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Israeli War Plan Readied If New Peace Effort Fails

By Jim Hoagland

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October 26, 1977

Israel is actively preparing to fight what senior Israeli defense officials privately describe as "a war of annihilation" against the Egyptian and Syrian armies if the Carter Administration's new Middle East peace effort fails.

Israeli strategy in any new war will be to destroy the two main Arab armies so quickly and completely that the Arabs will not present a military threat to Israel for the next 10 years, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and other Israeli officials have told visiting Americans.

This strategy was basically set before Menachem Begin's Likud coalition ended the Israeli Labor Party's 29-year rule in May. But U.S. analysts feel that Begin's government has put its own stamp on Israeli war strategy since coming to power.

The refinements flow in large part from the differences in attitudes toward Washington of the ousted Labor government, which placed a higher premium on staying on good terms with the United States to ensure arms supplies, and of the Begin Administration, which masks neither its growing fears of President Carter's Middle East policy nor its readiness to use Israel's current overwhelming military superiority to fight a war without American help or advice if necessary.

Refinements in planning since May

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reportedly emphasize the use of the great military depth to crush Arab armies before the United States can intervene to bring about a cease-fire, as the Nixon Administration did in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.


A rapid victory would free Israel from having to depend on the United States for the kind of massive resupply

airlift that triggered the Arab oil countries' embargo of 1973.

The flow of arms supplies under the Ford and Carter administrations has virtually eliminated any immediate need for the kind of airlift that angered the Arabs in 1973. With U.S. approval, Israel has stockpiled enough weapons, ammunition and fuel to fight a three-front conventional war for 30 days before needing fresh supplies from the United States, American experts estimate.

Despite political differences with Begin over the Palestinian role in the new peace effort, the Carter Administration has not tampered with the pipeline of heavy weapons that has become the most vital link in the American-Israeli relationship.

Last week the Pentagon released \$50 million worth of Cobra helicopter gunships mounted with anti-tank missiles for shipment to Israel. Since April the Pentagon has cleared nearly



\$150 million in shipments that included M-60 tanks, 155-mm howitzers and armored personnel carriers.

But Carter Administration officials concede that the continuing arms flow and the "binding" commitments they have given that it will continue have not quieted Israeli apprehension.

Since Arab armies caught them by surprise and took advantage of their defensive strategic posture in 1973, the Israelis have been determined to have both the capacity and the political freedom to strike first and ferociously if war threatens.

Labor Party leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres said publicly that by destroying the Arabs militarily for seven to 10 years, Israel would be able to get through a period when Arab oil and money could be used to squeeze concessions from Israel.

For Begin's military strategists, the political lifespan of the Carter Administration is rapidly becoming an equally important planning factor. While he has spoken little in public on the subject, the sharp-tongued Weizman has made no secret of his view that Israel's continuing buildup is designed in part to make its armed forces invulnerable to pressure from Washington.

"The Israelis have gone on the offensive, and have designed an 18-month, \$2 billion pipeline of new equipment that will keep them in that posture into the 1980s," says one American official. "If we were to try to exert the kind of pressure we used in 1973 to keep the Israelis from destroying the Egyptian Third Army, the Begin Government could and probably would tell us to mind our

own business."

Henry A. Kissinger exerted enormous pressure to get the Israelis to accept a cease-fire and halt their drive to smash the entrapped Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai in 1973. Kissinger argued that the Egyptians would be able to engage in serious negotiations only if they were not humiliated on the battlefield.

Officials in Washington estimate that on a scale of 100 equaling their military capabilities in 1973, Israel today stands at 160, Syria at 100 and Egypt, after its complete break with the Soviet Union, at 80 to 90.

The first serious test of the Carter Administration's attitude toward the continuing Israeli military buildup will come in late November when Defense Minister Weizman comes to Washington with an arms shopping list described as "staggering" by one official who has had glimpses of preliminary requests.

The Israelis are expected to seek weapons transfers that will significantly increase their technological and firepower advantage over the Arabs. They will also repeat requests for co-production agreements for new weapons systems, and will press for a second shipment of 20 F-15 jet fighters within the next year and specific delivery dates for 200 or more F-16 fighters in the early 1980s.

The fears felt by Israelis and their American supporters on the Carter Administration's reliability were clearly evidenced in a press release issued this week by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. The release called for a Pentagon investigation of an "anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish" article in the current issue of *Armed Forces Journal*

magazine by a former Defense Department official.

Asserting that the article may contain classified information, the Anti-Defamation League's press release cited views that linked the article to "a mentality which is becoming more and more widespread in the Department of Defense and the State Department—that our strategic interests lie with Arab oil and petrodollars, thereby converting Israel from an asset to a liability."

The article was written by Anthony H. Cordesman, civilian assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth during the Ford Administration. Cordesman, who has left the Pentagon and now works in the Department of Energy, writes that Israel has become "a militaristic state whose military buildup has gone far beyond the requirements of defense."


Moreover, he gives a detailed breakdown in tables of Israeli military requests for the future, which he asserts "will create an Israel" that will be able to defeat Arab armies before the great powers can intervene."


Cordesman, who had no comment on the B'nai B'rith charges, refers in the article to a secret Israeli buildup plan known as "Matmon B," but credits his statistical data to Analytical Assessments Corp., a Los Angeles-based private research firm that works on Middle East topics for U.S. government agencies.

Abraham R. Wagner, head of Analytical Assessments, said in a telephone discussion that his firm had drawn the figures used in the article from unclassified sources such as the Institute of Strategic Studies of London, and had used them in an unclassified research paper done for the Congressional Budget Office in 1976.

But informed sources said that the estimates of future requirements appeared to have been so close to secret, official Israeli figures that Israel is deeply concerned about the possibility of a leak.

The tables printed by *Armed Forces Journal* show Israel asking for a threefold increase in armored personnel carriers, up to 9,200 by 1980, and seeking to raise its tank force from 2,200 to 3,300 by the same year. This would give Israel a greater total of tanks than the United States has deployed with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe, Cordesman said. ■





The Arab—Israeli Balance: How Much Is Too Much?

By Anthony H. Cordesman

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International*, October 1977

The pendulum is swinging in the Middle East. Last winter's hopes for some kind of Arab-Israeli peace settlement have faded, and recent press reports clearly show that fear of yet another war is growing.

This time, however, the destabilizing factor may be Israel, not the Arabs. While U.S. experts concentrated their attention on the vulnerability of the "moderate" leaders of the Arab confrontation states — Sadat, Assad, and Hussein

Anthony H. Cordesman, presently working in the Department of Energy, served as civilian assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth.

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— Israeli politics produced Menachem Begin. One of the most respected defense analysts in Israel, Zeev Schiff, wrote in the newspaper *Har'etz* that:

I deduced from certain developments . . . before the [Israeli] elections that another war with the Arabs was ultimately inevitable . . . An Israel ruled by [Prime Minister Menachem Begin's] Likud Party will perhaps more quickly be persuaded to start a preventive war or a preemptive strike, should the other side make any threatening, aggressive steps. We must be ready for war at all hours of the day.

The result is an Israel committed to permanent acquisition of an as yet undeclared portion of the West Bank and with dubious, if any, willingness to compromise on the Golan and Sinai.

Begin's Likud Party evolved out of

the Herut Party which, at least until 1965, claimed that Israel should include all of Jordan, based on the "historic" boundaries of Israel. In 1977, the Likud Party platform stated that:

The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is an eternal and inalienable right, and is also an integral part of the right to security and peace; thus Judea and Samaria (the entire West Bank) will never be turned over to foreign control; between the sea and the Jordan there will be only Israeli sovereignty.

The Risk of Another War

These shifts in Israeli politics give the Arab-Israeli military balance a new and different meaning. The United States may no longer be supplying an Israel whose military strength would lead to Israeli willingness to compromise for peace. It may now find

itself aiding an Israel which may use its military strength to take permanent control of former Arab territory in direct opposition to U.S. policy, and be locked into an indefinite cold war with the Arabs. At worst, the U.S. may find itself tied to an ally which will use military forces in a preemptive attempt to settle the PLO problem, or to destroy Arab military forces while they are weak.

In fact, in the past, several of Begin's senior advisors privately discussed provoking Syria into war as an excuse to destroy its improving forces before they became threatening. They have recently discussed another war as probable, and they have discussed attacks "in support" of Lebanese Christians against the PLO, and they have also actively supported a hostile Ethiopia against Somalia and its Arab rebels.

