The Untold Story of Suffering and Endurance

The Syrian Community

on the

Golan Heights

By Bashar Tarabieh

In the summer of 1996, while visiting my family in the occupied Golan Heights, I was arrested by the Israeli General Security Services (GSS) and interrogated for seven days. I discovered, through the process of interrogation, that I was suspected of burning the local council building of my hometown, Majdal Shams; burning an Israeli police station in the neighboring village of Mas'adeh; burning Israeli flags on every occasion when I could lay my hands on one; working as a secret agent for the Syrian Intelligence; directing all anti-occupation underground activities in the Golan; and inciting Golanis against the state of Israel. During the questioning, I was also asked about a visit I made to the Palestinian West Bank two weeks earlier. After telling them that I served as an interpreter with a Human Rights Watch researcher who was investigating torture and violation of freedom of the press by the Palestinian Authority, they brought my human rights activism into their questioning.
Throughout my detention I was put in solitary confinement, tortured and subjected to humiliation. In responding to their allegations, I did not deny my active opposition to the Israeli occupation of the Golan, or my commitment to non-violent means of struggle for the cause of returning the Golan to Syria. If these constitute crimes under Israeli law, I told my interrogators, then I’m guilty as charged. As for the other allegations, I challenged them to come up with a single piece of evidence or witness to corroborate them. “I am a human rights activist,” I told them, “and this arrest is unlawful and illegal. It violates many of my rights.” I demanded the right to see my lawyer, to be given decent meals (I did not eat for four days because the food they gave me was inedible), to be released from solitary confinement, and an end to Shabib (position abuse coupled with hooding that constitutes a form of torture). The interrogator’s responses were illuminating: “Here there are no individual rights, there are only state rights. As for the food, it is the same that we eat. You are not in a five-star hotel. We know that you will warn your accomplices through your lawyer, therefore you will see him until you tell us who they are and we arrest them. As for hooding, that is not torture. It’s simply intended to prevent you from seeing other prisoners while you are ‘waiting’ to be interrogated.”

My ordeal was a moderate example of the treatment of arrested activists in the Israeli-occupied territories. I was fortunate to have Human Rights Watch campaigning for my release and to be a resident of the United States, which enabled the American Embassy to influence on my behalf with the Israeli authorities.

Unlike other activists who stay in interrogation for months, I was detained for seven days. Unlike those who are usually subject to far worse forms of torture, my treatment was relatively mild. And unlike the many who end up going to jail on the basis of secret evidence or confessions extracted under torture, I was released. But despite my good fortune to have powerful advocates and good lawyers to secure my release, my experience, like those of countless others, bears testimony to the viciousness of Israel’s occupation.

This article is intended to provide an account of the long suffering and grave injustice that the Syrian community in the Golan Heights has endured over the past 33 years. It is a testimony to the inherent injustice of foreign occupation and to the steadfastness and resistance of a disenfranchised community. Since little has been written or reported about this community in the Western media, I find it necessary to couple the account of our struggle with a brief social history of the Syrian community of the occupied Golan Heights.

A Culture of Resistance

During the course of the 1967 war, Israel launched the largest population transfer (over 250,000, no official capitulation) in the history of the Middle East in the Golan, leaving only 6,396 of the total population of over 130,000. Over 94 percent of the population had to flee or were expelled from the region. Of the 129 villages in the Golan, only six remained inhabited.

Most of the evacuated villagers were bull dozed by the military during the first few years of occupation. Soon after the war, Israel announced that the retention of the Golan would be permanent. And while the Golan remained under military administration until 1981, when it was unilaterally annexed, it was evident that Israel regarded the Golan differently than the other territories occupied in 1967. Israel’s first Jewish settlement on the Golan was established two weeks after the occupation, only a few hundred feet from the new cease-fire line with Syria. But most significantly, Israel’s policy towards the remaining population reflected its intention to integrate the Golan Syrian community into Israel. Unlike its policy in the occupied Palestinian territories, which sought to integrate the land but not the people, in the Golan Israel sought to integrate both the people and the land.

Before discussing Israel’s occupation, a brief look at the social and political histories of the Syrian community in the Golan will be helpful. Despite its small size, this population has played a central role in the modern history of the region. As the Ottoman Empire weakened towards the end of the 19th century, the Golan villages, like many rural areas, were engaged in revolts against local and regional Ottoman authorities. Ottoman armies raided the Golan several times to suppress resistance.

