Roots of Zionism

In 1894, Alfred Dreyfus, a French-Jewish army officer, was sentenced to perpetual deportation and military degradation for selling military secrets to the Germans. Two years later, the chief of French army intelligence, Col. George Picquart, himself an anti-Semite, concluded that another officer, not Dreyfus, was the traitor.

The army ignored the evidence.

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John F. Mahoney
Executive Director
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Then, in 1898, the novelist Émile Zola published his "J'accuse!" the story of the army's cover-up. After an arduous series of legal challenges that inflamed French public opinion and deeply divided the Republic, Dreyfus was pardoned in 1899, exonerated in 1906 and returned to the army, where he eventually rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel and was named Officer in the Legion of Honor.

During this period, Alfred Dreyfus came to symbolize for many French the supposed disloyalty of French Jews. On the 100th anniversary of Zola's article, France's Catholic daily, La Croix, apologized for its anti-Semitic editorials during the Dreyfus affair. The case, however, had a ripple effect that went well beyond the French.

This was because of Theodor Herzl, a Paris-based correspondent for an Austrian newspaper. Up until the Dreyfus trial, Herzl, who was born in Budapest in 1860, felt, as did most European Jewish intellectuals, that the best course for Jews lay in assimilation, based on the liberal nationalism of the French Revolution, where the individual citizen is central, where the state is constituted by its citizens, and where all citizens stand equal before the law. The anti-Jewish attacks Herzl observed during the Dreyfus Affair were among the experiences that brought home to him the power of anti-Semitism even in such an enlightened democracy as France.

One alternative to liberal nationalism was racial nationalism. With its roots in German Romanticism, racial nationalism held that each state belongs to a particular ethnic nation, and that this national group occupies a privileged position in the state. Herzl concluded that authentic communities were formed not by legal bonds but by organic, mystical ties that precede and transcend the political. The "problem" for Jews, said Herzl, was that they "had completely lost their feeling of solidarity as a race;" the solution was for them to carve out a state, which they would own, and which would override the interests of its non-Jewish population.

Racial nationalism infused both Nazism and Zionism. As Norman Finkelstein pointed out in his Dec. 1992 Link article, the only Jews for whom Hitler reserved any praise in "Mein Kampf" were the Zionists. The Nazis saw Germans and Jews as two different ethnic and racially-based nations and, on this basis, first encouraged the Jews to leave Germany to found their own state, then later sought to exterminate them. This ideological convergence of interests was bemoaned by American Jews in "The Congress Bulletin" of the American Jewish Congress in 1936:

Hitlerism is Satan's nationalism. The determina-

tion to rid the German national body of the Jewish element, however, led Hitlerism to discover its 'kinship' with Zionism, the Jewish nationalism of liberation. Therefore Zionism became the only other flag permitted to fly in Nazi-land. It was a painful distinction for Zionism to be singled out for favors and privileges by its Satanic counterpart.

Initially Herzl, who was personally indifferent to religion, had not thought of Palestine as the new state of the Jews. First he considered Argentina; then the Sinai peninsula and al-Arish; then he asked the British for Cyprus; then asked Portugal for a piece of Mozambique; then asked the Belgians for the Congo; then asked the king of Italy for Tripolitania—only to be rebuffed by the king with the simple reminder that Tripolitania "is the home of others!" Finally, the British offered him Uganda. When he proposed this to the Fifth Zionist Congress in 1903, 295 delegates voted in favor, 177 against. The rejectionists wanted Palestine, which, at the time, was part of the Ottoman empire. Herzl sided with the rejectionists.

The evolution of Zionism from an improbable movement at the start of the 20th-century—Hitler scoffed at the idea it would ever succeed—to a member state of the United Nations in 78 percent of Mandated Palestine, with its military occupying the remaining 22 percent, is indeed the product of a remarkable sequence of historical events.

The Strategy

The key to this achievement, as Herzl and later his successor, Chaim Weizmann, realized, was to enlist the support of a world power.

By 1914, the British estimated the population of Palestine at 689,272, of whom no more than 60,000 or 9 percent were Jews. The goal of the Zionist hardliners, whose views became dominant, was to usurp the land from its rightful owners, while ingathering all Jews worldwide into the new Jewish nation. As Joseph Weitz, the administrator responsible for the colonization of Palestine put it: "Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both people together in this country...The only solution is a Palestine...without Arabs. And there is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries, to transfer all of them; not one village, not one tribe, should be left."

To do this would require sufficient military force and a strong international backer to validate the colonization process.

In 1904, the Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann, moved to England because he felt that Great Britain, of all the
great powers, was most likely to provide support for Zionism. Weizmann was a chemist and, when WW I broke out, he offered his expertise in support of the British war effort.

By August 1914, the line-up for World War I was in place: the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria) versus the Allied Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Serbia, Belgium). The Zionists calculated that the Allies would win, the Ottoman empire would be dismembered, and Britain would receive the Mandate for Palestine. The Zionists wanted Britain to promise them “a national home” in Palestine. But what could they offer the British in return?

What the British wanted was for the United States to join the war on their side.