Even a relative moderate, Israeli Chief of Staff Mordecai Gur, stated in a speech of fund raisers for the United Jewish Appeal (quoted in the 30 August *Christian Science Monitor*) "If another war breaks out between the Arab states and Israel, we must ensure that our victory is fast and decisive, so that the whole world knows who won"

What General Gur is proposing is that Israel wage war as intense as possible to destroy Arab armies before the West could intervene.

These new Israeli attitudes may well threaten the strategic interests of the United States and its allies. Even heightened confrontation between Israel and the Arabs might have the following effects:

Threatened or actual increases in oil prices;

Manipulation of oil production rates, particularly by Saudi Arabia, which would constrain supply and apply economic pressure on the West without an actual boycott;

Manipulation of Arab dollar holdings or debts to impose political pressure;

Major new funding of improvements of the forces of the Arab confrontation states by the Arab oil countries;

Re-orientation of Syrian and Egyptian politics back to building a war fighting capability with Israel;

Massive support of PLO attempts to keep the West Bank Arabs "free" by the conservative or moderate Arab states;

New Arab pressures to try to make

a still fragile Lebanon into a confrontation state with Israel.

This could be the "good news" spawned by recent actions of the Begin Government. The "bad news" might be actual war, and any such conflict could have far worse results:

Another oil boycott, particularly before the West has built up its strategic reserves, could lead to worldwide depression or recession. The West is far more dependent on oil imports than in 1973, and the Arabs are far better organized to conduct a boycott that could accelerate current trends towards Euro-Communism, and threaten every pro-Western government in the Third World.

It is impossible to measure how much damage the Arabs might do to the dollar, or world banking and monetary system, trying to put pressure on the West. They now have the ability to disrupt world currency movements as if they were blowing down a house of cards.

Even a swift and massive Israeli victory would be certain to lead to pressures for U.S. military re-supply. U.S. forces have still not recovered from the re-supply effort after the 1973 War and our Reformer divisions in Europe remain critically weak. A new re-supply effort would disrupt and delay U.S. "get well" plans indefinitely. Worse, our Allies would be forced to disengage themselves from any such U.S. effort. This could endanger NATO and U.S. basing and overflight rights throughout the world.

Another Arab defeat would be likely to radicalize the entire Arab world and force it back to the USSR as its major supplier of arms.

The former Director of the CIA has indicated that Israel now has at least a dozen nuclear weapons. There is growing Congressional discussion of the possibility these weapons were built using missile material stolen by Israel from the United States. It seems certain that both the Arabs and Israel have built up an extensive CBW capability. There is no way to estimate the kinds of escalation that would occur in a future war, or the efforts the Arabs would make to develop nuclear and other anti-population weapons after another defeat.

Foreign Minister Dayan indirectly made clear his views regarding this development in an interview with the Jerusalem Domestic Service last

March before becoming Foreign Minister in the new government:

Following the (1973) Yom Kippur War, the situation has arisen in which the Arabs have a great deal of new armaments. In 1967 the ratio of forces between us and the Arabs was approximated one to two . . . one Israeli tank opposite two Arab tanks, and the same in the Air Force. In the Yom Kippur War there was a ratio of one to three According to published reports not only in Israel, but from other authoritative sources, Israel had almost 3,000 tanks and the Arabs had over 5,500 tanks. Only this morning I saw in an American newspaper that they have altogether 9,000 tanks (in the U.S.). Just imagine that Israel has a third of the tanks that the United States has, three times as many as France, three times what England has. We have more planes than Italy, or Germany, or France, and a little less than England. How can a country of 3 million people run in this race against the Arabs, who have unlimited financial resources, unlimited political resources for procurement, and huge quantities of manpower?

. . . What I am saying is that along with this race we have to develop an option for ourselves, that is, an ability to produce nuclear weapons. We cannot stand up to the quantities of conventional weapons of the Arabs We should develop this (nuclear option) in addition to and not instead of conventional weapons we have, in reasonable quantities which we would be able to maintain so that if the Arabs try to conquer and destroy Israel, we will have the means to fight them not with convention, but with high quality arrestive arms—nuclear weapons.

These remarks take on added meaning given press reports of Israeli and South African cooperation in developing nuclear weapons, and that the weapon the South Africans were going to test was Israeli.

While the USSR may well choose not to exploit a war, and to concentrate on exploiting the aftermath, we have no guarantee this will happen.

The U.S. may well face Soviet intervention and pressures in the Eastern Mediterranean of unpredictable nature and consequences.

Shifting Arab and Israeli Capabilities

The shifts in the balance since the October War offer little hope that Israel would be deterred by Arab strength, that the outcome of a war would at least preserve Arab face or honor, or that war would not escalate into even more serious levels of casualties and equipment losses. U.S. aid since the October War has built up Israel into a state able to wage aggressive war with minimal risk.

Israel is no longer a small state surrounded on all sides by neighbors with large forces. It is a militaristic state whose military buildup has gone far beyond the requirements of defense.

Many of the details of this buildup are concealed from the public eye. They involve qualitative changes in Israeli training, logistics, operations and maintenance, readiness, and technology which are both expensive and important, but which cannot be easily compared to the capability of Arab states. The basic force numbers involved, however, cannot be concealed, and have recently been summarized in outstanding studies by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization and the Analytical Assessments Corporation. The results of these studies and other unclassified material now show the steady rise in Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) capability relative to Arab forces.

How David Became Goliath

Israeli military power grew from a "David" to a "Goliath" between 1948 and 1977.

Only small forces were involved in the 1948 War. Israel's forces were not much smaller than Arab forces. In fact, while the Arabs evidently had about 80 tanks to Israel's 40, the Israelis had more APCs, half tracks, and home made vehicles and actually had about 50 per cent more "armored" battalions. Israel also had about 55 combat aircraft to a deployable Arab strength of 35, although the Arabs had 35 general purpose aircraft to Israel's 15. Yet,

THE RESULT OF THE 1948 WAR

APPROXIMATE STRENGTHS, OPPOSING FIELD FORCES¹

	15 May 1948	October 1948
Israel	34,400	45,000 ²
Arabs	42,000	55,000 ²
ALA	5,500	3,000
Army of Salvation	5,000	5,000
Lebanon	2,000	2,000
Syria	5,000	5,000
Jordan	7,500	10,000
Egypt	7,000	20,000
Iraq	10,000	10,000

ESTIMATED LOSSES

	Killed	Wounded	Total
Israel	6,000	15,000	21,000
Arabs	15,000	25,000	40,000

¹Excluding Israeli and Palestinian Home Defense Contingents.

²90,000 mobilized and under arms.

SOURCE: Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*

NOTE: The tables in this section were developed by Trevor N. Dupuy of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization. They will be published in final form in *Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974*, Bobbs Merrill, in October 1977.

THE RESULT OF THE 1956 WAR

APPROXIMATE GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS

	Suez-Sinai Campaign, 1956			
	Egypt	Israel	Britain	France
Field Forces	150,000	100,000	13,500	8,500
Tanks	530	400	?	?
APC	200	450	?	?
Artillery Pieces	500	150	?	?
Self-Propelled AT	50	0	?	?
Combat Aircraft	255	155	70	45

ESTIMATED LOSSES

Suez-Sinai Campaign, 1956

Personnel Casualties	Captured /Missing			Total
	Killed	Wounded		
Egypt vs. Israel	1,000	4,000	6,000	11,000
Egypt vs. Allies	650	900	185	1,735
TOTAL	1,650	4,900	6,185	12,735
Israel	189	899	4	1,092
Britain	16	96	0	112
France	10	33	0	43

Aircraft Losses

Israel	15
Egypt	215 (200 on the ground)
Britain	4
France	1

SOURCE: Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*

this was by far the most "lethal" conflict. More men died and were wounded in this war than in any other.

The forces involved in the 1956 War are shown above. This time the Israelis had a significant numerical inferiority, but this was more than offset by:

The impact of British and French forces;

Superior Israeli training, manpower quality, and leadership;

The "rundown" of Egyptian forces in terms of parts and ammunition, and Egyptian conversions to new and unassimilated equipment;

The initiative Israel acquired in launching a surprise attack;

Greatly superior Israeli pilot and aircraft maintenance training.

The result was token Israeli casualties of about 1,100, while Egyptian casualties (compared with 21,000 in the 1948 War of Independence) reached 11,000.