When the French Mandate, a quasi-colonial arrangement, replaced Ottoman rule at the end of World War I, the Golan community was equally defiant against the French. The first major Syrian revolt began in 1925, in two rural areas in Syria, one of which was the northern villages of the Golan. When the revolt was eventually suppressed, over half of the male population of Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages had been killed in battle, and the villages were burned to the ground.

The villages continued to resist French occupation until Syria gained its independence in 1940. After independence, the region was fully integrated into Syria, and members from the community participated in the political life of the state.

Despite its relatively small size, the com-
The Syrian Population of the Golan Heights before and after the Israeli Occupation
(Source: “Taking Root: Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and Gaza,” by W.W. Harris, 1980, p. 65)

1960 Population: 130,000 plus
1967 Population: 6,396

First, it is important to note that, with the exception of the village of Ghajar, whose population belongs to the Aalwi sect of Islam, virtually all the other villages belong to the Druze sect of Islam. Historically, and to this day, Israel treats its Arab population as a collection of significantly “different” groups: Muslims, Christians, Druze and Bedouin. This is an elaboration of a historic colonial divide-and-rule policy that was employed by the British during their mandate in Palestine. Among these groups, Israel came to consider its Druze citizens as a “favored” minority on the grounds that they are more loyal to the Jewish state than others. Furthermore, while the vast majority of the Druze in the Middle East consider themselves and are considered by others as Arabs and Muslims, for ideological reasons Israel considers the Druze as neither Arab nor Muslim. In this context, it is worth mentioning that Israel’s systematic manipulation of Druze identity in Israel from 1948 to the present has been quite effective; many Druze citizens of Israel accept and embrace their “uniqueness.” Israel assumed that the northern villages on the Golan would follow their Palestinian co-religionists in supporting the Jewish state and its planned annexation of the region.

Taking this into consideration, the decision not to expel this population was no coincidence. To the contrary, evidence supports the contention that Israel had planned to retain this population before the war erupted. For example, when the Israeli mil-
tary entered the village of Majdal Shams, it found that the resi-
dents of all the surrounding villages had taken refuge there. The
military sorted the refugees into two groups: Druze and non-
Druze, and expelled the latter across the cease-fire line. A few
weeks later, the Druze residents of Mas'adeh, Buq'atha, and A'in
Qinya were allowed to return to their villages.

From the first days of occupation, Israel initiated contacts with
the local religious and traditional leadership through proxies in
the Druze community in Israel. The population was assured that
the new rulers would not infringe on the freedom of movement
and travel nor would they confiscate their lands.

Following its previously successful policy with the Palestinian
Druze, who had become Israeli citizens after 1948, the first con-
tacts were initiated with Golan's spiritual leaders and the heads
of the largest hamulas (extended families). As a result, all prob-
lems and grievances could only be solved through these indi-
viduals who now found themselves cultivating more power than
they had enjoyed before the occupation. By attempting to win
over the religious and traditional leadership, Israel hoped to con-
trol the community as a whole.

During the first two weeks, the military governor of the Golan
issued decrees canceling the Syrian curriculum and instituting an
Israeli curriculum (something that did not happen in any other
territory occupied in 1967), dismantling the local councils, and
removing institutional structures that had existed under Syrian
control. Israel also encouraged the population to travel to Israel,
to visit relatives whom they had not seen since 1948 and to
make pilgrimages to Druze religious sites. Within a year, Golan
Druze were allowed to participate in the Israeli labor market,
even to work in construction in sensitive military installations in
the Golan and the occupied Sinai peninsula. By 1970, Israel es-
tablished small clinics in three of the villages, and allowed the
population to become members of the Israeli healthcare system.
In other words, Israel sought to integrate this population, believ-
ing that through such "positive" policies and economic incen-
tives, it could win their loyalty. By doing so, it also worked to-
wards achieving a de-facto annexation of the Golan.