So, in 1916, the World Zionist Organization attempted to establish linkages with the British War Cabinet. In return for Zionist promises to pressure Jews in Austria, Germany, Hungary and the United States to support the Allied war effort, members of the British cabinet began to look favorably on Zionist political aspirations in Palestine. Samuel Landman, the personal secretary to Chaim Weizmann, may have overstated Zionist influence in the U.S., when he wrote:

The only way…to induce the American President to come into the War was to secure the cooperation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favor of the Allies on a quid pro quo contract basis.2

The United States entered the war in 1917 and later that year—before the war had ended, and before Britain had control over Palestine—the British cabinet approved a letter written by Lord Alfred Balfour, the British Foreign Minister (although most of it was written by Zionist negotiators), and addressed to Lord Baron Rothschild, a leading British Zionist leader. The letter stated that “His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” and added “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”

In 1919, Weizmann told a London audience that the Balfour Declaration “is the key which unlocks the doors of Palestine.”3 And as for the “non-Jews” who composed 91 percent of Palestine, Lord Balfour had this to say: “Zionism…is…of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.”4

By 1948, due to years of immigration, the Jewish population of Palestine had jumped to 33 percent, although Jewish ownership of land was just over 6 percent. Alarmed, Palestinians had carried out a revolt from 1936 to 1939 that was brutally put down by the British.

Between 1945-47, the British sought to find a peaceful settlement to the Palestine problem, promising the Arabs to limit further Jewish immigration. But they were stymied by acts of Jewish terrorism, most notably the bombing of the King David Hotel, and by pressure from the Truman Administration, which threatened to withhold postwar aid from Britain if it did not allow the immediate immigration into Palestine of 100,000 Jews.

President Truman, at first, had petitioned the U.S. Congress to allow 100,000 stateless Jews into the United States, but American Zionists made it known to Congress that these Jews should settle in their new “homeland.” Delegates to the 1944 Democratic Convention even adopted a resolution favoring “the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization” and the establishment of a “free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth.” Republicans, not to be outdone, called for “the opening of Palestine to…unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 …Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic Commonwealth.”5 No mention was made by either party of the indigenous habitants.

In the 1946 congressional elections Republicans won strong majorities in both houses of Congress. Truman complained that if more Jews had voted Democratic he would have been able to do more for them.6

In May 1947, the British, frustrated, gave notice that it planned to surrender its mandate in one year’s time. The onus then shifted to the United Nations to determine who should govern Palestine once the British left. The choices came down to partitioning the land into two nations, the position favored by the Zionists, or keeping it intact with an Arab majority, the position of the Arab countries. The U.N. created a commission of inquiry composed of 11 states, not one of which was Arab or African, which recommended partition.

By the fall of 1947, in his bid for reelection, Truman was running in the polls anywhere from 5 to 15 percent behind Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York. The president knew he needed every vote he could get and that the Jewish-American population, particularly in the delegate-rich states of New York, Pennsylvania, and California,
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could make the difference. His problem was that, on the one hand, virtually every senior official in his Department of State, the War Department, and the Joint Chiefs was against partition while, on the other hand, the White House was being barraged by pro-partition voices. Truman later complained: “I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favorable votes in the General Assembly.”7

Be that as it may, the columnist Drew Pearson reported in the Chicago Daily Tribune of Feb. 9, 1948, that “President Truman cracked down harder on his State Department than ever before to swing the United Nations’ vote for the partition of Palestine. Truman called Acting Secretary Lovett over to the White House on Wednesday and again on Friday warning him he would demand a full explanation if nations which usually line up with the United States failed to do so on Palestine.”

And the fact is that, with or without Truman’s knowledge, smaller countries were pressured into changing their votes in favor of partition. Congressman Lawrence Smith, addressing the Congress on December 18, 1947, recounted what happened:

Let’s take a look at the record, Mr. Speaker, and see what happened in the United Nations’ Assembly meeting prior to the vote on partition. A two-thirds majority was required to pass the resolution. On two occasions the Assembly was to vote, and twice it was postponed...In the meantime, it is reliably reported that intense pressure was applied to the delegates of three small nations by the United States’ member, and also by officials at the highest levels in Washington. The decisive votes for partition were cast by Haiti, Liberia, and the Philippines. These votes were sufficient to make the two-thirds majority. Previously, these countries opposed the move.

Abba Eban, the former Israeli foreign minister, recounted how, on the opening day of the U.N. session on partition, the delegate from the Philippines had declared: “The issue is whether the United Nations should accept responsibility for the enforcement of a policy which is clearly repugnant to the valid nationalist aspirations of the people of Palestine. The Philippines Government holds that the United Nations has the right not to accept such responsibility.” Then, the Philippine ambassador spoke by telephone to his president, Manuel Roxas, and told him of the pressure he was under. Congressman Sol Bloom, a Zionist and chairman of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, had intervened on behalf of partition, as had 26 pro-Zionist U.S. senators in a joint telegram; the ambassador advised that it would be foolish to vote against a policy so ardently desired by the U.S. government at a time when seven bills were pending in Congress in which the islands had a tremendous stake.9

The senatorial telegram was also sent to 12 other U.N delegations, four of whom would change their votes from no to yes and seven from no to abstain.

