Not by War Alone:

CURBING THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS RACE

by Fuad Jabber

The year 1974 may finally go down in the long annals of the Arab-Israeli confrontation as the "Year of Geneva." Though off to a shaky start in the immediate aftermath of the October war, the negotiating process is likely to pick up speed in the weeks and months ahead, thanks partly to Secretary Kissinger's unique "fireman" diplomacy.

The impact of the October war
The outlook for negotiations seems brighter today than ever in the past because of a convergence of several factors that have created nothing less than a new strategic balance between Arabs and Israelis. Applied in its most comprehensive sense, the term "strategic" embraces psychological, economic, and political, as well as military, components. While Israel does retain the military upper hand, the latest round has shown the Arab side to possess a counterbalancing capability to inflict almost unacceptable damage on her, and a willingness to go to war if no acceptable alternative is available. Economically, the conflict is increasingly imposing strains on Israel, in contrast with the marked alleviation, on the Arab side, of the financial burdens of the confrontation. The vast increase in the revenues of the Arab oil-producing countries has prompted a willingness on their part to share heavily in the financing of the war effort. Politically, the considerable growth of inter-Arab cooperation, and the intensified Superpower involvement in the dynamics of the conflict—both militarily and diplomatically—are also elements that help redress the still clear Israeli superiority in the purely military arena.

Nevertheless, the current halting movement toward peace should not be allowed to disguise the basic instability of the post-October situation. Indeed, the latest war has brought about a more volatile strategic environment than that which spawned it. Separation of forces agreements between the major combatants may help prevent the day-to-day frictions likely to arise when hostile military forces face each other in close proximity. They may also provide an earnest of newly found goodwill on the part of the adversaries. Basically, however, the present situation lacks even those deceptively stabilizing elements that seemed to presage in 1970-1973 an indefinite "no war-no peace" stalemate.

Of the several new factors making for increased fluidity in the over-all state of the conflict, three are of particular significance:

First, Israel's military superiority did not dissuade Egypt and Syria from seeking to alter the status quo by armed force. Greatly significant for the future strategic calculus is the fact that the challenge came at a time when the consensus of qualified opinion considered that superiority so overwhelming as to rule out Arab attack! The mis-

Amidst the March, 1974, tensions in the occupied Golan Heights, Israeli soldiers ready their American-built 20-mile-range, 175 mm. mobile cannon—"the most advanced heavy gun to enter the Arab-Israeli conflict."
CURBING THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS RACE (Continued)

reading of intelligence information by both Israeli and U.S. services in the days that preceded the Arab offensive largely resulted from the mistaken assessment, on which Israel had based its security posture and its political-diplomatic position since June 1967. In the event, not only did the Arabs seize the military initiative; they did so with relative ease, gaining a foothold on the Sinai and inflicting severe losses on the Israelis in both manpower and equipment.

Second, a psychological equilibrium has been reestablished. The Arab soldier has proved his ability to fight well, plan and execute complex logistic operations with efficiency, and master modern arms technology. Until the October war, Israel had found reassurance in the belief that such developments lay far in the future. As recently as August 1973, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan confidently told the graduating class of the Israeli Army Command and Staff College that "the weakness of the Arabs arises from causes which . . . will not be abolished for a long time; the low level of their soldiers in education, technology and integrity, and inter-Arab division..." Many Arab observers came to share this evaluation after the 1967 defeat, and something akin to a martial inferiority-complex developed in the Arab psyche. While it lasted, this perceptual element had a conflict-limiting effect in both camps. Its restraining hold has now been definitively broken.

Third, from an Egyptian vantage point, the war worked where nothing else did. Starting with Nasser's acceptance of the American-engineered cease-fire that ended the War of Attrition back in August 1970, and culminating in the Security Council debates of June-July 1973, the Egyptian leadership experienced enormous frustrations on the diplomatic front. A long campaign punctuated by repeated disappointments was unsuccessfully waged to induce active international—particularly American—participation in bringing about a settlement based on Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories.