The policies were clearly coercive. For one thing, unlike under
Syrian national rule, the majority of the population had to go
through a handful of individuals to get anything done, be it ac-
quiring a permit to cultivate land close to the new "borders" or to
expand a home. Furthermore, despite the power these individu-
als had, providing the service was contingent upon a promise by
the individual to formally state his acceptance of Israel's sover-
egignty over the Golan. Thirdly, the new policy of reviving the
power of the traditional leadership — which had relatively dimin-
ished under Syria's rule — benefited the largest hamula and put
its members in the position of local authority. In other words,
while the traditional hamula system was built upon distribution of
power among a number of large hamulas and their allies from
small hamulas, under the new system the largest hamula was
accorded a more exclusive form of power.

When schools were reopened, two of the three new adminis-
trators where from that largest family, one of whom was the son
of its traditional leader. And when Israel opened a post office in
Majdal Shams in the early 1970s, its appointed manager was the
other son of the same leader. Then, when Israel established lo-
cal councils in the villages in 1974, two members of that family
were appointed as mayors of Majdal Shams and Mas'adeh. Simi-
lar situations prevailed in the villages of Buq'atha and A'in Qinya.

As a whole, the community was aware of the unstated goals of
such appointments. While competition for power has always
existed among the different large families, this new favoritism
hardly increased such tensions. Resistance, rather, was di-
rected mainly against the individuals who took advantage of
the situation rather than against their whole extended family. Most
of the resentment, however, was against the Israeli authorities,
given the transparency of their goals. Such resentment took two
forms: a few chose to join the underground movement against
the occupation, while the majority expressed a more passive re-
sentment to such favoritism by minimizing their use of the local
and contacts with individuals representing Israeli authori-
ties or, when possible, by avoiding such contacts altogether.
Since local councils were appointed and not elected, and since
they hardly provided any of the desperately needed social and
other services, it was not difficult for members of the community
to identify Israel and its local agents as the source of their prob-
lems.

Overall, while the military rule of the population was less re-
pressive than in the other occupied territories, occupations are
inherently unstable and repressive arrangements. Following its
own colonial approach to governing non-Jews, Israel confiscated
lands from all of the Arab villages despite its exclusive control
over 95 percent of the land in the region. More striking was the
eviction of the village of Sehita in 1969 to build a military installa-
ton on its property.

Within this context, one can understand the emerging ten-
sions in relations between the traditional and spiritual leader-
ships and Israel. The community's leadership understood and
sought lines of communication with Israel to sustain its authority
through ensuring minimal disruptions in the community's life un-
der the new rulers. Israel, on the other hand, sought to control
the community through its leadership, co-opting individuals by
empowering them to function as liaisons between the state and
the community. The well being of the community was not a factor
in Israel's consideration.

When the first demonstration against Israeli erupted with the
death of the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, in 1970, Is-
raelis could not comprehend why "Druze" were mourning the
death of their putative enemy. More surprising for Israelis was
the unanimous support given by the traditional and religious
leadership and the community in general to members of an un-
derground movement who were caught engaging in pro-Syrian
activities and tried before a military court. Over two thousand
people (almost two thirds of the adult population) showed up for
the trial. The trial revealed that since the early weeks of the oc-
cupation, an underground movement was organized to resist it by
gathering information about Israeli military and settlement
activities in the Golan, and transferring the information to Syrian
intelligence across the cease-fire line.

It was not until a meeting in Tel-Aviv in April 1972 between
Israeli defense minister Moshe Dayan and the notables of the
community that Israel realized the magnitude of its illusions. At
that meeting, Dayan told the representatives that the community
must start paying taxes like all citizens of Israel do. One repre-
sentative answered that the Golan Druze are "Syrian citizens
under occupation by the Israeli army." Dayan replied, "If you
renounce your Syrian citizenship I will make you Israelis in 24
hours." The same leader answered, "I will never renounce my
Syrian citizenship." And another leader said, "You won the war,
but you did not win the people's confidence."
Dayan and his security advisers realized for the first time that co-optation of this population would not be achieved through "friendly" policies. An intimidation campaign started the next day. By the end of 1972, when the large underground spying operation was discovered, Israeli authorities reacted with collective repression for the first time. Those arrested were sentenced to long prison terms. Their families were harassed throughout the 1970s. The standards of providing services became harshly contingent on vocal support of Israeli presence in the Golan. More lands and water resources were confiscated and high taxation was imposed by force.