Summer Welles, former undersecretary of state, wrote: “By direct order of the White House every form of pressure, direct and indirect, was brought to bear by American officials upon those countries outside of the Muslim world that were known to be either uncertain or opposed to partition. Representatives or intermediaries were employed by the White House to make sure that the necessary majority would at length be secured.”9 And Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett noted that “never in his life had he been subjected to as much pressure as he had in three days beginning Thursday morning and ending Saturday night.”10

Alfred Lilienthal, in his monumental work “The Zionist Connection,” reports on “Operation Partition,” the effort of Zionists to influence foreign chancelleries. The three American “masterminds,” according to Lilienthal, were New York’s Judge Joseph Proskauer, Washington economist Robert Nathan, and White House Assistant “for minority affairs” David Niles.11

Robert Nathan targeted Liberia by telling its delegate that he would go after his good friend, Edward R. Stettinius, Truman’s first secretary of state, who at the time had enormous business interests in Liberia. (The Liberian diplomat actually reported this attempted intimidation to the Department of State.) And Harvey Firestone, of Firestone Tire, with his vast rubber concession in Liberia, sent a message to its representative, directing him to pressure the Liberian Government to vote for partition. In the end, Liberia did.
Lilienthal reports that various South American delegates were also told that their vote for partition would greatly increase the chances of a Pan-American Road project.

Bernard Baruch was persuaded to talk to the French, who could not afford to lose their postwar Marshall Plan aid. And Adolph Berle, legal advisor to the Haitian government, made a call to Haiti's president.

Bribes, too, were used. Robert Donovan, in his "Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948," reported that one Latin American delegate was given $75,000 to change his vote; the Costa Rican delegate refused a $45,000 bribe, yet still voted for partition on orders from his government.

When the vote was taken on November 29, 1947, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 had the two-thirds majority it needed, barely: 33-to-13, with 10 abstentions, and one absent. The votes of Haiti, Liberia and the Philippines proved decisive. No Arab nation voted for the partition.

Because the resolution was a General Assembly vote, it had only the force of a recommendation, as opposed to Security Council resolutions which have mandatory force. What would happen when the British Mandate expired in May 1948 still was uncertain. Truman seems to have been persuaded that, were the Jews and Palestinians unable to come to some agreement, Palestine should be placed under a U.N. Trusteeship. That was anathema for the Zionists, who continued to lobby the U.S. Administration for partition.

But Truman was fed up with all the lobbying and barred all Zionist representatives from the White House. That's when Eddie Jacobson entered the equation. Jacobson was the president's closest Army buddy in WW I and former haberdashery partner in Kansas City; Eddie, it was said, could get in to see his friend with just a simple phone call. The sequence of events, as recorded by Alfred Lilienthal, is as follows:

When Dr. Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization, came to the U.S. to petition the president, Truman refused to see him. At this point, Frank Goldman, president and secretary of B'nai B'rith, learned of Eddie Jacobson, who was a B'nai B'rith member. Jacobson agreed to send his friend in the White House a telegram asking that he see Weizmann, but when that failed, he phoned Truman on the morning of March 13, 1949 and requested a personal visit.

"Eddie," said the president, "I'm always glad to see old friends, but there's one thing you got to promise me. I don't want you to say a word about what's going on over there in the Middle East. Do you promise?"

Eddie promised and the two met in the Oval Room. Truman later wrote of their meeting:

Great tears were running down his cheeks and I took one look at him and said, "Eddie, you son of a bitch, you promised me you wouldn't say a word about what's going on over there." And he said, "Mr. President, I haven't said a word, but every time I think of the homeless Jews, homeless for thousands of years, and I think about Dr. Weizmann, I start crying. I can't help it. He's an old man and he's spent his whole life working for a homeland for the Jews. Now he's sick and he's in New York and he wants to see you, and every time I think about it, I can't help crying."

I said, "Eddie, you son of a bitch, I ought to have thrown you out of here for breaking your promise; you knew damn good and well I couldn't stand seeing you cry."

And he kind of smiled at me, still crying, though, and he said, "Thank you, Mr. President." And he left.

On March 18, 1948, Chaim Weizmann entered unnoticed through the East Gate of the White House and met for 45 minutes with Eddie Jacobson's good friend. The President assured Weizmann that he continued to support partition of Palestine.

On May 14, 1948, at 6:00 p.m. Washington time, the British mandate expired. At 6:01 p.m., David Ben-Gurion declared the existence of the State of Israel. At 6:11 p.m. the United States gave the new state de facto recognition.

On November 2, 1948, Truman, in an upset victory, defeated Dewey. Later, speaking to a group of U.S. diplomats, Truman explained why he did it: "I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents."

The Nature of Zionism

"60 Minutes" correspondent Mike Wallace often acknowledges that his mentor on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was Dr. Fayez Sayegh. The two were good friends and, when Sayegh died in 1980, Wallace sent his personal condolences.