In dramatic contrast, the October war swiftly sparked a world-wide sense of urgency that had vastly tried for three years to impart; catalyzed a measure of coordinated Arab action that produced an energy crisis of global proportions; and brought the Superpowers to the brink of confrontation. More importantly, the war forced the United States to engage in intensive diplomatic efforts it had previously shunned, loath as it was to confront the strains on the peculiar U.S.-Israeli relationship bound to follow any vigorous pursuit of a settlement devolving Israel of its territorial gains.

The lesson is clear. Should the current momentum toward negotiations wane, and world interest in pressing for a political settlement slacken; or should the negotiating process, once engaged, stall, thereby freezing again in the present unacceptable status quo, further recourse to arms may be the optimal Arab choice.

Thus, like Janus, the new Arab-Israeli strategic balance is double faced. It offers better chances of a negotiated peace; but, if diplomacy proves sterile, it presages an increase in both the tempo and the scale of armed violence. In either case, its most insidious impact will be felt in the arms race.

The continuing arms race

The arms competition between Israel and its neighbors is among the most fierce and expensive of any generated by Third World conflicts. The resources devoted to it by local participants, both in absolute value and in relative terms, have no parallel elsewhere. Since 1948, military outlays in Israel and Egypt alone have absorbed some $24,700 million, not including the enormous expenditures caused by the October war. About $9,000 million were spent in the last three years. It is also the most unstable of arms races: it is extremely competitive, with adversary states provoking offsetting armaments in a continuous action-reaction process; new arms accretions have repeatedly involved generational jumps in the quality of armaments, at progressively faster rates, and with sharp increases in military expenditures; finally, each side aims, not at equilibrium, but at achieving a preponderance of power.
Military Expenditures, 1951-1973, in U.S. $ millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td>649.7</td>
<td>1775.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>343.6</td>
<td>515.2</td>
<td>1406.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>173.3</td>
<td>230.6</td>
<td>228.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td>214.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>75.7</td>
<td>104.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1973 figures do not reflect expenditures caused by the October war.
+ 1973 figures not available.

Operational Inventories of Jet Combat Aircraft and Tanks on Fire of War:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jet Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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The results of the 1973 war are likely to speed up the momentum of the race even further. In this latest round, the vaunted deterrent power of the Israeli army was proved wanting. On the Arab side, despite the success of their initial offensive and their much improved battlefield performance, the Egyptian and Syrian forces could not register a military victory. A virtually irresistible incentive exists for all parties to seek a substantial increase in their military power.

This will be sought partially in further strengthening of the conventional forces. The heavy October losses in equipment have been already recouped, and the arms flow into the area continues apace. Educated by experience, the adversaries will place even greater emphasis than in the past on strategies of surprise attack for war initiation. This will be reflected in the weapons they procure and in their military postures. It will increase military instability, and raise the level of tension arising from inevitable frictions and incidents.

Future wars will not be short and conclusive, however. They will not follow the Blitzkrieg pattern of the 1956 and 1967 encounters, but the more protracted, costly and indecisive 1973 model. Higher levels of military proficiency and of available armaments, as well as the recently battle-tested effectiveness of missile defense systems, practically rule out the type of lightning war preferred—indeed required—by the Israelis. This will give increased prominence to a heretofore relatively submerged but important element in the Middle Eastern military picture: Israel may opt for "going nuclear" to reestablish a credible deterrent.

Across the nuclear threshold?
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by one or another of the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute has long been a subject of grave international concern. While the Arabs have lagged behind in atomic research and plant construction, Israel has developed a militarily significant nuclear option that has been a continuing source of friction between Washington and Tel Aviv. Repeated U.S. efforts first launched under the Kennedy Administration to bring the atomic program under effective external supervision have failed. Israel has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and she has pointedly refrained from excluding the possibility of developing nuclear weapons as a future military policy if circumstances warrant it.