From 1972 and until 1981, co-optation was sought through a mixed policy of rewards and punishments. On the one hand, more repressive policies were employed against those who expressed opposition to the occupation. Traditional leaders who previously enjoyed some privileges were shunned by the military authorities and treated with indifference at best. At the same time, fear was instilled in the population through a number of actions. When Israel discovered the spying rings in 1972, soldiers killed 18-year-old El'zat Abu-Jabal in an ambush on the border. The military wanted to teach the population a lesson. El'zat's body was tied to a military jeep and dragged through the streets of Majdal Shams for over six hours so that everyone could see it. In 1975, when Nazih Abu-Zaed, who also worked undercover with Syrian intelligence, stepped on a mine on his way to Syria to transfer information, the military left him lying in the mine field for over a day screaming for help with all the community watching him helplessly. After he bled to death, soldiers recovered his body and made a similar spectacle. The message was clear: no longer will Israel regard all the Golan Druze as friends; there are "good" Druze and "bad" Druze and each will be treated accordingly. During the same period, Israel stepped up its policy of land confiscation, and elevated the status of collaborators by installing them as the heads of local councils and religious courts.

But it was precisely during this era that the roots of the Arab nationalist identity were reinforced and articulated within the community. Before the occupation, many Golan Druze were active in the Baath and Nasserist parties of Syria. They saw their Druzness as mere sectarian belonging within a larger Islamic religious identity or in some inclusive Arab nationality.

What Israel tried to do was to invest their Druzness with a new meaning that included an opposition to Arabness. For Galanis, accepting Druzness as the core of their identity in effect became paramount to accepting Israeli occupation. Israeli-run schools taught children courses in "Druze Heritage," which presented Druze as a separate and always persecuted non-Arab, ethno-religious minority. In the curricula for "Druze History" and "Druze Civics," an emphasis was put on the "historic" relations between Jews and Druze, and the need to build a strategic alliance to combat the threat of the Arab Muslim enemy.

This use of education to promote a political agenda included publications of books titled "Mathematics for Druze" and "Geography for Druze." For parents, traditional leaders and religious leaders alike, accepting this narrative meant disconnection from their own history in which they saw themselves and were seen by others as part of a larger Arab community and culture. The seeds for a far more robust and collective form of resistance were planted through such flagrant manipulation of a people's identity.

Annexation and Full Scale Repression

But the peak of articulating their Syrian-Arab identity did not come until Israel unilaterally annexed the Golan on December 14, 1981. It was during this period that the entire community mobilized in protest against the annexation under the slogan "The Golan is Syrian Arab." When protesters shouted this slogan in Arabic, al-Jawatan Arabi Suri, it was clear to them that they meant that the Golan is not Jewish or Israeli, and that the Golan's Arabness is defined by their presence in it as Arabs.

An open strike was announced by the community to protest the annexation and Israel's attempts to force the population to accept Israeli citizenship. During the six months of this strike, many public meetings were held in all villages to reach decisions
The advancement in women's status in the Golan now is quite visible. While prior to the 1980s, only a handful of women worked as teachers in kindergarten and first grade, today scores of women with university degrees teach at all school levels. Many women professionals also work in the Golan as nurses, medical assistants, lab technicians, and administrators.

Even those who could not pursue higher education because of family restrictions or economic hardship have found opportunities to break the old patterns of confinement in the private sphere by finding jobs in agriculture and factories. A few women have succeeded in opening their own small businesses, such as shops, hair salons and dress-making. Women, however, are still disproportionately underrepresented in the job market compared to men.

In my own family, my mother was "fortunate" among women of her generation to have been allowed to finish fourth grade. The vast majority of my mother's generation is illiterate. My two sisters, on the other hand, attended universities despite my father's reservations. One finished her BA in Arabic literature and philosophy at Haifa University and now works as a teacher. My other sister studied to be a lab technician at Damascus University. She has not found a job in her field in the Golan and is employed as a dental assistant. This sharp generational contrast between older and younger women is common in many families.

The strike ended after six months, in part because of the shift in the media attention from Israel's annexation of the Golan to its invasion of Lebanon and the devastation that wrought. The Golan community had to cut its losses and negotiate a resolution to the strike. In these negotiations, despite some compromises, the community's leaders maintained a rejection of Israeli citizenship. Israel refused their demand to write "Syrian Arab" in the "nationality" section on the IDs. The compromise was to leave the space for nationality blank. Golan Druze hold IDs which state that they were born in the "Golan heights" (not "Syria" and not "Israel"). Their Israeli-issued travel documents state that their nationality is "undefined.