The force balance during the 1967 War is shown on page 6. Israel's armored force had grown from 40 tanks (in 1950) to 1,000, Arab tanks from 80 to 2,330. Israel's combat aircraft strength had grown from 55 to 1950 to 286, against an Arab increase from 35 to between 576 and 682. Artillery had increased from a few weapons to the point where the Arabs had nearly a 1,000, or a roughly 5:1 superiority over Israel.

Oddly enough, the 1967 War was the first in which the popular image of "David" vs. "Goliath" made any real sense; the Israelis really did have great numerical inferiority. It also, however, produced Israel's greatest and quickest victory. Israeli surprise, manpower quality, and superior aircraft defeated the Arabs in little more than a week.

Jordan and Syria also inflicted significant equipment losses on Israel in spite of their initial air losses. It was Egypt's loss of 10 tanks to Israel's one, and the massive Arab air losses on the first day of the war that made Goliath so inferior to David.

1956-1967 Defense Spending


The "David" image may have been misleading throughout this period. Israel put a great deal of money into developing the quality of its manpower, while the Arabs bought equipment. The table on page 6 shows the defense expenditures of each side, and explains a great deal about why Israel's equipment inferiority had so little actual impact on war fighting capability.

Impact of the October War

The Mid-East balance at the time of the October 1973 War is shown on page 6. Both approximately doubled their forces since 1967, and the Arabs

now could commit a tank strength comparable to NATO's combat ready strength in the Center Region.

The October War took longer than the 1967 conflict, but produced a far



Egypt, Syria, and Israel:
 Relative Defense Outlays as Percentages of GNP

SOURCE: Adapted from Nadav Safran, *From War to War*, Pegasus, New York, 1969.

smaller increase in the casualties on both sides than might have been expected. By 1973, Israel was able to rely on first line U.S. aircraft, modern U.S.-built tanks, and its own aircraft modifications. These equipments proved no less vulnerable than past weapons, but protected their crews far better. Similarly, the Arabs did not panic on any front, and did not suffer as the Egyptians had in 1967.

As a result, personnel losses were limited. To put this in perspective, more men were probably killed and wounded during the civil war in Lebanon than in all four Arab-Israeli wars.

Equipment losses in 1973 were no greater in proportionate terms than in 1967, and were smaller for the number of tanks and aircraft engaged than many battles of WWII. In fact,

the Israeli Air Force lost fewer aircraft per sortie than the U.S. lost in Vietnam.

THE RESULT OF THE 1973 WAR
 ESTIMATED GROUND STRENGTHS

	Israel	Total Arab Committed	Total Arab Potential
Available Army Manpower	310,000	505,000	650,000
Tank/Armored Divisions	7	5	8
Infantry/Mechanized Divs	--	11	18
Separate Brigades	18	47	46
Medium Tanks	2,000	4,841	6,131
APCs	4,000	4,320	5,870
Artillery (over 100mm)	570	2,055	2,885
Multiple Rocket Launchers	--	90	90
Mortars (over 100mm)	375	650+	650+
SSM Launchers	--	42	42
SAM Launchers	75	1,280	1,280
Strella	--	3,000	3,000
AT Guns	1,000	3,650+	3,650+
AT Missiles	280	1,200	1,200
AT Rockets	650	5,300+	5,300+
AT Guns	--	2,200+	2,200+

ESTIMATED GROUND FORCE LOSSES

	Israel	Arab Total
Personnel		
Killed	2,838	8,528
Wounded	8,800	19,549
Prisoners or Missing	508	8,551
Tanks	840	2,554
APCs	400	850+
Artillery Pieces	?	550+
SAM Batteries	--	47
Aircraft	102	360
Helicopters	?	55
Naval Vessels	1	15

THE RESULT OF THE 1967 WAR

APPROXIMATE LAND AND AIR FORCE STRENGTHS

	Israel	Arabs	Egypt	Jordan	Syria	Iraq
Mobilized Operational						
Manpower	250,000	329,000	210,000	55,000	63,000	----
Brigades	25	42	22	10	12	----
Artillery Pieces	200	960	575	263	315	----
Tanks	1,000	2,330	1,300	287	750	----
APCs	1,500	1,845	1,050	210	585	----
SAMs	50	160	160	0	0	0
AA Guns	550	2,000+	950	143	1,000	----
Combat Aircraft	286	682	431	18	127	106

ESTIMATED NAVAL STRENGTHS, 1967 WAR

	Israel	Egypt	Syria
Manpower	4,000	13,000	1,000
Patrol and Torpedo Boats	9	44	17
Guided Missile Boats	0	18	4
Destroyers and Frigates	3	7	0
Submarines	3	12	0
Amphibious Craft	0	5	0
Small Craft	?	?	?
	15+	86+	21+

ESTIMATED LOSSES

	Killed	Wounded	Captured /Missing	Total Casualties	Tanks Lost	Aircraft Lost
Israel	983	4,517	15	5,515	394	40
(vs. Egypt)	303	1,450	11	1,764	122	
(vs. Jordan)	553	2,442	--	2,995	112	
(vs. Syria)	127	625	4	756	160	
Arabs	4,296	6,121	7,550	17,967	965	444
(Egypt)	3,000	5,000	4,990	12,980	700	356
(Jordan)	696	421	2,000	3,117	179	18
(Syria)	600	700	570	1,870	86	55
(Iraq)	--	--	--	--	--	15

SOURCE: Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*

Israeli and Arab Recovery: 1973-1976

Both Israel and the Arab states made up their 1973 losses by 1976.

It is difficult to compare force ratios and force structures because the weaponry have changed so much from war to war, but the following table indicated that the balance has shifted in Israel's favor since the October War.

What these tables do not show is that Israel could correct many of the critical weaknesses revealed by the October War without American aid. Writings by Israeli defense experts like Zeev Schiff, and other Israeli defense correspondents, revealed that while Israeli soldiers, airmen, and sailors were outstanding, IDF failed to maintain readiness during the 1967-73 period:

The Israelis made virtually no use of their anti-tank weapons. Most of their French ATGM were in storage. They were not organized, trained, or equipped to support armor with mobile infantry.

The equipment for mobilized forces was badly maintained, and much of it

was improperly loaded with supplies. Ammunition, radios, and other key supplies were missing.

The high command had no real war planning staff or command and control center. These had to be improvised during the war with inadequate communications and poor ability to use reconnaissance systems effectively.

The Israeli army was not properly trained in combined operations, and the key officers and enlisted men responsible for artillery targeting and fire management had a low mobilization priority and poor training. Many units never had such personnel during the war because they could not be "married up" during combat.

Overall mobilization training had been allowed to drop to low levels,

The IDF combat engineering capability was poorly organized and key elements were never properly tested in the field. Key equipment, like the canal crossing gear, failed at critical points in combat.

The IDF had let its ammunition stocks grow critically low, but more importantly, had failed to organize a system that could allocate and ration ammunition effectively. Large amounts of ammunition and air munitions were used ineffectively while key units ran short.

The Israeli air force and army were not trained in combat air defense suppression. They relied on preemptive air strikes. The IAF had never been properly trained to use its U.S.-supplied ECM gear, and had no trained analysts for attack planning. As a result, many suppression sorties

numbers of Arab aircraft. The system could easily be overloaded, and left IAF pilots without sufficient aircraft control and warning.

Israel could quickly correct these problems, however, and began to do so immediately after the October War. By 1976, virtually all of the major problems in Israeli forces were eliminated.

Unfortunately, these Israeli reforms were not accompanied by public Israeli or U.S. understanding of the fact that many of Israel's problems in the October War were self-inflicted and not the result of improvements in Arab planning or Arab arms. Many memoirs publicizing these problems are only now being written, or are held up in Israeli censorship. There are also obvious political reasons why Israeli politicians like Shimon Peres should ignore such factors and stress that, "the qualitative advantage of a devoted people on the ground may be countered by the very advanced nature of modern weaponry."¹ Talking about a three-to-one Arab advantage is much more attractive than talking about the failures of one's own party. Accordingly, neither IDF force requirements planning, nor U.S. military assistance planning, takes account of how much such Israeli reforms could do to shift the balance towards Israel.

In contrast, the Arabs still lack effective air training and command, control, and communications systems; their vast amounts of air defense weaponry were not netted or organized into an effective system, and they still could not train effectively for armored maneuver warfare. Their aircraft generally lacked modern air-to-air missiles and attack delivery avionics, and they lacked modern anti-tank weapons relying on low-performing Soviet ATGMs.