Fayez Sayegh was a Palestinian Christian—his father a Presbyterian minister—who was forced from their home in Palestine in 1948, along with 750,000 other
Palestinian exiles. Twenty-seven years later, in the fall of 1975, Dr. Sayegh, now a representative of Kuwait at the United Nations in New York, spoke to the Third Committee of the General Assembly in support of a draft resolution being prepared for a plenary session of the General Assembly. In summary, this is what he said:

The subject of the resolution, Zionism, refers to a specific political movement begun in August 1897, in Basle, Switzerland, at the inspiration of Theodor Herzl, whose present-day organizational form is the World Zionist Organization. The WZO has held 28 regular Zionist Congresses which have adopted a number of resolutions constituting the official doctrine and program of Zionism. The proposed General Assembly resolution does not refer to Judaism or the Jewish religion. The draft’s term “racial discrimination,” as defined by the United Nations in its General Assembly Resolution 2106 of November 1963, means “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” The question before the world body is whether Zionism, as defined by the Zionist movement, is a form of racism and racial discrimination, as defined by the United Nations.

Quoting from Zionist sources, Sayegh noted that the central doctrine of Zionism was that the Jews of the world, regardless of the quality of their religious commitment to Judaism, constitute one nation, one separate and distinct people. As such they were entitled to create their own state, that is, a state for all Jews worldwide and only for Jews. To accomplish this, two steps were required: Jews had to be separated from their respective countries and transplanted to the new state, and non-Jews or the indigenous population, had to be removed from their land to make room for the transplanted Jews.

Much had occurred between 1948, when the United States recognized the Zionist State, and 1975, when the United Nations examined the tenets of Zionism. Well aware of the Zionists’ long-range plans, the Arabs had rejected the partition plan, which gave 55 percent of Palestine, including its most fertile regions, to Jews who owned slightly over six percent. Even before the May 14, 1948, declaration of statehood, however, Zionist forces had invaded and occupied large parts of the 45 percent that had been allocated to the Palestinians. With the formal declaration of statehood, Arab armies fought only in those areas allocated to the Palestinians in order to redress the injustice. But they were no match for the paramilitary forces of the Zionists which were formed during and in the wake of World War II.

As the fighting continued into 1949, and more Palestinians were evicted from their homeland, President Truman sent an angry message on May 28, 1949, demanding that Israel withdraw from territories it had captured and that it take back a certain number of refugees. Israel refused to make any of these concessions. Truman warned that if Israel continued in its attitude, “the U.S. government will regretfully be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable.” Ten days later, ignoring the warning, Israel formally told Truman that “the war has proved the indispensability to the survival of Israel of certain vital areas not comprised originally in the share of the Jewish state.”

When the Armistice Line between Israel and the Arabs was finally drawn in early 1949, Israel had increased its territory from 55 to 78 percent of Mandated Palestine. Some 750,000 Palestinians found themselves refugees, never to be allowed to return to their homes. A remnant population of 160,000 remained and eventually became citizens of the Jewish state.

Nineteen years later, in what it called a pre-emptive war, Israel attacked Egypt, triggering the 1967 war. Within six days Israel occupied the remaining 22 percent of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza), along with Syria’s Golan Heights and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Israel unilaterally annexed the Golan in 1981, having first forced 94
percent of its population out of the region. The Sinai was returned to Egypt in 1982 as part of the Camp David Agreement. Israel continues to rule militarily over 3.3 million Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in Gaza, in what is the longest military occupation in modern history.

In his presentation, Fayez Sayegh documented the discrimination against those Palestinians in pre-1967 Israel where, unlike in the United States, a distinction is made between citizenship and nationality. In Israel, Palestinians are identified as having Israeli citizenship and Arab nationality; Jews, on the other hand are identified as having Israeli citizenship and Jewish nationality. As Israeli citizens, like Jews, can vote and run for the Knesset or Parliament, although, unlike Jews, they cannot form any independent organization to work for their rights. As Arab nationals, however, Palestinians—as all non-Jews—are denied basic rights enjoyed by Jewish nationals.

Here, again, Sayegh stressed that Jewishness in this context does not signify a religious attribute, but a biological one, and he cited a March 10, 1970 law enacted by Israel’s Knesset which determined that a Jew was one born of a Jewish mother or a convert. Commenting on this definition Israeli Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohen was quoted in the Times of London, on July 25, 1963, as noting how ironic it was “that the same biological or racist approach which was propagated by the Nazis and characterized the infamous Nuremberg laws should, because of an allegedly sacrosanct Jewish tradition, become the basis for the official determination or rejection of Jewishness in the state of Israel.”

One such basic right given to Jewish nationals and denied to Arab nationals is the Right of Return. In 1950, Israel enacted the Law of Return by which Jews anywhere in the world, by virtue of their Jewish nationality, that is, by virtue of being born of a Jewish mother, have a “right” to immigrate to Israel on the grounds that they are returning to their own state, even if they have never been there before. Conversely, non-Jewish Palestinians, dislodged from their homeland in 1948 and 1967, have no such right because they are not Jewish. To spell this out more clearly, in 1952 Israel enacted the Citizenship/Jewish Nationality Law, granting every Jew in the world, and only Jews, the status both of Israeli citizenship and Jewish nationality as soon as they step foot on Israeli soil. Sayegh points out that, were the situation reversed, were, for example, those born of a Christian mother in the United States entitled by law to rights that were denied Jews, such a law would be decried, rightly, as anti-Semitic and “racist.” Why, then, he asked, is not the same practice, when perpetrated by Jews against non-Jews not condemned as racist and a form of racial discrimination?

