanish and Portuguese in the Caribbean and parts of Latin America – all of which imported slave labor. The violent settlement of Australia and New Zealand is well known. So is the subjugation by Dutch Afrikaner and British settlers of South Africa, of Kenya and Rhodesia by the British, of Angola and Mozambique by the Portuguese, of Algeria by the French, and of Tibet by the Chinese. Lesser known cases include the Russians in the Kazakh Steppe, Central Asia and Siberia, the Tswana and Khoi-San peoples of southern Africa, the Indonesians in New Guinea, and the Scandinavians among the Sami.
It’s true that settler colonialism generates conflict between the colonist usurpers and the indigenous population. No population is willingly displaced. But if a conflict involves two or more “sides” fighting over differing interests or agendas, then a colonial struggle is not a “conflict.” Colonialism is unilateral. One powerful actor invades another people’s territory to either exploit it or take it over. There is no symmetry of power or responsibility. The Natives did not choose the fight. They had no bone to pick with the settlers before they arrived. The indigenous were not organized or equipped for such a struggle, and they had little chance of winning, of pushing the settlers out of their country. The Natives are the victims, not the other “side.” Nor, to be honest, are they a “side” at all in the eyes of their conquerors. At best they are irrelevant, a nuisance on the path of the settler’s seizure of their country, an expendable population, one that must be “eliminated,” if not physically annihilated then at least reduced to marginal presence in which they are unable to conduct a national life and thus threaten the settler enterprise. Such a process of unilateral, asymmetrical invasion that provokes resistance on the part of Native peoples threatened with displacement and worse can hardly be called a “conflict.” Rather than the “Israeli/Palestinian/Arab Conflict,” we must speak of Zionist settler colonialism.
Why does this matter? Because it has everything to do with arriving at a just resolution, and you can only do that if you have a rigorous analysis. The conflict paradigm has led us to reduce a century-long process of colonial expansion over all of historic Palestine into a limited struggle to “end the occupation” over only a small portion of it (22 percent). By focusing solely on the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) – the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza – the conflict model leaves Israel “proper” out of the picture altogether. In so doing it legitimizes, or at least ignores, Zionist colonialism over the vast majority (78 percent) of Palestine.
If the problem is a dispute between two countries or a civil war between two nationalisms, as the Palestinian/Israeli “conflict” is often phrased, then a conflict-resolution model might resolve it. But it cannot resolve a colonial situation. That requires an entirely different process of resolution: decolonization, the dismantling of the colonial entity so that a new, inclusive body politic may emerge. This is not to say that the OPT is not occupied according to international law. It is, and after 50-plus years the occupation should be ended. It is only to point out that occupation is a sub-issue. It must be addressed, but only as one element in a much broader decolonization of the settler state of Israel. Only that will end “the conflict,” not limited Palestinian sovereignty over a small piece of their country.
Before moving on to decolonization – or to “resolving the conflict” as most people put it – let us revisit the origins of the Zionist project so that we may understand its basic character. Let’s begin by asking: What is Settler Colonialism, and how can it be ended?
In broad strokes, settler colonialism is a form of colonialism in which foreign settlers arrive in a country with the intent of taking it over. Their “arrival” is actually an invasion. The settlers are not immigrants; they come with the intent of replacing the Native population, not integrating into their society. The invasion may be gradual and not even recognized as such by the indigenous. And as in the case of Zionism, it is not necessarily violent, at least in its early stages. In the end, a new settler society arises on the ruins of the indigenous one. The Australian anthropologist Patrick Wolfe suggests that a “logic of elimination” is inherent in all settler colonial projects, in which the native population is “disappeared” through displacement, marginalization, assimilation or outright genocide. The settlers validate their right to the land by inventing narrative, stories, that justify their claims to the territory. The Zionist settlers claimed to be the “real” natives, both because they are “returning” to their native land and because, given its barrenness, only they love and “develop” it. Settler narratives either ignore the indigenous population or cast them as undeserving, unassimilable, menacing and unwanted. The indigenous cease challenging the normalcy of the settler society only after they disappear, remaining at best “exotic” specimens of bygone folklore.
