

## A Reply to Henry Kissinger and Fouad Ajami

By Norman Finkelstein

*On the evening of June 3, 1992, in New York City, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Johns Hopkins University Professor Fouad Ajami addressed a pro-Israel fundraising benefit sponsored by the Jerusalem Foundation.*

*Norman G. Finkelstein received his doctoral degree from Princeton University for a dissertation on *The Theory of Zionism*. He has written extensively on the Israel-Palestine conflict and has lived and worked in the Occupied Territories.*

The \$250-a-plate event was moderated by CBS news anchor Dan Rather, with introductory remarks by New Republic editor-in-chief Martin Peretz and concluding remarks by US News and World Report editor-in-chief Mort Zuckerman.

The fundraiser achieved immediate notoriety because of a remark by Henry Kissinger that "you can't really believe anything an Arab says" and an equally offensive slur by Fouad Ajami that he "be spared the ceremony of eating with a Bedouin."<sup>1</sup>

Both Kissinger and Ajami were acclaimed by Martin Peretz for the singular insight they brought to bear on the "unflinching realities of the


Middle East" and by Mort Zuckerman for the unprecedented "brilliance" they cast on the subject that night. Some of these more singular insights—along with comments by Dan Rather—deserve a response.

*Professor Ajami condemned Arab nationalism as "the most deadly ideology in the world" because it is "infected with Germanic notions of nationalism." He acclaimed Israel, by contrast, as one of the few democracies in the world today.*

The one nationalism in the Middle East that is steeped in "Germanic notions of nationalism" is Zionism.

Historians generally divide nationalism into two basic types: liberal nationalism with roots in the French Revolution and ethnic nationalism with roots in German Romanticism. Liberal nationalism has as its main pillar the citizen: the state is constituted by its citizens and between citizens is complete legal equality. Romanticism's main pillar is the ethnic nation: each state belongs to a particular ethnic nation, and the latter consequently occupies a privileged position in the state.

Zionism originated as a reaction to the perceived failures of liberal nationalism. Zionists believed that the liberal idea of citizenship neither could nor should work. Authentic communities, they held, were not formed by legal, juridical bonds—i.e., constitutions—but by organic, mystical ties that precede and tran-



Norman Finkelstein

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## About This Issue

First, about *another* issue: Bosnia. This summer I worked on an A.M.E.U. book called "The Colonization of Palestine: Lest the Civilized World Forget," a detailed listing of all 394 towns and villages destroyed and depopulated by Zionist forces in 1948. Lest we forget? More to the point, I thought, how could any civilized world allow such ethnic cleansing in the first place? A colleague tried to explain: When one family is driven by terror from its home, parents and children fleeing in panic, that's a human tragedy; when thousands of families do it, that's a refugee problem.

I ask our readers, if you have not done so already—or even if you have—to contact your elected representatives and demand that we, the superpower, do something to stop this filthy "cleansing" of the Muslim population in Bosnia. The White House Comment Line is 202-456-1111; Members of Congress can be reached at 202-224-3121. It's not a refugee problem. It's the savage destruction of one innocent family, multiplied by thousands.

Now, about this issue. It, too, has to do with ethnic cleansing and with the way in which the oppressors justify their savagery by turning the victim into the villain. In the case of the Palestinians, Zionist propaganda long has marketed the myths that the Palestinians voluntarily left their homes in 1948, that they started the war in 1967, and that they have refused every Israeli offer of peace ever since. One comes upon these myths repeatedly in letters to the editor, even though they have been thoroughly discredited by a new generation of Israeli-historians. Which makes it all the more puzzling to find them echoed in re-

cent addresses given by former Secretary of State (and CBS News board member) Henry Kissinger, and Johns Hopkins University professor (and CBS News consultant) Fouad Ajami, at a pro-Israel fund-raising event in New York, moderated by reporter (and CBS anchorperson) Dan Rather.

We have invited Professor Norman Finkelstein to respond to their pronouncements. It was Norman who, as a graduate student at Princeton University, first challenged the accuracy of Joan Peter's "From Time Immemorial," which claimed that Palestinians never did constitute an indigenous majority in those areas of Palestine which became Israel in 1948 [See *The Link*, Jan.-March 1985]. Since then, at considerable detriment to his own career, Norman continues to challenge those myths that suggest that Palestinians deserve what they got, moreover, are even blessed that they ended up with such benevolent occupiers.

Our selection of books and videos on pages 13-15 was made with our feature article in mind. Many deal with the history of Palestine's colonization. We have also selected a number of beautifully bound and illustrated books that make ideal gifts for the holiday season.

We at A.M.E.U. extend to all our readers our choicest best wishes for the holidays and for a truly *New Year* of justice and peace for all.

John F. Mahoney  
Executive Director

scend the political. Thus, Jews should not seek an artificial sense of belonging in a liberal state based on citizenship—a quest that, in any case, was destined to fail, as the Dreyfus affair supposedly showed—but rather a real sense of belonging in an ethnic community that had its “own” state.

Historians generally agree on the “Germanic” origins of Zionism. The great theoretician of nationalism, Hans Kohn, for example, pointed to the “German sources” that influenced Theodor Herzl, the founding father of modern Zionism. A recent expression of this view can be found in a study of early Zionist politics by the mainstream Israeli historian Anita Shapira. “Ironically,” she writes, “it was the Romantic-exclusivist brand of nationalism (whose prescriptions meant that the Jews could never be an integral part of the [German] organic nation) that contained certain ideas able to function as a basis for an elaborated notion of a Jewish nation and national movement.” The Zionist idea “adopt[ed] and transplant[ed] concepts deriving from German or Pan-Slavic sources of *völkisch* nationalism.”<sup>1</sup>

The “Germanic notions of nationalism” culminated in Nazism, which is presumably why Ajami condemns them as “deadly.” Revealingly, the only Jews for whom Hitler reserved any praise in *Mein Kampf* were the Zionists, who “came out sharply in confirmation of the national character of the Jews,” thereby conceding the central Nazi tenet that, his citizenship notwithstanding, “the Jew is no German.” (Unlike the Zionists, however, Hitler did not believe that Jews were capable of founding an independent state.)<sup>2</sup>

In 1934, Joachim Prinz, a rabbi and Zionist leader in Germany (and future president of the American Jewish Congress) lucidly summarized the basic affinity of the Zionist and Nazi national visions and their mutual incompatibility with liberal “assimilationism”:

The theory of assimilation has broken down. We have no longer any refuge. We want assimilation to be replaced by the

conscious recognition of the Jewish nation and the Jewish race. Only those Jews who recognize their own specificity [i.e., Zionists] can gain respect from a state [i.e., Nazi Germany] founded on the principle of nation and race...From every last hiding place of baptising and mixed marriage [the Jews] are being pulled out. This does not make us unhappy. In this coercion to acknowledge and clearly stand by one's own community, we see at the same time the fulfillment of our dreams.<sup>3</sup>

A respected Israeli writer, Aharon Barnea, reflected on the “cunning of history,” inasmuch as “a state for the Jewish people was...created which regards the Holocaust as the ultimate reason for its existence,” yet “the current Jewish ethnic concept of nationality traces its origins to the national romantic model which Germany developed to such-perfection.”<sup>4</sup>

The Romantic essence of the Israeli state was reaffirmed by a crucial High Court decision in 1989. Four of the five judges concurred that any political party which advocates complete equality between Arab and Jew can be barred from fielding candidates in an election. By so opining, the Israeli High Court effectively stated that—in the words of the eminent Hebrew University legal scholar, David Kretzmer—“the state is the state of the Jews, both those presently resident in the country as well as those resident abroad. Even if the Arabs have equal rights on all other levels the implication is abundantly clear: Israel is not their state.” (emphasis in original) In sum, Israel's highest judicial body confirmed that it is not a democratic state.<sup>5</sup>

Professor Ajami deemed “very interesting” the question, “Is there such a thing as a Palestinian nation?” He further ridiculed Palestinian Nationalism as merely reactive since Zionism “gave birth” to it, and because it “has always turned to Zionism for inspiration and plagiarism”—citing the example of the *United Palestine Appeal* which seemed to imitate the *United Jewish Appeal*.