As the conventional arms race reaches its technological ceiling (the most sophisticated weapons operationally available have been supplied by the U.S. and the Soviets), the nuclear-weapons option presents Israeli decision-makers with a definite choice. Its low viability over the past few years was a direct consequence of the unchallenged superiority Israel felt she had achieved as a result of the Six-Day War. Territorial depth, more easily-defensible borders, a fast-growing economy, the burgeoning local military industries, the technological advantage over the Arab world, as well as the increased level of American aid and identification with Israel were held as pointers to continued supremacy. Under these conditions, a nuclear arsenal was superfluous.

There was rather general agreement, however, that a nuclear deterrent might become essential if the Arab countries achieved some degree of effective unity that radically enhanced their military capabilities, if Egypt gained access to nuclear weaponry, or if the balance of conventional armaments shifted enough to allow the Arabs to seek a military confrontation.

Recent events have brought all these preconditions very near to realization. In October 1973, Syro-Egyptian coordination forced Israel to fight simultaneously on two fronts for the first time since 1948, and there were other effective aspects of Arab solidarity. During the fighting, the Soviet Union supplied Egypt with a nuclear-capable short-range missile, the Scud, and it was reported that Soviet nuclear warheads for the missiles were aboard Soviet cargo ships in Egyptian harbors. As for the general balance of power, developments since that fateful Day of Atonement cast heavy doubts on the future sufficiency of the Israeli army as a deterrent.

If Israel does go ahead and announces a nuclear posture (it is possible that the actual production of the Bomb or of its unassembled components has already been done in secret), there is a strong possibility of a regional nuclear arms race getting

![ISRAELI CASUALTIES in Syria are awaited by ambulances lined up behind an armed column advancing along the Damacus Road, October 15, 1973.](image-url)
under way as Egypt and other Arab countries pool their resources to acquire or develop a nuclear deterrent of their own. Arab efforts in this field so far have been minimal. Other two small research reactors exist in the Arab world—one in Baghlah and the other in the outskirts of Cairo—that produce negligible fissionable material. Not unusual, Egypt and more recently Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq have expressed serious interest in building nuclear power reactors for civilian purposes. Once operational, these would offer opportunities for stockpiling plutonium.9 The production of electric power through nuclear energy in an area rich in petroleum offers scanty economic attraction, but a desire for technological know-how, and the possible bonus of military spin-offs may spur a joint Arab project. Some influential Arab voices have begun calling for an independent nuclear force, both to balance a likely Israeli capability and as a precondition to more influential Arab world role.

It is hardly necessary to detail the grim implications of a nuclearization of the Arab-Israeli arms race. Even if a “balance of nuclear terror” should prove to be a stabilizing factor, the dangers of arms conflict would be magnified beyond measure, both for the people of the area and for the world at large. So would the consequences of any future Middle Eastern conflict. The Superpower mini-confrontation of October 1973, which resulted in a general alert of U.S. forces, provided a sobering reminder of how quickly and how easily a Middle Eastern crisis engulf the nuclear giants and attain global proportions.

The instability of the Arab-Israeli strategic environment, the continuing arms buildup, and the likely introduction of nuclear weapons suggest that it is none too soon for a concerted effort at curbing the current military competition. Solving some of the many standing political issues would contribute much to a relaxation of tensions.19 However, a comprehensive settlement of all the complex aspects of the Palestine question in short order is unlikely to materialize at Geneva. In any case, it would be ingenuous to expect any political settlement to lead directly to a state of blissful peace and neighborly amity. For a quarter-century, both sides have relied on ever-increasing military power as the best guarantee of security and the optimal means for attaining their political objectives. This doctrine of “flexible constraint” has already resulted in four major wars, and innumerable border clashes, raids and other skirmishes, with their grievous toll in blood and treasure. Even with negotiations in progress, the next several years will be a period of uneasy ‘cold war’, in which the possibility of military conflict breaking out, while perhaps substantially abated, will not disappear. Moreover, virulent arms races develop a life and a logic of their own. The parties will continue to spend large percentages of their GNPs on armaments, and to seek the most sophisticated weapons available.

If further escalation of the arms race into the upper rungs of the ladder of destruction is to be stopped, and future wars even more baneful than past encounters avoided, arms limitation should be included as a major item on the agenda of the Geneva negotiations.