Unlike Algeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola, where the settlers ultimately left, or the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and parts of Latin America where settler colonialism won out and the indigenous were reduced to marginal “Fourth World” status, Palestine/Israel, resembles more apartheid-era South Africa (and perhaps Tibet and Chechnya). In these cases the indigenous population was not rendered small and marginal, but remained major national groups who did not surrender their sovereignty to the settlers or their right of self-determination. As in the case of the Blacks in South Africa, the Palestinians demand the decolonization of the Israeli settler state, to be replaced by a completely new polity in which their national rights are restored. In short, the Zionist settlers and the indigenous Palestinians have arrived at a draw. The former have proven strong enough to establish a state of their own and temporarily marginalize the latter, but are not strong enough to decisively defeat them. For their part, the Palestinians are strong enough to mount a major challenge to settler dominance, preventing the “triumph” the settler state realized over Fourth World peoples.
Even if they should succeed in overthrowing the settler regime, however, as in fact happened in South Africa, the Palestinians are unable to expel the settler population, which is too large and embedded. Decolonization in this case is only partly achieved by the rise of a new polity. The indigenous may achieve self-determination, but they must share their sovereignty with the settlers. An additional phase of decolonization is thereby called for. Together with an inclusive polity and civil society, and in tandem with a process of reckoning with the settler past, a new, shared political community must emerge that gives meaning to the new layer of national identity that “thickens” joint citizenship.
ODSC: A Plan of Decolonization
We have to go back to the first and second stages of the PLO’s political program, almost half a century, to find a comprehensive and relevant vision of what form decolonization might take. The steady abandonment of the anti-colonial struggle for a two-state solution and conflict resolution in the 1970s and 1980s meant that from that time to this, no detailed program of decolonization has ever been presented, not by the Palestinian leadership or by its academics or civil society activists. Nonetheless, the rise of a new cycle of settler colonial analysis in the last two decades has revived this perspective, both theoretically and politically. Settler colonialism, always the language of the Palestinian people, has become accepted as part of the mainstream political discourse. I would humbly suggest a fourth phase of Palestinian political mobilization: a return to an anti-colonial analysis.
The one-state movement is still tiny. Nor is there an agreed-upon plan – although the single state initiatives are anti-colonial – and not all the initiatives agree on details. They all flow, however, from the logic of decolonization rather than conflict resolution. Some envision a binational or multicultural state that recognizes both Israel and Palestinian national identities, while others insist only on equal individual rights. Key issues such as the land regime, the fate of the settlements (dismantled or integrated?), the nature of the economy (socialist? capitalist? a mixture?), the role of religion (should the new state be secular or does religion play a formal role?), even the right to one’s sexual orientation – all these and more still need to be ironed out. Nonetheless, the different one-state groups have endeavored to coordinate with one another. Their different political programs share the following common elements:
· The historic land of Palestine belongs to all who live in it and to those who were expelled or exiled from it since 1948, regardless of religion, ethnicity, national origin or current citizenship status;
· The implementation of the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees and their descendants in accordance with UN Resolution 194 is a fundamental requirement for justice, and a benchmark of equality. It also signifies Palestinian national sovereignty, the ability to address one’s peoples’ needs with a significant measure of self-determination;
· Any system of government must be founded on the principle of equality in civil, political, social and cultural rights for all citizens. The regime of ethno-religious nationalism should be replaced by a constitutional democracy based on common citizenship, thus enabling and fostering the emergence of a shared civil society;
· The recognition of the diverse character of the society, encompassing distinct religious, linguistic and cultural traditions, and national experiences. Constitutional guarantees will protect the country’s national, ethnic, religious and other communities;
· There must be just redress for the devastating effects of decades of Zionist colonization in the pre- and post-state period, including the abrogation of all laws, and ending all policies, practices and systems of military and civil control that oppress and discriminate on the basis of ethnicity, religion or national origin;
· The creation of a non-sectarian state that does not privilege the rights of one ethnic or religious group over another and that respects the separation of state from all organized religion;
· In articulating the specific contours of such a solution, those who have been historically excluded from decision-making – especially the Palestinian Diaspora and its refugees, and Palestinians inside Israel – must play a central role;
· Putting into place an inclusive economy offering economic security, sustainability, meaningful employment and just compensation;
· Acknowledging a connectedness to the wider Middle Eastern and global community that requires engagement in creating new regional and global structures of equality and sustainability upon which the success of local decolonization ultimately depends.
