

The Palestinians in America

By Elias H. Tuma

When I came to America 25 years ago, I was often amused, shocked and disappointed that few people had ever seen, met or spoken with a Palestinian. The United States, I thought, had played a major role in the creation of the State of Israel, and, by the same token, in the dislocation and dispersion of the Palestinian people. Yet, Americans seemed to know about Israel and the Israelis, but not about Palestine and the Palestinians.

I must have been naive then, although I still am amazed at such occurrences as the wide circulation and acceptance of the late Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's derogatory remark: "Who are the Palestinians?" The apparent ignorance of the Palestinian identity may also explain President Ronald Reagan's blunt description of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a terrorist organization, and his apparent insensitivity to Palestinian national rights and aspirations.

It is not uncommon to hear people ask: How do you find out about the Palestinians, their just rights, or what is being done on their behalf. Usually Americans learn about the Palestinians by way of their concern for Israel and its security, or because of their relations with or concern for other Arab states

and countries. Some Americans have focused on the Palestinians' attitude toward the United States and the West, their national liberation movements, or the stability of the Mideast oil-rich strategic states and their role in "international terrorism." Others, aware of and concerned with the plight of the Palestinians, have tried to do something about it, but these individuals are small in number and too far apart to apparently make much difference. It is also possible that the Palestinians have contributed to the problem by failing to make their case better known.

Palestinians lived in Palestine without interruption for several hundred years. The vast majority of them were Arabs until the name Palestine disappeared from most maps in 1948, to be replaced by Israel, Jordan, or West Bank and Gaza. After about half a century of colonial maneuvering and two major wars, in 1947-8 and 1967, the Palestinians now find themselves dispersed around the world—stateless, homeless and refugees. Even in their diaspora they remain one people, with organized leadership which defends their rights and seeks solutions to the conflict, political and otherwise. The Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) provides services in education, health, research, and politics and diplomacy, and acts as close to a democracy as can be expected of a "government in exile" which the P.L.O. now stands for. (See page 3 for the geographical dispersion of the Palestinians.)

This study is an attempt to look at the Palestinians in the United States as

a microcosm of the Palestinians at large. Even so we can only look at a small group of Palestinians in this country, and the result may be considered a profile of a segment of the Palestinians as they see themselves in relation to others and as part of a people struggling for national liberation and independence. The views presented are based on my reading of the literature, my contacts with other Palestinians, and on the responses of 47 Palestinians to a questionnaire I circulated in the latter part of 1980. (*A sample questionnaire, together with the results, appears on pages 7-9.*)

The responses came from all regions of the United States, though mostly from the East and the West, where the Palestinians are apparently concentrated. More than 50 percent of the respondents are between 30 and 50 years of age; three-quarters of them are married, male and come from families with four or more members. (*Details of this profile are shown on pages 7-9.*) A vast majority of them are United States citizens. More than 60 percent are in academic or professional occupations, and about 30 percent earn over \$30,000 a year. The respondents have been in the United States for varying lengths of time, with over 80 percent here for more than 10 years. Two groups of immigrants seem more prominent: those who have been in this country more than 30 years, presumably because of the 1947-8 war in Palestine, and those who have been here between 10 and 19 years, presumably due to the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Elias H. Tuma is professor of economics at the University of California, Davis, and author of Peacemaking and the Immoral War: Arabs and Jews in the Middle East and other books.

These Palestinian Americans are concentrated in relatively small communities of less than 200,000 people, or in large communities of one million or more. They live where the Arab community is relatively small, less than 5,000 people, or is relatively large with 50,000 or more. One-fifth of the respondents did not know how large the Arab community in their locality was.

Eleven percent of the respondents did not know the size of the Palestinian community in their locality either, while about a third lived in communities with 5,000 Palestinians or less. All the respondents know Arabic, with more than 80 percent rating their knowledge as good or excellent. More than 85 percent rate their knowledge of English as good or excellent. It may come as a

surprise that 23 percent of the respondents know Hebrew in various degrees of proficiency. The respondents are divided in political affiliation: 40 percent are registered as Independents, 30 percent as Republicans and 21 percent as Democrats. About 50 percent of them belong to one or more civic or professional groups.

About This Issue

An estimated 4.4 million Palestinians now live in the diaspora that followed the 1947-8 and 1967 wars with Israel. Approximately 100,000 of these Palestinians are today American citizens.

Who are they and what do they think about such questions as: Should the United States government recognize the P.L.O. as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians? Should the P.L.O. amend its Palestine National Charter and accept the existence of Israel? Should American Palestinians identify closely with the P.L.O.? Should Arabs and Jews in America form joint fronts for peace in the Middle East?

To find out these and other answers A.M.E.U. asked Professor Elias Tuma of the University of California, himself a Palestinian American, to write an article on this subject. For this purpose he designed a questionnaire to be circulated to a cross-section of Palestinians in America.

The project, we knew, would encounter at least one major difficulty, which was best illustrated in the reaction of a Palestinian college student who required three separate assurances that her replies would remain anonymous. When you live in a country where the adjective most often grafted to "Palestinian" is "terrorist," you may well suspect pollsters who inquire about your political views.

Still, we went ahead with the survey because the climate is changing. With the founding in 1979 of the Palestine Congress of North America, politically active Palestinian Americans took a decisive step in identifying themselves not merely as individuals of Middle Eastern or Arab descent, but as members of a definable community, ready to participate in the national debate on foreign policy in the Middle East. And there are signs that other Americans are listening. The National

Council of Churches, representing 40 million Christians throughout the United States, recently voted that Palestinians, including the P.L.O., be included in future West Bank/Gaza negotiations. (See *The Link*, November/December 1980).

Our hope is that this issue will help to promote this emerging dialogue between Palestinian Americans and their fellow citizens.

Our book selection, reviewed by Greg Orfalea on page 14, is *Congress and Israel: Foreign Aid Decision-Making in the House of Representatives, 1969-1976*, written by Marvin Feuerwerker.

The September/October issue of *The Link* will take an indepth look at arms sales in the Middle East.

John F. Mahoney,
Executive Director

The Palestinians Become Organized

It is highly probable that this group of respondents is a good representation of the Palestinians in the United States whose exact number is unknown. Estimates range from 30,000 to over 50,000. The actual number is difficult to determine from census or immigration data because most have entered the United States as nationals of Jordan, Israel or some other country whose passport they had to use for entry. Another difficulty arises from the partial integration of the Palestinians with other Arabs in this country, whether in

the organizations they belong to or in the activities they participate in as Palestinian Arabs. (See page 3 for latest world population distribution of Palestinians.)

Palestinian organizations active in the United States may or may not have comprehensive and reliable data. The two most prominent organizations which may have such information are the Palestine Congress of North America (P.C.N.A.) and the American Federation of Ramallah Palestine. The former is the youngest but most

encompassing federation of Palestinian and Palestine-related organizations in North America. The latter, founded in 1959, is probably the oldest, but is more narrowly specified in the sense that all its members must be related in one form or another to the town of Ramallah.¹

The P.C.N.A. has a combined membership of 20,487 as of last September, distributed among 53 credentialed organizations, with 197 chapters throughout North America. Not all the members are Palestinians, although the majority apparently are, including students temporarily in this country. Though only in its third year of existence, the P.C.N.A. has made itself known to the American government and to the national organizations concerned with the Middle East. The thrust of its

activities has been political, concentrated on Washington and, therefore, its contact with the local Palestinian groups has been rather limited. Some Palestinians have actually not heard of the P.C.N.A., which has not tried to contact or recruit them, or seek their financial or moral support.

The P.C.N.A. has gone on record as solidly behind the P.L.O., opposed to the Camp David Agreements, and in support of the "Palestinian people's struggle to realize its inalienable national rights, including its right to return to its homeland, to national self-determination and to its national independence and sovereignty in Palestine in accordance with the policies of the Palestine Liberation Organization."² Major emphases have included lobbying activities with peaceful demonstrations, organizational meetings, and the issuing of political statements. One of the most expressive mottoes of the P.C.N.A. is: "No Peace without the Palestinians, No Palestinians without the P.L.O."

The P.C.N.A. is a federation of organizations, which cater to the individual members. However, these organizations, mostly non-political, have objectives other than those of the P.C.N.A.; some may not even be Palestinian in character or purpose. Furthermore, there is no monitoring system to make sure that these organizations carry the P.C.N.A. message to the members or promote campaigns for mass participation, involvement and financial contribution. In fact, the opposite may be true: the P.C.N.A. and its affiliates seem to be run by a few members acting as the "elite." The only activities that involve the rank and file are social programs and celebrations held periodically with little political purpose or significance.³ Although a positive potential force, the P.C.N.A. and its related organizations have hardly utilized this potential to strengthen their own organization or to reach and inform the American people on behalf of Palestine.

The American Federation of Ramallah Palestine, with a membership of more than 3,000, has emphasized cultural and charitable activities, although it has recently become progressively more political. The federation has raised funds for Palestinian causes and organizations primarily in North America. Although the federation regards itself as "the major American Palestinian organization in this country," its total financial contribution during the last 13 years has remained

below a quarter of a million dollars, while the individual members and clubs have contributed about half of that amount. On occasion the federation has passed resolutions in "support of our Palestinian cause and transmitted them to the proper American officials."⁴

There are other sources of information on Palestine in the United States: the Palestine Information Office in Washington, D.C.; the P.L.O. office at the United Nations; a Palestine Human Rights Campaign office in Washington, D.C.; a Project Loving Care in Terre Haute, IN; a Palestine Arab Fund in La Puente, CA; and a Holy Land Fund in Chicago, IL. Their activities are specialized, somewhat limited and hardly reach the larger American public. In fact they barely reach the Palestinian community outside the city or town in which they exist.

