Arms Buildup
In The Middle East

By Gregory Ofalea

Alaska. In the early 1970s, I went to live in the Far North for two years. Disillusioned with our nation’s disaster in Vietnam, as well as certain “leaders” of the protest movement, I was determined to leave off the fetters of modern civilization.

Early one summer day, I went hiking in the area north of Fairbanks near the Chattnika River, where there was “open entry land” in five-acre parcels—15 miles from any road—for anyone who could get to it. After three hours of hiking through thickets of alder and willow, with not a hint of a human being anywhere. I came upon an unreal sight. Coming closer I found a warning sign and a barbed wire fence. Suddenly the clearing became too clear. It was a missile site.

The next year in Anchorage, I again experienced a similar bleak moment when half a university classroom stood empty because military men from nearby Army and Air Force bases had become part of a worldwide American military alert during the October 1975 War in the Middle East. No, not even the tundra was safe. If the tundra had soldiers, they would be summoned.

Now it is 1981. Not a day goes by, it seems, without an article in the newspaper about the Middle East crises (I emphasize the plural). Certainly, the arms buildup is most staggering in the Middle East, where weapons seem to be pulled as if by a magnet.

How urgent is the problem of world armaments? Ruth Sivard’s World Military and Social Expenditures, 1980 edition, provides a good, if disturbing, answer. There are now more than 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world, with a combined explosive power estimated at 15 million kilotons of TNT—one million times the power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in seconds. The nuclear-tipped missiles are increasingly faster, more accurate and longer-ranged every year. They can carry nuclear weapons 6,000 miles in less than 30 minutes and can hit within a few feet of the target.

Research on new weapons worldwide receives eight times as much public money as research on new sources of energy. World outlays in the global arms competition exceeded $460 billion in 1979, compared with a year average in the 1960s and 70s of $370 billion (at 1979 prices)—a 20 percent increase. The superpowers alone account for 70 percent of worldwide arms exports (U.S., $24.9 billion, or 45 percent; U.S.S.R., $15.7 billion, or 27 percent—figures for 1977-80).

America’s defense spending will reach $222.2 billion for 1982, a

Gregory Ofalea was most recently staff officer of the National Association of Arab Americans in Washington, D.C., and editor of the N.A.A.A.’s political action report, Focus.

F-16 armed with AIM-9 missiles
"If arms sales in the Middle East continue as they are, there will be no poets—anywhere."

When we invited Greg Orfalea to write this issue of The Link, we didn’t realize at the time that, in addition to his other published works, he is the author of a book of poetry. Asked if he saw any connection between composing verse and cranking out cold data on military hardware, Orfalea gave the above reply.

Ironically, in the poetic tradition of the Middle East, verse was the form of speech used at the more solemn occasions of daily life: the birth and naming of a child, espousals and weddings, in blessings and curses—and at the start of wars. It was also the mode the prophets used, when they warned of destruction.

The United States in 1980 sold $15.3 billion worth of military equipment abroad, of which 53 percent or $6.1 billion went to the Middle East. That’s the prosaic data. Should we be concerned? The distinguished diplomat, George Kennan, gave his answer recently when he compared us to lemmings racing to the sea; The American Telephone & Telegraph Company gave its answer when, at its underground national emergency center, at Netcong, NJ, it shock-mounted all its equipment to the ceiling by heavy steel springs and to the floor by thick rubber bands, as a nuclear survival measure; and Col. Yoram Hamurzahi, Chief Liaison Officer of the Israeli Defense Forces, gave his answer when, in March 1979, he told a group of visiting Americans, “We will not concede an inch to the Arabs, even if it means atomic flames in New York.”

In this issue Greg Orfalea reviews the history of arms sales to and from the Middle East, the introduction of nuclear weapons into that area, and the terms of the United States Arms Export Law. In a final section, Congressional liaison—and poet—Orfalea warns of the implications of the arms race and suggests ways for a safer future.

Photos are courtesy of the United States Army and Air Force, Wide World Photos and Kay Brennan.

Basheer Nijim reviews The Population of Israel by Dev Friedman and Calvin Goldscheider, on page 14.

In recognition of 1982 as the International Year of Disabled Persons, our November/December issue will feature a special report on the care of the disabled in Arab society.

John F. Mahoney, Executive Director

---

14.6 percent increase from 1980. And the Middle East will receive the lion’s share (60 percent) of United States arms sales and grants to the world—$4.1 billion of $6.9 billion worldwide. Huge increases in military sales are planned for Saudi Arabia (without AWACS, $4 billion, of which half is for military construction) and Pakistan ($3 billion, half military sales, half economic aid spread over six years), a country that had trouble with the Carter Administration over nuclear proliferation.

Despite all the rhetoric of Jimmy Carter against the arms buildup, his Administration sold a near record $15.3 billion in arms in 1980. The Middle East states purchased $8.1 billion, or 53 percent of all American sales to the world. Between 1975 and 1980, in fact, United States’ sales to the Middle East totalled $32.8 billion—75 percent of all United States arms to that region in the 15 years since 1966. In 1980 alone, Saudi Arabia and Egypt purchased nearly $7 billion worth of United States military equipment, which was 85 percent of all United States arms sold to the region. Israel received $1.2 billion in military aid in
1980, half of which was "forgiven" (outright grant), the rest in favored long-term loans. 1

Six of the top ten nations with the highest percentage of budgeted spending on armaments are in the Middle East: Oman (47 percent), Yemen (Aden) (47), Syria (36), Taiwan (54), Israel (33), Argentina (30), Republic of Korea (28), Iran (27), Saudi Arabia (27) and Peru (26.5). 2

Fig. 2 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Middle East in 1978 had the highest military expenditure as a percent of GNP (Cross National Product) in the world, at 15 percent (See Figure 1). The Middle East was first in arms imports (37 percent) followed by Africa (25) in the world (See Fig. 2). In 1978, the Middle East spent the most on arms of all arms exports to the region during the period 1969-1978 (See Table 1, page 4). The Soviet Union supplies roughly half that amount ($7.5 billion), with Britain and France a distant third and fourth. (If, however, Soviet clients Libya and Algeria are added to "The Middle East," Russia comes closer to American figures.)

An important clarification on arms figures is that some wealthy Middle Eastern countries, like Saudi Arabia, buy their weapons. A country like Israel, however, receives most of its United States armaments through military aid—a distinction government officials do not always make clear. The three categories of United States military assistance to the Middle East are: direct government to government sales, called Foreign Military Sales, sometimes in a "credit" program; commercial sales between a United States company and a foreign power approved by the Department of State; and military aid of various types (security assistance, etc.).

The Soviet Union was the first major power to become involved in the Middle East arms trade, when it supplied money, military training and finally aircraft to Zionist terrorist organizations, such as Menachem Begin's Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang. After the United Nations-negotiated

political leverage. In 1954, France pulled up the Western arms floodgate by sending its most advanced Mystere jets to Israel.