Let’s take as a starting place in our project of decolonizing Zionism/liberating Palestine the 10-point program of the One Democratic State Campaign. The ODSC is a Palestinian-led group of Palestinians – primarily, though certainly not exclusively, ’48 Palestinians – and Israeli Jews who came together in Haifa in 2017. Its plan is based upon previous one-state plans and conferences, though is far more detailed. I have been involved from its inception. Its political plan, which I’m using as a “gateway” into issues of decolonization in Palestine, was forged over two years of discussion involving a core network of some 50 activists and academics, both from within Palestine and abroad. The ODSC plan is not intended to be the final word, of course; in fact, it is a project in its infancy which nevertheless integrates previous work and initiatives in order to move the urgent project of decolonization forward. The ODSC website is <https://onestatecampaign.org>. Although the 10-point program is brief and requires much more detailed work, it is grounded in the political logic of settler colonialism, thus returning to Palestinian analysis going back a century and a quarter. More important, the ODSC program “thinks through” the process of decolonization.
Let us now turn to the political program itself.
Preamble to the ODSC Program
In recent years, the idea of a one democratic state as the best political solution for Palestine has re-emerged and gained support in the public domain. It is not a new idea. The Palestinian liberation movement, before the Nakba of 1948 and after, had promoted this vision in the PLO’s National Charter, abandoning it for the two-state solution only in 1988. It was on this basis that, in September 1993, the Palestinians entered into the Oslo negotiations. The two-state solution was also endorsed by all the Palestinian parties represented in the Israeli Knesset. But on the ground Israel strengthened its colonial control, fragmenting the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza into tiny, isolated and impoverished cantons, separated from one another by settlements, massive Israeli highways, hundreds of checkpoints, the apartheid Wall, military bases and fences. After a half-century of relentless “Judaization,” the two-state solution must be pronounced dead, buried under the colonial enterprise on the territory that would have become the Palestinian state. In its place Israel has imposed a single regime of repression from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.
The only way forward to a genuine and viable political settlement is to dismantle the colonial apartheid regime that has been imposed over historic Palestine, replacing it with a new political system based on full civil equality, implementation of the Palestinian refugees’ Right of Return and the building of a system that addresses the historic wrongs committed on the Palestinian people by the Zionist movement.
We, Palestinians and Israeli Jews alike, have therefore revived the one-state idea. Although differing models of such a state range from binational to a liberal, secular democracy, we are united in our commitment to the establishment of a single democratic state in all of historic Palestine.
As formulated below by the One Democratic State Campaign (ODSC), the goal of this political program is to widen the support for such a state among the local populations, Palestinian and Israeli alike, as well as amongst the international public. We call on all of you to join our struggle against apartheid and for the establishment of a democratic state free of occupation and colonialism, based on justice and equality, which alone promises us a better future.
The ODSC Progam
1. Decolonization. The only way to resolve a settler colonial situation is through a thorough process of dismantling the colonial structures of domination and control. An inclusive and democratic polity, ruling over a shared civil society, replaces the colonial regime. Once a new political community arises offering equal rights for all, once the refugees return and once all the citizens of the new state gain equal access to the country’s lands and economic resources, a process of reconciliation may begin. Israeli Jews must acknowledge both the national rights of the Palestinian people and past colonial crimes. In return, and based on the egalitarian democracy that has been established, the Palestinians will accept them as legitimate citizens and neighbors, thereby signaling the end of Zionist settler colonialism. Having entered into a new post-colonial relationship, the peoples and citizens of the new state – whose name will emerge through the process of shared life – will be able to move on to the future they and their children deserve.
This first Article bridges the Preamble’s presentation of the problem – Zionism as a settler colonial project – with the detailed program of decolonization offered. It lays out the entire process of decolonization. The ODSC program begins with the dismantlement of the Domination Management Regime and its replacement by a new, shared, inclusive and democratic polity and civil society. It progresses into the new post-colonial relationship between Palestinians and Israeli Jews. In this new relationship, the Palestinians regain their sovereignty, their rights and their country, within the framework of a single democratic state shared equally with Israeli Jews and others. For their part, Israeli Jews, by accepting this new relationship in a political community enabled by the indigenous Palestinians, play a now-constructive role as the decolonized polity moves on towards its post-colonial future.