Probably the most active organization is the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (A.A.U.G.) which from its inception in 1967 has tried to play an educational-political role on behalf of the Arabs and of Palestine. This organization, however, in catering mainly to the academic community, precludes those most in need of educa-

do not belong in this discussion.

In terms of publications, the *Journal of Palestine Studies* is probably the most effective and well-prepared periodical in English on the Palestinian problem. Published by the Institute of Palestine Studies of the P.L.O. and edited by a Palestinian in America, it has filled a big information gap relating to the Palestinian cause. Like all research and academic-oriented publications, however, the journal reaches only a limited audience of Palestinians and Americans at large. Other less sophisticated or non-academic journals and magazines serving a different audience include the *Palestine Studies*, the *Palestine Review*, *Hathihe Ramallah*, the *Palestine/Israel Bulletin* and the *News Circle*, which has put out a special issue on Palestine.

Circulation of these periodicals is limited and it is difficult to find a library or bookstore that has copies on a regular basis—even in a university town. The Arab information centers around the country do not have complete series of these publications, and attempts to secure copies from Washington or New York Palestinian and Arab offices have

The Scattered Palestinians

1975*		1981**	
Occupied Palestine	1,500,000	West Bank	818,300
Jordan	900,000	Israel	530,600
Lebanon	300,000	Gaza	476,700
Syria	175,000	Jordan	1,160,800
Kuwait	170,000	Lebanon	347,000
Egypt	35,000	Kuwait	278,800
Iraq	20,000	Syria	215,500
Gulf States	20,000	Saudi Arabia	127,000
Libya	15,000	United States	110,200
Saudi Arabia	20,000	Elsewhere	325,000
U.S.A. and Latin America	70,000	TOTAL	4,389,900
Europe	30,000		
TOTAL	3,255,000		

*The Arab World, Arab Information Center, p. 15

**Al Fajr and the Palestine Institute of Statistics

tion in Palestinian and Arab affairs. Its conferences and publications no doubt serve an important purpose, but their impact is equally restricted by the organization itself as an academic and professional group.

Probably the most important group that works on behalf of Palestine are the Palestinian and Arab students who are not citizens or permanent residents of the United States. On many campuses and usually active at least for a part of the year, they try to publicize and dramatize issues as they arise. Strictly speaking they are not part of the American Palestinians and therefore

often ended in failure. Those who seek to learn about the Palestinians in America or about the Palestinian cause often face difficulties that discourage a further search.⁵

On the other hand, the Palestinians in America as individuals have actively disseminated information and knowledge about Palestine in the form of books, pamphlets and peace proposals.⁶ A discussion of these publications is not possible here, but it is necessary to point out that these publications generally address academic or specialized audiences, rather than the American general public.

The U.S. Palestinians in Action

By any measure of performance, it may be easy to conclude that the Palestinians in America have acted courageously, often intelligently, and sometimes quite effectively. In reaching out to the larger community, they have faced a hostile environment not of their own making. It exists because the United States has been so committed to the cause of Israel. Israel it seems can do no wrong and even if it did, the political, moral and financial support would still go on. The Palestinians in the United States observe these attitudes and wonder whether there is anything they can do to change the situation. They see the results of fierce Zionist propaganda in the United States Congress: blocs of senators and representatives who are always on the alert to dash any attempt to modify the pro-Israel policy. Members of Congress may voice their disapproval of the pro-Israel/anti-Palestine policy, but usually when they are no longer running for office.

The Palestinians, who are a very small minority in this country, also see the Zionist influence and propaganda in the media, schools, colleges and universities, trade unions, and local and state government. I have actually heard from numerous Palestinians that they try to hide their Palestinian identity because they are so awed by the pro-Israeli/anti-Palestinian bias that exists in this country.⁷

For Palestinians, the media perpetuates this bias by carrying many articles and news items about Israel, compared with the rare mention of the Palestinian cause, except possibly for derogation or the expression of sympathy with Israel. Acts of violence by Palestinians are acts of terrorism, while violence by the Israeli soldiers is reported as defensive, heroic, and deserving of support and sympathy. Many Palestinian lecturers and writers have been ignored or black-listed by the major national newspapers just because they are Palestinians.

The Palestinians are also discouraged by the unfriendly United States government which forbids them from having official representation in the major cities of this country, and which tries to

undermine their cause by negotiating their future with third parties such as Egypt, Israel, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia and Morocco. While a vast majority of United Nations members offer them wide recognition, their adopted country, America, refuses to recognize their rights as a people, and continues to forestall any action against Israel which has violated those rights throughout its existence.⁸

Despite this evident hostility, Palestinians continue to assimilate in this country while defending and spreading their cause. They lecture, debate, appear on radio and television wherever possible, and recruit individuals and groups to support Palestinian rights. Yet, their success has been limited, in part because of the adverse environment, but also because of their own defective approaches in dealing with that environment.

The Palestinians in America, as elsewhere, believe that "those who are not with us are against us" even when dealing with other Arabs or other Palestinians, let alone with outsiders. This attitude has often turned the neutral or not-too-sympathetic audience into adversaries. Could "those who are not with us" simply be uninformed, neutral, uninterested or too diplomatic to commit themselves openly to one side or another? Is it possible that others may have different views of the issues without being opponents?

Here and abroad, Palestinians generally do not recognize neutrality, indifference or the lack of information as sufficient grounds for not taking their side. They also fail to see that it is possible to serve the cause of Palestine by serving the cause of peace, or by working jointly with others, including Israelis and pro-Israelis, who may sympathize with a just solution, even though that solution differs from the mainstream Palestinian interpretation or solution. Palestinians have lost much sympathy because of their tactics and because they fail to capitalize on partial support of those who are not "blindly" committed to their cause or who might have a slightly different view of

the Palestinian rights and ways of realizing them.

Somehow Palestinians in America have not been able to comprehend the American political system in order to function within it. They have not utilized its system of pressure groups, lobbying, vested interests and vote getting. And until recently they would not share a forum with Israelis, Zionists or other non-sympathizers. An official of the Palestine National Council may be justified in insisting on protocol, but a private Palestinian who refuses to share a panel discussion, a debate or a forum with an Israeli or a Zionist hurts the Palestinian cause in this American environment.⁹

The Palestinians observe how the American system uses the media, advertising, and other modern techniques to drive home vital points of interest. Yet, they have hardly used these techniques. They apparently believe their cause is just; the justness of that cause can and must be recognized without gimmicks, advertising and consultants, without special efforts.

Often Palestinian speakers fail to recognize that punctuality in America is important. I recall on one occasion not only was the Palestinian speaker late and nobody knew where he was and why, but also young people put up a Palestinian flag which probably had more than a thousand wrinkles in it. Given the care and respect with which Americans handle their flag, it was not surprising that several Americans attending this program took notice of how carelessly the "national flag" was handled in an official program.

On another occasion, the anniversary of the Palestine Revolution, the speaker, who represented the P.L.O., began his lecture in English but spoke only long enough to show that he knew English perfectly and then shifted to Arabic, even though one half of the audience knew no Arabic, while everybody knew English. Although these symbolic gestures may appear to have little meaning to the Palestinians, which is actually not true, they do make a difference in this society.

The Palestinians in America feel handicapped in at least two other ways. Their organizations, underfinanced, understaffed and haphazardly organized, still function on the basis of personalities and personal relations, with little apparent concern for the rationalization of services. Therefore, the Palestinians in America who would like to reach out to the larger community are often frustrated because they cannot depend on these organizations. No doubt professional consultants or managers would correct this problem.

Another handicap is the widespread factionalism among the Palestinians and the conflict among the Arab countries with regard to Palestine. "If you cannot convince your own people of the justness of your cause as represented by the P.L.O., how can you convince others" has been heard more than once. It is true that differences of opinion should be considered normal, but not when they relate to fundamentals such as whether the P.L.O. represents the Palestinians or whether the Palestinians should have a state of their own. This

factionalism, originating in the Middle East and echoed in the United States, has arisen from differences surrounding Camp David, the troubles in Lebanon, and the relevance of Islamic revival to the Palestine issue. Palestinians in America may understand and appreciate these conflicting attitudes, but they are at a loss as to how to avoid divisiveness. Unfortunately the friction often weakens their organization and frequently breaks down the delivery system of their services.

Prevailing Attitudes of U.S. Palestinians

This was the picture I had of the Palestinians as I embarked on the survey to find out what they had to say about their environment and how actively they participated in the activities relating to the Middle East conflict. Having failed to secure the P.C.N.A.'s mailing list (my letters and long-distance telephone calls to the P.C.N.A. have gone unanswered, even though I was initially encouraged to formally request that list), I have relied on other sources for the names of the prospective respondents. The Ramallah Directory (of the American Federation of Ramallah Palestine) provided 300 names by random selection. Personal contacts produced another 69 names. About 50 returned questionnaires were technically defective and therefore unusable. The usable responses were 47 or about 15 percent of those sent out. Without debating the issue of randomness or representativeness of the sample, the responses should be interesting for their own sake, coming from a wide range of respondents in the United States.

How involved are these Palestinians "on behalf of the Palestinian cause" and in what form of activity do they get involved? The respondents were asked to distinguish between their roles in Palestinian groups and Arab groups. (*The results are shown in Section II, of the questionnaire, on page 7.*) Less than half the respondents are active members or occasional participants in Palestinian or Arab group activities. About 20 percent describe their roles as group

leaders or organizers, which is a relatively high leadership rate. A little more than 50 percent give financial support to Palestinian groups locally and nationally, and more than a third give financial support to Arab groups. However, financial support on the international level is less than half of the contribution to the local and national causes. It may be surprising that the percentage of contributors is not much higher than indicated. A major explanation may be the fact that solicitation by the Palestinian groups and authorities has been limited and in many cases nonexistent.