Traditionally, the question of

what is a “nation” has evoked a wide range of responses. Many Marxists have sought to establish “objective” criteria of nationhood—e.g., in Stalin's classic formulation, “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”

The democratic tradition, on the other hand, has generally confined itself to the “subjective” criterion of a compelling “collective will.” Thus, in his classic essay, “What is a Nation?”, Ernest Renan writes:

A nation is a great solidarity...It presupposes a past, but it resumes itself in the present by a tangible fact: the consent, the clearly expressed desire, to continue life in common. The existence of a nation is a daily plebiscite.<sup>6</sup>

By this reckoning, the longevity and “objective” correlates of a nation are of lesser importance than the current reality of its “desire” to live a “life in common.” And this aspiration to share a life together deserves—at any rate, in the democratic tradition—recognition. For, in the words of John Stuart Mill, “One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves.”<sup>7</sup>

The usual terms of the debate on whether or not a Palestinian nation “exists” would thus seem to be beside the point. For it may matter little how enduring a phenomenon Palestinian nationalism is or how distinct Palestinian culture is. (One may add that most nations in the world today probably could not meet these criteria—including the United States. The American nation as we now know it only came into being the past century and one would be hard pressed even today to define a uniform, distinct American culture.) Clearly there does exist among the community describing itself as Palestinian a collective will to establish an independent state—and, as Mill says, that is sufficient warrant to grant it one.

Furthermore, if there is some truth to Ajami's claim that Zionism "gave birth to Palestinian nationalism," there is even more truth to the claim that anti-Semitic nationalism gave birth to Zionism. Palestinian nationalism arose at roughly the same time as all the other local nationalisms—Syrian, Iraqi, etc. — in the Middle East. However much its dynamic may have been influenced by Zionism, it was fundamentally a product of the state system carved out by the colonial powers there.

Yet, with the Jews plainly in mind, Herzl himself averred that it was a "common foe" that forms a nation. "The enemy is the iron hoop that holds a nation together. It sounds like a tautology, like the most banal truism to remark: nations will last as long as they are hostile to each other. But that is the simple truth."<sup>8</sup> Indeed so much

*the only "window of opportunity" (Ajami) for a peaceful resolution of the Arab Israeli conflict was the "special circumstances" (Kissinger) between 1973 and the signing of the Camp David Accords. The other negotiating efforts foundered because the "proposals consist[ed] of Israel giving up territory and the Arabs granting the word 'peace'" (Kissinger).*

Neither the Arabs nor the Zionists were in principle committed to the 1947 United Nations General Assembly resolution partitioning Palestine. The Arab position is well known, the Zionist one less so. Israeli writer Simha Flapan observes that none of the Zionist parties had given up the aspiration of a Jewish state in all of Palestine. He deems Ben-Gurion's acceptance of the 1947 resolution "an example of Zionist pragmatism

"a sense of triumph and drunkenness with victory" whose not to exploit it. In the course of the war, Israel had occupied part of the proposed Palestinian state (Jordan, with whom it partially colluded, occupied most of the remainder) and effectively expelled some 750,000 Palestinians. Its refusal to make substantive concessions on these two issues—not recognition of Israel which the Arab states conceded—proved the main obstacle to a negotiated settlement. As Avi Shlaim concludes:

In 1949 the Arabs did recognize Israel's right to exist, they were willing to meet face to face to negotiate peace, they had their conditions for making peace with Israel, and Israel rejected those conditions because they were incompatible not with her survival as an independent state but with her determination to keep all the territory she held and to resist the repatriation of refugees.<sup>12</sup>

Or, as Ben-Gurion records Abba Eban, Israel's ambassador to the UN, saying: "[Eban] sees no need to run after peace. The armistice is sufficient for us; if we run after peace, the Arabs will demand a price of us—borders [that is, in terms of territory] or refugees [that is, repatriation] or both. Let us wait a few years."<sup>13</sup>

In sum, peace, as Israeli historian Ilan Pappé puts it; "was not a priority" for the Israelis in 1949.<sup>14</sup>

In the wake of the June 1967 war, a second "window of opportunity" opened up for peacefully resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict — only to be slammed shut again by Israel.

The basic terms of such a settlement were set out in UN Resolution 242. As widely interpreted (including by the United States), Israel was to withdraw from the territories it had occupied during the recent armed hostilities in accordance with the principle of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," and the Arab states were to recognize Israel in accordance with the principle that every State had a right to "live in security."<sup>15</sup>

Egypt and Jordan fully endorsed

### **... there is even more truth to the claim that anti-Semitic nationalism gave birth to Zionism.**

is Jewish nationalism a product of modern anti-Semitism that, even as late as 1913, only about one percent of the world's Jews had signified their adherence to Zionism.<sup>9</sup>

We saw above that, although Zionism was born of the struggle against anti-Semitic nationalism, it turned to this same nationalism for its essential framework. Interestingly, this is perhaps true not only of Zionist ideology but of such basic Zionist institutions as the kibbutzim as well. Thus, George Mosse observes in his important study on the intellectual origins of the Third Reich that, although the connection between "Germanic utopias and the Kibbutzim movement" remains to be fully established, the kibbutzim mark — "ironically" — the "fullest realization" of the *volksisch* "return to nature" ideology. The Palestinian national movement is not the first to find, as Ajami puts it, "inspiration and plagiarism" in the enemy's camp.<sup>10</sup>

*Both Dr. Kissinger and Professor Ajami stated that, before the Gulf War,*

par excellence. It was a tactical acceptance, a vital step in the right direction—a springboard for expansion when circumstances proved more judicious."

Ben-Gurion dreaded the prospect of peace overtures by Palestinian "moderates," the culmination of which could only be an Arab state in Palestine and the confinement of Israel within borders short of his territorial designs. Contrariwise, the refusal of Palestinian "radicals" to negotiate would give Ben-Gurion a free hand to conquer all of Palestine. Hence, it was Ben-Gurion's "belief...that Zionist expansionism would be better served by leaving the leadership of the Palestinians in the hands of the extremist Mufti than in the hands of a 'moderate' opposition. 'Rely on the Mufti' became his motto."<sup>11</sup>

Following the first Arab-Israeli war, a "window of opportunity" to peacefully resolve the conflict opened, but Israel, flush with what Israeli historian Benny Morris calls

these terms; Israel did not. Replying in March 1969 to the queries of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring, the Jordanian and Egyptian governments avowed separately but in identical language that they:

...accept[] the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries and free from threats or acts of force, provided that Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories it occupied since 5 June, 1967, and implements the Security Council Resolution of 22 November, 1967.