Only the indigenous can declare an end to the colonial situation. Replacing the Zionist settler state with a unitary democracy entails two major challenges. How can Israeli Jews be induced – or forced – to accept the status of equal citizens in an inclusive democracy, one that dismantles their domination and control but then allows them to end their otherwise unresolvable estrangement as settlers? And how can the Palestinians be induced – though they cannot be forced – to allow “their” country to be transformed into a civil polity that includes Israeli Jews?
2. A Single Constitutional Democracy. One Democratic State shall be established between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River as one country belonging to all its citizens, including Palestinian refugees who will be able to return to their homeland. All citizens will enjoy equal rights, freedom and security. The State shall be a constitutional democracy, the authority to govern and make laws emanating from the consent of the governed. All its citizens shall enjoy equal rights to vote, stand for office and contribute to the country’s governance.
As befitting an anti-colonial program, the ODSC program relates to the entire country of Palestine as the object of liberation, and not merely pieces of it. The great revolution here and in other one-state programs is that after decolonization, all the country’s inhabitants will enjoy equal rights as citizens. A constitutional democracy replaces the settler regime in which one’s place in society is dictated by one’s ethnic, religious and national identity. The state no longer “belongs” to one particular group but to its citizens. One citizenry, one parliament, one set of laws, one civil society of equals whose civil, human and national rights are guaranteed by a Constitution and a High Court that enforces it.
The role of religion in the new state is a major point of contention among single state advocates, specifically, should the state be secular? This is a fundamental issue that will have to be decided in the future. The ODSC program adopts the PLO’s position of non-sectarian government. Its vision of the new state is secular in the sense that the authority to govern and make laws emanates from the consent of the governed and not from religious law, and there is no official religion, although religious laws may still function alongside civil institutions. Since the term “secular” has so many connotations, mostly negative to religious people, and since the majority of Palestinians and Israelis alike describe themselves as “religious” or “traditional,” our strategy, like that of the PNC, is to advocate a non-sectarian democracy while refraining from using the red-flag term “secular.”
3. Right of Return, of Restoration and of Reintegration into Society. The single democratic state will fully implement the Right of Return of all Palestinian refugees who were expelled in 1948 and thereafter, whether living in exile abroad or currently living in Israel or the Occupied Territory. The State will aid them in returning to their country and to the places from where they were expelled. It will help them rebuild their personal lives and to be fully reintegrated into the country’s society, economy and polity. The State will do everything in its power to restore to the refugees their private and communal property and/or compensate them. Normal procedures of obtaining citizenship will be extended to those choosing to immigrate to the country.Coursing throughout the ODSC plan is a commitment to human rights. Article 3 acknowledges and prioritizes the right of Palestinian refugees and their families to return to their homeland. But the refugees do not possess only the right to return. Based on the political logic of our program – that of equal citizenship – refugees should return as part of the in-gathering of our country’s citizens. Just because people flee a conflict, are driven out or merely choose voluntarily to reside elsewhere, they do not lose their citizenship unless they take steps to revoke it. The return of the refugees and their descendants represents nothing more than restoring to them a civil status they should never have lost in the first place. Indeed, UN Resolution 194, adopted in December 1948, resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.
The ODSC program goes further than mere return and enfranchisement of the refugee community, however. It recognizes that this population is, in large part, traumatized, impoverished, undereducated and under-skilled. It will need a generation or more, supported by a vigorous program of affirmative action and economic investment, before they truly “come home” as integrated, and productive members of society. Hence Article 3 affirms that the new state “will help them rebuild their personal lives and to be fully reintegrated into the country’s society, economy and polity. The State will do everything in its power to restore to the refugees their private and communal property of the refugees and/or compensate them.”
4. Individual Rights. No State law, institution or practices may discriminate among its citizens on the basis of national or social origin, color, gender, language, religion or political opinion, or sexual orientation. A single citizenship confers on all the State’s residents the right to freedom of movement, the right to reside anywhere in the country, and equal rights in every domain.