Another example cited by Sayegh was the Agricultural Settlement Law of 1967, which banned Israeli citizens of non-Jewish nationality, i.e., Palestinian Arabs, from working on Jewish National Fund lands, i.e., on well over 80 percent of the land in Israel. This law prohibits the sale of state-owned land to non-Jews, the leasing of state-owned land to non-Jews, even the employment of non-Jews on state-owned land. Again, were the situation reversed, were Jews in the United States prohibited by law from owning, leasing, or working on state-owned land, this would instantly be condemned as racist.

Sayegh also pointed out that legal discrimination against non-Jewish nationals, that is, Palestinian Arabs, affected the most vital aspects of their daily life. This is because many state benefits, such as educational allowances, housing and welfare grants, and job entitlements, are all tied to military service. All Jewish nationals—even the relatively small number of Jewish nationals who are exempt from military service—are eligible for these benefits; non-Jewish nationals, with minor exceptions, are not. Again, were the situation reversed and Jews were de facto barred from essential state subsidies, this would rightly be condemned as anti-Semitism and overt racial discrimination.

On November 10, 1975, 72 countries condemned Zionism as “a form of racism and racial discrimination.” Thirty-five countries voted against the resolution, 32 abstained. The Arab countries were joined, in large part, by the Soviet Union, then one of the two superpowers, and by member countries of the Organization of African Unity who were reacting to their own colonial histories. Right after the vote was taken, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, rose from his seat, went over to where Israeli ambassador Chaim Herzog was sitting, and embraced him.

As Fayez Sayegh anticipated, those who opposed the resolution lambasted it as an attack on the Jewish religion. Ambassador Herzog dismissed it as anti-Semitic and anti-Judaism. The U.S. press, with possibly the sole exception of journalist I. F. Stone, called it “An Obscenity” and “Anti-Semitic.” Stone, writing in The New York Times of November 23, 1975, observed: “The painful point about the United Nations resolution equating Zionism and Racism is that it had an element of truth.” At the time, no one thought it would ever be repealed.

Things would change.

Israel had begun colonizing the lands it occupied in 1967 right from the beginning. President Carter had com-
plained to American Jewish leaders that, by building settlements, Israel was acting in a “completely irresponsible way.” The building, however, continued under President Reagan, but by then Israel had little to fear from the United States. As Reagan’s secretary of state George Schultz told the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the leading pro-Israel lobby in the U.S., the goal of U.S. strategic cooperation with Israel was to “build institutional arrangements so that eight years from now, if there is a secretary of state who is not positive about Israel, he will not be able to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the United States that we have established.”

By the summer of 1991, George Bush was riding high in the polls. The Soviet Union had imploded and U.S.-led forces in the Gulf War had liberated Kuwait. Israel felt that its restraint in that war had given it what one leading Israeli paper called “the moral and practical right to demand a significant material increase from the United States.” What Israel wanted from the U.S. was a $10 billion loan guarantee in order to borrow from U.S. commercial institutions at a greatly reduced interest rate. The money was needed, it said, to finance infrastructure, housing, training, and jobs for one million Jewish immigrants expected to arrive in Israel from the Soviet bloc countries between 1991 and 1995.

On September 12, 1991, leading Jewish organizations in the U.S., at the behest of Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, sent over 1,200 citizens, mostly Jews, through the halls of Congress to lobby for the $10 billion.

President Bush, however, said he would veto any foreign aid bill that contained the loan because of Shamir’s policy of putting the new immigrants in West Bank and Gaza settlements. Shamir, himself, made his position crystal clear in The Jerusalem Post of Jan. 15, 1990: “We need the space [in the Occupied Territories] to house all the people. Big immigration required Israel to be big as well...we must have the Land of Israel and we have to fight for it, struggle for it.”

The lines seemed drawn: a popular president versus a powerful lobby and an adamant Israeli prime minister.

Just after 1 p.m. on that September 12th—a “day that would live in infamy” for many Jews—George Bush went before the TV cameras and gave his famous “one lonely little guy” speech. He said: “We’re up against very strong and effective groups that go up to the Hill. I heard today there were something like a thousand lobbyists on the Hill working the other side of the question. We’ve got one lonely little guy down here. I think the American people will support me.”

Morris Amitay, the former head of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, charged that the president’s words “came as close to the line of inciting anti-Semitism as a public figure can go.” In the weeks that followed, the president and Republican Party strategists were warned that the remark could cost them much needed reelection campaign cash.

Suddenly, George Bush’s vice president, Dan Quayle, emerged as the president’s defender. Quayle, a self-declared Zionist who did not consider Jewish settlement an obstacle to peace, was looked upon by Jews as their best friend in the White House. To improve his boss’s standing in the Jewish community, Quayle recommended that the president push for the repeal of the U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism.