Arms control options
Two areas directly related to the arms race are open to immediate control: local acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the transfer of conventional armaments from outside the region.

In the nuclear field, as no Arab country has developed a nuclear program capable of producing bombs, it is Israel, which has a time-lead of eight to ten years in this regard, that poses the immediate problem. Were Israel to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a sufficient measure of control over her small capability could be afforded by international supervision, provided adequate account is given of the weapons-grade plutonium already stockpiled.11 In exchange, those few Arab countries that have not already ratified or acceded to the Treaty would agree to do so upon Israeli accession.

The Arab position has been constantly favorable to the NPT and other measures likely to inhibit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region. Awareness of the advanced Israeli capability and their own inadequacy in the nuclear field have mainly dictated the Arabs’ attitude. So far, twelve Arab countries have signed the Treaty and six of these have also ratified it, Iraq, one of the two Arab states possessing nuclear reactors, in February 1972 completed negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency on a safeguards agreement and placed its facilities under international supervision.

Barring enormous pressures by the United States, however, sweetened by very substantial compensations in other areas, perhaps including large supplies (or commitments) of conventional weaponry, such Israeli surrender of the advantages of the nuclear option is not to be expected. Its psychological-deterrent value vis-a-vis the Arabs would be undercuts, and its proven usefulness as a bargaining counter in procuring conventional arms would be greatly diminished.

Despite the hazards of a nuclear arms race, an Israeli fearful of eventual Arab superiority in conventional military power may prefer the creation of an Arab-Israeli balance of terror to surrender of a potential weapon that might provide a credible final line of defense against the opponent’s vast advantage in population and resources. Ultimate deterrence is the one
strategic role most Israeli observers are willing to concede for their nuclear capability. For this reason, and in view of the price Israel will seek to extract from the United States in exchange for suspending its nuclear option, the prospects for nuclear arms control will be inextricably linked to progress in limiting the shipment of conventional arms, to which we now turn.

Most past efforts and proposals have pointed in this direction. This practically total reliance of the regional parties on weapons imported from the Soviet bloc, Western Europe, and North America has enabled the supplying governments at times to impose restrictions on the arms flow. These have been both explicit and formal, as in the arms rationing system imposed by the U.S., Britain, and France in the fifties, and tacit on some weapons throughout the conflict period, notably as practiced by Washington and Moscow after the 1967 war.12 In every case, however, they failed to prevent the outbreak of conflict or limit arms competition. It is disquieting that current American policy calls for similar understandings between the major suppliers to curtail the future flow of arms to the Middle East.

Nixon as President repeatedly stated his desire to discuss with the Soviet Union practical arrangements to this end.13 Shortly after the October 1973 war, Secretary of State Kissinger restated this position.14 Moscow has not rejected these overtures; in 1968, it put on the record its willingness to consider limiting arms transfers to the Middle East, subject to Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territory.15

In any specific situation, to identify the objective conditions that make arms control relevant is not enough. It is also imperative to come to grips with the political variables, which will be the fundamental determinants of measurable success or ultimate futility. The hard political questions are the ones that have most often gone unanswered—or have been gingerly sidestepped with no more than perfunctory reference—in the arms control literature, particularly that which has dealt with the Middle East and other regional crisis areas. In any particular conflict relationship, who will benefit from which arms control steps? To whose advantage would increased stability work? Does the restriction of military means for challenging the status quo mean its indefinite consecration?

The politics of arms control
The rest of this paper will not deal with the nuts and bolts of possible arms control arrangements, but with the political pre-conditions essential to the success of any such efforts. These are—at least—three.

1. The restriction of violence is not always an absolute good. The arms-control approach is most persuasive in situations, such as the strategic arms race between the Superpowers, where the outbreak of war is unthinkable, and the ever present threat and costs of undesired Armageddon are such that arms limitation is a matter of the first priority. As for small states involved in regional conflicts, it is true that the principle of partial relief from the economic burdens of the arms race should provide enough incentives to interest them in control measures, and that arms control might afford them a level of security higher than that achievable by active military competition.