Two respondents (4.3 percent) are lobbyists and three (6.4 percent) are authors and/or publishers, and only two are teachers of Arabic. By giving differential weights to these forms of participation, as indicated in Section II of the questionnaire, with a maximum participation score of 14, only 2.1 percent scored between 11 and 14 points. More than 65 percent scored less than 4 points for their total participation in Palestinian group activities, and more than 70 percent scored that low a score for their participation in Arab group activities. Though I have not set a standard by which to evaluate the degree of participation effectiveness, I would venture that by comparison with Jews and Israelis in America, the Palestinian rate of participation is quite low. It is even lower with regard to financial contributions. On the other hand, these results suggest that there are unutilized energies and resources in

the field to be recruited on behalf of the Palestinian cause.

In Sections III-V of the questionnaire, the respondents were addressed with specific statements and asked to express Strong Agreement (rank 5), Agreement (4), No Position (3), Disagreement (2), or Strong Disagreement (1). The results have been cross tabulated and analyzed. Cross and multiple correlations have been computed, and selective regressions (statistical method by which it is attempted to predict dependent variable Y, given X, the independent variable) were run for 15 dependent variables as functions of age, education, level of income and length of residence in the United States as the independent variables.¹⁰ The results are discussed below in clusters for convenience.

Attitudes and Opinions Regarding the American Political Environment (Variables 1-11)

How well understood is the Palestinian issue in the community of the respondent? More than 70 percent disagree or strongly disagree that the Palestinian issue is well understood in their community. Indeed, those who agree are a small minority of less than 15 percent. A more surprising response is that 25 percent of the respondents agree that the Palestinians have a hard time in their community, and together with those who take no position this percent-

tage reaches 49 percent. In other words, only 51 percent do not agree that the Palestinians have a hard time, which seems to reinforce or justify the fears of those who hide their Palestinian identity in order to avoid abuse. Probably a more shocking finding is that more than 42 percent do not think the American Palestinians are familiar with the Palestine National Charter, and more than 75 percent do not agree that most American Palestinians have a copy of the charter. Only 11 percent agree with that statement.¹¹

While a little more than 60 percent of the respondents agree that the Palestinians are well integrated in their community, 25 percent agree that the Palestinians are afraid to make their identity known. Those who disagree on the identity statement are in the majority, but the mere fact that even a few percentages may be afraid to disclose their identity as Palestinians should be disturbing to the Palestinians and to the American community at large.

I have tried to explain this fear phenomenon by statistical analysis. It appears that there is a positive correlation between agreement with the statement and the respondent's age, education, income and length of residence in the United States. A regression with these independent variables suggests that the older, more educated and the longer in residence in the United States, the more likely the respondents are to agree that the Palestinians are afraid to make their identity known. In contrast, those with higher incomes are less likely to agree. Education, however, seems to be statistically significant and the most important determining variable among those considered.

A large majority of the respondents agree that the number of American Jews is high in their community; 85 percent agree or agree strongly. About 40 percent agree or strongly agree that the influence of American Israelis is high. When asked about their relationship with American Jews in their community, only 17 percent said they had cordial or intimate relations, and 23 percent said they had no relations at all with them; in contrast, 25 percent said they had friendly relations. A few years ago a much larger percentage would have said they had no relations with American Jews. The statistical analysis suggests that age and level of income of the respondent are negatively related to having intimate relations, while education and the length of

residence are positively related to intimacy. Education again is the most relevant single explanatory variable.

Religion and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

An interesting issue has been the confusion of the Arab-Israeli conflict with religion of the adversaries, which seems to have gained significance due to Mr. Begin's messianic image of himself on one hand and the Islamic revival on the other. To the statement that "the P.L.O. and Israel are using religion for political goals," only 30 percent agreed or strongly agreed, while 49 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed, with 17 percent taking no position. However, when faced with the statement that the "P.L.O. and Israel leave religion out of the conflict" as a precondition for peace, 66 percent strongly agreed, and only 15 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed. The attitude toward the first statement on religion has a higher positive correlation with the level of income of the respondent than with any other independent variable. However, education is the most relevant explanatory variable as to who agrees or disagrees with the statement the P.L.O. and Israel are using religion for political goals. In contrast, the age of the respondent is the most relevant independent variable in agreeing that religion should be left out of the conflict. The older the respondent, the less likely he/she is to agree that religion should be left out of the conflict. This suggests that the younger people view secularism as a precondition to peace more often than do the older people. It may be noted that this tendency toward secularism is far stronger than it seems to be among Palestinians in the Middle East and among the P.L.O. leadership.

Preconditions to Peace (Variables 13-26)

There is a tendency in this country to speak of the Palestinians as a homogeneous group. Few studies, if any, have been conducted to verify this assumption.¹²

What do the American Palestinians think about peace in the Middle East and how uniformly do they approach it? I have addressed certain statements to the respondents with regard to peace and asked them to express their opinion on the same 5-point scale used above. Here are the results.

To the statement "peace between the

Palestinians and Israel is possible only if' Israel withdraws from the territories occupied in 1967, 86 percent either agreed or agreed strongly, which is to be expected. However, 10 percent either disagreed or disagreed strongly, presumably because they did not think that the Palestinians would be willing to give up all other claims to Palestine, or that Israel would contain itself and not try to expand after it had withdrawn. In other words, there is a small minority which apparently does not think that peace between the two conflicting parties is possible because their long-term aspirations are mutually exclusive.

About 68 percent either agreed or strongly agreed that peace will take place only if Israel reaffirms its stand as a non-expansionist state, and 57 percent agreed or strongly agreed that Israel must affirm its position as a secular state. A minority in each case, less than 25 percent, did not agree with these statements, apparently because they did not consider mere affirmation to be a sufficient guarantee, or because even if there were a genuine reaffirmation by Israel, the Palestinians would not be satisfied short of gaining all their claims, whatever these claims are. Here again secularism seems related positively to education and negatively to age, though in both cases the relationship is rather weak.

There seems to be a large variation in the reactions to the statement that peace is possible only if the P.L.O. recognizes the right of Israel to a secure and peaceful existence in the Middle East. Fifty-eight percent agreed or strongly agreed, but a large minority of 36 percent either disagreed or strongly disagreed. Both groups of responses are interesting in that not a larger percentage agreed and that such a large percentage disagreed. Apparently there is much skepticism regarding Israel's interest in peace or in peace with the P.L.O., because Israel's views are irreconcilable with the P.L.O.'s views on peace. Agreement with the statement is positively correlated with the respondent's level of education and level of income. Agreement with the statement seemed to be functionally related to all the independent variables considered: age, education, income and length of residence in the United States. Age was negatively related, while all other variables were positively related to agreement with the statement. Income in this case was the most relevant explanatory variable: the higher the respondent's level of income, the more

(Continued on page 9)

Questionnaire and Summary of Responses

I. Demographic Data [Summarized on pages 7-9]:

Age ____ Family size ____ Sex: M ____ F ____ Marital Status: M ____ S ____
 D ____ W ____ Other ____
 Education ____ years Degree ____ Specialization ____
 Income: \$ ____ per year Citizenship: USA ____ Jordanian ____ Other ____
 Length of Residence in USA ____ years
 Location: East ____ Midwest ____ South ____ North ____ West ____
 Size of population in your community ____
 Arab community in your city or county ____ ,000
 Palestinian community in your city or county ____ ,000
 Your knowledge of Arabic: Excellent ____ Good ____ Fair ____ Poor ____
 Nonexistent ____
 Your knowledge of English: Excellent ____ Good ____ Fair ____ Poor ____
 Nonexistent ____
 Your knowledge of Hebrew: Excellent ____ Good ____ Fair ____ Poor ____
 Nonexistent ____
 Political party affiliation: Democrat ____ Republican ____ Independent ____
 Other ____
 American civic groups with public service orientation you are affiliated with:
 Number ____

II. You are involved in Palestinian or Arab groups on behalf of the Palestinian cause: please check as appropriate:

	In Palestinian Groups		In Arab Groups		
	Yes %	No %	Yes %	No %	
Weights: Yes =					
2 An active member	36.2	63.8	27.7	72.3	
1 An occasional participant	46.8	53.2	38.3	61.7	
2 A group leader or organizer	19.1	80.9	23.4	76.6	
1 Financial supporter locally or nationally	51.1	48.9	38.3	61.7	
1 Financial supporter internationally	23.4	76.6	14.9	85.1	
2 Lecturer and/or debater	17.0	83.0	12.8	87.2	
2 Author/publisher	6.4	93.6	6.4	93.6	
1 Teacher of Arabic	4.3	95.7	2.1	97.9	
2 Lobbyist	4.3	95.7	2.1	97.9	
14 Ideal Score					
Summary of participation scores	Less than 1	2-4	5-7	8-10	11-14
In Palestinian Group (%)	17.0	48.9	12.8	19.1	2.1
In Arab Group (%)	34.0	38.3	10.6	10.6	6.4

III. Attitudes and Opinions—On a scale of five, encircle the score that most closely represents your position on the following—strongly agree = 5; agree = 4; no position = 3; disagree = 2; strongly disagree = 1:

	5 %	4 %	3 %	2 %	1 %
1. The Palestinian issue is well understood in your community	6.4	6.4	12.8	46.8	25.5
2. The Palestinians have a hard time in your community	12.8	12.8	23.4	31.9	14.9
3. Most American Palestinians are familiar with the Palestine National Charter	6.4	27.7	21.3	38.3	4.3
4. Most American Palestinians have a copy of the Palestine National Charter	2.1	8.5	8.5	46.8	29.8
5. The Palestinians are well integrated in your community	17.0	44.7	10.6	19.1	8.5