Israel, however, fudged on the matter of withdrawal, stating that "the disposition of forces" would have to await "the boundaries determined in the peace treaties."<sup>16</sup>

Acting through Jarring's offices, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat offered Israel in February 1971 a full peace treaty on the pre-June 1967 borders, with security guarantees, recognized borders, and so on. The Israelis promptly rejected the offer for precisely the same reasons as in 1949: "if we continue to hold out, we can obtain more territory" (Cabinet member and General Haim Bar Lev).<sup>17</sup>

With diplomacy at a dead impasse because of Israeli intransigence—*crucially backed by none other than Kissinger himself*—Sadat resorted to force to recover the territories occupied by Israel, just as he had repeatedly threatened to do if Israel rejected his UN-brokered peace offering. The strictly limited nature of the Arab surprise attack in 1973 is confirmed by Major-General Avraham Tamir, former Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. He observes that, "in launching their attack," Egypt and Syria had only "limited objectives." The "military objective for Syria was to regain the whole Golan Heights" and the "military objective for Egypt was to break the Israeli hold on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and regain Western Sinai"—that is, to recover their own territory.<sup>18</sup>

In the aftermath of the 1973 war, the United States sought to bring Egypt, which had proven itself a

more formidable military power than imagined, under its hegemony, an effort that culminated in the Camp David Accords. In this regard, consider Kissinger's contention that Israeli-Arab negotiations have typi-

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cally foundered because the "negotiating proposals consist of Israel giving up territory and the Arabs granting the word 'peace.'" The one exception, he claims, is the "special circumstances between '73 and '80." Yet, that is precisely what happened during the negotiations leading to Camp David: Sadat was promised in advance that he "could expect to regain all of Sinai in exchange for peace," so he "journeyed to Jerusalem on the historic visit that made world news." (Tamir)<sup>19</sup>

Meanwhile, beginning in the mid-1970s, yet another "window of opportunity" opened up for resolving the Israeli-Arab, and in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Taking into account Palestinian aspirations, the terms of UN Resolution 242 were modified to include the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories from which Israel withdrew. (242 had made no explicit mention of Palestinian national rights, referring only to a "just settlement of the refugee problem.") The essence of the new international consensus was captured in a January 1976 UN Security Council resolution, which called for a settlement on the 1967 borders, with "appropriate arrangements...to guarantee...the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries," including Israel and a new Palestinian state in the occupied territories. The resolution was supported by Egypt, Syria and Jordan and "prepared" (accord-

ing to Chaim Herzog, Israel's UN Ambassador at the time) by the Palestine Liberation Organization. It was vetoed, however, by the United States (effectively, Kissinger) and Israel refused even to attend the Se-

curity Council session.<sup>20</sup>

Israeli political scientist, Avner Yaniv, persuasively argues that it was because of the PLO's willingness to resolve the Middle East conflict on the basis of the international consensus favoring a two-state settlement that Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982.

Yaniv reports that Israel has always viewed Palestinian "moderation" not Palestinian "radicalism" as the real "political menace." This is because the "moderates"—Arafat and the PLO mainstream—have more and more tended to support a two-state settlement since the 1970s whereas "all Israeli cabinets since 1967," as well as "leading mainstream doves," have strenuously opposed a Palestinian state in the occupied territories.

Israel consequently resorted to every imaginable subterfuge — including murderous unprovoked attacks on southern Lebanon — "for the purpose of weakening PLO moderates and strengthening radicals." By so "ensuring the PLO's inflexibility," Israel hoped to "saddle the PLO with a common platform which, owing to its denial of Israel's right to exist, would never make the PLO palatable to European and American opinion." (Recall here Ben-Gurion's dread of Palestinian "moderates" and strategy of "relying on the Mufti" to secure his expansive territorial aims in 1948.)

Yet, Yaniv continues, despite Israel's provocations, by 1982 the PLO was "visibly" committed to a "more compromising approach toward the

Zionist state than previously" and increased international pressure was being brought to bear on Israel "to deal with the PLO directly," since its mainstream was no longer wedded to extremist demands but was "basically moderate."

Yaniv succinctly poses the dilemma confronting Israel in the summer of 1982: "Israel had essentially two options: a political move leading to a historical compromise with the PLO, or preemptive military action against it." To fend off the PLO's "peace offensive," Israel finally chose "military action." In short, "destroying the PLO as a political force capable of claiming a Palestine state on the West Bank" was "the *raison d'être* of the entire operation."<sup>21</sup>

With the PLO smashed, Israel imagined that its hand would be free to incorporate the occupied territories. Hence, the wry comment of former chief of Israeli military intelligence, Yehoshaphat Harkabi, that "Calling the Lebanon War 'The War for the Peace of the Galilee' is more than a misnomer. It would have been more honest to call it 'the War to Safeguard the Occupation of the West Bank.'" *New Republic* editor-in-chief Martin Peretz, who introduced the speakers at the Jerusalem fundraiser, clearly understood this connection on the war's eve when he urged Israel to administer to the PLO a "lasting military defeat" that "will clarify to the Palestinians in the West Bank that their struggle for an independent state has suffered a setback for many years."<sup>22</sup>

One may add that, already at the time of the Camp David Accords, Israel intended to flout the international consensus by asserting sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. Avraham Tamir, who served as national security advisor in the Begin government, observes that, for "the Likud, the point of departure regarding the [Camp David] autonomy arrangements was the eventual incorporation of the territories into Israel." Indeed, it was the Camp David Accords that enabled Israel to deliver the PLO that crushing blow in Lebanon which, as we saw above,

was held to be a precondition for incorporating the West Bank and Gaza. Tamir again: "If there had been no state of peace with Egypt and no security arrangements in Sinai,...the IDP would have had to deploy considerable forces in the Negev during the Lebanese war, and quite possibly would have not had freedom of action to occupy all of Southern Lebanon and lay siege to Beirut."<sup>23</sup>

Since the war in Lebanon, and especially in the wake of the Palestinian intifada, support for the two-state settlement has continued to grow and by now includes almost the entire world community, except the United States and Israel. The Palestine National Council, meeting in Algiers in November 1988, endorsed such a settlement formally, as has the United Nations General Assembly repeatedly over the years, for example, in 1989 by a vote of 151-3, the three negative votes being cast by the United States, Israel and Dominica.<sup>24</sup>

The historical record reveals, then, that there has been many a "window of opportunity" the past four decades for peacefully resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. In each case, Israel let the opportunity pass—with Kissinger firmly closing the window in 1971 and 1976. What made the "circumstances" surrounding the Camp David Accords "special" was that Israel and the United States, for once, did not block such a settlement—but, alas, only because they viewed a separate peace treaty with Egypt as serving their more ambitious regional aims.