Israeli Equipment Improves After War

The deployment of new weaponry since the war has allowed Israel to correct most of its previous imbalance in combined arms. Israel is acquiring large numbers of artillery and anti-tank missiles, greatly improved land-based air defenses, penetration aids, air defense suppression weapons, and tank-killing air munitions necessary to

¹Jerusalem Post, 21 March, 1976

MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

	Israel			Syria			Egypt		
	Pre-Oct. 1973	Losses Oct. 1973	Total 1976	Pre-Oct. 1973	Losses Oct. 1973	Total 1976	Pre-Oct. 1973	Losses Oct. 1973	Total 1976
Medium Tanks	1,700	[810	2,260	1,500	[1,050	1,950	1,850	[900	1,920
Armored Vehicles	3,000		3,300	1,100		1,150	2,000		2,500
Field Artillery	550	n.a.	710	900	n.a.	800	1,400	n.a.	1,500
Submarines	3	0	2	--	--	--	12	0	12
Destroyers	1	0	0	--	--	--	5	0	5
Missile Boats	13	0	18	8	5	6	19	3	16
Bombers	12	0	10	n.a.	0	n.a.	30	0	30
Fighter-Bombers	308	79	380	110	[165	150	180	[182	140
Interceptors	59	12	47	200		250	210		250
Reconnaissance	6	0	6	--	--	--	--	--	--

n.a. = not available

SOURCE: *Strategic Survey*: 1974. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975.

NOTE: This and many of the following tables are adapted from Abraham R. Wagner, "The Middle East Force Balance and Israeli Assistance Requirements," Analytical Assessments Corporation, Los Angeles 1976. This is an extremely useful study of the Middle East aid issue and current balance, and I am indebted to the author for letting me adapt tables from it.

and had dropped seriously in quality.

Army units were not properly trained in air defense, although some units achieved brilliant individual kill records of Arab aircraft.

The so-called defensive barriers along the Suez Canal and Golan Heights existed only on paper. Most had virtually no anti-tank capability, and poor artillery support. They were undermanned because of the holiday, but most significantly, they were grossly underequipped with firepower.

Israeli field intelligence and reconnaissance was poorly organized and poorly integrated into the Israel command system. Israeli intelligence had some outstanding HUMINT capability, but it was not organized for armored war.

were wasted, and IAF pilots improvised penetration tactics which were often unsuccessful.

The IAF had not trained to attack defended targets, and was poorly trained to attack Arab armor. Its command accepted pilot claims of high damage, but postwar writing indicates many sorties were ineffective or wasted.

The IAF had no real air battle management center for attack air missions. It could not allocate attack sorties effectively; it could not use reconnaissance data effectively, and could not provide support to pilots in flying safe penetration corridors.

IAF fighter defense tactics and management were excellent, but were not designed to deal with large

restore the effectiveness of its air force. The Arabs, however, have so far been able to make only limited improvements in their force, and still lack needed equipment. There have been promises of support to Egypt by Saudi Arabia, but such aid has not yet materialized. Accordingly, the balance of arms transfers now seems to favor Israel.

The Current Balance

These changes have led to a new balance in the Middle East.

There are two counts of Arab forces. The first, which represents the count used by most U.S. experts, compares Israel against Egypt and Syria. It assumes Jordan would deploy only token forces, as in October 1973, rather than risk destruction of its forces. It also assumes that the collective strength the Arabs can deploy is unlikely to exceed the combined strength of Egypt and Syria because much of the Egyptian and Syrian forces shown are inoperable due to service or maintenance, unfit for combat because of training and readiness, or tied down for internal security reasons. Similarly, nations like Iraq and Saudi Arabia can deploy units, and perhaps even corps, but not whole armies. With the exception of a few Iraqi divisions, other Arab armies also lack training, experience, competent officers and NCO's, adequate logistic and support systems, standardization, and adequate command and control.

In contrast, Israel keeps virtually all its total force structure combat ready, has modified it to achieve a high degree of standardization, and has few of the massive qualitative defects of Arab armies.

Israeli Desires for 1980

Israel, however, uses a very different balance in arguing for aid than the U.S., although its assessment for war planning purposes is probably identical to that of the United States. Israel counts all major Arab forces in asking for aid, and not the major military threat. The result is a definition of military requirements for "defense" which also gives Israel the capability to launch lightning offensives against Egypt, Syria, Jordan, or Lebanon before the great powers could intervene, or before an oil boycott could have effect. These requirements are so high that they

ESTIMATED ISRAELI FORCE POSTURE GOALS

<i>Force Build Up Units</i>	<i>1976</i>	<i>Estimated 1980</i>	<i>Estimated 1986</i>
Armored Divisions	8	11	13
Mechanized Brigades	9	10	12
Tanks	2,200	3,300	5,000
Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)	3,300	9,200	11,000
Anti-Tank Missiles (ATGM)	100	500	900
SSM Battalions		4	6
Artillery Battalions	30	40	50
Jet Combat Aircraft	550	650	750
Attack Helicopters		30	80
Transport Aircraft	60	90	110
SAM Batteries	15	30	50
Missile Patrol Boats	18	24	30

SOURCE: Analytical Assessments

would leave Israel relatively immune to U.S. threats not to resupply it as the U.S. did after the October War.

These Israeli force goals were first set forth in a 1974 request for more U.S. aid in a plan called "Matmon B." They have never been fully announced, but they approach the levels shown above.

The U.S. has never accepted the "Matmon B" view of the threat or of Israeli aid and force requirements. However, it also has never come to grips with the qualitative differences between Israeli and Arab forces, and

during 1976-86 as the U.S. will maintain in the U.S. division in NATO. JCS chairman General George Brown was not simply shooting from the lip in his often misinterpreted remarks about the pressures such Israeli requirements put on the equipping and readiness of U.S. forces.

It is not clear just how many of these Israeli demands the U.S. will meet, or how the various Arab arms purchases will offset strength of forces in the confrontation states. A conservative estimate indicates, however, that Israel could achieve rough



has chosen instead to set aid requirements based on the U.S. view of the future strength of Arab confrontation forces or the threat. The resulting U.S. arms transfer plans have not been published, and have been renegotiated, but they are still incredible. An estimate of requirements for military assistance based on the U.S. analysis of the balance is shown on page 9. To put these requirements in perspective, Israel wants almost as many medium tanks

quantitative parity with Egypt and Syria in the combined strength of ground forces.

Israel now has real defensive barriers and fortified lines, unlike the paper defenses it had before the October War. This will greatly enhance Israel's offensive capabilities.

Offensive Versus Defensive Bullets

There is, of course, no easy way to set requirements for U.S. aid, or to make

meaningful distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons. Even a fortified, defensive barrier frees troops for offensive missions. A long-range aircraft can strike enemy troop concentrations in the rear and defensively break up an enemy offense as well as be used to support an armored attack into enemy territory.

The problem in shaping U.S. aid is, therefore, not the type of arms, but rather:

Whether U.S. assistance to the IDF is proportional to Arab and Soviet

to Israel from dependence on U.S. resupply and great power support.

There is no way to make this judgment with the data now available on U.S. military assistance. This would require data on arms transfers, and unclassified data show only dollar amounts. This data give little perspective on the impact of U.S. aid on the balance.

The U.S. aid program is not massively biased towards Israel in dollar terms. Although Israel received massive aid after the October War,

The weapons numbers shown in those tables indicate that planned U.S. aid will go far beyond the limit necessary to ensure Israel's security. Specifically, it indicated that the U.S. will create an Israel which has all of the capabilities necessary to wage offensive warfare:

Israel will have the arms to cover the Jordanian front and simultaneously attack Syria and Egypt. It will acquire the capability to conduct rapid war and defeat Arab armies before the great powers can intervene.

Israel will have all the infantry and artillery mobility necessary to penetrate or flank Arab armies, envelop them and destroy them in detail.

Improvements in Israeli artillery strength and attack air power will allow the IDF to suppress Arab anti-tank defenses and roll up the Arab air defense system.

Improvements in both equipment and Israeli planning will allow Israel to make effective U.S. ECM, precision guided munitions, anti-tank weapons and countless other post-1973 improvements in U.S. military technology which do not show up in any tables.

Israeli logistic systems and mobility now eliminate the weaknesses in long-distance support capability that existed in 1973. Israel also has the combat engineering equipment to rapidly move across the canal and land barriers.

Israel now has at least 30 days of ammunition. It probably has far more. Each new U.S. shipment frees Israel of dependence on U.S. resupply. This steadily reduces U.S. ability to put a rein on Israeli actions.