Demographic Characteristics of the Responding Palestinians in the U.S. (47 total)

Age Distribution

	Freq.	%
Less than 20 years	2	4.3
20-29	6	12.8
30-39	12	25.5
40-49	12	25.5
50 & over	15	31.9

Family Size

Size	Freq.	%
No Report	2	4.3
1	3	6.4
2	6	12.8
3	2	4.3
4	12	25.5
5 or more	22	46.8

Sex of Respondent

	Freq.	%
No Report	3	6.4
Male	35	74.5
Female	9	19.1

Marital Status

	Freq.	%
Widowed	2	4.3
Single	8	17.0
Married	37	78.7

Education

	Freq.	%
No Report	2	4.3
Less than Grade School	2	4.3
Grade School	1	2.1
High School	14	29.8
University Graduate	9	19.1
Post Graduate	19	40.4

Occupation

	Freq.	%
No Report	13	27.7
White Collar—Skilled	3	6.4
Academic	12	25.5
Professional	17	36.2
Indep. Bus.	2	4.3

Income Bracket

	Freq.	%
No Report	8	17.0
\$15,000 or less	7	14.9
\$16-30,000	18	38.3
\$31-50,000	9	19.1
\$51,000 and over	5	10.6

6.	The Palestinians are afraid to make their identity known in your community	8.5	17.0	6.4	27.7	36.2
7.	The Palestinians are afraid to make their identity known in America	8.5	21.3	6.4	29.8	31.9
8.	American Jews are highly influential in your community	53.2	31.9	6.4	4.3	2.1
9.	The number of American Israelis is high in your community	23.4	17.0	17.0	25.5	14.9
10.	The influence of American Israelis is high in your community	31.9	21.3	12.8	17.0	14.9
11.	Your relationship with American Jews is intimate (5), cordial (4), friendly (3), polite (2), nonexistent (1)	4.3	12.8	25.5	31.9	23.4
12.	The P.L.O. and Israel are using religion for political goals	12.8	17.0	17.0	19.0	29.3

IV. Peace between the Palestinians and Israel is possible only if (on a scale of five as above):

13.	Israel withdraws from the territories occupied in 1967	63.8	21.3	4.3	2.1	8.5
14.	Israel affirms its stand as a non-expansionist state	55.3	12.8	12.8	8.5	10.6
15.	Israel affirms its stand as a secular democratic state	46.8	10.6	14.9	10.6	14.9
16.	The P.L.O. recognizes the right of Israel to a secure and peaceful existence in the Middle East	29.8	27.7	4.3	14.9	21.3
17.	The P.L.O. amends the Palestine National Charter to accept the existence of the State of Israel	19.1	25.5	12.8	14.9	23.4
18.	The P.L.O. amends the Palestine National Charter to promote coexistence with the State of Israel	17.0	27.7	21.3	12.8	17.0
19.	The U.S. government recognizes the P.L.O. as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians	55.3	21.3	4.3	6.4	12.8
20.	Soviet Russia takes an active part in the search for peace in the Middle East	14.9	23.4	21.3	14.9	25.5
21.	American Jews use their financial support of Israel to influence Israeli policy in the cause of peace	34.0	23.4	8.5	14.9	19.1
22.	American Jews show a genuine desire to cooperate with Arabs for peace	29.8	29.8	4.3	14.9	21.3
23.	The United Nations resumes its role as the central mediator in the conflict	29.8	19.1	27.7	17.0	6.4
24.	American Jews and American Arabs form joint fronts for peace in the Middle East	23.4	36.2	14.9	12.8	12.8
25.	American Palestinians and American Israelis form joint fronts for peace in the Middle East	25.5	19.1	21.3	17.0	17.0

Citizenship

	Freq.	%
USA	41	87.2
Jordanian	4	8.5
Other	2	4.3

Length of Res. in U.S.

	Freq.	%
No Report	1	2.1
5 yrs. or less	3	6.4
6-9	4	8.5
10-19	13	27.7
20-29	9	19.1
30 yrs. or more	17	36.2

Location of Residence

	Freq.	%
West	15	31.9
North	1	2.1
South	4	8.5
Midwest	10	21.3
East	17	36.2

Size of Pop. in Community

	Freq.	%
200,000 or less	24	51.1
2-400,000	2	4.3
4-600,000	3	6.4
6-800,000	3	6.4
1 million or more	15	31.9

Size of Arab Comm.

	Freq.	%
No Report	10	21.3
Less than 5,000	16	34.0
5-14,000	7	14.9
15-24,000	4	8.5
25-49,000	1	2.1
50,000 or more	9	19.1

Size of Palestinian Comm.

	Freq.	%
No Report	11	23.4
Less than 1,000	13	27.7
1-5,000	16	34.0
6-9,000	0	0
10,000 or more	7	14.9

Knowledge of Arabic

	Freq.	%
Poor	4	8.5
Fair	4	8.5
Good	19	40.4
Excellent	20	42.6

Knowledge of English

	Freq.	%
Poor	0	0
Fair	2	4.3
Good	11	23.4
Excellent	34	72.3

26.	The Arab oil producers use their oil power on behalf of the Palestinians for a peaceful settlement	46.8	23.4	8.5	8.5	12.8
27.	The P.L.O. and Israel leave religion out of the conflict	42.6	23.4	17.0	6.4	8.5
V. American Palestinians would help the cause of peace if they (same as above):						
28.	Organize nationally as a political group	61.7	25.5	6.4	2.1	4.3
29.	Engage a professional lobbyist	57.4	21.3	8.5	4.3	2.1
30.	Avoid separation from other Arab groups in the United States	44.7	40.4	2.1	6.4	4.3
31.	Identify closely with the P.L.O.	48.9	25.5	14.9	4.3	4.3
32.	Engage in debates with American Jews	42.6	29.8	8.5	10.6	4.3
33.	Form their own views as American Palestinians of the Palestine-Israel conflict and its possible solutions independently of the P.L.O.	21.3	10.6	8.5	27.7	29.8
34.	Form their views as American Palestinians of the Palestine-Israel conflict and its possible solutions independently of the Arab states	25.5	19.1	14.9	17.0	21.3
35.	Try to assimilate and use the regular American political party channels to achieve their political goals as Palestinians	42.6	38.3	8.5	6.4	2.1

(Continued from page 6)

likely he/she was to agree that peace is possible only if the P.L.O. recognizes Israel.

A somewhat similar distribution of responses was evident with regard to the statement that peace is possible only if the P.L.O. amends the Palestine National Charter to accept the existence of Israel. In this case fewer people agreed and slightly more disagreed than with the previous statement. However, the number of respondents who took no position was tripled, though it was still only 13 percent of the total. This kind of skepticism regarding the prospects of peace even if the P.L.O. were to recognize Israel was reaffirmed in the responses, as shown below. Therefore, it seems clear that while a majority agrees that peace is possible only if the P.L.O. takes positive steps towards Israel, a large minority does not think such steps are even relevant because Israel does not want peace with the P.L.O., regardless of the P.L.O.'s position towards Israel. The importance of this minority should not be underestimated, since their views coincide with those of the P.L.O., and since 74 percent of all the respondents agree strongly or agree that they would help the cause of peace if they "identify

closely with the P.L.O." Thus, indirectly this minority group turns into a majority. Those who disagree on close identification with the P.L.O. are a small minority of 9 percent, while 15 percent take no position. In other words, both those who agree with the indispensability for the P.L.O. to recognize Israel for the sake of peace and those who disagree seem to think that identification with the P.L.O. is essential for peacemaking. The responses on identification with the P.L.O. as a way of helping the cause of peace have low correlations with age, education, income and the length of residence in the United States. That is, the higher the age, education and income and the longer the residence in the United States, the less agreement with the statement. Conversely, the younger, less educated, lower income earners, and the newer residents in this country are more likely to agree that identification with the P.L.O. helps the cause of peace.

A large majority of the respondents, 77 percent, agreed or strongly agreed that peace is possible only if the United States government recognizes the P.L.O. as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while

Knowledge of Hebrew

	Freq.	%
Nonexistent	36	76.6
Poor	7	14.9
Fair	2	4.3
Good	1	2.1
Excellent	1	2.1

Pol. Party Affiliation

	Freq.	%
Republican	14	29.8
Democrat	10	21.3
Independent	19	40.4
Other	4	8.5

American Civic Group Affiliation

	Freq.	%
No Report	11	23.4
None	12	25.5
1 Group	6	12.8
2 Groups	7	14.9
3 Groups	8	17.0
4 or more	3	6.4

19 percent either disagreed or disagreed strongly. Whether those who disagreed did not think the United States' recognition of the P.L.O. to be significant or whether they did not consider the P.L.O. to be the sole, legitimate representative is not clear. It is clear, however, that the Palestinians in America do not have uniform attitudes toward the P.L.O., Israel or the approaches to peace.

When asked if peace is possible only if Soviet Russia "takes an active part in the search for peace," those who agreed were equal to those who disagreed, with about 21 percent taking no position. One would think that if there is a bias in the representativeness of the respondents, it would be against the statement; yet 38 percent agreed or agreed strongly that Russia should take an active part as a precondition for peace. Most probably this percentage would be higher if Palestinians outside the United States were surveyed on this issue. It is interesting to note that agreement with the statement was positively correlated with the respondent's education more than with any other independent variable.