Despite this officially sanctioned vagueness, Golanis continually feel the need to assure the world and themselves that they see themselves as Arabs. This is evident in all public statements made by their leaders and activists, and by countless communal and institutional activities that have been organized since the annexation. Communal kindergartens and annual summer camps always incorporate the Syrian and Arab identity in their pedagogical frameworks. Sports clubs and athletic teams adopt names like "the Freedom Club," "the Unity Club," "the Steadfastness Club," "the Avanti-garde Club," etc. These clubs, despite their athletic purpose, become social and political institutions that organize activities around the goal of resisting occupation and attempts to change the community's Arab identity.

That being said, Israel has never given up its attempts to challenge the Arabness of the community. Though it changed its policy dramatically in the post-strike era, employing harsher and more repressive methods in dealing with the population as a collective, it continued its punishment and reward approach. This time, however, the strategy was not to favor whole hamulas but rather to favor individual collaborators regardless of their hamula background. When the mayor of Majdal Shams died in the late 1980s, Israel appointed Turki al-Ajam, an Israeli Druze who had fled the Golan in 1950 after the Syrian government learned about his spying activity for Israel. When al-Ajam did not prove to be
obedient enough and did not comply with all the dictates of the Israeli security services, he was replaced in the mid-1990s with Salim al-Shufi, who was a member of Al-Ajami’s spying ring, but is seen by Israeli as more loyal and less sympathetic with the local population.

The repressive policies of the 1980s, however, did not prove to be more efficient than the relatively “friendly” policy that preceded the annexation. Then, in the late 1980s, a dramatic policy shift occurred following recommendations submitted by Aharon Zubeida the Israeli prime minister’s adviser on Golan Druze affairs. Zubeida had held the office of the chief military officer for education in the Golan schools from the mid-1970s until annexation, and he served as the civil director of the educational system until 1990. His recommendations were part of an MA thesis that he submitted to Haifa University.

In his recommendations, Zubeida argued that the overall Israeli policy towards the Golan Druze had failed to achieve its goals. The fatal mistake in the pre-annexation era, according to Zubeida, was favoring the largest hamula in each village, while neglecting the rest. Instead, Israeli authorities should have focused on Majdal Shams, which dominated the traditional and religious leaderships of the villages. Another mistake of the 1980s, said Zubeida, was using collective punishment, which only helped to sustain and strengthen pro-Syrian sentiment. Rather, he argued, Israel should return to a strategy of building strong relations with the traditional leadership without favoring one big hamula over another, thereby fostering rivalries as a means of breaking down collective solidarity. In short, Zubeida recommended that Israel employ a more sophisticated approach to pit members of the community against each other.

Zubeida’s recommendations were adopted in their totality by the security apparatus, which continues to be the sole decision-making authority regarding resource allocations and appointments to positions in schools, government health clinics and local councils. Repression returned to being used selectively, and rewards were granted in proportion to the concessions made by individuals and hamulas. A few unqualified teachers and principals were fired and replaced with more qualified ones in the hope of changing the population’s perception of the schools as simply sites for fostering an Israeli agenda. The new teachers, however, were put under greater pressure than ever to impose just such an Israeli agenda. Today, anyone suspected of having a pro-Syrian political orientation in his/her private or public life is immediately fired. The curriculum, too, is under greater scrutiny, and academic appointments are contingent upon the applicants’ promise that they and their immediate family members will not participate in any political activity regarded as hostile to Israel.

But the most significant, recent step to break down communal solidarity was the institutional separation of Majdal Shams from the rest of the villages. Historically, Israel has maintained that a handful of pro-Syrians based in Majdal Shams is behind the anti-Israeli sentiments in the community. Now, following a new, unwritten policy begun in the early 1980s, Israel is isolating Majdal Shams systematically from the other villages. A new high school has been built in Majdal Shams. Previously, students from all villages attended one high school in Mas’adeh, where they got to know each other. This, to a large degree, knitted all four villages together, reinforcing their sense of community. By separating Majdal Shams students from all the others, Israeli authorities hope to destroy the continuity of common identification among
new generations from the different villages. In addition to this step, systematic efforts are in place to make each village an independent unit in terms of public services, thus minimizing the need to travel among the villages.