In contrast, the Arabs are in a far different position. Syria is bogged down in Lebanon. The Egyptian army has only had minimal resupply since 1974, and much of its equipment is deadlined or of questionable operational value. Libya and Iraq are even more divided from the confrontation states than usual. The Arabs have certainly improved since 1973, but not as quickly as Israel.

The Monetary Balance

These trends in favor of Israel become even clearer when the defense expenditures and military assistance each side is receiving are compared. Such comparisons provide a better measure of the overall trend in military capability than the inaccurate arms build-up counts available, and include the

ILLUSTRATIVE ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. WEAPONS SYSTEMS: 1976 - 1986

	1976	Additional By 1980	Additional By 1986
<i>Armor and Artillery</i>			
Medium Tanks (M-60, XM-1)	540	1,800	900
ATGM Launchers (TOW)	300	300	300
Howitzers (M-109 155mm, 175mm)	110	450	225
APCs (M-113A1)	500	5,900	2,800
<i>Aircraft</i>			
F-4 (Phantom)	50	25	--
A-4 (Skyhawk)	200	--	--
F-15 (Eagle)	15	35	--
F-16	--	--	200
Helicopters (Cobra, etc.)	20	100	150
Transports (KC-135, KC-130, etc.)	25	75	25
<i>Missiles</i>			
SAM Batteries (Hawk, Chapparal, SAM-D) ¹	15	20	30
SSM Battalions/Missiles (Lance)	--	4/400	4/400
<i>Naval Ships and Craft</i>			
Missile Patrol Boats	--	6	5
Other Ships	--	2	--

¹ Assumes replacement of Hawk-I and Hawk-II by SAM-D by 1986.

SOURCE: Analytical Assessments

assistance to the confrontation states;

Whether the quantity of arms exceeds what is necessary for Israeli defense;

Whether excess mobility is provided for Israeli offensive movement;

Whether the ability is provided to the IDF to over-run enemy and defenses;

Whether too much ability is provided to the IAF to suppress enemy air defenses;

How the aid impacts on IDF ability to sustain land and air penetrations deep into enemy territory;

The extent of the freedom provided

Jordan also received significant aid, and roughly twice as many dollars worth of U.S. military equipment and assistance were transferred to Saudi Arabia during 1950-76 as to Israel. Almost all of this aid was delivered in the last few years. The U.S. has also recently announced \$250 million in arms sales to Egypt. Moreover, U.S. arms sales to Israel are a comparatively limited part of total U.S. arms sales on a worldwide basis.

Yet, the previous estimates of the balance show U.S. aid will give Israel major new military capabilities while having little impact on Arab effective-

ESTIMATED ARAB-ISRAELI FORCE BALANCE: 1980

	Israel		Egypt and Syria		Egypt		Syria		Jordan	
	Estimated ^a	Possible ^b	Estimated ^a	Worst Case ^c	Estimated ^a	Worst Case ^c	Estimated ^a	Worst Case ^c	Estimated ^a	Worst Case ^c
<i>Total Mobilizable Military Manpower</i>	487,200	—	682,400	—	410,000	—	272,400	—	75,000	—
<i>Ground Forces</i>										
Total Mobilizable Manpower	450,000	—	593,000	—	353,000 ^d	—	240,000 ^d	—	67,100	—
Medium Tanks	—	3,240-5,040	5,180	5,710	2,420	2,670	2,670	3,040	540	600
Artillery (100-mm +)	—	672-1,120	2,520	3,100	1,560	1,900	960	1,200	250	460
AFC's	—	9,240-10,000	4,440	4,900	3,000	3,300	1,440	1,600	530	880
ATGM	500	600-900	1,900	—	1,200	—	700	—	—	—
SSM Launchers/ Missiles	24/-	—	76/1270-	99/-	36/600	44/-	40/670	50/-	—	—
SAM Batteries/Launchers	30/180	30-50/-	276/1656	304/1824	200/1200	220/1320	76/456	84/504	—	6/36
AA Guns	1,180	—	5,000	—	3,000	—	2,000	—	220	400
<i>Air Force</i>										
Total Mobilizable Manpower	30,000	—	66,000	—	36,000	—	30,000 ^d	—	7,300	—
Jet Combat Aircraft	650	750	1,114	1,450	586	760	528	690	76	130
Jet Pilots	1,000	1,200	1,650	—	900	—	750	—	180	—
Reconnaissance Aircraft	12	—	32	—	12	—	20	—	4	—
<i>Navy</i>										
Total Manpower	7,200	—	23,400	—	21,000	—	2,400	—	275	—
Destroyers and Frigates	2	—	5	10	5	8	0	2	0	0
Missile Patrol Boats	24	29	32	42	16	24	16	18	12	15
Submarines	3	5	12	12	12	12	0	0	0	0

a Estimates based on figures in *The Military Balance: 1976-1977* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976; *Aviation Week and Space Technology*.
 b Possible figures for Israel include high levels of output from domestic weapons production programs.
 c Worst Case analysis based on linear increments of 1980 estimates.
 d Includes Air Defense personnel.

SOURCE: Analytical Assessments

resources going into factors like training, readiness, command and control, logistics, defensive barriers and other intangibles.

Israel has moved from a two-to-one inferiority to the Arab states in defense expenditures on current forces to a larger total defense budget much

larger than that of its major Arab opponents combined. These figures are even more impressive when it is remembered that Israel spends its money more effectively than the Arab states.

Israel has gone from a society that spent 8 to 13 per cent of its GNP on

defense in 1956-1967, to one that spent 17 to 30 per cent in 1967-73, and which now spends up to 45 per cent.

Israel has achieved levels of mobilizable manpower almost comparable to Egypt, even though Egypt's population is more than an order of



magnitude larger. This is an incredible commitment for any society.

Israel has also gotten more military aid than the Arab confrontation states. U.S. military assistance to Israel was far greater than Soviet aid to the Arab states after the October War, and far more of the U.S. aid was in the form of grants rather than loans. This seems likely to continue unless the Arab oil states begin to make good on their promises to Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

Unfortunately, these levels of defense expenditures, and the resulting Israeli requirements for U.S. aid, are an inevitable outgrowth of Israel's present emphasis on developing the military capability to achieve "decisive solutions" in defeating and destroying Arab forces before the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can intervene. They are also

not necessarily each and every detail If we look at the algebra of Dayan's proposal, as opposed to the arithmetic, then we get the following formula: A reduction in the intensity of the conflict to a tolerable level (through territorial concessions to Syria and to Egypt) as a credible deterrent against full-scale wars plus the conducting of a non-total war equals a reasonable security at a reasonable price. The equation would balance out equally well if . . . the credibility is not based on nuclear weapons but on a defense pact with the United States."²

Peres and Rabin Versus Begin

These trends in U.S. aid might have presented few military risks under

strength to replace Rabin with a man the army and people would trust to negotiate. Peres could, as a conservative, gradually approach the PLO and make the concessions on the Golan Heights that Israel's growing military strength would permit.

However, Israel chose Begin, and Menachem Begin's Israel is not that of Yitzak Rabin or Shimon Peres. Begin is a brilliant politician, but he was also a ruthless guerrilla leader prior to the formation of the State of Israel, whose messianic advocacy of a greater Israel, including Arab territory, appeals to conservative religious groups, the masses of non-European Israelis who are at the lower end of the economic spectrum, and the rather large body of Israelis concerned with the future security of the state. His election may well have turned U.S. willingness to supply armament to Israel into a major national security problem.

The Drift Towards "Permanent" Liability

It is a cliché of diplomacy that nations have no permanent alliances, but only permanent interests. In reality, however, the U.S. has no permanent interest in Israel, and may now be acquiring something perilously close to a "permanent" liability. The Likud victory may have tied the U.S. into an alliance with Israel that violates the conventional canons of *realpolitik* and geopolitics.

Yet, there are three major reasons why the U.S. cannot react to Begin's election by reversing its policies and cutting its aid: morality, history, and domestic politics.

The moral reason goes far beyond Israel's strategic isolation and status as a "small" democracy. The West has a real collective guilt for the Nazi Germany holocaust, and the U.S. has a particular guilt for its indifference to the plight of the European Jews before, and sometimes during, World War II.