The same year America reluctantly joined the British in a $30 million arms sales spread over three years to Iraq. Ironically, Arab states initially and repeatedly turned to the United States for support in the early 1950s, only to be rebuffed. As early as 1952, Egypt requested arms from America, and in 1954 Syria had a modest shopping list of 1,700 trucks and 850 cargo trailers. Both countries were alarmed at repeated Israeli border attacks more real than Arab suspicions of the Great Bear of Russia. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles almost singlehandedly drove Egypt and Syria into the Soviet camp, after he turned down their arms requests. The first Soviet military aid to an Arab country began in a shipment to Egypt in 1955, through Czechoslovakia. Syria received Russian tanks through the Czech connection. American refusal to finance the high dam at Aswan in Egypt and the Syrian oil refinery at Homs that same year further alienated the two Arab countries. Though the United States proclaimed official shock, in retrospect it seems that it had only set the stage for the joint Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt that became

armistice in 1949, Britain and France, the key former colonial Middle East mandate powers, joined the United States in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, which, while not completely banning arms exports to the Middle East, did restrict their use for "legitimate self-defense." The Declaration has often been falsely misconstrued as between Israel and the Arab countries. By 1955, both Britain and France were breaking the declaration for economic gain and

the Suez crisis of 1956.

America's military involvement with Israel was practically nonexistent in the 1950s and 60s. American military presence in the Middle East had been confined to an air base agreement at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1951, and a naval base in Bahrain—both situated near oil sites. France and Britain piled the arms trade with Israel at a steady clip during this period. The United States' first arms sales to Israel was con-
ducted in 1962, a small amount. The 1967 June War changed all that. When Israel tripled its size by capturing lands of three Arab states, France broke off military shipments. Despite Israel's lightning victory and
dented order. From $15.5 million in 1970, to $4.5 billion in 1974, more than 40 percent of all United States weapons globally sold that year went to Iran. Tens of thousands of American technicians and military advisors also
meets overwhelming the ends." Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, on the floor of the Senate, alarmed at the inadequacy of Begin's West Bank autonomy plan and worried that the treaty smugled in a mutual security pact with Israel without Senate approval, offered an amendment that would require signatories of the treaty to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. Even as Camp David was in progress, Congress approved the controversial sale in 1978 of F-15s and other advanced fighter planes to three Middle Eastern countries at once—Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The sale was bitterly fought by Israel and its lobby, which wanted the long-range fighters to
military prowess, President Lyndon Johnson chose to sell jet warplanes to Israel, beginning a military arms transfer relationship probably unprecedented in history. Between 1949 and 1980, total American aid to Israel amounted to $19.5 billion, the largest amount given any nation except South Vietnam. Max Holland, American Friends Service Committee Middle East representative in Washington, has suggested that two other events, both related to oil, ignited the massive Western arms push to the Middle East after the 1967 War. When the British withdrew their troops east of the Suez and gave up the role as "policeman" of the oil-rich states "suddenly there was a political-military vacuum and something had to be done about it in the eyes of U.S. policy-makers lest the Russians come in and make mischief." The second event was Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's seizure of power in Libya in 1969. Qaddafi forced the United States to leave Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya, its largest foreign air base in the world at the time, outside of N.A.T.O. and the Philippines. After nationalizing Libya's oil in 1973, Qaddafi extracted higher prices for his country's desirable light crude. Holland states: "more and more Middle Eastern countries began to see the benefits of Libya's strategy."

With the Soviets arming Middle Eastern countries that had toppled monarchies and governments in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Somalia, the United States ushered in the Nixon Doctrine. Its main exponent became the Shah of Iran, who began to receive the most advanced American weaponry, including F-4 and F-15 Phantoms. Kissinger told the Pentagon to let Iran determine its arms needs, an unprece

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Value of Arms Transfers, Cumulative 1964-1978, By Major Supplier and Recipient Country</th>
<th>Continued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUPPLIER</strong></td>
<td><strong>MIDDLE EAST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US</strong></td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRANCE</strong></td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NETHERLANDS</strong></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISRAEL</strong></td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JAPAN</strong></td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ITALY</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TURKEY</strong></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHINA</strong></td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.</strong></td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.</strong></td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INVESTED STATES</strong></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

American-built F-4 fighter planes pass over pyramids in Cairo, Egypt.
C-141s and 77 C-5As to transport troops and services all over the world. It would take 623 C-141s to airlift a division to the Middle East, an impossibility given the existing situation. Furthermore, sending the C-141s and C-5As to handle contingencies in the Persian Gulf would leave other strategic areas unprotected (most notably, Europe).

In a major effort to improve airlift capability, the Administration requested $81 million to begin development of a transport plane, the CX. The CX, capable of carrying an XM-1, the main new American battle tank, several thousand miles non-stop, was designed to land on the short runways accessible in less industrialized countries. But the new transport would not be available until 1985, at the earliest, and its production would require nearly five times the $81 million requested for 1981.

The only United States base in the Indian Ocean was Diego Garcia, a tiny island 2,500 miles from any likely trouble spots. Frantic efforts to procure other base rights ran aground on the very real Middle Eastern fear that local resentment to American strong-arming would result in Qaddafi-type coups. Policymakers in this country, nevertheless, conveniently forgot what happened to Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya in 1969. Base and port facilities were sought in Oman, Kenya, Somalia and Egypt. Kenya, the closest ally and furthest from the Middle East, offered Mombasa, a regular port-of-call for the Navy. The Somalia government demanded too high a price—five times the $15 million package offered for American access to facilities at Berbera. Oman agreed to permit only limited use of an airfield, and to a certain extent, two other air bases. Egypt conducted joint exercises with the United States Air Force, but Sadat resisted an out-and-out base on Egyptian soil (See Fig. 5).

Then came the AWACS. Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, four AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) planes were sent to Saudi Arabia, together with 500 American military personnel. The purpose was to protect the oilfields and Saudi Arabia from threats, particularly from the Khomeini regime in Iran which balked at Saudi support for Iraq. The Reagan Administration agreed in 1981 to honor the Carter commitment to sell Saudi Arabia five AWACS, together with AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles for the F-15s, external fuel tanks that will double the range of the F-15s to 1,000 miles and seven KC-135 aerial tankers for in-air refueling. The proposed sale has already caused a furor in Congress, where long majority lists of both Houses have lined up opposing the sale as a "threat" to Israel.

Strangely enough, when the Sidewinder missiles (offensive weapons) were announced first for the new Saudi request in early 1981, the Israeli lobby reaction was muted, preferring to "go easy" on the new Administration. But with the AWACS—not a weapon at all but radar of use only for defense—the Lobby strongly reacted. In the wake of Israel’s violation of Saudi air space in its attack on Iraq, it remains to be seen whether or not the Israeli lobby can continue to convincingly label radar as a "threat" to Israel’s survival.

Weapons Coming Out Of The Middle East

Israel, by far the most advanced weapons manufacturer and exporter in the Middle East, led the Third World during 1970-79 in the export of major weapons. Selling $1 billion worth of arms in 1980 (mostly to dictatorial South American regimes), Israel is expected to export $2 billion in arms by 1982, thanks to withdrawal of some American restraints on export of the Israeli fighter jet, Kfir, which has an American engine.

From 1967-76 Egypt exported military equipment and weapons valued at $24 million. In 1975, the Arab Organization for Industrialization (A.O.I.) was set up in Egypt by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for $1 billion, with $9 billion in reserve capital. The first Egyptian-assembled Lynx helicopter
was due to fly in 1980, but after the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979, work stopped. The Gulf states withdrew financial support for the A.O.I.: Egypt meanwhile hopes to receive American financing to continue the project.

In 1980, discussion reportedly had begun on setting up a factory in Egypt to manufacture the American FX fighter. The plan will eventually replace the F-5 in arsenals of less developed nations around the world.