Thinking that American Jews can play an indispensable role in bringing

about peace in the Middle East, I asked the respondents regarding the statement that peace is possible only if American Jews "use their financial support of Israel to influence Israeli policy in the cause of peace." Many agreed, but there were skeptics; 57 percent either agreed or strongly agreed, but a large minority of 34 percent disagreed, either because they did not think the American Jews should interfere, or because they did not think it would make a difference. Many Palestinians question whether American Jews can back down from their "blind" support of Israel, even if they wanted to. Some believe that Israel has such a hold on them and can always make them feel guilty enough to crush any unwanted potential interference or to at least neutralize it. These respondents seem to agree with Irving Howe that "Israeli governments, from Golda to Begin, have acted to reduce the American Jewish community to a mere essential convenience."¹³

The same pattern of response distribution was apparent regarding the statement that peace is possible only if American Jews show a genuine desire to cooperate with Arabs for peace. The skepticism or disagreement may be explained in this case by a sense of futility and the conviction that no outside group can do much about peace: only the Israelis and the Palestinians can bring peace about, and American Jews and Arabs at large can only confuse the issue and complicate the peacemaking process. These attitudes toward the role of American Jews were only poorly correlated with any of the independent variables considered, which may give credence to the idea that the sense of guilt, skepticism and the belief that only the Israelis and Palestinians can create peace are a reasonable explanation of these responses.

The American Palestinians showed similar responses to the statement that peace is possible only if American Arabs and American Jews and also if American Palestinians and American Israelis form joint fronts for peace in the Middle East. Sixty percent agreed or strongly agreed that a joint front between Arabs and Jews in America would help peace, while 45 percent agreed or strongly agreed on the latter. The disagreement was also smaller on the Arab-Jew than on the Palestinian-Israeli joint front proposition, 25 percent and 34 percent respectively. These percentages are not consistent with

reality. There are few instances of cooperation, but no "joint fronts" between either pair are in existence. The cooperative efforts that prevail are usually between individuals or are concentrated on specific programs under the auspices of third parties such as the American Friends Service Committee.

The correlation coefficients between the response to this statement and the independent variables are low but positive. In functional terms, however, agreement with the statement is a positive function of age, income and the length of residence, but a negative function of education. Age, however, is the most important explanatory variable.

A more surprising distribution of responses is that relating to the role of the United Nations in the peace process. Asked about the statement that peace is possible only if the United Nations resumes its role as the central mediator in the conflict, only 49 percent agreed or strongly agreed; 23 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed, while 28 percent took no position. Though there may be a disappointment with respect to the apparent ineffectiveness of the United Nations in trying to influence Israel's actions, it is possible that some of the respondents are not willing to dismiss the role of third parties or other channels, such as the Camp David negotiations as potential mechanisms to promote peace.

In contrast to the foregoing distributions, a large majority, 70 percent, agree or strongly agree that peace is possible only if the Arab oil producers use their oil power on behalf of the Palestinians for a peaceful settlement. Twenty-one percent disagree or strongly disagree and 8.5 percent take no position. There is a positive correlation between agreement with this statement and the independent variables, especially with the level of income of the respondent. According to the regression, the older the respondents, the more likely they would be to agree that the role of the Arab oil producers is basic to peace. In contrast, those who have lived in this country longer have less confidence in the strategic role that may be played by the oil producers than those who have been here for shorter periods. The younger people and the latecomers to this country who are skeptical about the use of oil in the peace process may also be skeptical about the willingness and capability of the oil producers to apply the power of oil effectively on behalf of Palestine. This attitude would be consistent with the

widespread skepticism of the Palestinians as to how much they can depend on the other Arab countries and what kind of sacrifice they can expect of them.

The Role of American Palestinians in Peacemaking (Variables 28-35)

In the last set of questions I tried to explore the future by suggesting that "American Palestinians would help the cause of peace if they" were to take certain actions. To the suggestion that they would help peace if they would organize nationally as a political group, an overwhelming majority, 87 percent, agreed or agreed strongly, and only 6 percent disagreed, with 6 percent taking no position. Why then have the American Palestinians not organized as a political group? The closest they have come to forming such an organization has been through the back door of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (A.A.U.G.), but that is an all-Arab group and is relatively exclusive and does not reach the rank and file of the Palestinian Americans. The P.C.N.A., although a recent development, does not as yet reach the average Palestinian in America either. Is it because of their dispersion in this large country, because of the lack of a Palestinian national representation, or simply because of insufficient attention by the leadership that the Palestinians have not organized politically? Whatever the reason, it seems that a step toward political organization would receive much support.

Another large majority, 79 percent, agreed or strongly agreed that the American Palestinians would help the cause of peace by engaging a professional lobbyist. The disagreement on this is quite small, although quite a few did not take a position or did not respond to the statement at all.

On the sensitive proposition that the American Palestinians would help the cause of peace by avoiding separatism from other Arab groups in the United States, an overwhelming majority, 85 percent, agreed or strongly agreed, while 10 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed. Though they may feel dissatisfied with the role played by other Arabs in the conflict with Israel, the American Palestinians continue to see strength in numbers and in the material resources of the Arab world, in addition to the affinity they feel

towards other Arabs. Therefore, they seem certain that unity with other Arabs would be favorable to the cause of peace as they see it.

As for their relationship with the P.L.O., 74 percent of the Palestinians in America agreed or strongly agreed that they would serve the cause of peace by identifying closely with the P.L.O.; 9 percent disagreed, while 15 percent took no position. It is interesting that identifying with the P.L.O. appears as a negative function of age, education and income level of the respondent, and a positive function of the length of residence in this country. The length of residence also happens to be the most relevant variable. At least two points arise from this finding: first, it is apparent that some Palestinians in America do see other avenues to peace than close identification with the P.L.O. Second, this finding indicates that the American Palestinians are not uniform in their attitudes and differences of opinion among them regarding the relations with the P.L.O. do exist, even though such differences may not be displayed in public.

Exploring further, I asked the respondents about the proposition that they would serve the cause of peace if they "form their own views of the Palestine-Israel conflict and its possible solutions independently of the P.L.O." To this 32 percent agreed or strongly agreed, while 58 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed. That is, about a third of the respondents thought independence from the P.L.O. would serve the cause of peace, which is a relatively high percentage, given that about three-quarters of all the respondents had agreed that close identification with the P.L.O. would serve the cause of peace. It is possible that the discrepancy is due to the belief that identification with the P.L.O. should not preclude forming an independent opinion of the conflict and its solutions.

These responses regarding independence from the P.L.O. are negatively correlated with all four independent variables. However, agreement with the statement appears to be a negative function of age, education and income level, but a positive function of the length of residence in the United States, while age is the most significant explanatory variable. These observations are in contrast with the earlier findings that the young, less educated, and low-income earners would opt for close identification with the P.L.O. Here the

young, less educated and low earners tend to opt for independence from the P.L.O.'s opinion of the conflict and its solutions.

On whether the American Palestinians would serve the cause of peace by forming their own opinion independently of the Arab states, 45 percent agreed or agreed strongly, while 38 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 15 percent took no position. This distribution pattern suggests a high degree of disenchantment with the position taken by the Arab states with regard to the prospects of peace in the Middle East. It also suggests that the high degree of agreement regarding the role of the Arab oil producers could play in the peace process is a tribute to the power of oil rather than to the policy of the Arab states in this matter.

The final proposition addressed to the respondents was that the American Palestinians would serve the cause of peace if they "try to assimilate and use the regular American party channels to achieve their political goals as Palestinians." Eighty-one percent agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition; 8.5 percent disagreed. Apparently the American Palestinians have become aware of the party channels, of lobbying, and of trying from within to achieve their political goals. Yet, their party affiliation pattern does not seem to be consistent with this assessment or with the pattern of response. As may be recalled, only 51 percent belonged to the two main parties, the Republicans and Democrats, which would make a difference in international affairs such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The deed and the thought may be in discrepancy because the reality of the existing political parties is different from the ideal. The political parties in the United States are highly institutionalized and dominated by pressure groups and vested interests long established and powerful. Therefore, while the idea of working through the party system may seem correct, the probability of joining these parties and being able to modify their policies on the Middle East seems extremely remote and therefore joining a party for that purpose may seem as an exercise in futility.

Patterns of Behavior

Finally, I have tried to identify characteristic patterns of behavior that may be detected from the cross correlations. Certain patterns can be observed

and they seem logical such that the response to a given variable may serve as a predictor of the responses to the ensuing statements. For example, the people who agree that the Palestinians are afraid to make their identity known are likely to agree that peace will be possible only if the United States recognizes the P.L.O., if Soviet Russia takes an active part in the search for peace, and if the Arab oil producers use their oil power on behalf of peace. These people, however, are more likely to disagree that religion be taken out of the conflict or that American Palestinians should form their opinions independently of the P.L.O. These same people are less likely to have intimate relations with American Jews.

The respondents who are likely to have intimate relations with American Jews tend to agree that peace is possible only if the P.L.O. recognizes the right of Israel to exist and amends its charter accordingly, and if American Palestinians and Israelis form joint fronts on behalf of peace. On the other hand, these respondents are more likely to disagree that peace would be facilitated by Soviet participation in the peace search and by the use of oil power on behalf of peace.

Another clear pattern suggests that the respondents who agree that Israel and the P.L.O. use religion for political goals are likely to agree that peace would be possible only: if Israel affirms its secular status; if the P.L.O. recognizes Israel's right to exist; if the United States government recognizes the P.L.O.; if American Jews use their financial support to influence Israeli policy; if American Palestinians form joint fronts; and if the American Palestinians form their opinions independently of the P.L.O. and identify closely with that organization.