A program that was instituted between 1977 and 1980, which allowed a score of students to study in Syria, was reinstated in 1989. Previously, those selected to go were primarily from large hamulas, the sons of the most powerful traditional leaders. But, following the recent recommendations, the new program was less discriminating; any student is allowed to study in Syria if he or she and immediate members of their families promise to cease political activities. Those who refuse are punished by having their applications rejected. This program was also used to break the social ostracism that has always existed against collaborators who work in the state-appointed local councils. The applicants have to go through two interviews, one with the head of the local council and the second with a security officer from the office of the prime minister's adviser for Golan Druze affairs.

Following Zubeida's recommendations, Israel also sought to improve its relations with the religious establishment. For the first time, the state allowed a large religious delegation to visit holy sites in Syria in 1990. Two more visits were approved for hundreds of individuals to visit their relatives in Syria as long as they pass security clearance. And when the Syrian president's son (and heir apparent) died in a car accident, Israel allowed a delegation to visit Syria and participate in the funeral. While these steps are related to the renewed negotiations with the Syrian government after 1991, and might be interpreted as signs of flexibility in Israel's position regarding returning at least some territory to Syria, one must also consider their intended implications for the community as part of the new strategy of modified co-optation. If negotiations with Syria fail for whatever reasons, Israel hopes that such steps will prove its "good" intentions to the community, thereby facilitating a new campaign of permanent control and integration.

However, after ten years of active implementation, this new strategy has proved no more fruitful than previous strategies. So far, there are no signs to indicate that the community or segments of it are abandoning their belief in their Arabness or their identity as Syrian citizens. Even the younger generations who are more exposed to the Israeli-imposed educational curriculum are as active against the occupation as ever. This is because individual identity is forged primarily in family households and through communal socialization, a fact that is particularly true in the Golan Heights.

A Community under Siege

Virtually every family in the Golan has close relatives in Syria. This is largely a consequence of the 1967 war, when at least one third of the community happened to be outside the Golan and subsequently was barred from returning. Moreover, better known to the international community as the Shouting Hill, is a half mile east of Majdal Shams in the UN-controlled demilitarized zone. Because Israel has never given Syrians in the Golan the universal right, as opposed to rare, individual permission, to travel to Syria (or anywhere else in the Arab world), and because there are no phone links between the two countries, people use the hill to communicate with those across the boundary.

In the case of my family, for example, in the 1950s one of my father's sisters married into a family that lives in a village near Damascus. Her village is a 45-minute drive by car. But since 1967, all communication with her has been impossible. During the early 1970s, she used to come to the Shouting Hill to "meet" my family. But as she grew older, such trips became more difficult and eventually ceased. When her husband died, two funerals were held, one in his hometown, another in Majdal Shams, thereby giving my family a chance to mourn his passing. My aunt came to the Shouting Hill, and her sisters and brothers paid condolences through loudspeakers. Since 1967, every year one can witness funerals like this.

Sad incidents like funerals are seldom, if ever, reported by the Israeli or international media. But another phenomenon somewhat unique to the Golan community — marriage across the "border" is reported. Historically, the custom started when a few students who attended Damascus University in the 1970s decided to get married to women they met there. When they returned to the Golan, they applied for family reunification with their newly wedded spouses. In those instances, Israeli and international media arrived to cover the entry of the brides into the Golan through the UN base in the demilitarized zone. During the 1990s this phenomenon became more common. Now, however, the vast majority of the marriages are between family relatives who met on the Shouting Hill. While this might seem a very traditional form of marriage (i.e., marrying a virtual stranger), it emerged primarily due to the restriction of freedom of movement imposed by Israel on the community. The most common form of these marriages occurs between a bride from the Golan and a groom from other parts of Syria.

There is a sociological explanation for this phenomenon. Because the age of marriage has been on the rise since 1982, it has become more difficult for women who do not marry young to find spouses within the small population of the villages. One reason for this is that most high school graduates (especially males) decide to pursue higher education, thereby delaying their own marriages. At the same time, given the patriarchal realities in the Golan, there is still a tendency among men to seek marriage with women who are between 19 and 25 years old. As a result, many women find themselves with little prospect of finding a spouse and submit to family pressure to marry a relative in Syria.