On September 23, 1991, President Bush, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly, declared: “To equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and forget the terrible plight of Jews in World War II and indeed throughout history. Zionism is not a policy; it was the idea that led to the home of the Jewish people.”

Over the next three months the U.S., now the world’s one remaining superpower, worked to convince U.N. members that revocation of the resolution was in the interest of Middle East peace, as it was a condition insisted upon by Israel for its participation in the Madrid Peace Conference then in progress. On December 16, 1991, the U.N. repealed Resolution 3379 by a vote of 111 to 25, with 13 abstentions.

Within the next year, Shamir would lose his reelection bid to Yitzhak Rabin, George Bush would lose his reelection bid to Arkansan Governor Bill Clinton, and Israel would secure its $10 billion in loan guarantees. The Madrid Conference would lead to the 1993 Oslo Accords, and within the next five years, Jewish settlements on occupied Palestinian land would double. By the year 2002, some 72 percent of the West Bank, 89 percent of Arab East Jerusalem, and 25 percent of Gaza would be expropriated for settlements, highways, by-pass roads, military installations, nature preserves and infrastructure. Over 200 settlements would be built, and over 400,000 Israeli Jews would cross the 1967 boundaries, in the process rendering a viable Palestinian state improbable at best.

**Whither Zionism?**

Rabbi Elmer Berger, the former Executive Director of The American Council for Judaism, often pointed out that the State of Israel was never the end purpose of Zionism;
that purpose was and is to nationalize the lives of all Jews worldwide, ultimately ingathering them into the State of Israel from their “exile” or Galut, the Zionist term for Jews who don’t live in Israel.17 Fayez Sayegh called this the “pumping-in operation” of Zionism, the corollary to its “pumping-out operation.”

Ben-Gurion fully accepted the Zionist doctrine (’Avoda Ivrit) that only the ‘Conquest of Labor’ by Jews and not the mere conquest of land would assure the realization of Zionism and the attainment of a Jewish majority. Eleven years after Israel’s establishment, on his return from a visit to South Africa, Ben-Gurion reported that he had told the South African Prime Minister that, “The white settlers made a mistake—they should have done what we have done here with ’Avoda Ivrit. Then they would have been spared their present troubles.”18

With so many Palestinian “pumped out” in 1948, Zionists urgently needed Jews to fill the vacuum, especially agricultural workers, manual laborers, and military recruits to defend the seized lands.

The closest Jews were those living in Arab countries. In 1948, there were 717,000 Jews in Israel. In the years following the Arab defeat in the 1948-49 War, more than half a million Jews from some ten Arab countries began migrating to Israel.

The second largest pool of Jews was Soviet Jewry. In August, 1972, Richard Perle, an aide to Sen. Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA), along with I. L. Kenen, the director of AIPAC, convened a group of Senate staffers to promote a Soviet trade cutoff amendment that would force the Soviets to let more Jews emigrate. Within weeks, Perle and his colleague Morris Amitay, then chief of staff to Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT), had the backing of 72 senators and 258 congressmen. J. J. Goldberg reports in his book “Jewish Power” that wavering lawmakers were contacted by Jewish constituents who phoned or visited them at their homes.

The possibility of Jackson-Vanik passing threatened President Nixon’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union. He sent his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to convince Jewish leaders not to support it. Kissinger called on Jacob Stein, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, and Max Fisher, president of the Council of Jewish Federations. Both men said they would lobby against the amendment, which now had the co-sponsorship of Rep. Charles Vanik (D-OH). Nixon himself begged lawmakers not to undermine U.S.-Soviet relations by voting for the bill.

It didn’t work. On Dec. 13, 1973, the House approved the Jackson-Vanik bill by a vote of 388 to 44. On Dec. 13, the Senate voted 77 to 4 in favor.

The passage of Jackson-Vanik, according to J. J. Goldberg, brought “a sea change” in the way American Jews came to see themselves. Richard Perle and AIPAC had shown that Jews could take on a U.S. president, and win.

Ironically, Jewish immigration following Jackson-Vanik plummeted. Those who were allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. traveled to Vienna, where they were given the right to choose where they wanted to live; most opted for the United States. In 1980, e.g., of the 21,471 Soviet émigrés, 81 percent came to the U.S. The Chairman of the Jewish Agency charged the U.S. Jewish community with being anti-Zionist and anti-Israel for not insisting that all the émigrés go to Israel. A compromise was reached whereby Soviet Jews with immediate family in the U.S. could go there; all others went to a camp in Naples, Italy, where they would stay until deciding to go to Israel. The problem was many decided to stay in the camp rather than go to Israel. Still, between 1948 and 1995, over 800,000 Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel.

Today the largest remaining pool of Jews is in the United States. The problem here, though, is that most U.S. Jews don’t want to move to Israel. Back in the late 40s and early 50s, Ben-Gurion had pled unsuccessfully with American Jews to come to the new Jewish State. Jewish leaders in America told him, “We are not Zionist in your sense of the word. We can be Zionist as American patriots. We’ll give you financial support.”19

To convince American Jews to immigrate to Israel in significant numbers—and to stem the flow of Jews now leaving the Jewish state—Israel’s economy will have to make a major recovery. This means that the constant threat of terrorist attacks will have to end, the “Palestinian problem” will have to be resolved, and relations with Israel’s Arab neighbors will have to be improved.