Who are the respondents who associate peace with a secular Israel? They are the people who are more likely to agree that peace would be possible only if the P.L.O. recognizes Israel, if the P.L.O. amends its national charter accordingly, if the United States government recognizes the P.L.O., if Soviet Russia participates in the search for peace, and if American Jews use their financial support to influence Israeli policy. These people are likely to support a joint front between American Palestinians and Israelis; they are also likely to agree that peace would be possible only if the Arab oil producers use their oil power on behalf of peace. And they would engage a lobbyist.

The respondents who agree that peace is possible only if the P.L.O. recognizes Israel are likely to associate peace with United States' recognition of the P.L.O. and with the use of American Jewish financial influence to affect Israeli policy. They are quite likely to agree that peace is possible only if American Palestinians and Israelis form joint fronts. But they tend to disagree that peace would be served if the American Palestinians identify closely with the P.L.O.

An interesting pattern appears when we try to predict the responses of those who associate peace with the P.L.O.'s amendment of the charter. They tend to associate peace also with United States' recognition of the P.L.O., with the formation of joint fronts by American Palestinians and Israelis with the engagement of a professional lobbyist. To a lesser extent they are likely to associate peace with the use of American Jewish financial influence to affect Israeli policy.

Those who agree that peace is possible only if the United States recognizes the P.L.O. tend to agree also that peace is possible only if the Soviets participate in the search for peace and if American Jews use their financial support to influence Israeli policy. These respondents are even more likely to agree that peace is possible only if American Palestinians and Israelis form joint fronts, if the Arab oil producers use oil power for peace, and if a professional lobbyist is engaged. However, those who agree that peace is possible only if Soviet Russia participates in the search for peace are unlikely to agree that American Palestinians and Israelis should form joint fronts, but are quite likely to agree on the use of oil power for peace, on the engagement of a professional lobbyist, and on close identification with the P.L.O. as a service to peace.

The question of forming joint fronts between American Palestinians and Israelis may also serve as a predictor. Those who agree on the necessity of such fronts are likely to agree on the use of oil power for peace, that the P.L.O. and Israel leave religion out of the conflict, that a professional lobbyist be engaged and that the American Palestinians form their opinions independently of the P.L.O. and not identify closely with it.

The respondents who agree that peace is possible only if Arab oil producers use oil power to bring about peace are also likely to agree that the

P.L.O. and Israel should leave religion out of the conflict, engage a lobbyist, and to a lesser extent agree on the usefulness of close identification with the P.L.O. By the same token, they are unlikely to agree that the American Palestinians should form their opinions independently of the P.L.O. However, those who agree that peace is possible only if the P.L.O. and Israel leave religion out of the conflict tend to agree on the engagement of a professional lobbyist and on the service to peace by identification closely with the P.L.O.

A warning is in order at this point. These tendencies can at best be used to form hypotheses for further testing or as hunches for further study and verification. Nevertheless, they seem to be logical and consistent enough with common sense to be used for the identification of certain behavior patterns of the American Palestinians regarding the conflict and peace in the Middle East.

Political Goals and Settlement of the Conflict

So far we have been concerned with the conditions surrounding the American Palestinians and their reactions to these conditions. It is time to find out what their political goals and conceptions of a peace settlement are. It is easy to oversimplify and suggest that since the P.C.N.A. reflects the general conception of a settlement by the community at large, and since the P.C.N.A. solidly follows the P.L.O. policies, then the American Palestinian conception of peace is that of the P.L.O. However, the P.L.O. itself has different factions and the American Palestinians are not of one view either. Many differ with the P.L.O. on whether violence is the most viable approach to a solution. They question the wisdom of the P.L.O.'s policy in Lebanon. They also question the apparent identification of the P.L.O. with Islam and with the Moslem states, or with Khomeini of Iran and with Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan. While these differences relate mainly to tactics and strategies, some of them differ with the P.L.O. on substance.

In its early years, the P.L.O. called for a unified, democratic, secular state in Palestine in which Arabs and Jews would create their national home jointly. Though few American Palestinians considered that objective to be ideal or feasible, even fewer voices were heard against it.¹⁴ Since then there has been a change in the attitude and strategy of the P.L.O. and apparently

in the attitude of the American Palestinians as individuals. At present one can detect an acceptable if not an ideal solution emerging. The principles on which this solution is based have been pointed out many times before and only a brief summary is in order here:

1. The Palestinians are a people, with national inalienable rights in Palestine.
2. Like all other people, the Palestinians have the right of self-determination without infringing on the sovereignty of other nations.
3. Accordingly, the realization of their political goals should be possible and will be acceptable in a part of Palestine; hence, the two-state solution becomes the objective.
4. The exact boundaries within which these rights can be realized must not be determined through force or military expansion.

Given these principles, a number of unanswered questions of procedure and detail remain. For example, should the Palestinians form a state of their own or join with other states in the region? Do these principles imply the Palestinians' readiness to recognize the State of Israel within secure boundaries? Do these principles imply that the Palestinians would be willing to amend the Palestine National Charter to accommodate peaceful coexistence with Israel? What will happen to the Palestinian refugees who cannot for whatever reason return to their original homes?

As of now the creation of an independent state of Palestine seems to be the most popular proposal among the American Palestinians, with the conviction that a two-state solution in Palestine is feasible, just, and the most viable. Mutual recognition and guarantees of security between the two states would follow from the two-state solution, and so would amendment of the national charter. The issue of the refugees is first and foremost an issue of rights. Once the right of return of the refugees has been recognized by Israel, the form of settlement becomes a matter of negotiations.¹⁵ To recognize the rights of the Palestinians is important to them as a form of rehabilitation and justice. As Farhat Ziadeh has put it, "the situation calls for a *mea culpa* by Israel before the Palestinians could extend recognition to Israel or before they would negotiate a settlement."¹⁶ However, Ziadeh calls for "self-determination and security for both Israel and the Palestinians" within the 1967 boundaries. According to him, "a

Palestinian state would give an identity to the Palestinians...A Palestinian passport would end the nightmare of statelessness...A state would give rise to responsibility and stability."¹⁷ That this form of settlement is acceptable to the Palestinians has been suggested by the highly publicized article of Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State."¹⁸ That such a state may be economically feasible and viable has been shown in my own *Economic Case for Palestine*.¹⁹

Probably the latest statement by an American Palestinian on this issue is that by Edward Said, who also happens to be a member of the Palestine National Council, executive arm of the P.L.O.²⁰ According to Said:

1. The question of Palestine is not understood in the United States and elsewhere because of the refusal of Israel and the Zionists to even recognize the existence of the Palestinians as a people and the acquiescence of others on this matter, even though the existence of the Palestinians is an historical fact and a political reality.
2. The Palestinians know that Israel will remain, but the Palestinians will also remain. Hence, mutual acceptance of each other is the only way to a settlement.
3. The Palestinians who have borne the brunt of the tragedy have studied Zionism and should now try to come to terms with it and interpret its acceptance into a political solution.
4. The mission of the Palestinians is peace; they know that even when they face Israeli tanks and heavy armor, their mission is peace. It is now time that the Palestinians engage liberal Zionists and pro-Zionists in debates to make them understand the question of Palestine and the peaceful mission of the Palestinians. The two-state solution is at present acceptable and feasible.

Said's book is a powerful statement of the Question of Palestine as seen by a Palestinian. In that sense, the book is a self-gratifying statement and is at best addressed to intellectuals with strong backgrounds who have elected not to recognize the question of Palestine. It does not reach the general public, the people who have the votes, who might write to their representatives in Congress, and who are the main target of the Zionist and Israeli propaganda in this country.²¹

So far, the American Palestinians, with few exceptions, like most other Palestinians, have not come to terms with the idea of permanence of Israel or

with the partition of Palestine except as a temporary solution. On the other hand, it is highly conceivable that they have come to terms with the idea that only a political solution and rearrangement of the boundaries would be feasible.

The American Palestinians, as far as I can detect, are skeptical of Israel's intentions to reach a peaceful or political solution. They point to: Israel's expansionism since 1947, far beyond the boundaries specified by the United Nations; the establishment of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, contrary to international law; the cruel and colonialist treatment of the residents of the occupied territories; the discrimination against the Arab citizens of Israel; the disruptive and destructive meddling by Israel in Lebanon; and the internationally-condemned annexation of Jerusalem. They point to all these and wonder whether Israel truly wants peace. Just as they have little evident sympathy with the so-called Jordan solution to the Palestinian problem, they have little sympathy with the Camp David agreement, at least in public, even though some American Palestinians have shown appreciation of President Sadat's dilemma and Egypt's need for peace.

Despite this skepticism, suppose Israel and the Palestinians reach a peaceful settlement. What role will the American Palestinians play in the new state, if that indeed is the solution? Will they go back and resettle in Palestine? Will they be able to adjust to the austere life that will await those who shall build a new state on relatively meager resources and in a relatively hostile environment? Or will they act like the American Jews who support Israel morally and materially, but continue to enjoy the security and affluence of living in the United States?

Though conditions may change in the meantime and opinions may change as well, most Palestinians in America would like to play a role in making the new state a successful reality. Some of them say that they would go back and try. Others say they would go back if called upon to help the state. Still others dismiss the question by modestly insisting that whether they go back or not, the state of Palestine will have enough qualified people to make it a viable state and a haven for its people.

NOTES

1. The story of the P.C.N.A. is well told by Fawaz Turki, "The Passions of Exile: The Palestine Congress of North America," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, IX, No. 4, Summer 1980, pp. 17-43.

2. Preamble to the Constitution, and Report of the Executive Committee, September 25, 1980.

3. A glimpse of this "elite" approach comes through in Fawaz Turki, *op. cit.*, as practiced in the P.C.N.A. conference.

4. *The News Circle*, May 1980, pp. 13-14.