In certain conflict situations, however, not security but the alteration of an intolerable status quo may be the paramount objective—as it is for the Arab camp in the Middle East dispute for Arab camp in the Middle East dispute for the Arab camp in the Middle East dispute for the Arab camp in the Middle East dispute for the Arab camp in the Middle East dispute for the Arab camp in the Middle East dispute. Arms control is much less attractive where the perceived stakes are so critical, and the expected outcome of war not so catastrophic, that military action becomes a feasible choice. Nothing will undermine the support of arms recipients for the principle of arms limitation faster than suspicion that what is being offered in reality is a devious means of weakening their position or jeopardizing their vital interests.

On the other hand, military action is never an end in itself. “Sir, do you want war?” Bismarck was once asked. “Certainly not,” he replied, “I want victory.” For the parties to any international quarrel, the impact of arms control on their chances of securing a favorable outcome—or at least a face-saving “draw”—will be their primary concern. If arms control is to win their acceptance, it must be supplemented by the provision of non-violent means for challenging the status quo—such as diplomatic negotiations, arbitration, or legal adjudication.

2. Whatever its putative benefits, the acquiescence of Arabs and Israelis in arms control will be difficult to secure. Aside from issues of national sovereignty, prestige, and equality, there is no evading the fact that it does affect the core of a nation's strength and limits policy options. Moreover, past experience has taught many recipient governments that arms suppliers cannot be trusted. "Genuine" arms control remains to be tried. In the few instances where suppliers have shown restraint—in the Middle East and else-

where—they have not been motivated by any altruistic desire to spare their clients from the ravages of war or enable them to devote their resources to developmental tasks.

Many domestic economic, political, and strategic interests of the suppliers are well served by vigorous arms-exporting programs, and they have continually pumped enormous quantities of armaments into the Third World. When they have resorted to arms control, they have done so to minimize the risks of unwanted entanglement in regional conflicts their arms exports have fueled, and in some instances even provoked. They have used it not for its value as a conflict-reducing device—though conflict attenuation may have been a welcome incidental benefit—but for its utility as an instrument of policy at the expense of their immediate interests. In other words, weapons control became in itself a political weapon. Designed for unilateral advantage, it aroused the immediate opposition of those it was designed to victimize.

Dissociating regional arms control arrangements from objectives that translate into unilateral political, military or strategic benefits may be difficult, but it is essential for their success. More than a decade before assuming the office of Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger warned that “any attempt to achieve a unilateral advantage must doom arms control” because “the purpose of arms control is to enhance the security of all parties.”16 Insofar as arms limitations and multilateral arrangements voluntarily conceived, they will be viable only as long as and to the extent that they reflect such common interests of the parties to them. With the mind, it becomes easier to understand the world-wide paucity of arms controls, particularly among active opponents, and the ultimate failure of those measures—such as the Mideast rationing regime of 1960-68—that, both in conception and execution, failed to observe this cardinal requirement.

3. Since 1948, the need to secure friendly, reliable, and adequate sources of armaments has conditioned the foreign relations of the major participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict more than any other single factor. For Egypt, Israel, Syria, to obtain the weaponry their security was perceived to require has been their first priority, determining foreign policy orientations and alliances, as well as taking up the lion’s share of the national effort. Any

(Continued on page 7)
FOOTNOTES TO "CURBING THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS RACE"

The footnotes below do not appear in the Adai Rivennon Institute's Working Paper 15. Except for No. 4, they have been gleaned from Dr. Jabber's writings on the subject in the Summer issue of the Middle East Journal, pp. 228-247, published by the Middle East Institute, 1761 N. Bt., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

(1) About the limited nature of Egyptian objectives see the account of Arab, Israeli and American peacemaker calculations in the Sunday issue of the Middle East Journal, pp. 228-247, published by the Middle East Institute, 1761 N. Bt., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.


(2) In a speech to the graduating class of Israel's Army Command and Staff College last two months before the outbreak of the October war, Haaretz, August 10, 1973.