In 1996, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and David Wurmser, acting at the behest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, co-authored a strategy paper entitled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.” The realm in this case was Israel, the strategy was to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and this was promoted both as a means of containing Syria and as “an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right.” Perle hand-delivered the report to Netanyahu, and it received wide coverage in the Wall Street Journal when the new Prime Minister came to address the U.S. Congress in July 1996. Today, all three co-authors of the report occupy influential positions in the Bush Administration.20

Currently, Richard Perle is chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board and an advisor to both the Jewish
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Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the Center for Security Policy (CSP). For both these groups, according to Jason Vest writing in The Nation, “regime change” by any means necessary is imperative in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian Authority, and anyone who dissents from this goal “is committing heresy against articles of faith that effectively hold that there is no difference between U.S. and Israeli national security interests, and that the only way to assure continued safety and prosperity for both countries is through hegemony in the Middle East—a hegemony achieved with the traditional cold war recipe of feints, force, clientism and covert action.”

David Wurmser is currently special assistant to John Bolton, the State Department’s Undersecretary for Arms Control. (Both Bolton and Wurmser were former JINSA members.) Wurmser is said to have played a key role in crafting George Bush’s “Arafat must go” policy—a long-running refrain of Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

Even before the Perle paper of 1996, however, we can find a blueprint for the use of unilateral U.S. military power to pre-empt the buildup of weapons of mass destruction, even in conflicts that do not directly engage U.S. interests. In February 1992, the Pentagon distributed a classified memorandum on its “Defense Planning Guideline” to commanders-in-chief of worldwide military theaters and other top military service chiefs. The memorandum offered several scenarios in which the U.S. could use pre-emptive force: one such scenario envisioned war with Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby supervised the drafting of the memorandum. Wolfowitz, at the time, was Undersecretary for Policy for then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Today Libby is Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff.

In 1998, a new advocacy group called Project for a New American Century (PNAC), chaired by Weekly Standard editor Bill Kristol, sent letters to Democratic policy makers advocating the removal of Saddam Hussein. When that advice was ignored, PNAC wrote to Republican leaders calling for war against Iraq. Signatories on the recommendation included Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, and Richard Perle.

Wolfowitz, who is now Deputy Secretary of Defense, spearheads the Bush administration’s policy of toppling Saddam Hussein, remaking the Iraqi government in an American image, then redrawing the Middle East map by accomplishing the same goals in Syria, Iran, and perhaps other countries. When supporters of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s West Bank offensive staged a rally in front of the White House on April 15, 2001, to express U.S. solidarity with Israel, Wolfowitz, who lived for a time in Israel, spoke on behalf of the Bush administration. He expressed solidarity with the people of Israel, saying that, since 9-11, “every American understood what it is like to live in Jerusalem or Netanya or Haifa.” And he acknowledged that innocent Palestinians were suffering and dying in great numbers, at which point the crowd booed him, forcing him to interrupt his speech.

From the beginning, Israel’s foreign policy has been based on two assumptions: a) its enemies in the region are out to destroy it, and b) only its military invincibility will save it. These assumptions are based both on the geographical reality of having long borders and a small population, and on the geopolitical fact of being a colonialist state, viewed by the indigenous people as usurpers living on conquered land. Listen to Vladimir Jabotinsky, the Jewish national leader and mentor of future Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, speaking in 1928: “Zionism is a colonizing adventure and it therefore stands or falls by the question of armed force.”

Listen to Menachem Begin telling the Knesset in 1955: “I deeply believe in launching preventive war against the Arab states without further hesitation: By doing so, we will achieve two targets: firstly, the annihilation of the Arab powers; and secondly, the expansion of our territory.” And listen to Israel’s present prime minister, Ariel Sharon, justifying Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon: “The bigger the blow and the more we damage the P.L.O. infrastructure, the more the Arabs in Judea and Samaria [Israel’s term for the West Bank] and Gaza will be ready to negotiate with us.”

So the question arises: how closely does President Bush’s pro-Israel position reflect the policies of Israel’s government? On February 18, 2003, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told a group of visiting U.S. congressmen that America’s impending war against Iraq was of vital importance to Israel. He went on to say that Israel was concerned about the security threat posed by Iran, and stressed that it was important to deal with Iran even while American attention was focused on Iraq. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who was also present at the meeting, told the Israeli prime minister that he had no doubt America would attack Iraq, and that it would be necessary
thereafter to deal with threats from Syria and Iran. Bolton also met with Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the man for whom David Wurmser, now Bolton’s aide, co-authored the strategy paper back in 1996.29

Ariel Sharon has long opposed a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza, saying that the Palestinians already have a state, it’s called Jordan. After the ‘67 War, General Sharon deployed armed Jewish settlers into the West Bank under the pretext of creating a defense perimeter. From 1977-81, Minister of Agriculture Sharon oversaw the settling of 25,000 Jews on the West Bank. And by 1990, Housing Minister Sharon was settling Jews from the old Soviet Union in the occupied territories.