As a liberal democracy, the post-colonial state envisioned in the ODSC plan guarantees equal rights to all citizens regardless of their national, religious or ethnic affiliations. This goes a long way towards dismantling the structures of domination and separation. It also reorients Arab-Jewish relationships around the principles of equality, shared human rights and coexistence, thus paving the way for the emergence of a shared civil society, as proponents of a “rights-based approach” envision.
This very practice of democratization fundamentally alters the institutionalized inequality that exists between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, whether they be Palestinian citizens of Israel (“Israeli Arabs”) or stateless inhabitants of the OPT. Although Israel presents itself as the “only democracy in the Middle East,” we understand that Zionism is all about establishing an exclusively “Jewish” state, a goal and political reality that forecloses any genuine civil equality.
In fact, Israel has never tried to hide this. While Palestinian citizens of Israel have a right to vote, their vote only counts if it is cast for a Zionist party; the Joint Arab List, currently the third largest party in the Knesset, is effectively frozen out of all coalitions and political decision-making. In fact, the very notion that Israel should be a democracy of equal rights for all its citizens has been rejected outright; in 2018 the Knesset refused to even discuss a bill by the Joint Arab List calling for equal rights on the grounds that it “seeks to deny Israel’s existence as the state of the Jewish people.” (Not even the Arab parties can support, let alone legislate, the idea of a single democratic state over all of historic Palestine. To simply participate in elections, candidates and their parties must declare that they support Israel as a “Jewish” state. In every election the Arab parties are disqualified, only to be allowed to run after appeals to the Supreme Court.) Palestinians of East Jerusalem, we should note, are barred from voting in national elections because they have not been granted citizenship – although Israel officially annexed East Jerusalem twice (in 1967 and 1980). As “permanent residents” they may vote only for the (Israeli) Jerusalem municipality, and live in fear of having their residency evoked if they travel abroad for any reason.
5. Collective Rights. Within the framework of a single democratic state, the Constitution will also protect collective rights and the freedom of association, whether national, ethnic, religious, class or gender. Constitutional guarantees will ensure that all languages, arts and culture can flourish and develop freely. No group or collectivity will have any privileges, nor will any group, party or collectivity have the ability to leverage any control or domination over others. Parliament will not have the authority to enact any laws that discriminate against any community under the Constitution.
Palestinian citizens of Israel, permanent residents of the East Jerusalem and the stateless population of the West Bank and Gaza share a common political status in one fundamental way: Israel does not recognize their collective rights as a people – indeed, their very collective existence. In 2018 the Knesset passed a Basic Law (akin to a constitutional amendment in a country with no constitution) entitled “Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People,” popularly known as the Jewish Nationality Law. It stemmed from a contradiction in Israel’s Declaration of Independence that has longed dogged the Zionist idea: that between “the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine” and the commitment that the Jewish state “will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens.” The law has myriad consequences, but for our purposes two stand out. First, it affirms that while Palestinian citizens may have individual rights, they have no collective rights; the State of Israel “belongs to” the Jewish people exclusively. Second, and more threatening to Palestinian civil rights in Israel, the law instructs the courts that when a conflict arises between a “democratic” principle (such as equal legal or human rights) and “Jewish values” (such as protecting Israel as a “Jewish” state, expropriating land, denying building permits or economic rights), the court must rule on the basis of the latter.
Nonetheless, when we move to a one-state perspective, it is clear that the land between the river and the Sea has become bi-national. It might seem, therefore that binationalism, a political system that recognizes the existence of two national groups in the country and calls for a democracy based on power-sharing or federation that protects each group’s collective national rights, should be the foundation of the new shared state. While no single state option is acceptable to Israeli Jews, and there is no way to promote it within the Israeli political system, the binational option would in principle be the easiest one-state concept to “sell,” since it validates Israeli Jewish national identity and leaves it intact as a fundamental component of the new state structure.
Although binationalism creates power-sharing mechanisms, decentralizes authority, encourages inclusive coalitions and grants each group some autonomy, it does not amount to decolonization. On the contrary, Palestinians tend to reject it because it validates Zionist settler colonialism. “Recognizing national rights of Jewish settlers in Palestine or any part of it,” contends Palestinian activist Omar Barghouti, “cannot but imply accepting the right of colonists to self-determination,” and therefore contradicts the very notion of decolonization. In this the Palestinian-American journalist Ali Abunimah concurs.
