The Israeli-South African-U.S. Alliance

By Jane Hunter

Over the past year the economic isolation of South Africa has been the focus of anti-apartheid campaigns in the U.S. and Europe. One by one 14 state agencies, 42 local governments, 65 universities and colleges, plus numerous public institutions and pension funds have divested their portfolios of stocks of companies doing business in South Africa. Many localities have written statutes barring even the smallest purchases from vendors doing business in South Africa. On December 13, 1985, the Committee for International Trade Union Rights announced that a dozen major U.S. corporations had joined a boycott of South African goods. The companies, whose combined sales in 1984 totaled $22 billion, are Safeway Stores, Mervyn’s, Montgomery Ward, F.W. Woolworth, Carter Hawley Hale, Thrifty Drug, Nordstrom, Sprouse Reitz, Macy’s California, Sears, Roebuck, J.C. Penney and K Mart. Some organizations are now calling for a total ban on trade with South Africa.

Against this backdrop, last September, Yitzhak Shamir, Israel’s foreign minister, told a New York audience that Israel would not institute sanctions against South Africa. Instead, Shamir said, Israel would leave that task to the great powers and continue its “normal” relations with Pretoria. Those who have sought to quantify Israel’s dealings with South Africa, however, are at a disadvantage, for links between the two countries have been “subject to tight Israeli government censorship and careful phraseology.” Built on military and commercial exchanges during the 1960’s through the early 70’s, the present relationship began to define itself in the mid-70’s when Israel experienced severe setbacks in international relations. By 1975 their diplomatic missions had reached the ambassadorial level.

A pivotal event was the April 1976 visit to Israel by South African Prime Minister John Vorster, resulting in a comprehensive bilateral agreement. Essentially, the two nations pledged themselves to each other’s survival and freedom from foreign interference. Over the years this cooperation has taken on a symbiotic quality: from Israel South Africa gets advanced engineering, including military technology unobtainable elsewhere due to sanctions and embargoes; from South Africa Israel receives strategic raw materials and capital for a variety of purposes.

In their efforts to downplay these commercial ties, Israel’s defenders employ the International Monetary Fund’s statistics, claiming that: in 1983 Israel’s imports from South Africa amounted to 0.8 percent of the latter’s total exports, and its exports to South Africa were 0.5 percent of that country’s total imports. Israel’s imports from South Africa in 1983 amounted to 1.7 percent of its total imports, while its exports to South Africa amounted to 1.8 percent of its total exports.

These figures, provided by Israel and South Africa, have long been discredited as an accurate gauge. Omitted are military and nuclear activities, an assortment of joint economic ventures, and the uncut diamonds Israel purchases from South Africa through DeBeers Central Selling Organization in London.

In 1979 the Johannesburg Financial Mail noted that if only arms and diamonds “are taken into account, Israel is already one of South Africa’s biggest trading partners.” In a calculation made in 1985, assigning conservative values to both items, i.e., $350 million to Israeli military sales to South Africa and $750 million to Israeli diamond imports from South Africa (the diamonds Israel buys from South Africa do not show up in the IMF figures because the paperwork for diamond sales is done by the DeBeers Central Selling Organization in London), a more realistic ranking was demonstrated. (See chart, page 2.)

Since the Financial Mail made its observation in 1979, Israel and South Africa have continued to expand their trade relationship. At the end of 1980 the South African Minister of Finance, Owen Horwood, visited Israel where he concluded a major economic agreement with his counterpart, Yigal Yadin. Hunter is publisher of the monthly Israeli Foreign Affairs and author of the forthcoming book. Undercutting Sanctions – Israel, the U.S. and South Africa.
About This Issue

In March 1985, Denis Goldberg, a Jewish South African sentenced in 1964 to life imprisonment for "conspiring to overthrow the apartheid regime," was released through the intervention of his daughter, an Israeli, and top Israeli officials, including the president of Israel.

Arriving in Israel, Goldberg said that he saw "many similarities in the oppression of blacks in South Africa and of Palestinians," and he called for a total economic boycott of South Africa, singling out Israel as a major ally of the apartheid regime.

A Knesset member moved to deport Goldberg, but the motion was unnecessary. Pledging never to stay in a country that is a major supporter of South African apartheid, Denis Goldberg moved to London.

This issue of The Link examines the evidence on which Goldberg, and indeed most of the world community, base their charges. It also documents the many ways in which the U.S. government abets the Israeli-South African alliance. The author, Jane Hunter, is publisher of an independent monthly research report on Israel's diplomatic and military activities worldwide. Readers interested in details about this informative resource should write to Israeli Foreign Affairs, P.O. Box 285, Oakland, CA 94609. Yearly rates are $20 for individuals and $35 for institutions. Her book, Undercutting Sanctions, may be obtained from Washington Middle East Associates, 918 16th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Our book review selection is Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of Palestinians 1876-1948, written by Walid Khalidi and reviewed on page 14. This and other significant books on the Middle East are offered at substantial discount prices on page 15.

Our next issue of The Link will probe the psychological effects of the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

John F. Mahoney, Executive Director

Hurwitz. Later, in Cape Town during March 1983, the two governments signed yet another agreement strengthening trade and investment. Early in 1985 an Israeli newspaper indicated that a new round of economic agreements between Israel and South Africa were likely. Reportedly, in the first six months of 1985, Israeli exports to South Africa increased by 15 percent. Then in August 1985, when even South Africa's most committed supporters, President Reagan and U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher were warning Pretoria to end apartheid, Le Monde's correspondent in Jerusalem noted that although Israelis "denounced the myth of prodigious economic and military relations [with South Africa]," two factors limited the political room in which Israel could maneuver: concern for the South African Jewish community and "the economic ties between Pretoria and Jerusalem." And as Elihu Lankin, until recently Israel's ambassador to Pretoria, pointed out to a Jerusalem Post reporter, "Israel has a legitimate trade interest in South Africa." Israelis are particularly given to citing the trade between the independent countries of Africa and South Africa as justification for Israel's revealed trade figures with Pretoria. As a legacy of colonial days, the Southern African states, which account for much of that trade, are tied to South Africa's ports, railheads and, in some cases, corporate headquarters. Much of the commerce between these countries and Pretoria is in the form of remittances from workers who spend part of the year working in South African mines and agriculture. South Africa, which sees its security in terms of regional dominance, seeks to perpetuate this state of affairs. It has funded insurgencies and opposition groups in neighboring countries and its agents have repeatedly destroyed Mozambique's rail and power lines. Zimbabwe's finance minister recently announced that "rather than deal with the South African Government," his government would seek an alternate route to the sea, "regardless of cost."