The historical reason grows out of postwar American concern with this guilt, Israel's isolation, and Israel's once inferior military position. The U.S. became the almost inevitable protector of Israel after the collapse of British and French power in the Middle East. This in turn led to a situation where Israel became dependent on the U.S. for military equipment and supplies, and this

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO THE MIDDLE EAST: 1973 - 1975

(Millions U.S. \$)

	U. S. AID		SOVIET AID			
	TO ISRAEL	TO EGYPT	TO SYRIA	TOTAL	SOVIET/ U. S. AID	
Grants	1,550	150	250	400	26%	
Loans	983	485	865	1,350	137%	
TOTAL	2,533	635	1,115	1,750	69%	

SOURCE: Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976 (H.R. 9861). Hearings before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, 94th Congress, 1st Session (1975), and *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts* (November 1975). Data Management Comptroller, DSAA.

the outgrowth of the Israeli focus on the total Arab threat, and a lack of willingness to address either the major qualitative weaknesses in Arab forces or the political liabilities of admitting how badly Israel was prepared for war in 1973. It is almost certain that Israel could afford to cut these defense expenditures back sharply if it was willing to accept a defensive posture, and that requirements for U.S. aid could be cut even more sharply if Arab defects and the post-war revitalization of Arab forces were taken into account. At least some Israelis also share the view that the defense expenditure and aid can be reduced without, as Dayan has suggested, relying on a nuclear strategy. Abraham Schweitzer noted, in commenting on Dayan's views, that, "What is important in this doctrine is

Rabin or Peres, and might well have contributed to peace. Part of what the Israeli public perceived as Rabin's weakness in decision-making and vacillation was the result of the fear the Israeli Cabinet had of being dependent, of being alone, and of Arab mass. Israel also feared any U.S. attempt to supplant Soviet military aid to the Arabs. A U.S. oversupply of military equipment was a reasonable *quid pro quo* for flexibility on negotiations. Sadat even publicly stated that he did not mind what level of aid Israel received as long as it improved the climate for negotiation.

After Rabin's fall, most U.S. experts saw Peres as having the

²*Ha'aretz*, 15 March 1976, as translated in *The Middle East Force Balance*, p. 39.

dependence now ties the U.S. to Israel with added moral obligations.

Domestic political pressures are an outgrowth of morality, history, and the alignment of many Jewish Americans with Israel. This alignment is the result of cultural and religious factors, but also of the heritage of the holocaust and having been subjected to anti-Semitism. It is an alignment born out of fear and emotion as well as normal ethnic ties.

Collectively, these three factors now bind the U.S. into what would otherwise be one of the most undesirable strategic relationships in history.

The Administration is limited in its flexibility by Congress and one of the most effective lobbies in U.S. politics. It is almost certainly this set of causes—and not U.S. interests—which recently led President Carter to state that the U.S. will not use military aid to put pressure on the Begin Government.

The Congress is even less able than the Administration to change U.S. policy, and is highly reluctant to examine U.S. aid to Israel in realistic detail.

The American Jewish community—or that undetermined part of it which wishes to identify itself as being politically pro-Israeli—seems determined to react from fear rather than thought. It not only does not examine U.S. and Israeli relations with sufficient independence, it is prone to over-react to any attempt to do so by others; and some extreme American Jewish groups always seem willing to use anti-Semitism and the holocaust as a moral club.

This paralysis is also a vicious circle. It would take great moral courage for the Administration to put pressure on Begin's military jugular, without Congressional or American Jewish support. Congress might accept (but can scarcely precede) Administration leadership, and is even more vulnerable to American Jewish political pressures. American Jews are normally one of the best educated and informed political groups in the U.S., but in this case they lack leadership and information from the Administration and Congress.

Unfortunately, Begin probably understands how to exploit U.S. paralysis as well as any politician in Israeli history. He also seems to lack Shimon Peres' ultimate practicality and restraint. While a Labor majority in Israel probably meant that there

would be sharp limits on how far Israel would trespass on its relationship with the U.S., Begin's public statements in Israel have made it clear he intends to abuse the U.S.-Israel alliance to seize permanent control of West Bank towns and territory that have no desire to be part of Israel. Unfortunately, he may go much further and actively seek the political and military destruction of the PLO as well.

While Begin may or may not destroy Israel's first real hope for peace in the process, he has already begun to seriously damage U.S. interests.

Beyond Strategic Paralysis

The U.S. has powerful tools to change this situation *if* it can break out of its own domestic political constraints. For example:

Begin is himself a "terrorist." He has applied the "inhumanity" he attacks in Arafat, and has described this in thinly veiled terms in his autobiography, *The Revolt*. The U.S. can exploit the fact that there is no "moral" difference between an Israel led by a "patriot" like Begin and the PLO led by a "patriot" like Arafat. The U.S. can now attack Israel's refusal to talk to the PLO in a way that it could never do when Israel was led by David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, or Yitzak Rabin.

The U.S. can freeze aid levels in current dollars, and move to reduce credits and other tacit economic support and indirect subsidies. It can re-price military aid to include full transportation and R & D costs, and restrict military credits.

The U.S. can make it clear in many different politically acceptable ways that Begin endangers Israel's lifeline to the United States. It can probably force the collapse of his coalition.

The U.S. can slow down military aid without endangering Israel, and it can announce that it will suspend military aid as long as any current member of the Israeli Cabinet is in power if IDF forces cross into Arab territory. It can preempt Begin diplomatically before he acts militarily.

The U.S. still, if it hurries, can force IDF dependence on U.S. resupply. It can halt parts, ammunition, and training aid selectively to erode Israel's military endurance to defensive levels.

The U.S. can use these pressures to tacitly force the end of Israeli-South African cooperation on land and air weaponry and nuclear weapons.

The U.S. can probably use the current peace talks to force Begin and the Likud to set clear and unambiguous limits to what they define as Eretz Israel (the land claims to Jordan or the West Bank "Triangle" as "God-covenanted" or "God-given"). This should include a rejection of any such return of the West Bank as "not only a crime, but a blasphemy and abortion" in the face of a "natural right."³ And it should include specific rejection of Arik Sharon's "master plan" to install two million Israeli settlers on the occupied lands, and of his declaration Israel will "never leave the West Bank."⁴

None of these actions will endanger Israel, and all can be accomplished in ways that do not violate diplomatic procedures. They can also be backed with still greater limitations on military and economic aid, and increasing political pressures. Even reductions in official U.S. and Israeli contacts would, for example, have a visible and powerful impact in Israel.

If the U.S. is going to use these tools, however, the Administration and Congress are going to have to take risks. At the least, they are going to have to debate openly and discuss U.S. military aid to Israel, the trends in the Israeli balance, and Begin as a man and Likud/Herut as a party. More desirably, the Administration or leading Members of the Congress should place fixed limits on U.S. obligations to Israel which specifically tie Begin's hands. But any major debate would be real progress.

There is no reason to assume that the "pro-Israel lobby" is, inevitably, pro-Begin rather than simply pro-Israel. There is also no reason to assume American Jews will not follow such a debate with considerable independence of thought, or not support a U.S. policy that protects U.S. interests without threatening Israel's survival. It may be impractical to demand moral leadership, but to avoid a debate that could free U.S. policy of its present constraints, would be moral cowardice, and could be disastrous. ■

³*The Revolt*, pp. 349, 373, 377.

⁴*Newsweek*, 19 September 1977.

Congressional Pressure Points



While letters, telegrams and visits with Representatives and Senators are timely year round, they have the greatest impact just prior to key subcommittee, full committee or floor votes on legislation that directly relates to human rights issues. **If your Representative or Senators are on any of the key committees listed below, it is especially important that you contact them regularly between January and May of each year as they write the foreign military and economic aid bills.** (It is these bills that authorize and appropriate federal dollars for arms aid and economic support for repressive regimes.) If they are not on these committees, then they will vote on the aid bills when they come to the House and Senate floors between May and September. If you are on the Coalition's mailing list, you will receive action alerts about critical legislation deserving of support or opposition that will be offered either in a committee or on the floor.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)

Democrats: John Sparkman (AL) — **Chairman;** Frank Church (ID); Claiborne Pell (RI); George McGovern (SD); Hubert Humphrey (MN); Dick Clark (IA); Joseph Biden (DE); John Glenn (OH); Richard Stone (FL); Paul Sarbanes (MD).

Republicans: Clifford Case (NJ); Jacob Javits (NY); James Pearson (KS); Charles Percy (IL); Robert Griffin (MI); Howard Baker (TN).

Foreign Operations Subcommittee — Senate Appropriations Committee

Democrats: Daniel Inouye (HI); William Proxmire (WI); Lawton Chiles (FL); J. Bennett Johnston (LA); Patrick Leahy (VT); Dennis DeConcini (AZ).