*Dr. Kissinger stated that, "You will find very few conflicts in the Arab world, between Arabs, that have ever been settled by a document that proclaimed permanent peace, and then permanent peace in fact occurred." He went on to argue that, unlike the "really quite concrete" Israelis, "you can't really believe anything an Arab says."*

The Arab world is not the only place where documents that "proclaimed permanent peace" did not result in "permanent peace." Indeed, so far as breaking agreements is con-

cerned, the standard set by the West is most impressive—as Kissinger, of all people, ought to know from extensive personal experience. For example, David Stannard observes in an important new study that the European colonists had "every intention to violate" the peace treaties that they signed with the native populations in North America and that (quoting another historian) "the Englishmen's most solemn pledge would be broken whenever opportunity conflicted with advantage."<sup>25</sup>

Consider then what the historical record reveals about the "really quite concrete" Israelis as against the Arabs who "you can't really believe."

Avi Shlaim, in his authoritative study of the peace negotiations that ensued after the 1948 war, reports that Zionist diplomacy was typified by "heavy-handedness, deviousness, and plainly unscrupulous methods." He cites the supporting opinion of Gershon Avner, who headed the Western Europe Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry in 1948:

Cleverness, *shatara* [an Arabic word meaning shrewdness or cunning], is an inseparable part of the Zionist approach. If they want to get something, and there is a straight way and a crooked way of getting it, they always take the crooked way. This is not a trait that the Oriental Jews brought to Israel. It was here from the beginning. As early as 1949 we had an argument with Ben-Gurion's men about our attitude to the armistice agreements. They always pushed to lie, to deceive, to resort to tricks. I am not opposed to lies in principle. A diplomat is a person who lies for his country. But why lie when there is nothing vital at stake? Yet, Ben-Gurion's men wanted to lie in any case, even if it was unnecessary and brought no advantage.

Notice that, according to Avner, the policy of lying for the sake of lying was not only characteristic of Zionist diplomacy in 1948, but is "an inseparable part of the Zionist approach"—or, in Shlaim's words, is

"a manifestation of, rather than an aberration from, Zionist norms."<sup>26</sup>

The Camp David Accords constitute the first and, to date, only full peace treaty between Israel and an Arab country. Harkabi, the former chief of Israeli intelligence, includes in *Israel's Fateful Hour* a close analysis of them. He observes that the Accords made no less than five explicit references to UN Resolution 242 and thus precluded Israel's annexation of the occupied territories. In his words, "The historical truth is that in the Camp David Accords Mr. Begin conceded that the West Bank and Gaza Strip would not be part of Israel."<sup>27</sup>

Yet it is precisely this fact that the Israel government steadfastly denied, stating that—in the words of the "Fundamental Guidelines of the Government," issued in 1981—"At the end of the transition period set down in the Camp David agreements, Israel will raise its claim, and act to realize its right of sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip." Harkabi concludes that, "I am deeply troubled by how evasively Israel has conducted itself in its first agreement with an Arab state. On the basis of this experience, why should other Arab countries want to conclude agreements with Israel?" Former Foreign Minister Abba Eban made much the same point, if even more emphatically. Comparing the "Fundamental Guidelines" cited above with the Camp David Accords, he remarked that he was unable to find any precedent "in the jurisprudence of any government for such a total contradiction between an international engagement and a national statement of policy."<sup>28</sup>

Consider, finally, the July 1981 ceasefire agreement between Israel and the PLO, which is the nearest precedent to date to a full peace treaty between them. All independent observers concur that the PLO scrupulously observed the agreement almost to the eve of the Israeli invasion in June 1982, notwithstanding repeated violations and murderous provocations by Israel. Indeed, the ink had hardly dried on the ceasefire agreement before Israel began preparations for the in-

vasion of Lebanon, only waiting for—in fact, desperately trying to provoke—a suitable pretext to launch it.<sup>29</sup>

The historical record thus suggests that, to put it most charitably, the Arabs have at least as good grounds for distrusting Israel. Yet, one may sensibly conclude with Harkabi that "no peace comes with a lifetime guarantee. Wars always break out of peace... [G]uarantees that peace will endure forever are utopian."<sup>30</sup>

*Dr. Kissinger stated that, "A nation whose margin of survival is as narrow as that of Israel cannot be, should not be pressured, into agreements that go against its conception of its need for survival... It is important to show more compassion for the concerns of a country that has only a very limited margin for experiment." Moderator Dan Rather added that, "For years journalists reporting out of the Middle East... were never able... to convey Dr. Kissinger's point of how fragile Israel's security is."*

Aside from perhaps three weeks in 1948, Israel's security has never been threatened.

Reviewing the new military literature on 1948, Israeli historian Benny Morris concludes that Israel had, throughout the year-long war, a "clear edge" over the Arabs in both numbers and equipment, with the partial exception of the period between 15 May and 11 June when it was "fifty-fifty" (quoting a Haganah commander) In his words: "the truth... is that the stronger side, in fact, won" in 1948.<sup>31</sup>

At the Jerusalem Foundation fundraiser, *New Republic* editor-in-chief Martin Peretz dramatically evoked the "tremendous anxieties, tremendous fears" in 1967 when Israel had "to fight with its back to the sea." Yet Western intelligence agencies already knew on the War's eve that Israel would "trounce the Arabs, whoever fired the first shot" (Patrick Seale). With remarkable prescience, the CIA predicted that Israel "would win in six days." Ezer Weizman, who as commander of the air force and then deputy head of the Israeli General Staff, did much of the opera-

tional planning for the war, said in 1972 that there was "no threat of destruction" in June 1967, but still justified Israel's "preemptive" strike on the grounds that it enabled Israel to "exist according to the scale, spirit, and quality she now embodies." General Mattiyahu Ebed, who before his metamorphosis into a dove had been a hawk among hawks on the General Staff, likewise stated that Israel was not threatened with destruction in 1967: it was merely a "bluff."<sup>32</sup>

Regarding the current scene, the respected Israeli columnist Shulamit Hareven comments:

The existence of the Israeli state is not in question today. It possesses an enormous stockpile of conventional or less conventional weapons. Armed to its teeth it nonetheless cries as if it were a helpless Jew in danger of a pogrom.<sup>33</sup>

The main security threat in the Middle East is posed not to but by Israel. It has secretly accumulated an arsenal of several hundred nuclear devices, repeatedly threatened to use them, and reacted with rage bordering on hysteria to any suggestion that it sign the UN convention prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. By contrast, the Arab military posture has been basically defensive. Author Yossi Melman observed in *Ha'aretz* that, "The efforts of Iraq, Syria and also Algeria to develop a nuclear capacity are motivated by the assumption that Israel has nuclear bombs of an advanced type and devices to launch them." Israel's most respected military correspondent, Ze'ev Shiff, similarly stated in *Ha'aretz* that, "All Syrian military efforts are essentially defensive, aimed at deterring Israel from attacking it."<sup>34</sup>

One would want to add that, even if Israel did face a genuine security threat from the Arab world, and even if incorporating the West Bank and Gaza enhanced its security (also a highly dubious proposition), Israel would still have no warrant to so extend its sovereignty. Consider, for comparison's sake, the case of Nicaragua. Unlike Israel, Nicaragua does

face a major security threat from its North American neighbor. During the past hundred years, Nicaragua has repeatedly come under US military assault and, for fully two decades, was occupied outright by the US army. Yet, no one would seriously maintain that the US threat gives Nicaragua title to annex it. The general point is lucidly made by Harkabi. Dismissing the claim that "the security of the State of Israel precludes the existence of a Palestinian state right next to its borders," he observes:

For the sake of its security, a state may impose conditions on its neighbors, by military means, guarantees, or taking precautions. But it cannot, for that purpose, demand that a neighboring state not exist. The Arabs are right in arguing that the Israeli position amounts to a "politicized in advance" or "preemptive suicide."<sup>35</sup>

Finally, one cannot embrace "Israeli sovereignty...always...from the Sea to the Jordan River" (Ajami) without also embracing the massive human rights violations that are an inseparable concomitant of it. As Ha'aretz bluntly noted: "It is impossible to maintain the occupation without torture."<sup>36</sup>

*Professor Ajami stated that although "we think of it as this hideous occupation," it has actually given Palestinians "some of the confidence and the liberalism and the openness of Israeli society." He praised Israel's enlightened "rules of engagement," and stated that the Palestinians "were lucky in the enemy that they drew" and "blessed" that the enemy was not Iraq which is among "the worst regimes in the Middle East." Both Ajami and Dan Rather faulted the double-standard of the media, "Israel is held to a higher standard...One is kidding oneself to believe it is otherwise" (Rather).*

Compare, first, the summary for "Iraq" in Amnesty International's 1990 Report, when Saddam Hussein's regime was routinely being compared with Hitler's, and the summary for "Israel and the Occupied Territories" in the same 1990 Report:

IRAQ - Thousands of political

prisoners, among them prisoners of conscience, continued to be detained without charge or trial or imprisoned after trials which reportedly did not satisfy international fair trial standards. Torture of political prisoners remained widespread. "Disappearances" were reported and the government did not clarify the fate and whereabouts of thousands who "disappeared" in previous years. Many of the "disappeared" were believed to have been killed. Executions were also reported. Some of those executed apparently had sought from the authorities benefits announced under official amnesties. In most cases it was unclear whether they had received any form of trial.

ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES - About 25,000 Palestinians, including prisoners of conscience, were arrested in connection with the intifada (uprising) in the Occupied Territories. Over 4,000 served periods in administrative detention without charge or trial. Several thousand others were tried by military courts. By the end of the year over 13,000 people were still in prisons or detention centers. At least 45 Israeli prisoners of conscience were held, most of whom were conscientious objectors to military service. Thousands of Palestinians were beaten while in the hands of Israeli forces or were beaten or ill-treated in detention centers. At least eight were reported to have died as a result. Over 260 unarmed Palestinian civilians, including children, were shot dead by Israeli forces, often in circumstances suggesting excessive use of force or deliberate killings. Others died in incidents where tear-gas was possibly deliberately misused. Official investigations into abuses appeared inadequate. One person remained under sentence of death.<sup>37</sup>

Ajami is thus applauding the human rights record of a country whose

Amnesty International entry is interchangeable with Iraq's. Yet, Ajami's remarks suggest that comparisons of this sort elide a crucial distinction: Iraq is an arbitrary police state whereas Israel with its "liberalism and openness" governs the occupied territories by the rule of law.

A first and basic point to make is that the Israeli government does not even recognize the applicability to the West Bank and Gaza of the relevant international law, namely, the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, although—in Amnesty International's words—the "international community" has "consistently stated that Convention applied in full to the Occupied Territories."<sup>38</sup>

Furthermore, Israel's High Court has proven itself to be a willing accomplice of the conquest regime in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits the destruction of private property except "where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations," and also explicitly forbids collective punishment. Yet Israel's High Court has ruled that house demolitions in the occupied territories are permissible, even claiming that "there is no basis to the claim that house demolition is a collective punishment." Israel is the *only* country in the entire world that employs such an "inhuman" (former President of the Supreme Court, Justice Agranat) method of punishment. The order to demolish a dwelling is issued without even a trial, let alone a conviction. The family is prohibited from rebuilding its home and security authorities have destroyed tents erected on the rubble. Just since the beginning of *intifada*, more than 600 Palestinian homes have been punitively demolished or "sealed" (a near-equivalent fate).<sup>39</sup>

The Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits "individual or mass forcible transfers as well as deportations" (my emphasis). Yet Israel's High Court has ruled that this convention is not relevant to the occupied territories and, in any case, applies only to mass deportations. Deportations are carried out without



charges or trial and the candidate for deportation and his attorney are not permitted to see the file or evidence that led to the deportation order. In the 25 years of Israeli occupation, nearly two thousand Palestinians have suffered this fate.<sup>40</sup>

The Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits an occupying power from resettling its "own civilian population in the territory it occupies." Yet Israel's High Court has upheld the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. To date, some 300,000 Jews have been settled in the West Bank and Gaza, or an average of 12,000 for each year of the occupation. Under Prime Minister Rabin's supposed "settlement freeze," at least 40,000 more Jews will be settled there in the next two years. Israel has confiscated fully two-thirds of the land and four-fifths of the precious water reserves in the West Bank and Gaza to accommodate the Jewish settlers (in the case of water, Israelis as well). To give but a couple of indications of the gross inequities that have resulted: (1) the Kiryat Arba settlement with a population of 5,000 and the Hebron region with a population of 90,000 are granted roughly the same daily water allotment; and (2) four-fifths of Gaza's land has been reserved for the 800,000 Palestinians and one-fifth for the 6,000 Jewish settlers.<sup>41</sup>

Israel has also "methodically thwarted all efforts at autonomous economic development in the Territories" as it waged "an economic war that was more cruel than all our violence" (the Israeli bimonthly, *Politika*). Some 120,000 Palestinian adults and children have consequently been forced to seek menial employment at substandard wages in Israel—"the largest slave market I ever saw...a shocking juxtaposition of poverty and poverty...a horrifying scene..." reads one typical Israeli dispatch from a Gaza checkpoint where desperate Palestinians plead with arriving Israeli contractors for work; and Israel has profited to the tune of roughly one billion dollars annually from its controlled market and tourism in the occupied territories. Meanwhile, Israeli soldiers stationed

in Gaza tell of the "shocking scene" of "little children standing for days on end...humbly begging for something to eat" and "rushing ravenously for whatever remained" of the scraps of food tossed to them.<sup>42</sup>

International law stipulates that the right of a person to found a family and of married couples and their children to live together is basic and inviolable. Yet Israel's High Court has ruled that family reunification in the occupied territories is not a right but a privilege. As a result, more than 200 "illegally resident" wives and children of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians have been brutally deported (the wives were also Palestinian by birth, but stripped of their residency rights after being expelled during the June 1967 war; they returned home on limited visitors' permits and stayed beyond the expiration dates) and fully 120,000 more women and children in the occupied territories may be slated for a similar fate. It is openly conceded that the rationale for this policy is strictly "demographic"—i.e., "fear of the increase" of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. *Ha'aretz* reported one typical case in which a Palestinian doctor was told that he "had 24 hours to get his wife and three children out of the West Bank, or else she would be forcibly deported and the house would surely be damaged."<sup>43</sup>