Israel-South Africa Trade*
(In millions of U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Published Figures</td>
<td>$142</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds</td>
<td>800</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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*Figures do not include profits from investments or joint ventures.

Courtesy of Washington Middle East Associates
Interlocking Economies Provide No Solutions

In his "Foreign Affairs Newsletter" (April 1985), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Lee H. Hamilton (D–IN) writes "the U.S. should strengthen economic development among South Africa's neighbors. Economic hardship in these countries makes them vulnerable to South Africa on issues related to Southern Africa and apartheid."

On January 1, for example, South Africa, which encircles the small black-rulled country of Lesotho, imposed an economic blockade of Lesotho's borders in order to obtain African National Congress fugitives. The blockade soon brought about the overthrow of Lesotho's prime minister in a military coup. Israel has helped South Africa take advantage of the region's vulnerability. In 1975, for example, Israel acted on the suggestion of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and began to help South Africa in its efforts to influence the outcome of the fighting in Angola, which had just gained its independence from Portugal. According to one report, Israeli officers helped South Africa plan its 1975 invasion of Angola.

Soon thereafter Israel began to assist South Africa's efforts to preserve white rule in what was then Rhodesia. Israel acted as a conduit for U.S.-made Bell helicopters. Eleven of the aircraft were shipped from Haifa; Singapore was given as their destination, but they were delivered to South Africa, which in turn passed the helicopters on to Southern Rhodesia.

In 1979 the British publication Africa Confidential reported that Israeli advisors were training South African armed forces in "anti-guerilla" warfare and that Israeli experts had made "on-the-spot military assessments in Namibia and Rhodesia." South Africa's fight in Namibia, the former colony it refuses to relinquish, is against the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO); Pretoria also uses Namibia as a launching pad for its frequent incursions into Angola.

In 1981 Ariel Sharon, then Israeli defense minister, spent ten days with South African troops along the Angolan border in Namibia. At the same time the South African government began an "outreach program," inviting South African Zionist leaders to visit "the operational area" in Namibia. In 1983 concern arose that a 60-ton shipment of Israeli arms ostensibly for Zaire, an important military client of Israel's, had made its way instead to UNITA, the South African-supported anti-government forces in Angola. In the same year, an Israeli drone (pilotless surveillance) plane was shot down over Mozambique, another neighbor subject to South African attacks.

While Israel's defenders downplay figures for Israeli-South African trade, they are wildly profligate in their claims about Arab fuel in relation to South Africa's economy. According to Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, Arab oil shipments to South Africa were "about 20 times as great as Israel's entire trade," to that is, Arab governments were directly selling South Africa $2.2 billion worth of oil a year. Netanyahu cited information on specific oil shipments from South Africa Shipping Research Bureau in Amsterdam, established in 1980 to monitor shipments of oil to South Africa, information about the origin of those shipments from Lloyds in London and the assertions of a Norwegian foreign ministry undersecretary whose expertise on South Africa appears nowhere else in relevant literature.

In a telephone interview, a Shipping Research Bureau spokesman said that direct government-to-government oil contracts involving Arab governments amounted to one in the early '80s with the Saudi government and a recent one with the government of Oman. Kevin Dannaher, a specialist on South Africa, explained one way oil gets through the embargo. Sold to a legitimate trader, a load of oil departs for a stated destination—not South Africa. At sea the captain might be radioed (by whom it is not exactly clear) to unload part of the shipment in a
South African port. This, according to Dannaher, is called partial off-loading. He added that some entire shipments are sold at sea. Thus, it is dealers and operators in the demi-monde, not governments, which provide the oil that fuels apartheid.

The conditions under which Israel buys coal from South Africa are a good deal more telling.

Following the loss of its Iranian oil supply with the fall of the Shah in the late '70s, Israel moved heavily into coal-generated electricity. In 1979 South Africa's principal coal exporter, the Transvaal Coal Owners' Association, agreed to sell Israel up to one million tons a year. The following year the South African government agreed to increase that total, although it is not clear whether the increase amounted to the three million tons requested by Israel.27

Along with the coal deliveries came a South African promise to join Israel in a naval escort, if need be.28

The value of all these arrangements to South Africa has led it to grant Israel economic privileges it extends to no other country. Beginning in April 1979, with a $20 million cap, Pretoria, which had never before allowed another country to solicit South African capital, approved the sale of Israel bonds.29 That cap has since been raised several times; in 1984 South African capital provided 35 percent of all non-U.S. investment in the Israeli economy.30

Rules governing South African citizens' investment in Israel are more liberal than those governing their investment in any other country.31

Over the years the white minority government has directed its citizens' funds toward Israel's infrastructure— with a special focus on the military industries, railways, ports, power stations, housing, tourism, and sports-related projects—and toward ventures that would put the final manufacturing touches on South African products for export to Europe and the U.S.32

For its part Israel also has been nonrestrictive, in 1979 allowing South African companies to bid on construction contracts for a military base in the Negev.33

Almost immediately after Vorster's visit to Israel, a deliberate program to export South African products under Israeli labels to unsuspecting consumers began. In 1978 a widely distributed master's thesis by a South African business student outlined the opportunities such trade presented to South African firms. Seminars were held to acquaint businessmen with the opportunities for establishing joint ventures in Israel for the purpose of re-export.34

In 1979 one South African industrialist, Archie Hendler, whose joint venture in Israel manufactured kitchenware, noted that "the main reason for going into Israel is to gain access to the Common Market." Israel has associate status with the European Community and exports its nonagricultural products duty free. The same held true for Israel's most favored nation status with the U.S.35; since September 1985, with the implementation of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA), South African exporters could make long-term plans to exploit the vast U.S. market.

While almost no survey has yet determined which Israeli exports, now appearing in U.S. stores in steadily increasing quantity, are produced by South African companies, it is possible to say that all Israeli tin cans produced by九龙, a steel company jointly owned by the South African government and Koor, the giant conglomerate owned by the Histadrut labor federation, have South African content.36

On June 3, 1985 the South African publication Business Day announced that an Israeli businessman plans to act as a middleman in channeling South African exports to European and American markets. Entrepreneur Amnon Rotem said the SA Department of Trade and Industry was keen on the idea. He added: "The project is ambitious and it will require a large investment by the SA government... We intend to add value to SA goods and re-export them duty-free to the European and American markets."