Republicans: Richard Schweiker (PA); Edward Brooke (MA); Mark Hatfield

(OR); Charles Mathias (MD).

House International Relations Committee (HIRC)

Democrats: Clement Zablocki (WI-4-Milwaukee) — **Chairman;** Dante Fascell (FL-15-Miami); Charles Diggs (MI-13-Detroit); Robert Nix (PA-2-Philadelphia); Donald Fraser (MN-5-Minneapolis); Benjamin Rosenthal (NY-8-Queens); Lee Hamilton (IN-9-Columbus); Lester Wolff (NY-6-L.I. and Queens); Jonathan Bingham (NY-22-Bronx); Gus Yatron (PA-6-Reading/Allentown); Michael Harrington (MA-6-North Shore); Leo Ryan (CA-11-San Mateo); Charles Wilson (TX-2-Orange); Cardiss Collins (IL-7-Chicago); Stephen Solarz (NY-13-Brooklyn); Helen Meyner (NJ-13-Trenton); Donald Bonker (WA-3-Seattle/Tacoma); Gerry Studds (MA-12-New Bedford); Andy Ireland (FL-8-Sarasota); Donald Pease (OH-13-Lorain); Anthony Beilenson (CA-23-Beverly Hills); Eligio de la Garza (TX-15-Southern Ranch Country); Berkley Bedell (IA-6-Sioux City); George Danielson (CA-30-San Gabriel Valley); John Cavanaugh (NE-2-Omaha).

Republicans: William Broomfield (MI-19-Detroit); Edward Derwinski (IL-4-Chicago); Paul Findley (IL-20-Springfield); John Buchanan (AL-6-Birmingham); J. Herbert Burke (FL-12-Fort Lauderdale); Charles Whalen (OH-3-Dayton); Larry Winn (KS-3-Kansas City); Benjamin Gilman (NY-26-Rockland County); Robert Lagomarsino (CA-19-Santa Barbara); William Goodling (PA-19-York); Shirley Pettis (CA-37-desert region).

Foreign Operations Subcommittee — House Appropriations Committee

Democrats: Clarence Long (MD-2-Towson) — **Chairman;** David Obey (WI-7-Wausau); Charles Wilson (TX-2-Orange); Sidney Yates (IL-9-

Chicago); Yvonne Burke (CA-28-Los Angeles); Edward Roybal (CA-25-Angeles); Carl Stokes (OH-21-Cleveland).

Republicans: C.W. Young (FL-6-St. Petersburg); Silvo O. Conte (MA-1-Pittsfield/North Adams); Virginia Smith (NE-3-Grand Isle).

Human Rights Action Timetable

January: Carter budget (with foreign aid requests) presented to Congress. **Action:** Publicly protest continued high levels of aid to dictators.

February — May: Hearings and "mark-up" on FY 1979 foreign military and economic aid **authorization** bills in HIRC and SFRC. **Action:** Pressure members of the HIRC and SFRC — to support amendments in committee to end aid to dictators.

March — June: Hearings and "mark-up" on FY 1979 foreign aid **appropriations** bill in Foreign Operations Subcommittees of House and Senate Appropriations Committees. **Action:** Pressure members of these committees.

May — June: House and Senate **floor** debate and votes on military and economic aid **authorization** bills. **Action:** Pressure **all** Members to support amendments to end or reduce aid to repressive regimes.

June — September: House and Senate **floor** debate and votes on foreign aid **appropriations** bill. **Action:** Pressure **all** Members to support amendments to further reduce or end aid to rights violators.

October 1: Fiscal year 1979 begins.

Brother Joe and the Colonel

Struggle for Academic Freedom on Occupied West Bank

By L. Humphrey Walz

Condensed from an article that appeared in the *Presbyterian Outlook*

The "little town of Bethlehem," one of Christianity's oldest communities, has become the home of one of the world's youngest institutions of higher education.

On papal initiative, Bethlehem University was founded in 1973 not far from the ancient Church of the Nativity, the traditional site of Christ's birth. Members of its first graduating class are now employed in hotel management, business administration, nursing, teaching and other careers for which there is a demand in the area.

According to Archbishop William A. Carew, Pope Paul's personal representative to the Christians of Israel, Jordan, Cyprus and Greece: "Its vocational courses, leading as they do to immediate jobs after graduation, are a great enticement for keeping the young at home." Thus, the Pope's dream of equipping bright young Arab Christians for employment in Israeli-occupied territory is steadily becoming a reality.

Lt. Col. Nathan Rom, Israeli Military Governor of Bethlehem, does not seem to share this dream. In fact, his actions, sometimes violating traditional academic freedoms, make it difficult for students to prepare for and hold jobs in their ancestral homeland.

The colonel prohibits such normal activities as student assemblies, alumni meetings, guest lectures, campus

L. Humphrey Walz is well known to AMEU supporters as a scrupulous researcher on aspects of the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Zionist controversies. His long service in the U.S. and overseas with church-related and governmental programs for victims of Nazism and Communism has sensitized him to the hopes and fears of refugees in and from Palestine/Israel.

exhibits, school magazine articles and purchase of equipment from overseas unless his advance approval is secured. Whenever his authority is by-passed in the slightest degree, he summons student leaders from their classes to his military headquarters. Nor does Rom hesitate to pull the university's President, Dr. Joseph B. Loewenstein, FSC — affectionately known as "Brother Joe" — away from his administrative responsibilities.

The Bulletin Board "Battlefield"

The extent to which Rom will go is illustrated by an incident that, in his mind, warranted drastic action. It led to his stationing armed soldiers on the roof of a nearby apartment house, increasing motor patrols around the campus, and building a road block on the hill to the university.

The basic conflict was over control of the academic bulletin boards. On September 6, 1977, two weeks before the start of classes, Rom and two aides invited themselves to the campus and presented Brother Joe with a list of restrictions, including prior approval of all posted notices.

Rom assigned its enforcement to his house Arab, Abu Fahed. On October 6 Abu Fahed summoned the entire student senate to his office with the demand that they show him all bulletin board items. Considering this a military intrusion on academic rights, the senate did not comply.

On October 10, 11, 19, 20 and 21, he sent out further peremptory decrees. Disregarding their classes, schedules and other prior commitments, he required the President, a dean and several student leaders to appear before him immediately on this "urgent" matter. They appeared but continued to stand for academic freedom.

Finally, on October 24, after four insistent phone calls to the President, Abu Fahed strode onto the campus with one Captain Near. Together they

scanned the notice board and confiscated four articles.

This censorship upset the students, who refused to attend classes for three days. It was then that Rom took his retaliatory actions culminating in the blockading of the campus.

University presidents do not usually condone student strikes. This time, however, Brother Joe stated: "This is their only peaceful means of indicating their displeasure and rejection of the continued harassment and interference by the military authorities."

Student Arrests and Recriminations

Other situations are more serious. Walid En'eim is one example. As president of the student senate for two years, Walid had done much to help keep campus life stable and tranquil. After midnight of December 27-8, 1976, soldiers took him and two other students from their homes in Beit Ummar. Arrested for agreeing to join, though they actually did not join, an "illegal" society, one was imprisoned for five weeks without trial, while Walid and the other student were tried and sentenced to three months in jail.

On March 27, 1977, the day of Walid's release, Rom served him with an order not to return to Bethlehem District to complete his studies for graduation. Brother Joe, with the boy's father, went to inordinate lengths to get the ban modified. After almost a month of negotiations, Rom agreed to let Walid come to the University at specified times three days a week.

In June Walid graduated with his class and on September 1 he started his career as a teacher. On September 19 Rom issued a stop-work order, which prevents him from further pursuing his chosen profession.

Magazine Censorship

A very different situation is that of Linda Ghawali of Beit Jala. Shortly after her June 1977 graduation, Linda started work with the Hebron Social

Welfare Department. Then came word that she couldn't continue there without the Military Governor's recommendation, which Rom refused to give. Why?

"Linda," says Brother Joe, "was never directly involved in any student demonstration. Her only crime was to have written one article for the school magazine which the Military Governor considers illegal."

Linda's article, a page-long sentimental tale of a mother's death while her son was behind bars, conforms in no conceivable way with Rom's denunciation of it as a "violent attack on the authorities." Rom's real target is apparently the student literary magazine, which he has been trying unsuccessfully to control.