5. I shall not discuss sources of information that are not primarily Palestinian in origin or emphasis.

6. The following is a representative list: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed., *The Transformation of Palestine*, Evanston, Ill., Northwestern Univ. Press, 1971; H. Cattani, *Palestine, The Arabs and Israel*, Longman, 1969; S. Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest: Palestine Between 1914-1967*, N.Y.: The New World Press, 1967; Samir Anabtawi, ed., *Palestine Documents*, various years; Emile Nakhleh, ed., *Palestine Documents*, various years; Emile Nakhleh, *The West Bank and Gaza*, American Enterprise Institute, 1979; George Assoua (with Joseph Ben-Dak), *Peace in the Near East: The Palestinian Imperative*, Stanley Foundation, 1974; M. Cherif Bassiouni (with E. Fisher), *Storm Over the Arab World*, Chicago: Follett Publ. Co., 1972; Nasir Aruri, ed., *The Palestine Resistance to Israeli Occupation*, Medina Press, 1970; Edward W. Said, *The Question of Palestine*, Times Books, 1979; Elias H. Tuma, *Peacemaking and the Immoral War: Arabs and Jews in the Middle East*, Harper, 1972; Elias H. Tuma (with H. Darin-Drabkin), *The Economic Case for Palestine*, London: Croom, Helm, and N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1978.

7. I myself have suspected that I am sometimes excluded from certain committee positions because I am a Palestinian, and my suspicions have often been reinforced by informal communications from colleagues and friends.

8. Unlike other immigrants to this country, the Palestinians come as individuals, not as celebrated political refugees from Communist countries or as mass refugees escaping the war-torn places they came from like the Vietnamese; hence they are noticed or become notorious only because of what they do in this country.

9. A major breakthrough may have occurred in October 1979 when prominent Palestinians shared the forum with Israelis in the New Outlook International Symposium in Washington, D.C.

10. Given the high degree of multicollinearity between the variables and that the data represent discrete or point observations rather than continuous functions, tests of significance have been given little weight. The weight of the analysis has been to determine whether a relationship exists between the dependent and independent variables, and whether it is positive or negative. An attempt has also been made to determine the contribution of each independent variable as an explanatory variable to the R². The dependent variables are numbered 1 to 35. The tables summarizing these results will be available upon request from the author or from A.M.E.U.

11. The study of the Palestine National Charter is a must in Jewish schools in Israel.

12. I do not know of any study of the Palestinians in the United States other than R. Mansur, "The Palestinian Community in the U.S.: Background,

Social Conditions, and Potentials for Development." *Shu'un Filastiniya*, No. 100, Mar. 1980, pp. 66-87 (Arabic), which is not readily available.

13. *New Outlook*, Nov./Dec. 1979, p. 39.

14. See my *Peacemaking and the Immoral War*, 1972. For other proposals and statements see George E. Assoua, *op. cit.*, 1974. Assoua *et al* offer a two-state solution, a Palestinian Law of Return, and a United Jerusalem as the capital of both Israel and the New Palestine. In 1974 Mattityahu Peled and I issued a joint statement calling for a peace initiative by both Arabs and Jews and a two-state solution. ("Israel and the P.L.O.: A Way Out of the Impasse," *New York Review of Books*, XXII, No. 8, May 15, 1975, p. 45).

15. E. H. Tuma, *op. cit.*, 1972; this point has been iterated more recently by Hisham Sharabi, "Development of the P.L.O. Peace Policy," *New Outlook*, Nov./Dec., 1980.

16. *New Outlook*, Nov./Dec. 1980, pp. 27-8.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

18. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1978, pp. 695-713.

19. Tuma, *op. cit.*, 1978.

20. *The Question of Palestine*, Times Books, 1979.

21. It is unfortunate that Said isolates the Maronites of Lebanon as if they were anti-Palestinian; he also characterizes the question of Palestine as a Moslem question. I do not think

these views would be shared by many American Palestinians. The Palestinian problem is definitely an Arab problem but not necessarily a Moslem one; also the position of the Maronites is treated by him unfairly out of context.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

I am grateful to Ziadah Shamieh and to my colleagues Suad Joseph and Jay Helms for their encouragement and help in various ways. Ibrahim Ibrahim did the computer programming and analysis, for which I thank him. Last, but not least, I am grateful to the people who responded and made this study possible.

Congress and Israel: Foreign Aid Decision-Making in the House of Representatives, 1969-76

By Marvin C. Feuerwerker
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979,
195 pp., \$25.00.

By Greg Orfalea

Say you wanted to write a book demonstrating the lead-hard tie between the United States Congress and Israel. You pick a short period, but not 1948 to 1966, because there wasn't much American foreign aid to Israel then. You don't pick 1977-1980, when a defeated Israel lobby witnessed the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, and two unprecedented amendments to reduce aid to Israel were offered in the Senate.

Why not pick 1969-1976, the period of massive boosts in military and economic aid to Israel, particularly after the October War of 1973, when United States transfusions of arms kept Israel from defeat, if not embarrassment. Between 1969 and 1976 United States foreign aid *was* Israel. (From 1976 on, Israel has been receiving approximately half of American aid to the world). The world may be a shrinking place, and for the United States aid checkbook, that place is Israel. This is the conclusion one draws from Marvin Feuerwerker's rather dry, but

informative book, *Congress and Israel*.

Some shading of opinion is inherent in just about anything written about the Middle East. It is important to know Feuerwerker was a legislative aide of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (A.I.P.A.C.), a foreign affairs adviser to Rep. Stephen Solarz, Democrat of New York, who represents the largest Jewish district in America, and also principal deputy to former President Carter's adviser on Jewish affairs. Currently, Feuerwerker is an official at the Department of Defense. His book has much useful data and charts, and contains selections from interviews with 75 members of the House of Representatives. It also has a subtle slant and some methodological weaknesses.

One such weakness is the author's failure to study and to focus entirely on the House of Representatives. The Senate by its very nature tends to be less parochial than the House. During the period studied, Senators William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as James Abouresk, Democrat of South Dakota, and Charles Percy, Republican of Illinois, put sympathy for wrongs done to the Arabs by Israeli expansionism into practice. Recent amendments offered by Senators Mark Hatfield, Republican of Oregon, and Adlai Stevenson, Democrat of Illinois, over the bombing of south Lebanon and the settlements question only underscore the more individualistic bent of the Senate. But alas, the Senate is not considered.

In spite of this and other limitations (due to what Feuerwerker calls "manageability"), the book is valuable reading for anyone examining not only what the Israeli lobby delivers on Capitol Hill (amendments, resolutions, letters of concern) but how this support is engendered. The book affords a unique glimpse into the inner workings of A.I.P.A.C., as well as the various psychological, philosophical and financial pressures applied to the vast majority of Congressmen who vote the Israeli line.

Congress and Israel is divided into seven chapters that deal with: foreign aid legislation; Congressional attitudes toward military assistance; what makes Israel different and causes for wide-spread support for aid to Israel; Congressional opposition to assistance to Israel; how the aid package for Israel is "important" for all foreign aid; a close look at the House Foreign Affairs Committee; the limits of committee action, with concluding remarks that quickly touch on certain new interest groups that question such massive aid to one foreign state. ("There is ample evidence that the National Association of Arab Americans is improving its lobbying efforts each year.")

The book considers the startling fact that as Congress slashed Administration foreign aid proposals by 23.5 percent during 1970-1977, it increased aid to Israel by 8.7 percent. The author details methods used for special favors to Israel, such as earmarking, forgiveness of loans, loan payment terms that would drive (but don't) a

(Continued on page 16)

Books To Order

New Selection

Marvin Feuerwerker, *Congress and Israel: Foreign Aid Decision-Making in the House of Representatives, 1969-76*, Greenwood Press, 195 pp., \$23.95. An insider's look at the Israeli lobby in Washington. Covers the causes of widespread support for aid to Israel, Congressional opposition to assistance to Israel, and the special workings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Our price, \$16.95. See review on page 14.

The Arab Image in Western Mass Media, Outline Books, London, 1980, 280 pp. (paperback). Collection of papers delivered at the 1979 International Press Seminar in London. Contributors include Jack Shaheen, Edward Said, Mohammad Heikal, Claud Morris, Lord Caradon, Hisham Sharabi and Eric Roleau. Our price, \$3.50.

Uri Avnery, *Israel Without Zionists: A Plea for Peace in the Middle East*, Macmillan Publishing, 278 pp., \$1.95 (paperback). A remarkable description of Israeli politics, as presented by a member of Israel's Knesset and the sole representative of a party that believes in the transformation of the Jewish state into a pluralistic and secular one that is able to achieve reconciliation with the Arabs. Our price, \$1.70.

Dewey Beegle, *Prophecy and Prediction*, Pryor Pettengill, 274 pp., \$5.95 (paperback). Refutes the biblical claim of Zionists to the Promised Land by discussing what the Bible teaches about prophecy, especially concerning the predictions of events which already have occurred and those which are to come. Our price, \$5.25.

Hagop Chakmakjian, *In Quest of Justice and Peace in the Middle East: The Palestinian Conflict in Biblical Perspective*, Vantage Press, 157 pp., \$8.95. Written for those concerned about, but unfamiliar with, the facts regarding the Palestinian issue, and, in particular, the scriptural claims for the Zionist right to the land of Palestine. Our price, \$6.50.

John H. Davis, *The Evasive Peace*, revised 1976, Dillon/Liederbach Inc., 136 pp., \$5.95. Factual background to present Arab-Israeli dilemma, with a prescription for peace in Middle East. Our price, \$3.60.