In late November 1985 Joe Hallis, chairman of the South Africa-Israel Chamber of Commerce, said that between January and May of 1985 South African exports to Israel had increased "considerably in volume and by 53 percent in rand terms." Hallis also predicted that as Israel's economic austerity program bore fruit, "South African businessmen would be able to send more products to the country for finishing."37

On November 4, 1985, the state president of South Africa told the international press that a new system of "unconventional trade" was being instituted by Pretoria. Under this system, South African products would be routed through "other countries" before shipment to their ultimate destination. The BBC reported that South Africa had opened an office to carry out this unconventional trade.38

The announcement, coming only weeks after Western banks had refused to roll over loans to South Africa, reflected the white minority government's concern over its $24 billion dollar foreign debt, while its sources of capital and its opportunities to earn export income were withering away.

Only weeks before Botha went public with South Africa's long-standing practice, a Jerusalem Post reporter had noted that "the relatively high level of Israeli sales of semi-finished or nearly finished goods [exports] indicates that joint ventures and trans-shipments of goods to other countries may be taking place."39

This apparent increase in economic sleight of hand comes at a time when Israel has been granted unprecedented trade concessions by the United States. The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of September 1, 1985 eliminates tariffs on goods traded between the two countries, and continues the privileged access of Israeli manufacturers to U.S. markets under the general systems of preference (GSP). The FTA was prompted by fears that Israel's rising per capita gross national product would make it ineligible for tariff exemption under the GSP.40

During Congressional hearings, the AFL-CIO protested that the FTA would cost union jobs, but its opposition, along with the opposition of various agricultural associations, was brushed aside by a Congress eager to help the Israeli economy. Only 35 percent of a product's value need be added in Israel and there is no mechanism in place to monitor or enforce compliance.41
Two months before the apartheid government declared its present state of emergency, Stel Wertheimer, whose Iscar Blades machine tool company has a South African subsidiary, visited South Africa and urged support for the private sector there. The resulting increase in exports, said Wertheimer, "could stand isolation tactics on their heads." 62

Wertheimer is only one of many Israelis who have set up shop in South Africa. Another company, Afitra, owned by the Israeli labor federation, Histadrut, markets kibbutzim products in South Africa. The main focus, however, is on high technology. At least a dozen major Israeli companies have invested in South African operations. 43 Among them is the defense giant Tadiran, which built a South African military communications factory. 44

In 1978 it was reported that there were 5,000 Israeli expatriates at work in South Africa. 45 In 1981 South African recruitment focused on Israeli engineers, and specialists in electronics and computers. 46 Today there are 20,000 Israelis in South Africa. 47

Much of Israel's high technology has been absorbed over the years from the United States—through legitimate joint ventures set up by U.S. firms in Israel, technology transfers, mostly of weapons systems, purchased with U.S. aid, and through illegitimate activities. "It's been assumed for a long time that the Israelis were collecting everything over here that they could get their hands on," a State Department official told a journalist for Jewish and Israeli newspapers in the wake of the Jonathan Pollard affair (the naval intelligence officer caught spying for Israel). "If it involved Silicon Valley and trying to get some technology, that didn't really worry us all that much," stated the same official. 48 Israel's wealth of U.S. technology must now be of some concern to those campaigning to keep advanced equipment out of the hands of the white South African government.

One of the most salient, and, as it turned out, prescient, elements of the 1976 agreements was that Israel would help South Africa establish a modern electronics industry. 50 In 1977 three major Israeli electronics companies, Tadiran, Elbit and Israeli Aircraft Industries, "combined to help South Africa design and build its own electronics-manufacturing capability." 3 These companies also sold South Africa a variety of electronic and infra-red equipment with which it sealed off its borders to prevent passage in and out of insurgents. 51

Access to Israeli high technology is inestimably important to South Africans. South African investment in Israel, agreed to in 1980, was to be directed toward the development of Israel's solar, medical and electronics industries. 52

Israel and South Africa have held fourteen joint scientific symposiums, nine in Israel and five in South Africa. The last one was held at Ben Gurion University in the Negev. 53

In early 1985 a South African delegation concluded a visit to Israel by secretly signing yet another agreement with Tel Aviv for cooperation in science and technology. According to similar reports in Jane's Defense Weekly and the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, the "joint ventures and projects in high technology fields" stipulated by the contract were worth $5 million. The agreement was negotiated by the Israeli ministry of finance and trade and industry. It was then approved by the Israeli cabinet. 54

S. Kruger, director of the South African Department of Trade and Industry, noted in the fall of 1985 that "Israel could provide much of the high technology needed by South Africa." During his visit Kruger called for increased trade between the two countries. 55

A New Generation Of Military Cooperation

Just as Israeli technological achievements are permeated with technology absorbed from the U.S., where South Africa is concerned, it is pointless to try to separate "civilian" from military high tech. 56

In 1976 Vorster's visits to Israeli military installations and factories gave rise to reports that among the "joint projects to exploit Israeli manpower and South African raw materials," to be encouraged by the bilateral committee of cabinet officials established during the course of his visit, would be a new generation of military deals. 57 Israel had been selling arms to South Africa since the 1960's. South Africa undertook to finance the research and development of new Israeli weapons systems. 58 Thus began "a flow of South African capital to Israel's military industries." 59

On the first anniversary of Vorster's visit, South Africa had become Israel's single largest customer for weaponry. Israeli military deals with South Africa included six Reshet missile boats and six Dabur patrol boats (the latter built under license in Durban, with four more on the drawing board.) Both
types of craft were equipped with Gabriel ship-to-ship missiles (the Israeli half-price equivalent of the French exocet missile), as were patrol boats South Africa had obtained from Spain and West Germany.\textsuperscript{39}

Israel also equipped South African helicopters with state-of-the-art night vision equipment.\textsuperscript{50}

Israel soon began to provide a range of training to South African military personnel. Enough South African naval officers, for example, came to Israel to learn to operate the naval craft under construction there to warrant setting up an Afrikaners-language school for their children.\textsuperscript{51} And:

Senior army officers in Israel have confirmed that IDF [Israel Defense Forces] personnel have been seconded to all branches of the South African armed forces and according to senior sources in the Israeli defense establishment, there are currently some 300 active Israeli servicemen and women on secondment in South Africa. These include army, navy and air force personnel who help train the South Africans, border security experts who advise on improvements to restrict guerrilla activity, counterintelligence experts who have information relating to guerrilla activity worldwide and . . . defense scientists who co-operate on the development of new weapons systems. In addition, there are several hundred South Africans in Israel at any one time, being trained in weapons systems, battle strategy and counter-insurgency warfare.\textsuperscript{52}