The ODSC program recognizes the binational character of the country, of course, but understands that reinforcing ethno‐national segregation through binationalism contradicts the goal of decolonization. It also makes the emergence of a new, common political community difficult by perpetuating impenetrable barriers of identity and interaction between citizens. The ODSC plan prefers to nurture the emergence of a new “national” (state-based) identity and political community, relegating ethno-religious national identities to expression within each community.
Article 5 of the ODSC program on “collective rights” thus states: “Within the framework of a single democratic state, the Constitution will also protect collective rights and the freedom of association, whether national, ethnic, religious, class or gender.” Most Palestinians understand that Israeli Jews will remain in the country after decolonization. That is not the problem. The problem is Palestinians being forced to legitimize, even institutionalize, Zionist national rights. By recognizing the right of people to their collective identities the ODSC plan merely lays the foundation for a cultural plural society within the framework of a shared unitary state. As the Palestinian/Israeli Raef Zreik puts it:
For the Palestinians, injustices of the past cannot be overlooked, and the way the colonial past has shaped the relationship between the two communities must be tackled and unpacked…. The settler cannot simply one day stop being a settler as if there is no past: the past injustices and dispossessions must be settled and addressed.
The collective communal and national aspect must also be taken into account for the Israeli Jews. Any forward-looking solution must take the collective Israeli-Jewish identity into account and give an answer to people’s need and interest in their culture, religion, nationality, and history. In this sense, the category of citizenship does not aim to comprehensively replace these interests, but rather to create a space where a conversation based on an equal footing can take place. Citizenship, in this regard, stands for the new “we,” based on equal terms of engagement. It does not abolish identity but puts it in its place and tames it.
Under the rubric of “ethical decolonization,” Barghouti accepts the possibility of the birth of a common, post-oppression identity where “the indigenous Palestinians and the indigenized settlers” can live in equality, peace and security, individually and collectively.
Any program for a single state will also have to deal with the fears the two peoples harbor of the other’s communal identity, understandable given the background of more than a century of colonialism, resistance and suffering. Besides their refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Zionist national identity, many Palestinians simply do not believe that Israelis will actually relinquish power. For their part, the large majority of Israeli Jews also resist inclusiveness in a democratic, citizen-based civil society with “Arabs,” their permanent enemies and contestants for ownership of the land. Article 5 attempts to address these fears, affirming; “No group or collectivity will have any privileges, nor will any group, party or collectivity have the ability to leverage any control or domination over others. Parliament will not have the authority to enact any laws that discriminate against any community under the Constitution.”
The very process of engaging in this dual process of decolonization and nation-building may well help forge a new civil society and shared national identity. Over time, as civil life assumes a normalcy and routine, it will expand until it eventually encompasses, to one degree or another, all sections of the population. One example might illustrate how this process of nation-building might work. In the 2019 international FIFA football standings, Israel was ranked 93 and Palestine 103 (out of 211 national teams). Neither team has managed to break into the World Cup. Imagine if, by combining them, a strong enough team would emerge that would be a World Cup competitor. That alone would go a long way towards creating a common national identity and acceptability of the Other. Examples of immigrants or minorities becoming stars of international teams demonstrate the dynamic power of sports, entertainment, the media and other sectors of civil society towards integration.
6. Economy and Economic Justice. Our vision seeks to achieve justice, and this includes social and economic justice. Economic policy must address the decades of exploitation and discrimination which have sown deep socioeconomic gaps among the people living in the land. The income distribution in Israel/Palestine is more unequal than any country in the world. A State seeking justice must develop a creative and long-term redistributive economic policy to ensure that all citizens have equal opportunity to attain education, productive employment, economic security and a dignified standard of living.
We begin by deracializing the economy. In an ethno-nationalist state like Israel, access to land, natural resources and economic opportunities and the right to social benefits all depend on what national, ethnic and religious group you “belong to.” Decolonization must first of all ensure equal access and equitable redistribution of resources to all the country’s citizens. But it must go deeper than that. While Palestinians and Israeli Jews alike desire a modern economy, and many are enraptured of capitalism’s promises of a good life as consumers, our role in establishing a new polity is not merely to replace one set of political and economic elites with another.