(3) According to information provided by an authoritative US source, in the Fall of 1973 Washington was passing up for another major Middle East diplomatic offensive in search of an acceptable compromise. This author, however, spent the Summer of 1973 in Cairo, interviewing members of the Egyptian foreign policy community, and the overriding impression he gathered was that one general Egyptian bailment at the American position and almost total despair of any sincere US effort at peacemaking.

(4) Allan Solomon, Executive Director of the Committee on New Alternatives in the Middle East, 339 Lafayette St., N.Y., N.Y. 10012, adds these further statistical observations in "Arms Crisis in the Middle East," Nase World, Aug.-Sept., 1974, pp. 29-34:

"The statistics on arms shipments to the Middle East are stunning. In the two years preceding the last war, the United States, and including the U.S. Peruvian deal - Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia - have accounted for over one-half of all arms sales by the United States and the Soviet Union. Between the 1967 and 1973 wars the Soviet Union supplied those countries with $3.3 billion in arms, the United States somewhat more than twice that amount - close to $6.4 billion. Quantity of armaments is only part of the story; the United States has supplied perhaps a more sophisticated weaponry. The newest weapons systems flowing into the area represent a significant escalation over the weapons used in Indochina, or anywhere else in the Third World..."

(5) It is now undeniable that the Middle East is the most armed region in the world. The one year elapsing since the last war as many arms have been shipped to it during the previous five years. Of the $8.5 billion in arms sold by the United States in fiscal year 1973, $2.3 billion went to arms shipments in the Middle East. Figures for the Soviet Union remain obscure and tend to be estimated by the least disinterested parties.

(6) "Both statistics and analysis regarding the Middle East conflict are shrouded in secrecy, double-talk and partisan distortion. Until July 13, 1973, the United States government released no hard figures on American arms shipments to the Middle East. Figures for the Soviet Union remain obscure and tend to be estimated by the least disinterested parties.

"As with our experience in Indochina, the United States Government is loath to reveal the full-scale military aid, and as a matter of course, does not mention arms furnished through Security Assistance Programs. Military Assistance Program Grants. Excess Defense Grants, Foreign Military Financing, Military Assistance Grants."

"Each Middle East war has caused more casualties and more destruction. The 1967 War cost each side about $100 million a day. The 1973 War cost approximately $500 million a day. The next war could easily be a mutual holocaust..."

On SOVIET military aid, Solomon gives the following "elaboration" which he himself indicts and indicts and... millions of dollars:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal years: 1968-73</th>
<th>1973-74</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>$2.3 billion</td>
<td>$1.7 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$3.4 billion</td>
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Figure 4.3: American aid on a similar basis, Solomon comes up with the following estimates, also in millions:

<table>
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<th>Fiscal years: 1968-73</th>
<th>1973-74</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>$2.3 million</td>
<td>$1.7 million</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
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<td>$728,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$6,810,000</td>
<td>$6,810,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(9) On June 14, 1973, President Nixon signed an agreement with Egypt which provided for US aid in the development of a 4,000,000 kilowatt atomic power plant valued at $390 million. Three days later a similar agreement was reached with Israel. Both reactors will, according to the agreement, have stringent safeguards that no plutonium can be extracted from the spent fuel and diverted to non-peaceful purposes.

(10) On December 7, 1973, the Christian Science Monitor reported that Secretary of State Kissinger had ordered the CIA to update a three-year-old estimate of Israel's nuclear weapons capability, reflecting a sentiment that this capability might now come into play...

(11) Counting military aid being a source of difficult problems. For instance, to 1973 it was reported in a story widely assumed to have been passed to the US by an authoritative US information that, in 1968, "some flamboyant material from the (Israeli) Dimona reactor was sent to the US. It wasPellet Reactor fuel. It is not known whether this was diverted to weapons use, but they are in the stories." If they are, it is not known here..."

(12) "And the U.S. Assumes the Israelis have A-Bombs or Its Parts," The New York Times, July 15, 1973. It is worth noting that in 1971, while the Non-Proliferation Treaty was still in the negotiating stage, Egyptian foreign minister called for an acceptable safeguards system "must be extended to all... nuclear activities, past and present...," ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1967, p. 156.