In the face of all this Israel has doggedly insisted that it has honored the 1977 U.N. mandatory arms embargo (Resolution 418)—a claim buttressed by a paucity of available statistics. The extent, however, to which it has dishonored the embargo is revealing: in 1979 a South African daily noted “it is rumored that several local firms have an interest in the production in Israel of strategic goods which are exported to South Africa.”\textsuperscript{53}

In 1980 the Los Angeles Times reported that Israel and South Africa “have engaged in an increasingly active exchange of trade and technology in recent years. Much of it involves what could be considered security matters.” The paper noted widely reported findings by arms-sales research institutes that “South Africa is Israel’s biggest customer of weapons and military technology.”\textsuperscript{54} In 1982 the Christian Science Monitor called South Africa one of Israel’s three top customers.\textsuperscript{55} In 1983, when Israel’s arms sales were running about $1 billion a year, a British report ranked South Africa as Israel’s top customer. Argentina, which was fighting the British, was second.\textsuperscript{56}

And in one remarkable slip-up in the Israeli censor’s office, an Israeli state radio report in 1980 told listeners that the defense minister, Ezer Weizman, had gone on a “routine secret mission,” to South Africa, where he discussed “security matters.”\textsuperscript{57} Israeli censors

South African Prime Minister John Vorster, second from right, meets in Jerusalem with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, right, and Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres, second from left, during a four-day official visit in 1976.
hurriedly pulled the story.

In April 1984 the Jerusalem Post noted a report by SAPA, the South African government news agency, that "a visit to Israel [by President P.W. Botha] is likely, given what it described as the extent of the two countries' economic and military links. Botha, a former defense minister, is considered the architect of South Africa's arms production and sales program." 58

Last November a member of the Israeli Knesset, Mattiyahu Peled (Progressive List for Peace), charged in a press release that Israel intended to sell South Africa a "sophisticated Israeli-made electronic border fence." The release noted that on November 5 "a South African purchasing mission visited Israel and IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] soldiers demonstrated to it the operation of the Jordan Valley electronic border fence." 60

Also to be included in the list of post-embargo Israeli arms sales are aircraft, weapons and training to the pseudo-states, or "tribal homelands," especially to Ciskei. 70

Recently, Israel's most often cited Africa specialist, Prof. Naomi Chazan, told Le Monde that arms sales to South Africa comprise "only" 5 percent of Israel's total weapons sales abroad. 71 Using the figure of $1 billion, most frequently given for Israel's annual arms exports, would mean that Israel sells South Africa $50 million of hardware every year—certainly not a scrupulous adherence to the U.N. embargo.

A recent Tel Aviv University study puts Israel's arms sales to South Africa at about $300 million a year. The arms sales represent approximately 5,000 jobs for Israelis. 72

Israel's effort to hide this military commerce is respected by South Africa. "If we have to indulge in a certain amount of clandestine activity to fulfill our mandate, we will do so without hesitation," wrote the executive general manager of the state-owned Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) in the company's magazine SALVO. He went on to apologize that this secrecy thwarted the public's right to know how their tax monies were spent. 73

Founded in 1964 (the first U.N. arms embargo was in 1963), ARMSCOR's "mandate" was to obtain arms and to develop an arms industry that would replace imported weapons denied to South Africa. Israeli assistance—continuing up to the present time—has been instrumental in that task. The foremost specialist on Israel's relations with South Africa, James Adams, defense correspondent of the Sunday Times of London, says that over the years Israel's licensing of its weapons systems (patrol boats, missiles, the Galli assault rifle, for example) and its technical assistance have resulted in an integrated "joint arms industry." 74 The two countries reportedly have also pooled their resources on joint projects—a corvette, or "miniature aircraft carrier," a helicopter, and armor plating for tanks, claimed to be the most effective in the world. 75

Despite the fact that Pretoria now claims to be 95 percent self-sufficient in weapons production, another expert, national security analyst W. Andrew Terrill, believes it is important to keep the pressure on South Africa. By slowing the flow of technical data from the U.S. and its allies, there is some potential for reducing the quality (and hence export potential) of South African weapons. In particular, the U.S. must vigorously enforce its own embargo legislation as well as convince U.S. allies, such as Israel, of the inadvisability of cooperating with South Africa on military matters. 76 The U.S., however, has never been very eager to confront Israel on this score.

The recent unprecedented action by U.S. customs agents to block the export to Israel of chrome gun barrel technology does serve as a reminder of Israel's past collaboration with South Africa and an indication of the problem posed for the U.S. by Israel's military ties to Pretoria. The use of chromium in the gun barrel design is consistent with the 1976 agreements to trade South Africa's rare minerals for Israeli know-how, as is the likelihood that Israel would get its barrel steel from Pretoria. As with other such deals, South Africa would be able to buy gun barrels lined by this process from Israel or would be granted Israeli licenses to build them. Israel had made the purchase with its U.S. military assistance funds. 77

A decade ago, in defiance of the U.S. prohibition on arms sales to South Africa, Israeli operatives joined forces with renegade elements of the CIA to help Pretoria obtain from the U.S.-based and funded SCR Corporation the world's most advanced field artillery piece. Some shipments were routed through Israel, others cancelled as unrelated scandal rocked the government of Yitzhak Rabin. Not only did Pretoria receive 155mm howitzers and thousands of rounds of ammunition, but also blueprints, instructors, and assistance in obtaining machinery to go into production. 78 South Africa now holds the rights to this weapon, called "one of the most advanced artillery pieces in the world, capable of moving at 50mph along roads ... and of firing its 155mm gun within a minute of stopping and moving off again a minute later." 79

Reports have also been circulating since 1977 that Israel is helping South Africa build a modern jet fighter, which is one area where South Africa still needs an outside hand. 80 Since 1980 it has been said that the two countries would cooperate on the production of the Lavi. 81 For its own part, the U.S. Congress has bent over backwards to provide Israel with $1.3 billion for the development of this multi-role aircraft—$450 million of that to be spent in Israel, a concession that has never been allowed any other nation. 82

Unlike the Kfir, Israel, not the U.S., will produce the engine for the Lavi, and although financial difficulties require that other work on the plane be farmed out to U.S. firms, there has been neither a statement from the U.S. nor a challenge to Israel regarding its plans for exporting or relicensing production of the plane. Except for one airy assurance from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Steven Bryen, when pressed by Rep. Mervyn Dymally (D-CA) at a recent hearing, 83 no official assurance has been sought from Israel that South Africa would not have access to the Lavi or its blueprints. Just as likely South Africa will also be a silent partner in the recently announced U.S. program to jointly build submarines with Israel in the Haifa shipyards. 84
Partnership Extends To Nuclear Testing

Israel and South Africa tested a nuclear device on September 22, 1979. Details of that test—and of course of nuclear cooperation between the two countries—are a closely guarded secret.