Article 6 sets out briefly the fundamental expectations that the new economy must fulfill. Much work remains to be done in the sphere of land reform, economics and social policy. A proper balance must be found between a market-based economy – which, after all, is still the global norm – and a kind of eco-socialism that is egalitarian and sustainable. It must offer equal access to all forms of employment, a safety net of job protections and benefits, and shelter for non-commodifiable social and cultural resources.
7. Constructing a Shared Civil Society. The State shall nurture a vital civil society comprised of common civil institutions, in particular educational, cultural and economic. Alongside religious marriage the State will provide civil marriage.
Article 7 turns to the next phase of decolonization: the processes of constructing a post-colonial polity and shared civil society. The goal of a single state is to normalize relations among its citizens. That requires a shared civil society. Settlers can only be “sufficiently indigenized” if a civil space is opened to them, conditional on their readiness to engage in the decolonization process. Indeed, only when citizenship is deracialized can a level civil “playing field” emerge.
Once participation in a democratic polity and a civil society of equals becomes normalized, the conditions arise for the forging of a new post-colonial relationship between Palestinians and Israeli Jews that transcends the legal formalities of common citizenship. In this new relationship, which, following Mahmood Mamdani, we are calling a political community, the Palestinians regain their sovereignty, their rights and their country within the framework of a single democratic state shared equally with Israeli Jews and others. For their part, Israeli Jews, by accepting this new relationship enabled by the indigenous Palestinians, are now able to join in fully as the country moves on towards its post-colonial future. Only at this point does the name of the country emerge (whatever it will be), the expression of a new state-generated “national” identity.
For the sake of brevity, I won’t go into detail over the next three articles of the ODSC plan, which are fairly self-explanatory. They are:
8. Commitment to Human Rights, Justice and Peace. The State shall uphold international law and seek the peaceful resolution of conflicts through negotiation and collective security in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The State will sign and ratify all international treaties on human rights and its people shall reject racism and promote social, cultural and political rights as set out in relevant United Nations covenants.
9. Our Role in the Region. The ODS Campaign will join with all progressive forces in the Arab world struggling for democracy, social justice and egalitarian societies free from tyranny and foreign domination. The State shall seek democracy and freedom in a Middle East that respects its many communities, religions, traditions and ideologies, yet strives for equality, freedom of thought and innovation. Achieving a just political settlement in Palestine, followed by a thorough process of decolonization, will contribute measurably to these efforts.
Article 9 turns to decolonization in its regional context. It does not take place in isolation, disconnected either from its region or, globally, from international politics or racialized capitalism.
10. International responsibility. On a global level, the ODS Campaign views itself as part of the progressive forces striving for an alternative global order that is just, equitable and free of any oppression, racism, imperialism and colonialism.
How Do We Get There?
The good news is that the campaign to decolonize Palestine is further along than we realize. Grassroots resistance among Palestinians has succeeded in mobilizing major segments of the international civil society – trade unions, religious denominations, intellectuals, academics and students, political and human rights organizations, activist groups, alternative media outlets and social media, general public opinion, and even some government officials and parliamentarians. The Palestinian cause has attained a global prominence equal to that of the anti-apartheid movement. Palestinians have become emblematic of oppressed peoples everywhere. A wide range of activities advance the Palestinian cause. Protest actions in the OPT, grassroots campaigns, lobbying, hosting international conferences, producing a wealth of books, articles, films, social media presentations and advocacy materials. Israel’s panic over the BDS campaign demonstrates that it has already lost in the Court of Public Opinion. Only the shallow support of governments, Christian evangelicals and a diminishing Jewish Establishment remain.
What is lacking, of course, is a political end-game. The illusionary two-state solution collapsed with the Oslo “peace process” that started in 1993, leaving us all floundering. It is that crucial piece, a political program together with a strategy for summoning power in its pursuit, that the ODSC, alongside others, is attempting to insert. So armed with an analysis, a shared vision of the future and the outlines of a political program, let’s now turn now to strategy. How do we get there?