International law stipulates that an occupier may not institute new taxes in the territory under its control. Yet the High Court has ruled that the arbitrary value-added tax (V.A.T.) introduced in the occupied territories in 1976 is permissible. Palestinians are forced to pay the Israeli government in taxes far more than they receive from the Israeli government in services and investments. Israeli social scientist Meron Benvenisti conservatively estimated the illegal "occupation tax" (his phrase) at more than seven hundred million dollars or more than twice Israel's total investment in the Palestinian economic infrastructure during the entire occupation period. Since the intifada, the Israeli government has employed absurdly arbitrary tax as-

essments both as a means to loot the Palestinians and—in the words of the Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem)—as an "instrument of bureaucratic violence" to reimpose the conquest regime. An Israeli writer described with astonishment that, in Gaza, "With my own eyes I saw documents ordering the poorest workers to pay hundreds of thousands of Shekels in fines for 'not paying Income Tax' even as the Income Tax had already been routinely deducted from their paychecks." Unemployed, destitute Gaza residents must still pay a "tax on life"—that is, "a tax for the air you breathe," as Israeli tax officials are wont to put it.<sup>44</sup>

Israel's High Court has routinely dismissed challenges to the more than twelve hundred arbitrary "military orders" that are legally binding in the occupied territories. An illustrative example is Order No. 101 ("Concerning the Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda") which—in the words of Amnesty International—"criminalizes and makes punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment almost every form of political expression in the Occupied Territories, including non-violent forms of political activity" such as "the display of flags or emblems and the publication of any document or image with a politically significant content."<sup>45</sup>

Israel's "rules of engagement"—about which Professor Ajami waxed rhapsodic at the Jerusalem fundraiser—allow for the virtually unrestricted use of lethal plastic bullets as well as the extrajudicial execution of Palestinians simply for wearing masks, erecting roadblocks, and throwing stones even after the incident has ended and the danger has passed. They also allow for "shooting at the kneecaps" of Palestinians who "have already been apprehended" (*Davar*). Israeli "undercover units" operating in the West Bank and Gaza summarily execute "wanted" Palestinians (as well as masked individuals and stone-throwers) even if they are unarmed and can be apprehended without being killed (which to date has most

often been the case), and even if they try to surrender. These "rules of engagement" are in flagrant contravention of international law which sanctions the use of lethal force only in life-threatening situations and then only if there is no recourse except to use lethal force.<sup>46</sup>

What is more, these are still only the official rules of engagement." The unofficial or *de facto* guidelines are even more lax, as is evident from the record on investigations and convictions of Israelis accused of the killings. More than 800 Palestinians—including 173 children—have been shot dead by Israeli security forces since the beginning of the *intifada*. Yet not one Israeli soldier has been indicted on a murder charge and only two have been indicted on a manslaughter charge. A tiny handful have been indicted on a lesser charge such as illegal use of weapons. The fewer than ten soldiers thus far convicted in connection with killings of Palestinians received punishments ranging from an official reprimand to eighteen months' imprisonment. (One two year sentence was vacated on appeal.) By way of contrast, Amnesty International reports that Palestinians have received sentences of up to five years' imprisonment for throwing a stone.<sup>47</sup>

Reviewing the notorious case of a Gazan brutally beaten to death by Israeli soldiers (none of the accused was indicted on a major criminal charge or served more than five months in prison), the respected Israeli advocate Avigdor Feldman concluded: "The illegality in the Territories is total. Everyone—regardless of echelon, regardless of disagreement on every other conceivable topic—is of a mind on one matter: the value of an Arab's life is equal to zero."<sup>48</sup>

Yet, not even Feldman fully captures Israel's attitude toward Palestinians. When a Gazan filed a lawsuit in an Israeli court after his wife was without provocation clubbed and then shot dead by Israeli soldiers, the Head of the Civil Claims Department suggested as a defense strategy that: "the plaintiff could only benefit from the death of his wife, since he

now no longer needs to support her. The maximum damage he suffered, therefore, was no more than zero."<sup>49</sup>

During each of the past four years, Israel has imprisoned some 25,000 Palestinians. The sheer magnitude of this figure is suggested by a comparison with the Nazi regime. A year after Hitler came to power, 150,000 Germans, or one of every 400, was in prison. The comparable ratio in the occupied territories has been one of every 70.<sup>50</sup>

It is true that most Palestinians were imprisoned only after passing through the "military justice system" in the occupied territories. But human rights organizations have raised serious questions about the kind of justice meted out by this system.

Upon arrest, a detainee can be deprived of his right of access to a lawyer for fully three months, and does not even have a right of access to a judge for a month. Confessions obtained under interrogation during this period of incommunicado detention are the primary basis for conviction in the great majority of cases. And these confessions are regularly extracted by means of torture or ill-treatment—with the effective complicity of the military justice system.

An exhaustive 1991 Amnesty International study concluded that: "...torture or ill-treatment seem to be virtually institutionalized during the arrest and interrogation procedures preceding the detainee's appearance before a military court. The practices relating in particular to interrogation procedures have been officially endorsed or are generally condoned, and therefore effectively encouraged, by the authorities. They clearly have a direct impact on the possibility of having a fair trial, mainly leading to coerced confessions which are difficult to challenge in court."<sup>51</sup>

An equally exhaustive report published a few months earlier by B'Tselem reached similar conclusions. It found that "torture is carried out in a widespread and routine way by the agents of the Shin Bet" to extract confessions, and that "there is the serious possibility that doctors

and medical staff are colluding in the process by not reporting injuries that they know or suspect to be caused by interrogators."

Such torture was used against "only suspects whose guilt cannot be presumed." Indeed, nearly "50 percent of interrogations end up with no charges being pressed, or any other steps taken against the detainee." In addition, although all of the Palestinians in the B'Tselem sample had been tortured or ill-treated during interrogation, not one was charged with a serious offense involving violence.

The B'Tselem study also noted that, whereas the "prohibition against torture is absolute" under international law, the 1987 Landau Commission Report, which sanctioned the use of "moderate physical force" (in a manner specified only in a secret annex) "ended up legitimating the use of torture—the use of torture and ill-treatment follows logically from its recommendations." (Landau was a former Supreme Court President and the commission he chaired was charged with investigating allegations that the Shin Bet had lied in court when it denied using physical force to extract confessions.)

A B'Tselem follow-up study published one year later concluded that, despite the "immediate and extensive attention" given its original report, "the picture is much the same as we revealed a year ago."

A recent Middle East Watch Report observes that only "in one instance did the mistreatment of a Palestinian in custody lead to actual time in prison for GSS interrogators." Due to a "unique combination of circumstances," the State did prosecute and convict two GSS interrogators. For the torture death of 27-year old Khaled Ali they were sentenced to six months in prison on a charge of negligence.<sup>52</sup>

Summarizing Israeli attitudes to the exhaustively documented and widely publicized allegations of torture, Hebrew University criminologist Stanley Cohen writes:

Within the tiny (and diminishing) liberal enclaves of Israeli

society, there is the self-serving myth that "things like this can't happen here"—and if they do, they are isolated abuses that will be dealt with properly. The ideological Right...perceives any attempt to expose gross human-rights violations as anti-Israel propaganda. The rest of the society—the majority of which has no moral unease about what happens to Palestinians and will justify anything in the name of national security—pays no attention to such talk.<sup>53</sup>

One would want to add that it is not only Palestinian adults that are victims of Israeli torture; Palestinian children have had to endure it as well. A B'Tselem study found that "illegal violence against minors"—"many [of whom] are innocent of any crime"—"occurs on a large scale." Severe beatings—including "slapping, punching, kicking, hair-pulling, beating with clubs or with iron rods, pushing into walls and onto floors"—are reportedly "very common."