The nuclear test itself was an outgrowth of numerous agreements concluded in 1976.86 By 1977, Israeli nuclear scientists were seen in South Africa.87

Reports of “an agreement on the development of nuclear weapons—with South Africa having the uranium and Israel the technique” appeared repeatedly in some of the world’s most cautious and conservative periodicals.88

Many observers said that Israel was implicated in a planned 1977 test that South Africa was pressured into calling off.89 There is no longer any question that Israel was the mentor in the 1979 test on board a ship in the South Atlantic. Current thinking has established that South Africa did not achieve a nuclear weapon of its own until 1980.90 When the weapon itself was fired from the 155mm howitzer Israel had helped South Africa obtain from the U.S.91

Despite all indications, “A U.N. study in 1980 on ‘Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa’ found no evidence to substantiate these allegations,” according to a pamphlet distributed by the Israeli Embassy in Washington. Instead, the pamphlet points out the “crimes” of France and China, in supplying reactor parts and enriched uranium to South Africa, then quickly jumps to the putative danger of “Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weapon capability.”92

Irregardless, on December 13, 1984, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 39/72 C, entitled Relations between Israel and South Africa, which:

Reiterated that the increasing collaboration by Israel with the racist regime of South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields, in defiance of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council is a serious hindrance to international action for the eradication of apartheid . . . and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.93

An investigation, undertaken by the Carter Administration in 1980, after CIA reports indicated that “Israel was the most likely author,”94 was quickly abandoned for political considerations. This cover-up, discussed in a second investigation, released as a report in May 1985 by Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), was written by Howard University Professor Ronald Walters. Based on documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the report criticized the abandonment by the White House of the initial investigation and presented new evidence that the 1979 test did occur, called for the investigation to be reopened under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and took Congress to task for never having held a hearing on the matter.95

Hearings on the implications of the Walters report promised to Rep. Conyers—who was very careful not to name the country implicated in Pretoria’s nuclear weapons program when he sought an amendment to the foreign aid bill to cut aid to nations that contribute to South Africa’s nuclear capability—in June 1985 have yet to take place.96

This is indeed ironic, given the near obsession with purported Pakistani-Chinese nuclear cooperation, which blocked for over a year the signing of a nuclear energy accord with China. That campaign—led by Sen. Alan Cranston (D-CA), a paramount “friend” of Israel—was based on “evidence” provided by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, and imparted by the Israeli Embassy to Cranston. U.S. intelligence sources have twice dis- counted its accuracy, calling such “broad intelligence assessments from Israel biased and, in one official’s words, ‘highly tinged’ to advance Israeli policy.”97

When asked about the Walters report, the Defense Department said it saw no reason to change the “official 1980 U.S. verdict that the case for a bomb test had not been proved.”98

Only one grassroots organization to date has felt itself strong enough to speak up on the “apartheid bomb.” That exception is the Washington Office on Africa, whose director at the time, Kenneth Zinn, did the research for the Walters report. “A bomb is a bomb,” Zinn said.99

In May 1985, while Congress was retreating from the Walters report, news broke that Israel had smuggled 800 krytrons—sensitive devices primarily intended for detonating nuclear weapons—from the U.S. In the call for Israel to account for the smuggled device, no one wondered whether any had been passed on to South Africa. No one checked too closely into the previous activities of Israeli movie mogul and arms dealer Arnon Milchan, whose Hell company acted as a front for the operation.100 Yet several years ago two reporters specializing in Israel’s Mossad identified Milchan as a “millionaire arms dealer” with possible Mossad connections, and, in an article in the London-based magazine Mideast, detailed several instances in which Milchan acted in concert with the South African government. Milchan, according to the article, had “organized the diversion of a substantial shipment of Italian submachine guns from Israel to South Africa.” Reportedly, Milchan’s partner in that project was the South African Secretary of the Department of Information, Eschel Rhodie.101 Rhodie’s name is familiar from the Muldenwarf affair of the early 80’s when South Africa set up a secret slush fund to influence public opinion in the Western world.

Yet no one speculated on a possible connection between the krytrons and South Africa’s deliberate revelation in September that it had the ability to build two nuclear weapons a year.102
Israeli Policies Produce Increasing Dissension

Organizations fighting apartheid have begun to focus their members' attention on Namibia, which the United Nations has unsuccessfully ordered South Africa to relinquish. In November 1984 the Israeli ambassador to Pretoria, Eliahu Lakin, went to Namibia and indicated that Israel would be willing to engage in development activities in Namibia before South Africa granted its former colony independence. 103

In April 1985 high-level Namibian representatives went to Israel to investigate "agriculture, water management and water supply, community development and regional planning." 104

In the meantime, efforts are underway in Congress to enforce U.N. Decree No. 1, barring exploitation of Namibian natural resources—uranium and other minerals, all coveted by South Africa. In 1985 Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) introduced HR 2589 intended to forbid U.S. corporations from exploiting Namibian natural resources. 105

In a larger sense, U.S. policy toward Israel imposes limitations on U.S. policy toward South Africa. There are striking similarities between U.S. policy toward Israel and the Reagan Administration's policy of constructive engagement toward South Africa. Constructive engagement was the Administration's euphemism for its opposition to sanctions against South Africa. Six years ago—during a Democratic Administration—one of Israel's supporters wrote:

The United States and its NATO allies, in recent years, have not been able to separate clearly the pressures put upon them by black Africa and the Arab states with respect to the internal policies of South Africa and Israel from the external, geopolitical situation now operative in the Middle East and Southern Africa. Even if they are correct in the conviction that Israel must yield control over the West Bank to some form of Palestinian nationalism and that South Africa must devise a method of sharing power with the blacks, there is no justification for policies which isolate and weaken these two countries to the detriment of vital Western interests. 106

In interviews, several persons involved in the campaign against apartheid have remarked that the U.S. government will never impose meaningful sanctions on South Africa because of the precedent that would set for applying pressure on Israel.