(13) The major issue at the Soviet revolution was the abandonment of some advanced weaponry in 1970-1972, including jet fighter-bombers of a quality matching the Israeli F-4 Phantoms and surface-to-air missiles, was the principal of several factors that led to the ejection of the Soviet presence in Egypt in July 1972. The Egyptian leadership strongly suspected that the United States had reached a major understanding with the Soviet Union and its Middle East supplies to the area. Later, President Sadat would say, "It was clear that the statement—one peace, no war—suited the superpowers. There was some agreement between them about the level of arms supplies"; quoted in the Sunday Times, December 9, 1973.

(14) See his 1975 foreign policy statement in The New York Times, November 3, 1975, quoted in ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1975, p. 32; similar sentiments are further expressed in subsequent statements. On March 1, 1975, the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, Dr. Lehmkuhl, issued a statement by former Secretary of State Rogers shortly before the 1973 Middle East peace conference. The New York Times, March 8, 1975. Congress urged the President to pursue these efforts in an amendment to the Military Sales Act of 1971, Public Law 91-672, January 12, 1971.


(16) In ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1968, p. 468.


NEWSPHOTO CREDITS: Pages 1 and 2, Wide World Photos; page 3, Israeli Army, W.P.P.; page 4, Arab Information Center.
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initiatives purporting to restrict their access to military hardware by a "ganging up" of the NATO defense alliance as that propounded by the Nixon Administration—will be highly suspect to these governments, if not downright unacceptable.

That they have just emerged from another bitter war is likely to sharpen their resistance. Moreover, the successful use of the "oil weapon" to extract political concessions from the industrialized countries has provided the Arab bloc with a potent lever that, together with the immense funds oil revenues are only beginning to yield, will facilitate arms sales both by arms suppliers unilaterally to impose arms rationing or embargo schemes along the lines of the earlier trilateral experience.

Hence, a third political prerequisite of significant, and successful, arms-transfer control in the Middle East must be the securing of the cooperation of parties at both ends of the transfer process in the envisaged limitations. Tacit consent to the exclusion of some weapons systems from the area is feasible—and has been operative in the past—but is almost impossible to obtain for systems already being provided to the opponents. Control limitations will have to be negotiated, with the participation or approval of the conflicting parties, so as to insure that when they are enforced, they will not be perceived by any one of those parties as a threat to its relative power position. For such negotiations to be fruitful, a strategic dialogue may be required between Israel and its neighbors, from which will emerge a matrix of mutual conceptual and situational understandings essential to the joint approval of specific arms control measures.

These requirements are not visionary or beyond reach at the present time. Direct talks on the whole range of issues comprised by the Arab-Israeli dispute are in prospect. Were these to finalize, arms limitations can be indirectly negotiated through the U.S. and U.S.S.R., who, as the major arms providers, are ipso facto intimately involved. Also, a strategic "dialogue" of sorts has been under way between Arabs and Israelis for twenty-five years, as their frequent military confrontations, at practically all levels of the escalation ladder, have given them multiple chances of feeling each other out and created a reservoir of interactive experience rich in guidelines to their respective strategic and military postures.

What has been so far missing is that minimal, but indispensable, commitment by both sides to deemphasizing military means in the conduct of their mutual relations in favor of political, diplomatic and juridical instruments necessary for consensual arms control agreements. Dissatisfaction with a status quo perceived as inequitable, coupled with despair of an alteration by peaceful means, on the Arab side, is matched on the Israeli side by distrust in the credibility of international compacts and in Arab "paper" assurances, plus reliance on a forward-defense strategy of assertive military superiority, better territorial depth, and easily defensible borders. Only a qualitative change in this state of relations can make for present Israel and Arabs can open up significant prospects of achieving arms limitations that will drastically reduce the current level of armaments. Without such a change, all too scarce economic resources to the urgent developmental and other internal social tasks that remain to be tackled.

Despite some partial setbacks, events since the conclusion of the October war give grounds for cautious hope that the process of change has begun. For those who put store in the utility of arms control for the mitigation of international conflict, it may be the greatest irony of all that it took four major wars to reach this turning point.

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