By Israeli law, all periodicals produced for *public* distribution in the Occupied Territories are subject to the Military Governor's censorship. Until the spring of 1977, the University magazines, for sole distribution to students, were mimeographed on campus. The May issue, however, was typeset and run on an off-campus press, which, Rom felt, brought it at last under his jurisdiction.

On June 30 he issued the ultimatum that brought Brother Joe to Bethlehem

Military Headquarters on July 5 with fifteen members of the editorial board. Rom demanded that they explain the magazine's "illegal" appearance without his prior censorship. Six of the students were later remanded to Ramallah Military Court for a September 11 trial. This was postponed and is still pending. Meanwhile Linda Ghawali is being punished as a past contributor and kept from earning her living where she is needed.

Questions and Hopes

Many questions arise: Is Nathan Rom, with his injunctions and fulminations, simply another self-assertive, vindictive martinet who enjoys flashing his rank? Or is he a conscientious implementer of Israeli policy? In either case, what hope is there for improvement?

Israel has deported many established Palestinian leaders like President Hanna Nasir of Bir Zeit — the only other Christian university in Occupied Territory — for no apparent reason except that they were leaders. Others have left voluntarily because of harassment or lack of economic opportunity.

Does the government want to press the new crop of university-educated

leaders to depart without being expelled? Does it want the training of new Arab leadership to stop? Is it, as provocative parallels at Bir Zeit suggest, creating confrontations that could be used as an excuse to close down Bethlehem University?

Brother Joe is an American, not a deportable Palestinian like Hanna Nasir. Is he being badgered to make him give up, pack up and leave?

Whatever the answers, there are hopeful signs that questions like these will be asked less and less. Israeli voices calling for fair play for Palestinians within their government's purview are becoming stronger and better organized. Their influence is being supplemented by fuller, more candid media coverage of life in the Occupied Territories. The U.S., Israel's financial mainstay, is stressing its special concern for human rights in aid-receiving countries. And the Begin-Sadat talks have focused world attention on the West Bank, where Bethlehem is located, along with Golan, Sinai and the Gaza Strip.

Such trends deserve our support for many reasons, one of which would be greater academic freedom for Brother Joe and Bethlehem University.

Books to Order

John H. Davis, *THE EVASIVE PEACE*, revised 1976, Dillon/Liederbach Inc. 136 pp. \$5.95 Factual background to present Arab-Israeli dilemma, with a prescription for peace in Middle East. Our price, \$3.50.

Alistair Duncan, *THE NOBLE SANCTUARY*, Longman Group, Ltd. 80 pp. 2.00 pounds. Appreciative look by text and picture at Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock. Our price, \$3.00.

Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri, *THE LAND OF PROMISE*, North American. 255 pp. \$7.95 (paperback). A scholarly and objective study of Zionist ideology and Israeli practices, showing Zionism as a political movement more western than Jewish in nature; based on mostly Zionist and Israeli sources. Our price, \$5.20.

F.H. Epp, *THE PALESTINIANS, PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE IN CONFLICT*, Herald Press. 240 pp. \$10.00. Tells a story not widely heard in the West—the Palestinian side of the present Middle East conflict. Our price, \$6.25.

Sabri Jiryis, *THE ARABS IN ISRAEL*, Monthly Review Press. 314 pp. \$12.50. Expanded version of Jiryis' original authoritative account of the deprivation of Arabs living in Israel. Our price, \$7.75.

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D. Magnetti & M.A. Sigler, *AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEAR EAST*, Our Sunday Visitor, Inc. 240 pp. \$3.95 (paperback). General history of Near East from ancient times to 1967, with factual studies of each Near Eastern country and of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Our price, \$2.25.

C. Mayhew & M. Adams, *PUBLISH IT NOT . . . THE MIDDLE EAST COVER-UP*, Longman Group, Ltd. 193 pp. 5.00 pounds. Documents difficulty in England in publishing any material, even proven facts, critical of Israel and favorable to Arabs. Our price, \$10.00

Moshe Menuhin., *THE DECADENCE OF JUDAISM IN OUR TIME*, The Institute of Palestine Studies. 589 pp. \$12.00. A protest against the identification of Judaism with Zionism, emphasizing that Judaism as a faith must not be equated with a national movement. Our price, \$7.00.

E.R.F. Sheehan, *THE ARABS, ISRAELIS AND KISSINGER*, Reader's Digest Press. 287 pp. \$8.95. A secret history of recent American diplomacy in the Middle East. Our price, \$5.50.

R.P. Stevens & A.M. Elmessiri, *ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA: THE PROGRESSION OF A RELATIONSHIP*, New World Press. 214 pp. \$6.00 (paperback). Traces historical framework of relations between these two countries, both believers in racial and cultural superiority over the "native population." Our price, \$3.25.

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Books

The Land of Promise, Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri. North American Inc. New Brunswick, N.J. 08903 1977. 255 pp. \$7.95

Reprinted from *Middle East International*

This is a disciplined, scholarly critique of Zionism, written largely in understatement, by a knowledgeable Arab. As such it is an important — perhaps even an invaluable — study for at least two groups of "Middle East Watchers." The first of these is the present crop of "peacemakers." They need to know what none of them gives public evidence of knowing: that Zionism (institutionalized in the State of Israel) is the core of the Arab/Israel/Zionist problem. This is Dr. Elmessiri's central theme, which he abundantly documents from *Zionist sources*.

Dr. Elmessiri carefully draws the important distinction between Judaism and Zionism and, equally important, between several varieties of unobjectionable Zionism of the religious or genuinely messianic variety, on the one hand, and on the other the political/nationality ideology codified in Israeli law and practice.

This last form of Zionism is "racist." It has practiced exclusivism against "Arabs" for all the period of the Mandate, deliberately building a "state within a state." It bestows the "rights" of Zionism upon Jews only — "the Jewish people," no matter where they may live. The obverse of this coin of the Zionist realm is that it excludes "Arabs," whether they live in Israeli-controlled territory or are in the Palestinian "diaspora." Committed as they are to this national ideology, Dr. Elmessiri finds it difficult to foresee what the present Israelis, and also apparently the Carter Administration, describe as "total or full peace" between this Zionist state and "the Arabs." For, in effect, the aspiration urges "the Arabs" to establish normal relations with a state committed *on principle* to "anti-Arabism." That would be like asking sub-Saharan Africa to consent to normal relations with an unregenerate Rhodesia or South Africa.

But Dr. Elmessiri is not an absolutist when he addresses the present hazardous situation in the

area. Although he is pessimistic about an ideological peace, at least in the short term, he offers some broad guidelines for accommodation. In essence he calls for "the State of Israel" to be reconstituted . . . for its *present Israeli citizens* within its pre-1967 borders." A specific step in this direction, he observes, would be "to drop the abstract category *Jewish national*," the official designation of Israeli Jews, and replace it by the *non-existent* category of 'Israeli national' " (Emphasis supplied).

"The new state," he is persuaded, "would necessarily recognize the urgent need to resolve the outstanding problem of the displaced Palestinians." That is a whole mouthful of shorthand ideology, politics and demography. Dr. Elmessiri's book advances cogent arguments which transcribe the shorthand into specifics which define the fundamental issues in the historic conflict. The "peacemakers" should read the book to find out why. Otherwise they toy at treating only the symptoms of the problem at the peril of their efforts, of the stability of the Middle East and of world peace.

The second group who could to their advantage read Dr. Elmessiri's book are all those who, even though they may have no active interest in resolving the central problem of the Middle East, still regard Zionism as one of the liberating, emancipating, or spiritually redemptive or eschatological forces in the contemporary world. Their number among both Jews and Christians is legion. Dr. Elmessiri disabuses all such romancers of Zionism by employing abundant evidence from the writings of such Zionists as Nordau, Herzl, Jacob Klatzin, Horace Kallen, indeed from most of those pragmatists and ideologues who made Zionism and its Middle Eastern state what they are.

Dr. Elmessiri's efforts will not flatter the cliché-mongers among Jews or Christians, or even among some of his own Arabs. But Dr. Elmessiri writes, by his own admission, as a humanist, and only secondly as an Arab. The book justifies his self-labeling and, in the final analysis, if there is hope for man at all, it is in the realization that it is truth about humans not clichés which alone can set man free.

Elmer Berger

The Link aims at maintaining contacts among Americans who believe that friendship with the people of the Middle East is essential to world peace, who would contribute to this goal by spreading understanding of the history, values, religions, culture and economic conditions of the Middle East, and who would — in this context — press for greater fairness, consistency and integrity in U.S. policy toward that area.

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