Apologists for Israel's relations with South Africa present a number of political justifications, mostly directed at blacks, who have been at the forefront of the anti-apartheid movement. During the past year the anti-apartheid campaign for many black activists has been a primary political focus, with the campaign of Jesse Jackson for the Democratic Presidential nomination as its historical antecedent. The Jackson campaign was a particularly bruising episode for blacks, as well as other minorities and disadvantaged groups aligning with them. Jackson found himself the target of pro-Israeli Jews, disturbed by his clearly articulated dissent from the longstanding Democratic party position of uncritical support of Israel.

While Jews and blacks have traditionally relied on the Democratic party as a vehicle for their political platforms, a recent survey conducted by the World Jewish Congress among members of

On November 27, 1985, anti-apartheid protesters marched to South African Embassy in Washington, D.C., to commemorate one year of demonstrations and arrests. Carrying the sign, from left, are: Eleanor Smeal, NOW president; Roger Wilkins, former assistant U.S. attorney general; Episcopal Bishop John Walker; Silvia Hill, co-chairperson, Free South Africa Movement; Coretta Scott King; Walter Fauntroy, D.C. district delegate; Mary Berry, Civil Rights Commission; Randall Robinson, co-chairperson, Free South Africa Movement; D.C. Mayor Marion Barry; Rev. Jesse Jackson.
the Congressional Black Caucus suggests that those platforms are no longer synonymous. Survey findings indicated that the legislators and their constituents regarded Israel as a leading trading partner of South Africa.107

Conversations with a number of black leaders confirm that Israel’s links with South Africa are an issue of deep concern and one deeply intertwined with attempts of a minority coalition led by blacks to set a domestic political agenda. Thus, black perceptions of and attitudes toward the ties between Tel Aviv and Pretoria are by no means peripheral issues in U.S. politics.

At the Congressional level, a press release issued by Rep. George Crockett (D-MI), after visiting the Israeli-occupied West Bank, compared the living conditions there with those of South African blacks and concluded that the West Bank was an instance of apartheid that no one in the U.S. was talking about.108

In the past two years Israel and South Africa have both shown inordinate willingness to suffer the consequences of their intransigent policies, South Africa in terms of political and economic isolation, Israel in the economic culmination of years of high military spending.

Both have engaged in repeated external aggression. The attacks of both Israel and South Africa upon their neighbors have enabled them to postpone the day of domestic reckoning. South Africa with the majority black population, Israel with the Palestinians and the social-political divisions among its Jewish population.

It is interesting that South Africa’s foreign minister announced on January 7 that South Africa would begin to apply “the Israeli solution,” the no-holds-barred policy of attacking neighbors on the pretext that they harbor the “terrorists,” who carry out insurgent attacks. (International law recognizes the right of resistance of both Palestinians under occupation and blacks under apartheid.)

And what is “the Israeli solution”? Shlomo Gazit, formerly head of Israeli military intelligence, put it this way: “Israel is in a state of war, and has been for the last 36 years. We are under tremendous pressure. We can’t allow ourselves the luxury of refusing cooperation, of receiving political, economic and scientific help or support from any party that could be of assistance to us. If cooperation with SA helps Israel, I’m for it.”109

Recently an article in the U.S. press noted that:

Pretoria and Jerusalem have formed an alliance of pragmatism, Realpolitik in action. Neither side is particularly fond of the other. But for their own political and material needs they have moved into a close almost symbiotic relationship.”110

The quality of that relationship is reflected in other ways. In August, when repression in South Africa reached its highest level to date, the Israeli government announced that it would aid KwaZulu, one of the South African bantustans. The promise came during a visit to Israel by Gatsha Buthelezi, hereditary chief of the Zulu nation and chief minister of KwaZulu, the bantustan to which South Africa, under its “separate development” statutes, has assigned the Zulus, the largest ethnic grouping in South Africa.111

This move is especially significant because the decision came from the government of a Labor prime minister and thus brought the Israeli Labor party into a previous domain of the political right, with a number of leading Likud bloc politicians investing in and promoting the bantustans.112

Buthelezi, whose tribalistic Inkatha organization has attacked and killed blacks attending funerals and protests in the Durban area, around which the scattered parcels of KwaZulu bantustan are located, and who has had “private contacts” with the ultra-rightist Afrikaner Broederbond, is a great favorite with Moral Majority head Jerry Falwell. Buthelezi calls for “reforms” to the apartheid system that stop short of universal suffrage; he would give whites the “reassurance” of a veto. The Israeli labor federation, Histadrut, reportedly has offered training and support to trade unions affiliated with Buthelezi’s Inkatha organization.113

Another indication of the ties between the two governments comes from the tourism industry, which has grown steadily since the late 70s, when their respective national airlines, El Al and South African Airways, signed a reciprocal agreement115 and South Africa became the first government to establish a tourist office in Israel.116 In December the Israeli press noted that while overall tourism to South Africa had declined by 50 percent (the greatest dip occurring after June 1985), Israeli tourism to the apartheid state had risen by 7 percent, reflecting a total for the year of 11,615 Israeli tourists. This increase came on top of a 50 percent rise in Israeli tourism to South Africa since 1981.117 In 1985 Israeli travel to the U.S. had plummeted by 35 percent, to Europe by 25 percent and to Asia by 60 percent. Israel has also been able to provide the sports and cultural contacts, so important to white South Africans.118

While Israel’s defenders don’t try to explain away these affinities, they go on the offensive: “It is unfortunate, but Israel’s enemies are now using the struggle against apartheid as a pretext for attacks on the Jewish state.”119

A particularly cynical appeal, identifying Arabs as the main promulgators of slavery has also been directed at blacks. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on October 31, 1985, Israel’s U.N. Ambassador argued that Jews have always been against slavery, while Arabs had been until modern times involved in the slave trade in Africa. Conveniently ignored by Ambassador Netanyahu was the participation of Jews, along with other Europeans in the financing, transporting, importing, breeding, marketing and owning of slaves during that same period. “The false accusation about Israel’s support for apartheid is not merely an ordinary trampling upon the truth, for it is propagated by the worst offenders against the rights of the blacks in the history of the world,” he declared.120