Other Middle Eastern nations, like Iran, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia are involved in the re-export of arms purchased from industrialized countries. In the 1970s, Iran sent American weapons to Pakistan and Jordan. Ninety percent of Jordan's small re-export of weapons went to South Africa. Syria and Libya are reported to be delivering arms to Iran, causing a major schism in the Arab world concerning the Iran-Iraq War. At the same time, Iran sent 36 M-60 A1 tanks of American make, captured from Iran, as a gift to Jordan. That country had been contracting for a direct purchase of the same tank from the United States. Seventy percent of Libya's re-exports of arms went to Uganda, 24 percent to Syria.

Yet it is Israel—40 percent of whose exports are now weapons—which is the only Middle Eastern nation to concentrate on a domestic defense industry. The industry began before the 1948 War in the form of workshops that made small arms, ammunition, armored cars, and even light aircraft. By the 1967 War, major Israeli industries were turning out sophisticated original weapons systems, or collecting data to copy systems of other countries. For example, there is the Kfir jet fighter, allegedly patterned on Mirage jet plans stolen from the French Dassau plant in the late 60s, and the Galil gun, an improved copy of the Russian AK47 Kalashnikov. Israel now designs and manufactures a wide range of weapons: small arms; mortars, air-to-air (Shapir), sea-to-sea (Gabriel) and surface-to-surface (Jericho) missiles which can carry nuclear weapons; armored personnel carriers; gun and torpedo boats (Dabur, Deborah, and Reshef); Kfir combat planes and the prized Merkava tank. Israel's Ministry of Defense budget is projected to triple for fiscal 1981.

Even an embattled war economy such as Israel's could not possibly consume all these weapons, so markets were sought in places where the so-called "legitimate" suppliers would be hesitant to compete. In 1978, after the United States stopped economic and military aid to the Somozan government in Nicaragua, Israel stepped in with shipments of heavy mortars, machine guns and helicopters. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (S.I.P.R.I.) calculated that Israel supplied 98 percent of Somozan's arms imports until the Sandanista takeover.

Israel's aeronautical students launch rocket carrying supersonic glider, showing Israeli advances in missile and jet production. S.I.P.R.I., the leading authority on Third World arms exports, notes that the El Salvador junta received 85 percent of its arms from Israel in 1980, culminating more than a decade of Israeli involvement in the regime, including Israeli military advisers. The Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies reported that from 1974-79 El Salvador purchased 18 Israeli fighter bombers and 25 Arava short take-off and landing planes, well-suited for counter insurgency warfare. The 1981 S.I.P.R.I. report shows no Israeli aid to El Salvador.

Other Latin American customers have included Honduras, Bolivia, Panama, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile and Mexico, where Israel has a licensed assembly plant for the Arava aircraft. By 1980, 58 percent of Guatemala's arms imports came from Israel.

Perhaps as a last-minute desperate attempt to win American Jewish votes, four days before the November election, President Carter loosened restrictions on the sale of Israeli military equipment that uses American parts or technology. The embargo had caused a furor in American-Israeli relations when the Administration in 1977 refused to permit Israel to sell its Kfir fighter planes to Ecuador. The aircraft is powered by a General Electric J-79 jet engine. Now Mexico, Venezuela, Columbia and Ecuador will be allowed to purchase the Kfir.

In 1978, Israel sold a squadron of Dagger Mirage fighters to Argentina, a country where anti-Semitism has near-official sanction. Between 1970 and 1979, 20 percent of Israeli arms exports went to Argentina, second only to South Africa as a favored Israeli customer. And in 1976, Israel sold 150 Shifrin missiles to Chile, a country long on the "outr" with the United States for notorious violations of human rights.

In Asia, Israel's strongest military ties appear to be with Singapore. Singapore soldiers are now being trained in Israel. Taiwan manufactures by license Israeli surface-to-surface missiles of the Gabriel type. In December 1979, without publicly acknowledging it, the United States allowed Israel to sell 16 A4 fighter-bombers to Indonesia for $24.8 million, the first such third-country sale of American warplanes. Some American aerospace executives were angered because Israel buys United States warplanes at a substantial discount—50 percent of loans are "forgiven"—and then sells older American planes for world market prices at a profit. Other Asian nations receiving Israeli arms and various other paramilitary and counterinsurgency equipment include South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.

Even in the Middle East, Israel has had a market for its arms. Until 1974, Iran was Israel's biggest arms customer. After the Shah's fall, the Israeli press revealed the extent of "secret" visits of top Israeli officials to Iran, as well as the close ties of Israel's secret police, MOSSAD, and the Shah's SAVAK agents. Israel was also known to be supplying Iraqi Kurds with Soviet arms captured from Egypt in the 1967 War, an attempt to topple the Iraqi government from within.

Now, in Lebanon, Israel supplies everything from tanks to Israeli uniforms to Lebanese renegades. Major Saad Haddad, who has built up a little principality of his own in a six-mile border strip north of Israel. The right-wing Lebanese Phalangists have been known for some time to be receiving Israeli arms at the port of Jounieh in Lebanon.

Most black African nations cut diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1973 War. Only three such
Nuclear Weapons
And Israel

Few people knew how close the world came to all-out nuclear war in the Middle East October War of 1973. The Egyptian-Syrian attack to regain territories lost in the 1967 War surprised Israel. Stunned by the highest casualty count in any of the previous Arab-Israeli conflicts, Israel prepared its atomic arsenal. During the fighting the Soviet Union provided Egypt with a nuclear-capable, long-range missile, the Scud. On October 15, nine days after war broke out, a Soviet ship carrying nuclear warheads passed through the Bosphorus Straits, heading towards Alexandria, according to American intelligence. Ten days later, the United States ordered a worldwide military alert.

The tide of the battle shifted after a massive airlift of American weapons to Israel, which countered the surprise Egyptian Suez Canal crossing with a crossing of its own, dangerously isolating the Egyptian Third Army Corps in south Sinai. Frenzied behind-the-scenes negotiations ensued between the superpowers to stave off the first nuclear attack. Egypt agreed to a cease-fire; the Soviet ship left Alexandria. On October 31, the United States alert was cancelled and nine days later a truce was declared.

The 1973 War demonstrated how slim was the nuclear threat on which the world hung. The first and to date only nation that has spun the nuclear weapons threat is Israel. One of the best known "secrets" of Middle Eastern affairs is that Israel's reactors are "hot" and that Israel has a monopoly of nuclear weapons in the region. Current arsenal estimates range between 10 and 27 atomic and hydrogen bombs.

In December 1979, Egypt offered a resolution in the United Nations to create a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. Members responded by a vote of 135-0 in favor. Only Israel abstained (it later offered, then withdrew, its own resolution on the subject).

Egypt, Libya and Iraq—the three Arab countries suspected at one time or another of seeking nuclear weapons—have all signed and ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Israel has not signed the treaty, even though former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan has acknowledged recently that: "We are not going to be the first ones to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but we do have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons." Dayan said atomic bombs could be manufactured "in a short time." This was believed to be the first time an Israeli official (or former official) confirmed Israel's long-assumed nuclear capacity.

Stephen Rosen cites at least 16 independent reports published outside Israel validating Israel's atomic weapons stockpile—ranging from the leading work on the subject, Israel and Nuclear Weapons by U.C.L.A. professor Fuad (Paul) Jabber to a Time Magazine article (April 12, 1976) that said 13 Israeli nuclear warheads were "hastily assembled at a secret underground tunnel during a 78-hour period at the start of the 1975 October War (and) were sent to desert arsenals where they remain today, still ready for use."