The strategy of political organization proposed here builds on the international support the Palestinian cause has generated. It seeks to offset Israel’s strength as a recognized state and its military and economic superiority with civil society organization. This model sets out a strategic “tripartite alliance” among three main political actors: the Palestinians at home, in exile and abroad; the Israeli Jewish public; and the international community, both civil society and governments.
The Palestinians. The struggle for decolonization must be led, of course, by the Palestinians themselves. It is their struggle. No other party can define for them what decolonization entails, what will replace it. No one else can represent their collective voice. On the surface it appears that the Palestinians have little power or leverage. Yet as strong as Israel is, it is not winning in the Court of Public Opinion. True, it has the support of many governments, but that does not translate into widespread support among the world’s peoples. Indeed, a worldwide Palestine solidarity movement already exists. For all its seeming clout, Israel has not been able to bring its colonial venture to completion. It has not been able to normalize itself as the replacement of Palestine. Nor has it succeeded in removing Palestine from the international agenda.
The international community. The international civil society represents the Palestinians’ strongest potential ally. It represents a prime source of summoning effective power. Although the struggle for freedom in Palestine has become a global issue, neither the PA nor Palestinian grassroots leadership has taken advantage of this wellspring of support to support a political plan. Even when the international public has been tapped, support remains limited and unfocused by the lack of a political end-game. The BDS campaign supports a “rights-based” approach but its three demands – ending the occupation, enacting the Right of Return and ensuring equal rights for Palestinian citizens of Israel – fall well short of a political program.
Armed, however, with an end-game such as that of the ODSC, the international civil society is eminently mobilizable. A coordinated, focused, Palestinian-led one-state campaign, evoking the moral and legal authority of international law and human rights, would empower the international grassroots to pressure their governments to change their policies, as the anti-apartheid struggle did. It must be mobilized and led, however, by Palestinians and their anti-colonial Israeli Jewish allies, armed with a political program, strategy and effective organization.
Israeli Jews. There is a large literature on the importance of engaging settlers in the process of decolonization. The lesson of Oslo suggests, however, that that may be futile. Engagement, unsettling, decolonization, the construction of a new, shared political community and, ultimately, reconciliation in a post-colonial reality – these are not processes that interest settlers. The vast majority of Israelis, like the whites in South Africa, will not be willing partners in the process of decolonization. Why should they? As the dominant population enjoying a monopoly over the country’s economy and politics, what would motivate them to bring in the Palestinians? As a settler population whose goal has always been the Judaization of Palestine, why would they give that up, especially as their colonial project seems on the edge of victory? And having demonized “the Arabs” as mere terrorists who have no national claim to our country, how could we do an about-face and suddenly embrace them as fellow citizens? No, if South Africa is an example, decolonization will have to be imposed on Israeli society. The Palestinians will have to empower themselves to a point where Israeli Jews must engage with them, as the ANC did in South Africa.
This does not mean that Israeli Jews are irrelevant. Particularly relevant is that (small) segment of the population who are more open to civil or “liberal nationalism” that could entertain a pluralistic democracy. As in South Africa, the presence of Israeli co-resistors, “colonists who refuse,” lends credibility to the struggle. The academic literature affirms the possibility of settlers being transformed through anti-colonial resistance. Shared resistance, over time, may nurture the emergence of a post-colonial society.
The Tripartite Alliance that thus emerges among Palestinian Arabs, their Israeli Jewish allies and the international civil society has one primary objective. Given the inability to overcome settler colonialism from the inside, it seeks to marshal those forces, especially of international public opinion, that can cause its collapse. Israeli settler colonialism, like that of South Africa, is only sustainable as long as it has international support. The main task of the Triple Alliance must be to mobilize public opinion abroad so that governments change their policies towards Israel and the issue of decolonization.
How, then, does settler colonialism actually end? When a new, inclusive political community arises. Decolonization means replacing the colonial regime and its unequal structure of settler/indigenous relations with a new polity and economy (including access to land and resources). It means the emergence of a civil society which is genuinely inclusive and democratic, yet also accepting of cultural pluralism. Replacing an ethnocratic colonial state that “belongs” to one particular group with a democracy. The ODSC plan, while requiring much more detail, systematically targets these structures of domination and control. And that is why it is so important to have a political end-game that provides a clear blueprint for decolonization, and not only a vision. ■