The study also highlights more imaginative methods for interrogating Palestinian children:

Beating the detainee as he is suspended in a closed sack covering the head and tied around the knees; tying the detainee in a twisted position to an outdoor

many hours in the "grave"—a kind of box, closed by a door from the top with only enough room to crouch and no toilet.<sup>54</sup>

The Israeli periodical *Hadashot* described the grisly fate of Palestinians as young as 14 arrested on "suspicion of stone-throwing." Directly quoting an inside source at the Hebron detention center, it reported:

What happened there...was plain horror: they would break their clubs on the prisoners' bodies, hit them in the genitals, tie a prisoner up on the cold floor and play soccer with him—literally kick and roll him around. Then they'd give him electric shocks, using the generator or a field telephone, and then push him out to stand for hours in the cold and rain...They would crush the prisoners...turning them into lumps of meat.

Another inside source was quoted as saying that the "tortures recall what is being inflicted in the cellars of Damascus's prisons."<sup>55</sup>

Professor Ajami no doubt had scenes like the above in mind when he told the audience at the Jerusalem fundraiser that, although "we think of it as this hideous occupation," the "irony" is that the "liberalism and openness" of Israeli society has "seeped into" the "children of the occupation."

Khomeini's famous remark that he was not struggling for power and privilege but for principle: "My resolution is not about melons, it's about Islam." Much to the audience's delight, Ajami retorted, "Everything is about melons." As an insight into human nature, it is an open question. As an insight into what makes Ajami tick, it couldn't be more precise. For Fouad Ajami, *everything* is about melons.

#### Notes

1. The evening's proceedings were transcribed by Sam Hussein. A copy of the transcript can be obtained from Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR). For discussion of Kissinger's and Ajami's remarks, see *Extra*, October/November 1992.

1. Hans Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea," in Walid Khalidi (ed), *From Haven to Conquest* (Beirut, 1971), p. 817; Anita Shapira, *Land and Labor* (Oxford, 1992), p. 7.

2. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (New York, 1971), pp. 56, 232, 301, 305-6.

3. Cited in Nathan Weinstock, *Zionism: False Messiah* (New York, 1979), p. xxi.

4. *Ha'aretz*, 11 April 1991.

5. David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder, 1990) pp. 30-1.

6. Cited in Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (New York, 1965), p. 139.

7. John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York, 1867), p. 308.

8. Theodor Herzl, "Zionism," reprinted in Zvi Zohar, *Israel Among Nations* (Jerusalem, 1966), p. 53; also: Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State* (New York, 1970), p. 49.

9. David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace* (New York, 1989), p. 294.

10. George Mosse, *The Crisis of German Theology* (New York, 1981), pp. 123-4.

11. Simha Flapan, *Birth of Israel* (New York, 1987), pp. 33, 67.

12. Benny Morris, *1948 and After* (Oxford, 1990), p. 22. On Israeli-Jordanian interactions before and during the war, see Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan* (New York: 1988). On the Palestinian refugees, see the companion studies by Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949* (Cambridge, 1988), and *1948 and After*, and my critique of Morris, "Myths, Old and New," in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Autumn 1991. (Morris replied to my critique in the same issue and there is a rejoinder by

## No one utters the words 'enlightened occupation' anymore.

pipe with hands behind the back for hours and, sometimes, in the rain, at night, and during the hot daytime hours; confining the detainee, sometimes for a few days, in the "lock-up"—a dark, smelly and suffocating cell one and a half by one and a half meters [5x5 feet]; placing the detainee, sometimes for many hours, in the "closet"—a narrow cell the height of a person in which one can stand but not move; and depositing the tied-up detainee for

Danny Rubinstein, the veteran Israeli journalist who has written most knowledgeably about the occupied territories, recently described the situation there as a quasi-police state in which the Shin Beth has "near absolute authority" and its "authority is totally unaccountable." A *Ha'aretz* writer similarly observed that, "No one utters the words 'enlightened occupation' anymore."<sup>56</sup>

No one, except Fouad Ajami.

At one point in the evening's proceedings, Ajami recalled Ayatollah

me in the winter 1992 issue.) The last quote is from Shlaim, p. 488.

13. Cited in Morris, *1948 and After*, p. 22. Ben-Gurion conveyed a similar sentiment during a July 1949 newspaper interview, "I am prepared to get up in the middle of the night in order to sign a peace settlement...but I am not in a hurry and I can wait ten years. We are under no pressure whatsoever." Shlaim, who cites the comment (p. 465), rightfully observes that, "in practical policy terms this position meant that while Israel was interested in peace, she was not prepared to pay a price for it."

14. Ilan Pappé, *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-52* (New York, 1988), p. 119.

15. On the United States's interpretation of 242, see Donald Neff, *Middle East International*, September 1991.

16. Yehuda Lukacs (ed), *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, a documentary record, 1967-1990* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 6-12.

17. Cited in Noam Chomsky, *Towards a New Cold War* (New York, 1982), p. 460, note 19. For background and context of the Sadat peace proposal, cf. *ibid.*, as well as the same author's *The Fateful Triangle* (Boston, 1983), chapter 3, and *Deterring Democracy* (New York, 1992), afterword.

18. Avraham Tamir, *A Soldier in Search of Peace* (New York, 1988), p. 195; cf. p. 203. On Kissinger's crucial encouragement of Israeli intransigence, cf. sources cited in above note.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

20. Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, p. 67.

21. Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 20-3, 50, 52-4, 67-9, 87-9, 101, 113, 143.

22. Yehoshaphat Harkabi, *Israel's Fateful Hour* (NY, 1988), p. 101; Peretz cited in Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, p. 199. Cf. Tamir, p. 93: "In the view of Defence Minister Sharon, who prepared the ground for Operation Peace for Galilee, crushing the PLO in Lebanon would neutralize its influence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and allow a local Arab leadership to emerge which would be amenable to the concept of autonomy within Israel. In that sense, the war aims in Lebanon concerned Israel's hold on the occupied territories as well"; cf. 117.

23. Tamir, pp. 69, 56.

24. See my "Israel and the 'Scourge' of Palestinian Moderation" in *New Politics*, vol. II, no. 3, and "Israel and Iraq: A Double Standard in the Application of International Law," in *Monthly Review*, July-August 1991, pp. 39-42.

25. David Stannard, *American Holocaust* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 106, 116.

26. Shlaim, p. 445.

27. Harkabi, p. 91

28. The "Fundamental Guidelines" are cited in Geoffrey Aronson, *Creating Facts* (Washington, 1987), p. 237; Harkabi, p. 92; Eban cited in Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, p. 62.

29. Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, chapter 5; Harkabi, p. 101; Yaniv, pp. 21, 101, 251.

30. Harkabi, p. 5.

31. Morris, *1948 and After*, pp. 13-16.

32. Patrick Seale, *Asad* (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 132-4; Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, *Dangerous Liaison* (HarperCollins, 1990), p. 142; John Cooley, *Green March, Black September* (London, 1973), pp. 161-2; Stephen Green, *Taking Sides* (New York, 1984), p. 200; William Quandt, "Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War," in *Middle East Journal*, p. 202.