More recently, on March 21, 2001, at an event sponsored by Israel Bonds in New York City, Sharon spoke of his political vision which, he said, consisted of four pillars, the first being immigration. “We need to bring one million more immigrants over the next 10 to 15 years,” he said, adding: “The goal is that by the year 2020 the majority of Jews will be living in Israel.” Jews had immigrated from Russia, Brazil, South Africa, France, and Ethiopia, he said, now the “time has come to see a strong aliyah from the United States as well.” Sharon’s other three pillars were: integrating Zionism and Jewish education, building strategic settlements (he called them communities), and competing in today’s global marketplace. He concluded: “It is time to be proud Zionists again, and to wave the flag of renewed Zionism...We have accomplished great things in the past 120 years of Zionism...”30

Ariel Sharon may well be on the brink of achieving the Zionist goal of “pumping-out” most of the Palestinians.

The Zionist code word for expelling Palestinians from Israel-Palestine—“finishing the job begun 55 years ago,” as some put it—is “transfer.” The word enjoys more legitimacy today than it has since 1948. A March 2002 poll conducted by Tel Aviv University found that 46 percent of Israeli Jews support the transfer of Palestinians from the West Bank, and 31 percent say the same for Palestinian citizens of Israel.

In the summer of 2002, posters declaring “Transfer = Security and Peace” and “Jordan is the Palestinian State” appeared throughout Israel. The government did nothing to remove them. Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon actually called the Palestinian threat a “cancerous” one that required “chemotherapy”—a sentiment later endorsed by Prime Minister Sharon.31

Instances of “cleansing” Palestinians from the Jewish state are widespread, as documented by Robert Blecher in the Winter 2002 issue of Middle East Report:

Dozens of Israeli firms have signed a pledge not to employ Arabs. Offices of Palestinian professionals practicing in Jewish towns have been destroyed, in some cases repeatedly, by arson. Demonstrators in Safad, led by the city’s chief rabbi, have demanded the expulsion of Palestinian Israeli college students, claiming that they “endanger the city’s residents not only in terms of security, but also morally.” Flyers have been distributed in Haifa calling on Jewish citizens to boycott Arab businesses. In Safad and Upper Nazareth, religious and city officials have urged the Jewish population not to rent or sell apartments to Palestinians.32

In December 2002, some 750 U. S. academicians and intellectuals joined 187 Israeli colleagues in warning that the “fog of war” against Iraq “could be exploited by the Israeli government to commit further crimes against the Palestinian people, up to full-fledged cleansing.33

And what if Israel did “transfer” Palestinians in droves, wouldn’t the United States government protest such treatment? It is instructive to recall Israel’s response when, in November 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell called on it to halt all settlement building because it “cripples chances for real peace and security.” Benny Elon, a right-wing minister in the Sharon government, replied that the settlers weren’t worried. “America has a special talent for seeing things in the short term,” he said, adding that what Powell said he said only for Arab consumption.34

History, indeed, may support that assessment. Will more and more Palestinians be “pumped out” of their ancestral homeland, while more and more Jews worldwide, including American Jews, are “pumped in”? Will Israel achieve the security and economic hegemony it seeks in the Middle East with the political, financial (now $12-million per day), and diplomatic patronage of the one remaining superpower? Or will President Truman’s Secretary of Defense James Forrestal have the last word, when he warned back in 1948, that even though failure to go along with the Zionists might cost President Truman the states of New York, Pennsylvania, and California, “it was about time that somebody should pay some consideration to whether we might not lose the United States.”35

ENDNOTES

6Truman papers, Palestine-Jewish Immigration Files, Truman to Panby, Oct. 22, 1946.
10Lilienthal, “The Zionist Connection,” p. 66.
11Lilienthal, “The Zionist Connection.” The Truman administration’s lobbying efforts and the Eddie Jacobson’s visit are based on his Chapter III, pp. 46-102.
12References to Fayez Sayegh are based on his speech before the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, that was reprinted in “Zionism: A Form of Racial Discrimination,” Office of the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations”. The entire speech is available on AMEU’s Web site at: www.ameu.org.
30”Report on a Speech by Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel,” by Sascha D. Freudenheim, on the web at: www.sascga.com/Ariel Sharon_1.html.
32Blecher, “Living on the Edge.”
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- Kelley, R., *The Bedouin of Israel* (1998, 2 hours). Never-before-seen film of how Israel has treated its Bedouin citizens, including interview with the notorious Green Patrol. **AMEU: $30.00.**


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- Moushabeck, M., *Anatolia: Lost Songs of Palestine* (2001, CD, 52 minutes). **List: $15.00; AMEU: $12.50.**


- Studio 52 Production, *Checkpoint: The Palestinians After Oslo* (1997, 58 minutes). Documents the post-Oslo situation with off-beat humor and historical insights provided by Palestinian and Israeli activists like Naseer Arad and Hanan Ashrawi. **AMEU: $27.00.**

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