It is true that the Jews of South Africa are threatened: Jewish merchants have been boycotted along with other white businesses; Jews are as likely as any other South African whites to die as a “soft white target” of the rising insurgency in the country; a strong strain of Nazism has always been present
in Afrikaner politics. As for this last threat, the reasoning is advanced that should Israel offend South Africa, South African Jews will become easy targets for Afrikaner revenge. 121 It is a weak case at best. Israel's support over the last decade for the Afrikans-dominated ruling National Party has if anything strengthened this threat to the Jews. Allowing Prime Minister Vorster, imprisoned by the British during World War II for collaborating with the Axis, to lay a wreath during his 1976 visit at Yad Vashem, memorial for the six million Jews slaughtered by Hitler during that war, did not arouse a great deal of concern. Nor was there mounting anxiety when the wreath-laying routine was repeated in 1984 by the visiting South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha. 122 Many South African Jews were appalled by Israel's cordial reception of Premier Vorster and critical of the closer bonds between Tel Aviv and Pretoria which grew out of that visit. At the time a South African reporter noted that "there are South African Whites of Liberal persuasion, whether Jewish or non-Jewish, who . . . are stunned by Israel giving apartheid South Africa a degree of acceptance, for whatever reason, which no other country in the world has up to now been willing to do." 123 

Within South Africa are 110,000 Jews, who are spread across the political spectrum from the African National Congress to the ruling National party. Israel's major interest in them, now that South Africa seems so close to all-out civil war, is their immigration to Israel. Prime Minister Shimon Peres has said that Israel values their donations - per capita, South African Jews donate three times more than American Jews donate to Israel. 124 But Peres values their immigration to Israel even more, 125 as evidenced last June when Israeli recruiters were in South Africa encouraging contributions and settlers for "Gallilee South Africa," three South African outpost-settlements in the northern Gallilee region. 126

In international politics, unwavering U.S. support for Israel often excludes the U.S. from action against apartheid. As it had on similar occasions since 1977, the U.S. boycotted the 1983 U.N. World Conference to Combat Racism because of Israeli objections to the U.N. resolution equating Zionism and Racism. Held in Geneva, the conference's final declaration condemned Israel's intensified cooperation with South Africa. 127

At the time of Vorster's 1976 visit to Israel, the Netherlands officially expressed concern, and privately warned Israel "that the visit would complicate the efforts of Israel's friends abroad to persuade the world that there is no connection between Zionism and racism." 128 The relationship was "the center of discussions," at a late 1984 meeting of the Socialist International attended by Prime Minister Peres, according to a report in Israel's leading daily Ha'aretz. The report also noted that "recently Israel has been denounced in many international conferences for its relations with South Africa." 129

In the past year Nigeria has cited Israel's ties with South Africa as being the major impediment to a renewal of diplomatic ties. According to Nigeria state radio "the vital factor is the overwhelming evidence of Israeli military, nuclear and economic collaboration with the racist regime in South Africa." 130 Ghana has expressed a similar sentiment along with a reluctance to break solidarity with the Organization of African Unity, whose 1973 resolution called for the severing of diplomatic links with Israel. 131 Among the 108 member states of the United Nations voting in favor of the most recent resolution (this is the one mentioned above) against Israel's relations with South Africa were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Greece, Guinea, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela. And Arab and Islamic and socialist governments.

The 1984 resolution reaffirmed all the previous resolutions on Israeli-South African relations. This was the only General Assembly resolution concerning South Africa on which Israel cast a vote - a negative one - in 1984. In none of the other resolutions is Israel recorded even as an abstention. 132

As has been shown, there is not a single area of possible action against South Africa - economic sanctions, deprivation of military goods and high technology, the bomb, participation in international forums, and policy toward the Frontline States - in which Israel's priorities do not intrude on U.S. policymaking options. Against this resides the notion that the "great powers" should defang the apartheid government of South Africa, suggested by Israel's Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and echoed by Theodore Mann, president of the American Jewish Congress - "The United States, as the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world, can afford to take the lead . . . It is not fair to ask Israel, boycotted by so many nations and in deep economic trouble from the day she was born, to adopt a policy that even America will not adopt." 133

The United Nations, the citizens and governments of dozens of nations, and with them the citizens of the United States, have spoken resoundingly about the need to force the minority government in Pretoria either to negotiate the future of South Africa or give way. Are the concerns of Israel so overriding that the United States, the giant among nations, is stymied?

Notes

5. Jonathan Broder, "Israel grows sensitive over links to South Africa," Chicago Tribune, April 2, 1977. A note at the bottom of this report, written from Tel Aviv, says "the above dispatch was subjected to Israeli censorship."


8. Financial Mail (Johannesburg), September 14, 1979 in "Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa—Special report of the Special Committee against Apartheid on recent developments in the relations between Israel and South Africa." General Assembly 34th session—Agenda item 28, A/34/22/Add.1, S/13956/Add.1, November 2, 1979, p. 5. Hereafter "Policies of Apartheid ...


29. South African Digest, April 20, 1979 in "Policies of Apartheid ...


32. This article, op. cit., p. 17; Israel. A survey, op. cit., p. 41.


38. BBC World Service. 0500 and 0603 GMT, November 4, 1985, monitored on KKLR-AM, San Francisco.

39. Joseph Morgensztern, "Partners in trade," Jerusalem Post, October 10, 1985; this article is on Israeli trade with West Germany.


41. Halpern, op. cit. See also Proposed United States-Israel Free Trade Area, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, May 22 and June 13, 14, 1984, Serial 98-72, passim.


48. Among these are Control Data, Motorola, Gerber Scientific, and until recently GTE, Ignacio Klich, "Israel Arms: The New Carve-Up," South, April 1982.


50. Broder, op. cit.


52. "Israel and S. Africa tighten trade ties," op. cit.


56. Thomas Conrad, "Holes in the Anti-Apartheid Embargo," New York Times, November 11, 1985. This op ed piece by the author of Automating Apartheid makes the point that even "computers sold to a South African "slopetafe factory" will "wind up in a machine gun plant."