In 1975, the respected Egyptian editor Mohammed Heikal, quoted in the Los Angeles Times, pinpointed Israeli atomic arms as "almost certainly stored..."
in a particular air base outside Elat." A more recent examination of Israel's nuclear arsenal came in the fascinating and disturbing ABC 'Close-Up Report' -- seven months in the making -- "Near Armageddon: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East" (April 27, 1981). The most compelling American documentation appeared in a C.I.A. secret memorandum dated September 4, 1974 (made public in 1978), entitled "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." The report stated: "We believe that Israel already has produced nuclear weapons...based on Israeli acquisition of uranium, partly by clandestine means; the ambiguous nature of Israel's efforts in the field of uranium enrichment; and Israel's large investment in a costly missile system designed to accommodate nuclear warheads."  

The Israeli press has carried on an open debate for more than a decade concerning the use of nuclear weapons. A common argument, largely unknown in the West, asserts the advantages of a preemptive nuclear attack on the Arabs. One writer, political scientist Shlomo Aharonson, in a 1975 article in Haaretz, advocated Israeli exploiting a nuclear bomb underwater off the coast of Lebanon. Said Aharonson: "A sufficient amount of atom bombs, together with adequate dispatching means, can hit hard all the Arab capitals and tear down the Aswan Dam. Another amount can hit other cities and oil installations. Thermonuclear bombs (H-bombs) can destroy territorial aims, including concentrations of Palestinians in Lebanon, if, for instance, they are dropped in the sea close to the aim and cause a giant pressure wave."  

How did Israel get the Bomb? One incident often referred to is the disappearance in 1965 of 206 pounds of highly enriched uranium from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania. Corporation President Zalmon Shapiro, who had worked as a sales agent for the Israeli Defense Ministry and had formed a N.U.M.E.C.subsidiary as half partner with the Israeli government, came under repeated investigations by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Agency, the Justice Department, and four Congressional Committees. Richard Helms, former C.I.A. director, confirmed that an incensed President Lyndon Johnson had covered up the affair and that Israel indeed had stolen the uranium.  

A more bizarre Israeli heist occurred, according to the C.I.A., with the sailing of the Scheenbourg A at midnight on November 17, 1968, bound for Genoa, Italy with 200 tons of natural uranium. It never arrived. Instead, 15 days later, the ship docked in Iskenderun, Turkey without any uranium. The vessel went on to Sicily, where the captain and crew vanished. United States government documents recently released show European investigators believe the uranium was re-routed to Israel. The owner of the Scheenbourg A turned out to be Dan Ert, an agent with Israel's secret service.  

But Israel had been thinking nuclear long before the mid-60s. Israel's first president, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, an outstanding organic chemist, had been in touch with prominent nuclear and other scientists in the years just prior to and after Israel's creation in 1948. Weizmann saw in science "Israel's mighty weapon which we must utilize with ingenuity and skill, with every means available to us. Science is that weapon, our vessel of strength and our source of defense."  

Within a year of the state's founding, a nuclear program had been established in Israel. Five Israeli scientists were sent abroad to Holland, Switzerland, Britain and America, obtaining "practical experience in the latter country."  

By the early 50s, Israel was extracting uranium from phosphate ore in the Negev desert. A telltale sign of the future was the establishment of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission in 1952 within the Department of Defense. In 1955, Israel received United States aid for the construction of its first major reactor, Nahal Soreq. All this was occurring a few years after the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb (1949) and Britain its first (1952), to join the United States as the only nations on earth with nuclear arsenals.  

Israel was quick to become a nuclear pioneer. A patent for the Israeli (Dostrovsky) method of "heavy water" distillation for nuclear power was purchased by France in a secret agreement in 1953. Today a process for enriching uranium (required for bomb-grade material) by laser has been developed by Israel Nathan Banzhaf, a physicist with Israel's Ministry of Defense and Menahem Levin of Tel Aviv University. The scientists received their patents from West Germany and France, the March 1974 Jerusalem Post reported. The laser process of extracting uranium 235 from natural uranium is termed "extraordinarily cheap" and represents a technology the United States and Russia have yet to master.  

The Nahal Soreq reactor has a capacity of 5,000 kilowatts (thermal) and cost $5 million. American inspectors visited the reactor twice a year until 1965, when the United States turned over safeguard functions to the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.). Israel's relations with the agency have always been strained, and no inspection of Nahal Soreq has been made since.  

The big name in Israel's nuclear arsenal is Dimona, a 24,000-kilowatt (thermal) reactor constructed in the northern Negev desert in 1957 with French assistance (for $130 million). Of the two reactors, Dimona is much more important in a military sense because it is "particularly well-suited for producing fissionable plutonium used in nuclear bombs." The facility resembles the American one at Savannah River, South Carolina, a large source of the plutonium stockpile in the United States.  

Dimona, a by-product of the 1956 Suez crisis, caused a stir in Washington which, until 1960, still thought the site was a textile plant! On December 9, 1960, when the United States formally asked if Israel was planning to build nuclear weapons, Israel stalled. Israeli officially assured President Eisenhower on December 21 that nuclear weapons were not being produced. Unofficial visits by American scientists took place once a year from 1961 to 1967 (except 1965) at the Dimona reactor. Although they never challenged the "peaceful purposes" of the facility, the scientists considered their considerations "avowedly tentative, as once-a-year inspections are insufficient to determine with certainty that no fuel rods are being removed for the purpose of extracting plutonium produced during the operation of the pile, which would be sufficient to manufacture one Nagasaki-type bomb per year."  

A team which visited the facility in 1969 reportedly submitted a written complaint, stating that "it could not guarantee that there was no weapons-related work at Dimona in view of the limitations imposed by the Israelis on inspection procedures." Even unofficial American inspection stopped after the 1960s. In 1977, The New York Times reported that two erstwhile
friends of Israel—Senators Jacob Javits and Abraham Ribicoff—were turned away at the gates of Dimona.

With the Dimona reactor capable of yielding sufficient plutonium for one 20-kiloton bomb per year since 1966, the question then is raised: How could Israel deliver such weapons? Is Israel strapped like India, having a nuclear armament with no way to use it? Apparently not.

In 1966, the United States shipped 48 Skyhawk A-4E tactical bombers to Israel. By 1970, Israel had 100 Skyhawks. The A-4Es were capable of delivering atomic weapons. Later, the C.I.A. detected A-4Es flying in a new pattern of bombing practice that "would not have made sense unless it was to deliver a bomb." In 1968, Israeli officials requested bombing raids from the United States specifically made for atomic weapons. The request was rejected.

Israel began to receive superpower-class fighter bombers with the 1968 shipment of 50 F-4E Phantom IIs. The F-4E also has a nuclear delivery capability. The shipment of the best combat aircraft in America's arsenal—the F-15 and F-16—in 1978 and 1979 increased the likelihood of Israel's delivery of an atomic weapon.

With effective Soviet SAM anti-aircraft missiles supplied to Syria and Egypt, Israel's "nuclear option" relied more heavily on surface-to-surface missiles. As early as 1966, Israel had about 30 French-made missiles, a version of the Diamant, which is highly effective to 500 miles. (The distance from Tel Aviv to Cairo is 250 miles; to Damascus, 130 miles; to Baghdad, 525 miles). The Diamant has little military importance in a conventional program, according to American officials, and can only be considered of military value when carrying a warhead of great destructive power.