33. *Yediot Achronot*, 5 August 1991.

34. Seymour Hersh, *The Samson Option* (New York, 1991, *passim*; *Ha'aretz* 5 April 1991, 11 August 1991, 14 October 1991, 15 October 1991, 16 June 1992.

35. For Israel's security being enhanced by a two-state settlement, see Harkabi, 53, 119-20. The Harkabi quote is from *Hadashot*, 1 November 1991.

36. *Ha'aretz*, 17 September 1991.

37. Amnesty International, *1990 Report* (New York: 1990), pp. 125-8, 129-32.

38. Raja Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law* (Washington, 1988), pp. xi-xiii; Thomas Mallison and Sally V. Mallison, *The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order* (New York, 1986), chapter 6; Amnesty International, *The Military Justice System in the Occupied Territories*, (New York, 1991), p. 12.

39. Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem) *Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 1990/1991* (Jerusalem, 1991), chapter 4.

40. Al-Haq/Law in the Service of Man, *Punishing a Nation* (Boston, 1990), pp. 123-8; Palestine Human Rights Infoworld Center, Chicago, IL; B'Tselem, *1990/1991 Report*, chapter 10.

41. Shehadeh, pp. 12, 18-22, 28, 32; *Ha'aretz*, 25 April 1989, 3 May 1989, 22 June 1990, 27 April 1991, 29 July 1991; *Yerushalayim*, 12 October 1990 *Yediot Achronot*, 16 March 1986, 10 May 1991.

42. *Politika*, September 1991; *Yediot Achronot*, 26 May 1992, 4 June 1992; *Ha'aretz*, 12 June 1992, 24 June 1992; Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, p. 46.

43. B'Tselem, *1990-1991*, *Report* chapter 13; *Ha'aretz*, 28 October 1991. Due to mounting international pressure, Israel

suspended this practice in January 1990 but then quietly resumed it a few months later; cf. B'Tselem, *Renewal of Deportation of Women and Children From the Occupied Territories on Account of "Illegal Residency"*, September-October, 1991.

44. *Punishing a Nation*, p. 242; B'Tselem, *The System of Taxation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip* (Jerusalem: 1990); B'Tselem, *1990/1991 Report*, chapter 16; Meron Benvenisti, *1986 Report...Demographic, Economic, Legal, Social and Political Developments in the West Bank* (Boulder, 1986); *Ha'aretz*, 22 August 1991, 12 June 1992; *Politika*, September 1991.

45. John Quigley, *Palestine and Israel* (Durham, 1990), pp. 201-2; Shehadeh, 95-100, 224-6; Amnesty International, *The Military Justice System*, p. 20.

46. B'Tselem, *The Use of Firearms* (Jerusalem, 1990); B'Tselem, *Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories* (Jerusalem, 1992) Palestine Human Rights Information Center, *Targeting to Kill* (Jerusalem, 1992); *Davar*, 22 August 1991; *Kol Ha'ir*, 17 April 1992.

47. B'Tselem, "Press Release," 4 April 1992; Amnesty International's annual Reports; Middle East Watch, *The Israeli Army and the Intifada* New York, 1990, chapter 2; B'Tselem, *The Use of Firearms*, 42-51. The B'Tselem report effectively disposes of the "explanation" that there were so few indictments because soldiers acted within official guidelines.

48. *Ha'aretz*, 2 June 1989;

49. Al Hamishmar, 18 October 1991.

50. Amnesty International annual Reports; Ingo Muller, *Hitler's Justice* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 86

51. Amnesty International, *The Military Justice System*; *Ha'aretz*, 6 November 1987

52. B'Tselem, *The Interrogation of Palestinians During the Intifada* (March 1991); B'Tselem, *The Interrogation of Palestinians During the Intifada; Follow-up to March 1991 B'Tselem Report* (Jerusalem, 1992); Middle East Watch, *Israeli Interrogation Methods Under Fire After Death of Detained Palestinian* (March 1992).

53. Stanley Cohen, "Talking About Torture," in *Tikkun*, vol. 6, no. 6.

54. B'Tselem, *Violence Against Minors in Police Detention* (Jerusalem, 1990). A "minor" is defined as a child between the ages of 12 and 18.

55. *Hadashot*, 24 February 1992.


56. *Ha'aretz*, 7 February 1992, 17 September 1991.



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 Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, Pluto Press, 1992, 218 pp., paper.  
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 W. Khalidi, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991 (2nd. ed.), 351 pp., paper.  
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 Philippa Stram, Lawrence Hill, 1992, 345 pp., paper.  
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- **PALESTINIANS: Life Under Occupation**  
 Nancy Murray, The Middle East Justice Network, 1991, 97 pp., paper.  
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 Abba Eban, Putnam, 1992, 671 pp., cloth.  
 Distinguished Israeli statesman offers impassioned call for a Palestinian state: "The idea that national freedom is indispensable for Bosnia-Herzegovina while military rule is reasonable for the Palestinian people defies all logic."  
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- **BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS: A Palestinian Christian in the Occupied West Bank**  
 A. Rantisi & R. Beebe, Zondervan Books, 1990, 172 pp., paper.  
 Audeh Rantisi's family had lived in the town of Lydda for 1,600 years until that day, in July 1948, at age 11, he went hand in hand with his grandmother on a death march, to become a refugee in his own homeland. This is his story, and the story of one refugee's effort to understand why foreigners stole his land.  
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*George Ball & Douglas Ball, W.W. Norton Co., 1992, 382 pp., cloth.*  
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 Acclaimed history of Jewish Americans and the role Israel has played in their history. Good analysis of pro-Israel political action committees, Jewish-American dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Shamir, and the future of U.S.-Israeli relations. "Mr. Sachar confronts unflinchingly and in detail [the probability no other group in the U.S. is so deeply committed to the success of the foreign state], making his narrative not only good history but a contribution to the current debate on American-Israeli relations." *N.Y. Times Review, June 28, 1992.*  
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- PROPHECY AND POLITICS: The Secret Alliance Between Israel and the U.S., Christian Right**  
*Grace Halsell, Lawrence Hill Books, 1986 Update, 210 pp., paper.*  
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- Available again by Popular Demand: ASSAULT ON THE LIBERTY**  
*James Ennes, Random House, 1979, 299 pp., cloth.*  
 The author was an officer on the bridge during the prolonged and brutal attack on the U.S.S. Liberty by Israeli planes and torpedo boats in 1967 that killed 34 American crewmen and wounded 171 others.  
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- USS LIBERTY SURVIVORS: Our Story**  
*Sligo Productions*  
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- DANGEROUS LIAISON: The Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship**  
*Andrew & Lesita Cockburn, Harper, 1991, 416 pp., paper.*  
 Called by the Village Voice "a gem of clarity in political writing, meticulously documented, and damning as hell."  
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- ISRAEL AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST: A Critical Examination**  
*Cheryl Rubenberg, Univ. of Illinois Press, 1986, 429 pp.*  
 The author, a professor of international studies, argues that the U.S.-Israeli partnership has severely damaged U.S. national interests in the Middle East.  
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