Saad El Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, American Mideast Research, 333 pp., \$14.00. Egypt's former military commander-in-chief tells how the Egyptian army

executed its brilliant 1973 crossing of the Suez and how Egypt's political leaders turned that success into disaster. Our price, \$10.95.

James Ennes, Jr., *Assault on the Liberty*, Random House, 301 pp., \$12.95. The author served as lieutenant among the officers of the U.S.S. Liberty on her fatal voyage. He was on watch at the bridge during the day of the Israeli attack. Our price, \$8.50.

A.C. Forrest, *The Unholy Land*, Devin-Adair Co., 178 pp., \$3.95 (paperback). The author's personal, informed and uncompromising stand against what he considers to be imbalanced and distorted news coverage of the human tragedy brought about by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Our price, \$3.60.

David Gilmour, *Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians 1917-1980*, Sidgwick and Jackson, 242 pp., 12.50 pounds (U.S. \$29.00). Well-documented history of Palestinians, based in part on revealing quotations from Zionist sources. Author examines the status of Palestinians in exile, the complex inter-relationships of the P.L.O., and the Palestinians vis-a-vis the international community, particularly with the Soviet Union and the Third World. Our price, \$13.95.

Grace Halsell, *Journey to Jerusalem*, Macmillan, 1981, 256 pp., \$10.95. A distinguished journalist visits the Holy Land and meets people as diverse as Mayor Bassam Shaka of Nablus and Bobby Brown of the Bronx, NY, now a Gush Emunim settler near Bethlehem. Our price, \$7.95.

Stephen D. Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics*, Doubleday & Co., 302 pp. An investigation into the role Jews play in American politics. It explodes many myths on this subject and shows how Jews have recognized and exerted the power they have. Our price, \$3.85.

Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, Monthly Review Press, 314 pp., \$12.50. Expanded version of Jiryis' original authoritative account of the deprivation of Arabs living in Israel. Our price, \$7.85.

Alfred Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection: What Price Peace?*, Dodd, Mead & Co., 800 pp., \$20.00. Covers the Arab-Israeli conflict from the time of Herzl to Camp David. Research involved is monumental. Contains much information of which most Americans are unaware. Our price, \$12.75.

Livia Rokach, *Israel's Sacred Terrorism*, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980, 68 pp., \$2.50 (paperback). Examines the 1953-57 diary of Moshe Sharett, founding member of Israel's Labor Party, his country's first foreign minister and its second prime minister. Our price, \$1.95.

Raymonda H. Tawil, *My Home, My Prison*, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 265 pp., \$12.95. Autobiography of a Palestinian woman whose description of life under Israeli occupation mirrors the changing moods on the West Bank. Our price, \$8.50.

Evan M. Wilson, *Decision on Palestine*, Hoover Press, 244 pp., \$14.95. Well-documented analysis of the six years leading up to the creation of Israel. Based on author's personal experience and on information only recently made available by the United Nations and governments involved. Our price, \$10.00.

Contribution to A.M.E.U., tax deductible
 Free Pamphlet Collection

A check or money order for \$ _____ is enclosed, payable to A.M.E.U.

Name _____
 Address _____
 Zip _____ 14-3-81

Notices:

A sign of the growing visibility of Palestinian Americans is a new Palestinian monthly to be published in the United States. Edited by Fawaz Turki, *The Palestine Review* presents articles on the literary, artistic, cultural, economic and political aspects of the Palestinian people. Subscription is \$15 for 12 issues. Write: *The Palestine Review*, 1884 Columbia Road N.W., No. 511, Washington, D.C. 20009

Search for Justice and Equality publishes the *Palestine/Israel Bulletin*, and recently issued a statement by 400 clergy supporting Palestinian rights. For a sample copy of the bulletin and/or the clergy petition, send a self-addressed, stamped, business envelope to: Search, P.O. 53, Waverly, MA 02179.

The Palestine Congress of North America announces its Voice of Palestine telephone service. For the latest Palestinian news, in Arabic and English, dial 24 hours a day, 7 days a week: (202) 686-9600.

fiscal conservative wild, and amendments such as the one of Senator Henry Jackson, Democrat of Washington, in 1970 that freed the President to send virtually unlimited weapons to Israel "whenever he desired." The Jackson amendment instituted the great American arms "giveaway" to Israel—since 1970 all arms go to Israel on credit, two-thirds of which is now "forgiven" as outright grant. No other country in the world receives free arms from the United States in this fashion.

Occasionally Feuerwerker is guilty of understatement, omission of crucial details, and misstatement. In light of a recently published secret memo of Henry Kissinger assuaging the fears of Jewish community leaders during the so-called "reassessment" period of 1975, it is hard to agree with the notion, quoted from Robert Trice, that in Middle East diplomacy the executive branch shows a "lack of receptivity to the demands of interest groups." The flip-flop of former President Carter on the March 1, 1980 United Nations vote condemning settlements after meeting with 30 Jewish leaders would seem to confirm this. Feuerwerker states that Congressional resolutions and letters no-noing an Administration that would consider the needs of any other countries in the Middle East but Israel "generally expressed public sentiment." If this principle follows, then should we assume that the results of the October 1980 Lou Harris poll noting that 71 percent of Americans favored the creation of an independent Palestinian state (and 51 percent of American Jews favored it as well) will prompt the Congress to shortly draft a resolution supporting such a state? We'll see.

In discussing the Arms Export Control Act, Feuerwerker unsurprisingly does divulge how Senators Hubert Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, and Clifford Case, Republican of New Jersey, toiled the new law into being practically unenforceable on Israel concerning its strikes on south Lebanon. (State Department attorneys know about these machinations, but the issue has never been brought to light).

The workings of A.I.P.A.C. may be the most interesting section of the book, particularly for political activists. Among reasons for A.I.P.A.C.'s effectiveness, according to the author, are its close relations with key Congressmen and their staff, the tightly-knit network of the Jewish community, the reputation of A.I.P.A.C. for solid research and the

expertise of its staff, and its ability to avoid identification with any political party or faction. (It is, at least from this writer's point of view, a sad fact that Arab Americans have never formed a committee of heads of their organizations such as the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, which works closely with A.I.P.A.C.). The A.I.P.A.C.'s newsletter, *Near East Report*, regarded by Feuerwerker's sources as the Bible of Middle East affairs on the Hill, has received some competition from *Focus*, the bi-weekly newsletter of the National Association of Arab Americans which began publication after the Feuerwerker book was written.

Some time is spent examining the second amendment ever offered in the House to cut aid to Israel (\$200 million) by Dave Obey, Democrat of Wisconsin, in 1976. (Lee Hamilton, Democrat of Indiana, had offered an amendment in the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1973 to reduce assistance to Israel by \$500 million). The Obey amendment got only 31 House votes. Feuerwerker cites an Israeli political scientist: "If House support for Israel diminishes, the diminution is most likely to occur among relatively conservative Congressmen who represent districts having small Jewish populations." On that score, we find a liberal, Adlai Stevenson, from a state which has a sizable Jewish population in its key city of Chicago, offering an amendment on June 30, 1980 to cut aid to Israel that goes to funding its settlements in occupied territory. Stevenson received private support of prominent Jewish constituents, as well. But that story and others await inclusion in another book called "Congress and Israel." In the meantime, the present one is important especially for experts (reading with a fine-toothed critical comb) who are fascinated with the process of how bills become laws which flaunt other laws, and how American aid to Israel is so dangerously out of proportion to Israeli performance. Be advised—Feuerwerker does not say that.

Greg Orfalea is Assistant for Public Affairs of the National Association of Arab Americans in Washington, D.C.

The Link aims at maintaining contacts among Americans who believe that friendship with the people of the Middle East is essential to world peace, who would contribute to this goal by spreading understanding of the history, values, religions, culture and economic conditions of the Middle East, and who would—in this context—press for greater fairness, consistency and integrity in United States policy toward that area.

It is published by A.M.E.U. (Americans for Middle East Understanding, Inc.) whose directors are: Hugh D. Auchincloss, *Atwater, Bradley & Partners, Inc.*; John V. Chapple, *former C.A.R.E. Director, Gaza Strip Project*; John H. Davis, *former Commissioner General of U.N.R.W.A., International Consultant*; John Dorman, *former Director of American Research Center, Cairo*; Henry G. Fischer, *Curator in Egyptology, Metropolitan Museum of Art (Vice President)*; Robert J. Hayes, *Ergon Corporation (Treasurer)*; Robert M. Henry, *Aramco, retired*; Dr. O. Kelly Ingram, *Professor, Duke University*; Robert E. Marsh, *Consultant, The Olayan Group of Companies*; John G. Nolan, *National Secretary, Catholic Near East Welfare Association (Secretary)*; Joseph L. Ryan, *S.J., Rector, Holy Cross College*; Jack B. Sunderland, *President of Coroil, Inc. (President)*; Elizabeth Thomas, *Egyptologist*; L. Humphrey Walz, *Associate Synod Executive, H.R., United Presbyterian Synod of the Northeast*; Charles T. White, *former Financial Executive, Near East Foundation and A.I.D.*

John F. Mahoney, *Executive Director*;
Michael Villani, *Distribution*;
L. Cooley, *Editor*; F. Cooley, *Designer*

The views expressed in *The Link* are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Americans for Middle East Understanding, Inc.

A.M.E.U. grants permission to reproduce material from *The Link*, in part or whole, with full credit given to A.M.E.U., which requests one copy of the work upon publication. All correspondence should be addressed to Room 771, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-2336.

Americans for Middle East Understanding, Inc.
Room 771, 475 Riverside Drive
New York, N.Y. 10115



A \$10.00 voluntary annual subscription is requested to cover cost of postage and handling for *The Link* and Public Affairs Pamphlet series.