Since 1971, Israel has been manufacturing its own missile, the Jericho, at the rate of 60 to 80 missiles a year. The Jericho's range is 280 to 300 miles, carries a 1,000 to 1,500 pound warhead, and is so expensive it seems unnecessary except as a nuclear-tipped weapon. It is also supposed to have guidance problems. Far more accurate Lance missiles were given by the United States to Israel in 1975, with a very versatile range of 5 to 125 kilometers. The Lance missile is specifically used with nuclear warheads. Indeed, Congress prohibited the Pentagon from producing a conventional warhead for the Lance until it could be proved cost-effective, a proof never presented, at least in public.86

Arab restraint could not last forever. It probably was inevitable that some Arab states would seek nuclear weapons, too. Those most often discussed in this context are Egypt, Iraq, Libya and the non-Arab state of Pakistan.

During the height of Arab nationalism in the early 60s, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser tried unsuccessfully to get the Bomb. Under Anwar Sadat, Egypt's course is charted full sail toward peace under the aegis of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. Whether Sadat and Egypt will withstand the continued embarrassment of Israel's thickening settlements in the occupied territories, bombardment of Lebanon, "on-guard" attitude towards the Syrian missile in Lebanon (and in Syria), and the attack on Iraq, remains to be seen. Although Egypt signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on July 1, 1968, it repeatedly refused to ratify the treaty, asking that Israel sign as well. In typical Sadat fashion Egypt ratified the treaty in February 1981—without Israel's signature. Israel remained the "odd man out" of Egypt's United Nations resolution in 1979 to make the Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone.

The one reactor in Egypt is the Soviet-built facility at Inshass, north of Cairo. It is much smaller than the Dimona reactor (two as compared with 24 megawatts) and its potential for nuclear weapons is "almost nil."87

The case of Libya is more ambiguous due to the mercurial personality of its leader, Muammar Qaddafi. In 1981, Libya was being transhipped to Pakistan. Add to this the Reagan Administration announcement of $3 billion in military aid to Pakistan, whose ruler is the repressive Gen. Zia Ul-Haq, and the Pakistan connection seems singularly troublesome.

Recently, the Soviet Union agreed to build a research reactor in Libya. We now turn to the Tammuz 1 reactor outside Baghdad, Iraq. Given American intelligence reports and Administration witnesses before Congress, it does seem that Iraq was 5 to 5 years from producing a nuclear weapon, if it was on that track.

On at least three occasions before the June 7 attack, Israel tried to destroy Iraq's nuclear potential. On April 6,
1979, parts of a nuclear reactor to be shipped by France to Iraq were blown up as they rested on the dock of Seyne-sur-Mer, near Toulon, France. The sabotage, which set back Iraq’s nuclear plans by two years, was believed to have been carried out by Israeli agents. Another action was the murder in Paris in June 1980, of an Egyptian-born Iraqi nuclear scientist, Yahlia El-Mashad, who was completing arrangements for a shipment of enriched uranium from France to Iraq. Finally, it is widely believed that an Israeli F-4 Phantom, operating under cover of the Iran-Iraq War, struck the Tuwaitha installation in December 1980, but did not destroy the main building.

A number of reporting blunders marred Begin’s argument that the Iraqi reactor would be “hot” by July or September and in one year produce an atomic bomb. Shortly after the attack he said Iraq had dismissed I.A.E.A. inspectors in 1980 at the outset of the war with Iran, with no inspection since. In fact, inspection commenced again in January 1981, and all nuclear material was accounted for by the I.A.E.A. The reactor would have been inspected by I.A.E.A. officials, probably at monthly intervals, after start-up in July. Begin accused the French of building a secret Tamuz 1 installation 150 feet underground for the purpose of manufacturing nuclear weapons. On June 12, the French government described Begin’s claim as a “fantasy,” noting that the only underground chamber he could be referring to was 13 feet deep, a “neutron guides building... (where) such equipment in no way could be used for military purposes.” Begin corrected his estimate of depth.

At the first press conference after the strike, Begin quoted an October 4, 1980 statement by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in the Baghdad paper, Al-Thawra, that Iraq’s reactor was to be used not against Iran, but the “Zionist enemy.” The quote was proven to be a fabrication and the Israeli Defense Ministry, embarrassed, halted use of it. Several Israeli-produced quotes of malevolent Iraqi intentions could not be documented by the Library of Congress, or were found to be taken out of context.

Begin also claimed that Iraq is still in a state of war with Israel. While this may technically be so, Iraq sent a letter to the United Nations in 1949 accepting the armistice agreements signed by the other Arab states and would therefore be in a condition of non-belligerent armistice with Israel. This may be a moot issue now, with Tamuz 1 destroyed.

Does the United States have leverage on the spread of nuclear weapons? The 1978 Nonproliferation Act prohibits American assistance to any country which explodes a nuclear device. During a CBS Report in February 1980, reporter Dan Raviv said that a mysterious “blip” off the coast of South Africa on a radar screen September 22, 1979 was a nuclear bomb test explosion in which Israel and South Africa cooperated. Raviv’s report originated in a book written by two Israeli editorial staff members of Haaretz which revealed the extent of Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Israeli authorities promptly banned the book and stripped Raviv of his press credentials.

U.S. Arms Export: Any Strings Attached?

The United States has enforced its arms export laws only once. When Turkey invaded Cyprus in July 1974, Congress cut off all arms shipments to Turkey until 1978. The United States Arms Export Control Act contains undefined phrases like “legitimate self-defense,” “internal security,” and “substantial violation.” But on June 7, 1981, when the Israelis struck an Iraqi reactor, the public and officials alike were scrambling for definitions.

The attack on the Tamuz 1 became the first aerial bombing of a nuclear plant in history. The State Department quickly condemned the strike as being of “unprecedented character... which cannot but seriously add to the already tense situation in the area.” Washington admitted American F-15 and F-16 warplanes were used “in possible violation of the applicable agreement under which they were sold to Israel.”

On two separate occasions, April 5, 1978 and on August 6, 1979, Congress had prompted a Carter Administration response that Israel “may have violated” American arms law by its preemptive strikes on Lebanon. For the first time, the Israel-Iraq crisis triggered a swift response in the Executive Branch. President Reagan ordered a review of the incident to present to Congress and suspended shipment of four F-16s slated to be sent to Israel five days after the attack.

On the face of it, Israel’s attack on Iraq would seem to be a violation of the Arms Export Control Act. Section 4 states that United States-supplied arms are to be used “solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations...” Israel had signed in 1952 the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with America which adds the further restriction that Israel is “not to undertake any act of aggression against any other state” using United States weapons.

Concern in 1978 with Israeli misuse of the American-supplied cluster bomb (a vicious anti-personnel weapon) in Lebanon resulted in a “secret agreement” in which Israel promised it would use cluster bombs (CBLUs) only against military, fortified targets and only if Israel were attacked by more than one country.