58. Brynbenach, op. cit.

59. Broder, op. cit.; many other reports op. cit., for example.

60. Farrell, op. cit.

61. Broder, op. cit.


63. Israeli supplement to Financial Mail, September 14, 1979, in "Policies of Apartheid ...


Book Views

Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of Palestinians 1876-1948
By Walid Khalidi
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984, 351 pp., $60.00 ($27.00 paperback)

Reviewed by Dr. Henry C. Fischer

Walid Khalidi’s photographic portrayal of the Palestinians inevitably invites comparison with that of Graham-Brown, published in 1980 and reviewed in the first issue of last year’s Link. The most obvious difference is that it is bigger; there are more photographs (474 as compared with 247); the format is larger; and there is a more elaborate series of maps (six in all, and all in color), which graphically chart the accelerating incursion of Zionism. The new book also extends two years farther in time, to the end of the British Mandate. Although the pictures cover similar topics, there are remarkably few cases of reduplication (nos. 79, 242, 243b, 263, 336, 338), and Khalidi, drawing on the archives of the Institute of Palestine Studies, is much less dependent on European sources. Coverage of towns, cities and buildings is more extensive. Rural workers and villagers are represented in all their diversity and, while the small but distinctive population of Bedouin are given less than their due, the educated sector is very much in evidence. The group-pictures of school classes, committees, delegations and families may seem a little tedious to some, but they effectively attest the existence of a very responsible society. This point is underscored by the list of signatories of the Memorandum Submitted by Arab Senior Government Officials of June 30th, 1936, to the British High Commissioner (no. 250b-g). It shows “both the range of Palestinian professional talent already in public service in the mid-1930’s, and the extent to which the Palestine national movement had crystallized since then.” The same kind of documentation is also provided for books (no. 241a-p), ranging from an Arabic translation of “The Odyssey” to tracts on chemistry, politics and trade unions. A series of advertisements (no. 242 a-q) similarly supplements views of trades and industry, including some items not otherwise represented, such as “The Eastern Bus Factory,” makers of bodies for buses and trucks, and “The Palestine Iron and Brass Foundry,” which manufactured equipment such as irrigation pumps, stone crushers, and flour mills. Banking is also represented here and in no. 241p as is printing (342d and much of the 241 series). On the other hand Filastin is mentioned only in passing, in reference to two caricatures (243b,c), whereas Graham-Brown illustrates the front page of this Jaffa newspaper, initially biweekly, and eventually a daily (page 165).

In respect to agriculture Khalidi points out that, even at the end of the Mandate, the land under cultivation by Palestinian farmers (excepting citrus) was about 93 percent of the total. In the desert cultivation of the Negev the proportion was 99 percent: “Thus it was the Palestinians who made the desert bloom!” Palestinian livestock represented more than 93 percent of the total. Only in citrus production, which had long been a specialty of the Palestinians (and notably the Jaffa orange) was Zionist production nearly the same.

As an example of the way the new book sometimes brings the reader closer to the subject, one may compare the views of “punitive destruction” of Arab buildings, which, in Graham-Brown’s book, are puffs of smoke, photographed at a safe distance by one of the British officers responsible for them (p. 177). Khalidi shows the effects of the demolition at short range (nos. 258, 262, 283).

In contrast to the more sociological approach of the earlier book, the newer one, as its title indicates, emphasizes historical sequence. The material is divided into five chronological sections, each of them subdivided by topics. “Political and Public Events” or “Political Developments” is the most recurrent theme, while most of the other topics occur at least twice, including rural life and the countryside, urban and religious life, towns, and trades and industries. People are portrayed under various categories; the most memorable picture of this kind (351) shows a family of the fateful village of Deir Yassin, dated 1927.

Each of the five sections is headed by an introduction and a chronology of events. The initial introduction is particularly forceful, describing the roots of the Palestinian community and the profound significance of Palestine for Islam. Jerusalem was given the Arabic name of al-Bait al-Muqaddas, “the Holy House” (now al-Quds, “the Holy”), and the mosque that crowns the old city “is the earliest surviving Muslim monument anywhere.” Khalidi emphasizes that, until the advent of Zionism, “relations between Palestinians and Jews were stable and peaceful, mellowed by more than a millennium of coexistence and often shared adversity”; behind this tolerance lay “the reverence held by Islam for the Hebrew prophets, enhanced, in the case of Palestine, by the tradition of pilgrimage to biblical sites.”

It will be clear from the foregoing remarks that I believe Khalidi’s book represents the Palestinians, and their plight, more fully and dramatically than its predecessor. But it must be said that if the pictures of Graham-Brown’s book are outdone in this one, her text, with its emphasis on the lives and problems of villagers, is still worth reading.

Dr. Fischer is Research Curator in Egyptology at the New York City Metropolitan Museum of Art.
New Selections


□ George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon, Washington: Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984, 158 pp., $7.95. The former Undersecretary of State analyzes the confused American Middle East policy that took shape during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and continued, in changing form, until the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Beirut. Our price, $5.95.


□ Isaac Diks, A Bedouin Boyhood, New York: Universe Books, 1983, 176 pp., $10.40. A vivid portrait of a vanishing and misunderstood culture by a man who began his life as a Palestinian Bedouin at the edge of the Negev Desert. Diks relates colorfully such events as weddings, Bedouin legal proceedings, and Ramadan festivities. A gifted storyteller, Diks can also weave the routine of the daily life of his semi-sedentary tribe into unforgettable episodes, and contrast those peaceful times with the shock of 1948 and the exile of his people from their land. Our price, $7.00.

□ Paul Findlay, They Dare To Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby, Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1985, 362 pp., $16.95. The former eleven-term Congressman from Illinois, through documentation and case studies, shows how Americans are victimized for putting their own country's interest before Israel's, and how coordinated efforts are made throughout the country to control open debate on Middle East issues. Our price, $9.95.


□ Peter Galbrer, Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events, Boulder: Westview Press, 1983, 139 pp., $12.95. The author describes and analyzes Jordan's unique role in the Middle East, and focuses on its attempts, and successes, at developing its economy and society in the face of a dearth of natural resources and a large influx of refugees. Our price, $7.50.

□ Y. Haddad, B. Haines, and E. Findly, eds., The Islamic Impact, Syracuse University Press, 1984, 264 pp., $12.95. Ten noted authors analyze the manner in which Muslims in the past have attempted to nurture, synthesize and implement the prescriptions of their faith in fashioning their world, and current efforts to recuperate the impetus and dynamism of Islam to create a new Islamic civilization. Informative texts on Islamic music, law, mysticism and other subjects are neither esoteric nor opaque technically. Our price, $7.00.

□ Alan Hart, Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, American Edition, 1985, 501 pp., $19.95. Written by a journalist familiar with both Palestinian and Israeli leadership, this biography permits Arafat and senior PLO colleagues to give their side of the story. Author challenges many popular notions and concludes that "no leader has done more than Arafat to prepare the ground for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict." Our price, $12.00.


□ Ammon Kapelouk, Sabra and Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre, Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1983, 89 pp., $5.95. Document of the massacre which has come to symbolize the total horror of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Our price, $4.00.


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