In 1978, alarmed that Israel was again using CBLUs against civilians during its invasion of south Lebanon, Representative Paul McCloskey, Republican of California, wrote in a letter to President Jimmy Carter on April 10, 1978: “I think the use of U.S.-supplied CBU cluster bombs against civilian areas in Lebanon was such an outrageous decision by an
allied government that the United States should make it clear in the most direct form possible that we will cut off military assistance to any nation which uses CBUs against civilian targets." Although McCloskey's promise to introduce a foreign aid amendment to end arms deliveries to Israel never materialized, his protest forced the Carter Administration to review the action. Another secret agreement concluded between the United States and Israel re-established the terms of the 1976 cluster bomb agreement.

Nevertheless, Israel continued to use the cluster bomb, as well as phosphorus and napalm bombs in southern Lebanon. After waiting two and a half months without a State Department response to a personal letter, Representative Paul Findley, Republican of Illinois, on August 7, 1979, introduced a "highly privileged" resolution of inquiry directing Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to supply: classified information concerning misuse of American-supplied warplanes by Israel in Lebanon; protests filed by the United States; response by the Israeli government; and documents governing the legality of Israel's use of warplanes. Secretary Vance sent a letter to Findley (through Representative Clement Zablocki, Democrat of Wisconsin and House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman) on August 6 and used the code phrase "Israel may have violated" United States arms laws in hitting Lebanese civilians—an echo of the same language he delivered to McCloskey in 1978.

The carnage in Lebanon continued, with more than 350 Lebanese and Palestinian civilian deaths resulting from Israeli (and proxy) strikes in 1979, and 120 civilian deaths from such strikes in 1980. The Arms Export Control Act and the secret agreements seemed nothing but paper. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Sternner told a public audience on October 5, 1979 that Israel had violated arms laws in Lebanon. But Washington apparently was afraid of incensing Jewish-American voters with an arms halt followed by a definite statement.

In 1976, some Congressmen, smarting from Presidential inaction after misuse of American arms in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, determined to expand leverage. They wanted to give Congress, as well as the President, the chance to cut off arms used in "offensive strikes...in substantial violation" of the arms control act. (Congress had had to attach a special amendment to the foreign aid bill to cut off arms to Turkey.)

Some senators however took advantage of amending the act to make it almost inapplicable to Israel. They deleted a phrase "shall be immediately ineligible" which heretofore made an arms cut off automatic if a violation was cited. This allowed both the Executive and Legislative branches to stall if they wanted to. The Conference Committee of both Houses considering the arms act inserted the phrase "may have violated." The conference report stated."The conference substitute does not require the President to make an immediate determination of ineligibility."

The senators who took the lead in altering the arms act were Jacob Javits, Republican of New York, Clifford Case, Republican of New Jersey, and Hubert Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, described by government sources as friends of Israel very worried about Israeli exposure under the A.E.C.A. concerning Lebanon.

The only Senator to object to what Javits, Humphrey and Case were doing was Thomas Eagleton, Democrat of Missouri, who proffered a number of counter-amendments which would require the President to employ all available resources, including the American intelligence agencies, to ascertain whether such a violation has occurred. 89

Eagleton's amendments died a quick death; what remained after Javits and colleagues attacked them was completely stripped from the Senate version of the bill in Conference Committee. It should be noted that another Middle East beneficiary of the loosened restrictions within the act is Morocco, which has been fighting a bitter desert war with Algeria-backed Polisario guerrillas for the Western Sahara. The Carter Administration endangered its own neutrality by sending Morocco in 1980 reconnaissance planes and Cobra helicopter gunships, 155mm howitzers and ammunition totaling $75 million.

Early in 1981 the Reagan Administration announced plans to sell Morocco $182 million worth of M60 and A3 tanks, 108 in number. The Algerians, who had just worked tirelessly for the release of the American hostages from Iran, took the Morocco sale as a slap in the face. The risk lies in possible misuse of American-supplied equipment by Morocco against Algeria in response to Polisario attacks on towns in southern Morocco. Compounding these complexities is the United States' non-recognition of Morocco's unilateral claim to the Western Sahara. America's dubious raison for funneling new weaponry to Morocco is that it will placate King Hassan to seek a negotiated settlement of the dispute.

Nothing in the Arms Export Control Act, therefore, forces a definitive decision by the President once he has reported to Congress that a "substantial violation" of arms law "may have occurred." If the President tells Congress in writing, or the Congress passes a joint resolution that a substantial violation by a foreign country has occurred, then the country becomes ineligible for American weapons. Even then, the arms trade can continue to the violating country if the President certifies in writing to Congress that termination would have "significant adverse impact on United States security." Such a Presidential waiver could not be invoked, however, if Congress adopts (or had adopted) a joint resolution finding the country ineligible. A President retains the right to veto any joint resolution and Congress would then have to override the veto to impose its will.

Congress can also adopt regular legislation imposing varying degrees of penalties upon any country it finds has "substantially violated" an arms sales agreement with the United States. Such legislation would also be subject to the veto process.

Once a country has been deemed ineligible, it can regain arms shipments under two conditions: the President "determines that the violation has ceased"; and when "the country concerned has given assurances satisfactory to the President that such violation will not recur." Alternatively, Congress could pass regular legislation exempting the particular country from specific sanctions imposed through A.E.C.A. procedures, although it would be subject to a Presidential veto. 90

"Legitimate self-defense." What Israel defines as its "legitimate self-defense" interests stretches far beyond the boundaries stipulated by the four United Nations armistice agreements in 1948. Capture of portions of Jordan, Syria and Egypt (and the Palestinian West Bank) in the 1967 War represented a bold move to insure internal security, to create Israeli "buffer zones." Just how quickly this rationale
turned into outright annexation is vividly demonstrated by the frenzied settlements policy of Israel in the occupied territories. Indeed Israeli official borders remain undefined and ever-expanding, leaving the P.L.O. with the dilemma of trying to decide which Israel to recognize. According to Menachem Begin's Herut Party's charter, Israel owns all the land from the Nile to the borders of Iraq.

As far as the Lebanon campaign goes, the ratio of Palestinian and Lebanese civilian deaths by heavy bombardment and shelling of Israeli troops in relation to Israeli citizens killed by fedayeen attacks remains high, at least ten to one in the last ten years. The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith reported in January 1979 the number of Israelis killed in a ten-year period (1967-77) by "Arab terrorism" to be 318. That is less than the 548 civilians killed in Lebanon in one year—1979—by Israeli attacks. In 1980, the figures are even more lopsided. Civilian deaths in Lebanon from Israel's strikes amounted to 120; Israel sustained only two casualties from guerrilla raids the entire year—a ratio of 60 to 1. This disproportionate and brutal death-dealing in Lebanon seems hardly warranted by the minimal threats to Israeli security from its northern border.

Substantial violation. At what point does a violation of the arms export act become "substantial"? One hundred civilian deaths in Lebanon? Two hundred? What about Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978 which turned 300,000 people into refugees fleeing north to Beirut? The law also says that besides considering "quantities" (referring to the amount of United States weaponry used or casualties resulting) the "gravity of the consequences regardless of quantities" must be considered.

Many commentators have noted that the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor set a dangerous precedent—that nations around the world may conduct bombing raids on nuclear reactors in other countries, "hot" or not.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jean Kirkpatrick used the word

Palestinians and a representative of Americans for Justice in the Middle East examine American-made CBU cluster bomb cannister supplied to Israel and used in 1979 attacks on southern Lebanon.

"gravely" in voting for the Security Council resolution June 19 that "strongly condemned" Israel's raid. On July 17, 1981 an unprecedented air and sea attack on Beirut and southern Lebanon resulted in 300 dead and more than 800 wounded, most of whom were civilians. If this wasn't a "substantial violation" of American arms law, the phrase would seem to have no meaning.

Internal security. The phrase, "internal security," becomes sticky when applied by the Israelis to the West Bank and Gaza. According to Israel, these are "internal" areas; according to the United States and the United Nations, they are not. There is little evidence that Israel has used heavy United States armaments such as tanks and fighter-bombers against the Palestinians in these areas since 1967. But light arms that the settlers are equipped with to fight the Palestinians deserves to be examined for possible arms violation.

Assurances satisfactory to the President that such violations will not recur. Prime Minister Begin has made it abundantly clear that he, or any Israeli prime minister, will destroy any reactor Iraq builds. That amounts to saying he will continue to violate United States arms law.

Senator Mark Hatfield, Republican of Oregon and chairman of the powerful Appropriations Committee which holds the purse strings for arms shipments, told the Senate on June 9, 1981: "There is an enormous and dangerous arrogance which surrounds the unilateral decision to use U.S.-made weapons to attack an Iraqi nuclear reactor on Sunday, an arrogance which has resulted in one of the most provocative, ill-timed and internationally illegal actions taken in that nation's [Israel's] history."

Concrete steps can be taken around the globe and here in the United States to halt the wild arming of the Middle East by supposed "civilized" countries. The following steps could be taken, preferably together, to get a handle on our worldwide death instinct the arms race in the Middle East represents:
1. The ill-fated Tripartite Declaration of 1950 should be resurrected, expanded and toughened. The Soviet Union should be added to that original list of the United States, France and Britain. This quartet of powers together account for most of the arms exports to the Middle East. An immediate embargo—without qualification—for at least one year should be agreed upon and effected. The old declaration's "legitimate self-defense" loophole has proven itself not curb on arms proliferation, so an arms embargo to the Middle East, for increments of time, should be total. At the very least, the superpowers should agree to a freeze on shipments of "very advanced weaponry" to the Middle East, suggested by the United Nations Association in a policy paper, "Controlling the International Arms Trade" (1976).
2. In 1981, George F. Kennan, the pre-eminent expert on American-Soviet relations for more than 40 years,
stunned a Congressional committee by proposing that the United States and the Soviet Union enter into immediate negotiations to cut their military arsenals in half. A SALT III summit—something President Reagan has committed himself to arrange for substantive arms cuts not guaranteed in SALT II—should not be held up much longer. Kennan's proposal could be taken up at SALT III. And there are ample proposals by many responsible groups in and out of government (such as S.A.N.E.) that show how defense cuts can streamline and actually produce a more efficient defense.31

3. The United Nations Secretariat in conjunction with the World Health Organization has published a detailed report on how every phase of the arms industry and research could be converted to specific peaceful means.32

4. The Arms Export Control Act could be tightened, re-instituting the language withdrawn by Senators Javits, Humphrey and Case in 1976. The President should be required to make an immediate determination of any arms violations, perhaps within a week's time of notification of possible violation. Above all, the weak-kneed phrase "may have violated" should be expunged as an end product of arms violation investigations. A special task force in both the Executive and Legislative branches should be created to specifically facilitate arms violations rulings. As it is now, the responsibility is spread out all through the maze of the federal bureaucracy.

5. Re-exports must cease under pain of an American arms embargo on the violating nation. Restrictions on sale of arms using American parts—should be re-instituted, and co-production of American planes by Israel and Egypt should not be granted. The arms race is bad enough without killing what few restrictions we have had. The Soviet Union, too, should be encouraged to halt arms shipments to Syria and Libya if these countries continue to pass around Soviet arms.

6. This paper has not dealt with the largely incalculable arms rocketeering going on in the Middle East. The black market is flourishing with the Lebanese debacle, in particular, operating largely through the transit station in Limassol, Cyprus. The United States should take the lead in a strong campaign against such outlaws.

7. No United States arms to Middle Eastern countries which fail to ratify and sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It makes no sense to send arms, much less nuclear material, to Middle Eastern countries which fail to put their nuclear reactors under I.A.E.A. safeguards by signing and ratifying the treaty. This means Israel, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and if North Africa is included, Algeria.32

8. Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Republican of Maryland, drew the wrath of the Israeli lobby when he criticized the preponderant influence of ethnic lobbies in a Summer 1981 Foreign Affairs article, "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy." But Mathias' point is long overdue and needs to be heard from higher places. Too many White House cover-ups for Israel (i.e. over the Liberty incident in 1967 when Israeli attacked a United States ship at high sea killing 34 American sailors; the Israeli-South Africa nuclear weapons cooperation; the failure to apply the A.E.C.A. on the raids into Lebanon and Iraq) have caused legitimate fear in the world that the United States is led by Israel and its vociferous American lobby—at least on the Middle East crisis. President Reagan has four more years in office; he has nothing to fear from that lobby by issuing a strong, principled statement that our foreign policy will not be dictated or distorted by any ethnic group, be it Arab American, Jewish American, Turkish American, or Swiss American.

9. The P.L.O. itself has sanctioned a two-state solution many times in the past three years, most recently and explicitly in a letter from P.L.O. European Emissary Isam Sartawi to Israeli Retired General Mattiyahu Peled: "Sooner than all our combined enemies think, peace must and shall reign between the Palestinian and Israeli states and their peoples."34

The compromise solution has been proffered by the P.L.O., in numerous contacts with the West, including—it was revealed recently in the L.A. Times—with high United States officials.35

What is missing, then? No Israeli government leader, either from the Labor or Likud parties, will accept even this modicum of justice—a Palestinian state on a fraction of the original land. The Israeli government prefers to people the West Bank with 20,000 violent settlers and appropriate by now over one-third the land there. Outright annexation is almost a fait accompli at this point, and will not be accomplished without an explosion that could involve genocide of the Palestinians there, or mass deportation. Israel certainly cannot remain a "Jewish state" by enfranchising 1.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

Dr. John Duke Anthony, of Johns Hopkins University's Sais Institute, has argued cogently that it is time for the United States to act like a world power with a vision of peace and responsibility, by opening discussions with the P.L.O. on diplomatic fronts around the world. It should be prepared to extract a written pledge from the P.L.O. to recognize Israel. In turn, it should be realistic and just and agree to Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza. If the P.L.O. did not go along with this mutual recognition, its movement would fall into disrepute worldwide. If it did (and every indication of late is that it would), the ball would be in Israel's court. Israel, then, would be able to do itself and the world a big favor by withdrawing troops from the occupied territories and the guaranteeing of a Palestinian state, in exchange for P.L.O. recognition of Israel.

History is on the side of peace in the Middle East, but time is not. This is the harrowing paradox we live with, we who love the Arabs and the Jews, who want the holy land once again "holy" and not a tickling nuclear bomb.

NOTES

1. Rex Wingeter, "Arms To the Middle East," Middle East International, June 5, 1981, pp. 11-12


4. Ibid., p. 8.


12. Recounted in Marshall Frady, Christopher
The Population of Israel
By Dow Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider
Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, 240 pp., $16.00

By Basheer K. Nijim

In no country is population policy as much a matter of ideology as it is in Israel. Political Zionism, for 50 years after its founding in 1897, was an unusual nationalism due to its lack of a territorial base and a dominant population core in the targeted territory. Migration of the desired population, world Jewry, to the desired land, Palestine, was an absolute requisite. With the establishment of Israel in 1948 a second source of population increase became a matter of national policy at the level of the prime minister's office: an increase in the birth rate of Israel's Jewish population. This book is an examination of the two variables of immigration and natality in the context of Zionist and Israeli ideology and policy. The question of when does the present start is especially relevant to issues involving Israel. The present begins more than 4,000 years ago in the presumption of a promised land; it starts yesterday in terms of the latest Jewish settlements on Arab land. In The Population of Israel the present starts in the mid-19th century. Thirty-six percent of the book deals with pre-Israel Palestine and the matter of Jewish immigration. The authors then analyze the impact of post-1948 immigration fluctuations on the economy, education, welfare, and on the varied national origins of Israel's Jewish population. The mass migration between 1948 and 1951 was of the ut-
Books To Order

New Selection

☐ Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider, The Population of Israel, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979, 240 pp., $16.00. This scholarly work warns of the dangerous implications of annexationist tendencies, but for political or moral reasons, but not purely demographic considerations. Through population statistics, the reader is able to see that permanent Israeli rule over the area taken during the Six-Day War endangers the Jewish basis for the State of Israel. Our price, $13.95. See review on page 14.


☐ Uri Avnery, Israel Without Zionism: A Plea for Peace in the Middle East, Macmillan Publishing, 278 pp., $1.95 (paperback). A remarkable description of Israeli politics, as presented by a member of Israel's Knesset and the sole representative of a party that believes in the transformation of the Jewish state into a pluralistic and secular one that is able to achieve reconciliation with the Arabs. Our price, $1.70.

☐ Dewey Beegle, Prophecy and Prediction, Pyror Pettengill, 274 pp., $5.95 (paperback). Refutes the biblical claim of Zionism to the Promised Land by discussing what the Bible teaches about prophecy, especially concerning the predictions of events which already have occurred and those which are to come. Our price, $5.25.

☐ Hagop Chalakmajian, In Quest of Justice and Peace in the Middle East: The Palestinian Conflict in Biblical Perspective, 1980, Vantage Press, 157 pp., $8.95. Written for those concerned about, but unfamiliar with, the facts regarding the Palestinian issue, and, in particular, the scriptural claims for the Zionist right to the land of Palestine. Our price, $6.50.


☐ James Ennis Jr., Assault on the Liberty, Random House, 301 pp., $12.95. The author served as lieutenant among the officers of the U.S.S. Liberty on her fatal voyage. He was on watch at the bridge during the day of the Israeli attack. Our price, $8.50.


☐ A.C. Forrest, The Unholy Land, Devin-Darriolv, Co., 178 pp., $5.95 (paperback). The author's personal, informed and unemotional account of what he considers to be disbalanced and distorted news coverage of the human tragedy brought about by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Our price, $3.60.

☐ David Gibnour, Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians 1917-1980, Sidgwick and Jackson, 242 pp., 12.50 pounds (U.S. $29.00). Well-documented history of Palestinians, based in part on revealing quotations from Zionist sources. Author examines the status of Palestinians in exile, the complex inter-relationships of the P.L.O., and the Palestinians vis-à-vis the international community, particularly with the Soviet Union and the Third World. Our price, $13.95.


☐ David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, Faber & Faber, 303 pp. (paperback). Aply subtitled "The Roots of Violence in the Middle East." In tracing these roots, the author dispels a number of myths about both Arabs and Zionists. A carefully researched and documented account. Our price, $5.25.


☐ Liviu Rokach, Israel's Sacred Terrorism, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980, 68 pp., $2.50 (paperback). Examines the 1953-57 diary of Moshe Sharett, founding member of Israel's Labor Party, his country's first foreign minister and its second prime minister. Our price, $1.95.


☐ Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, Hoover Press, 244 pp., $14.95. Well-documented analysis of the six years leading up to the creation of Israel. Based on author's personal experience and on information only recently made available by the United Nations and governments involved. Our price, $10.00.

☐ Contribution to A.M.E.U., tax deductible

☐ Free Pamphlet Collection

A check or money order for $1 is enclosed, payable to A.M.E.U.

Name
Address
Zip

14-4-81
most importance to Israel's viability as a Jewish state, and its impact on the country's population characteristics was more profound and more enduring than that of any other demographic event.

The authors pay considerable attention to an active pronatalist policy espoused from the first days of the state's existence by Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, who had been advocating pronatalism for Palestine's Jewish population back in the early 1930s. A national committee, eventually appointed in 1962, submitted a report in April 1966 that became the basis of Israel's official pronatalist policy. Friedlander and Goldscheider find no evidence that this policy has induced an increase in the Jewish birth rate; they argue that an increase is unlikely and if it does occur it will make hardly an impact on population trends in Israel. They project different combinations of natality and immigration rates and repeatedly conclude that the latter will continue to be the dominant variable well into the 21st century. In the concluding chapter on Means and Goals of Population Policy in Israel they suggest that more state resources should be spent on improving the conditions of disadvantaged Israeli Jewish groups (such as Afro-Asian Jews) than on a pursuit of an active immigration program. The rationale is that improved domestic conditions would trigger an increase in immigration especially of Western Jews, with a greater net benefit for the state.

It is axiomatic in the discussion that the subject of study is the Jewish population. The reader keeps wondering, how about the Arabs, both before and after 1948? There is casual reference to them as being in Palestine as a minority. Yet one has the feeling that they are wished away by omission in the discussion of Jewish legal and illegal entry into Palestine, and that they are wished away by an active pronatalist policy for Jews only: "The offices [of the special body that would deal with the general questions of natality] were to be located within the prime minister's office, although at least one member of the natality committee suggested that the Jewish agency might be a more appropriate location, since the policy was intended to increase Jewish fertility and not the fertility of the Arab population" (page 135). This elimination of Arabs by omission extends to the Index, where the only Arab entry is 'Arab Higher Committee,' to which the text makes fleeting reference in connection with the Royal (Peel) Commission of 1956.

It is possible to isolate such details as using the term "boundary" instead of "armistice demarcation line" (page 28), or dating the declaration of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948 instead of May 14 (page 81; May 15 was a sabbath), or quoting Emil Feisal's 1919 agreement with Chaim Weizmann (page 61) without referring to Feisal's handwritten note on the agreement that the agreement was absolutely conditional on the Arabs obtaining independence. More important, however, and of more far-reaching implication is the way the essential immorality of Zionism (in terms of covering another people's land and then instituting a discriminatory pronatalist policy) is overlooked matter of factly and treated as an operating premise. About the only time the question of morality arises is in connection with the question of whether or not the government should limit the spread of family planning among the country's Jewish population (page 136).

The phrase "population problem," used several times in the book, has a special meaning to Israel: the presence of non-Jews. If Israel annexes the West Bank and Gaza Strip (one of the projections considered by the authors), and assuming no major de-Arabization of these occupied territories, Israel's "population bomb" will turn out to be a differential birth rate that will result in the Jewish minority of 45 percent by the year 2010 (page 194)—an eventuality unacceptable to Zionist and Israeli ideology.

The book is certainly an instructive analysis of Palestine's and Israel's Jewish population and a searching critique of Israel's pronatalist policy. The reader, however, must not overlook the ideological visor through which the authors treat their material.


Dr. Nijim is professor and head, Department of Geography, University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA.

A $10.00 voluntary annual subscription is requested to cover cost of postage and handling for The Link and Public Affairs Pamphlet series.