More recently, financial hardship and inability to find a plot of land to build a private house makes marriage for young men and women more difficult. While the population of the villages has tripled since 1967, areas designated by Israel for construction have hardly increased.

As a result, the villages have become so crowded that little new construction is possible. And because, as most societies, members of the community believe that establishing a new family requires a separate residence that can accommodate children, many individuals suspend their engagement or marriage until a private residence is secured. All of which contributes — negatively — to the rising age of marriage.

For women approaching their mid-twenties, this often means that agreeing to a fixed marriage to a relative in Syria becomes more appealing than the prospect of remaining single for life. And while the practice of forced marriages does not exist in the Golan, social pressure and lack of options are the primary factors inspiring them to meet their future husbands at the Shouting Hill.

While the Israeli-imposed restrictions on freedom of travel to
Syria is the chief reason for this phenomenon, Israeli and Western media present these marriages as exotic or sad at best. Also underlying the coverage of these incidents is the assumption that Israel is helping these couples by allowing the marriages to take place and approving permissions for family reunification.

Between 1974 and 1979, under pressure from the international community, Israel granted limited access to some members of the community to meet their family members at a UN post inside the cease-fire line across from Majdal Shams. Permissions were granted by the office of the Israeli military governor. Excluded were all the families and relatives of those imprisoned after the arrest of the underground movement in 1973.

In 1977, community leaders petitioned Israel to allow high school graduates to attend Damascus University since very few could afford Israeli universities. Syria expressed its willingness to accept anyone who wished to study there and declared that Golan students would be given full scholarships and monthly stipends to cover food and other living expenses. While the military agreed to grant permissions, its security apparatus took advantage of this opportunity to further its control over the community. By restricting the number of permissions to ten students a year, Israel hoped to create competition among the extended families so that the leadership of these families would be inclined to improve their relationships with the military authorities to secure opportunities for their student relatives. The selection process was highly politicized in that permissions were given to the siblings of key persons in the community.

But when Israeli politicians began voicing their intent to annex the Golan in 1978, the military authorities were surprised by a unified rejection of its plans by all leaders of the community, even those who were previously seen as compliant. In response, Israel arrested five of the main leaders from Majdal Shams and canceled family meetings at the UN base. When the community's dissent became more vocal, Israel canceled the Syria scholarships altogether in the summer of 1981. In a dramatic display, Israel allowed the ten students going to Damascus to reach the UN office in Guneitra, at which time it declared they could not go, and forced them to return.

Between 1981 and 1988, not one person was allowed to travel to Syria. Furthermore, while most Palestinians could travel to Jordan, and from there to other destinations in the Middle East, no Golanis were allowed such opportunities. After Israel signed a peace agreement with Egypt, Israeli citizens (Jews and Arabs) could travel there, but not Syrians from the Golan.

Using the desperation of the community to reestablish contact with relatives in Syria, Israel applied the same strategy for handling applications for family reunification or travel to Syria. Throughout the 33 years of occupation, the only way to achieve family reunification has been by seeking the intervention of influential Israeli Druze to intervene with the authorities. By doing so, Israel hoped that a system of protectionism would emerge that would foster rivalries among families to compete for benefits. However, while people did take advantage of this setting, and competition did emerge among leaders, no serious strife resulted. When Israel took drastic measures to enforce the annexation, the leadership was wise enough not to let such rivalries come between them and a unified front against annexation.

Golani woman from Majdal Shams communicating with relatives across Shouting Hill, also called the Valley of Tears. Source: Arab Association for Development
After Israel revised its policies towards the community in accordance with Zubediah’s recommendations, scholarships to Syria were reinstated. And after the resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states in Madrid in 1991, restrictions on the number of students were lifted. However, while over 600 students have attended Damascus University between 1989 and today, these scholarships were used, as was the case in the 1970s, to undermine and compromise the community’s political will. High school students known to be active against the occupation are always denied permission. Moreover, all those who are granted permission are forced to meet with the appointed mayors of the local councils, who have always been seen by the community as collaborators and command no respect whatsoever.

The assertion that Israel uses (and abuses) the community’s needs to establish contacts with relatives in Syria to further its policies of co-optation or for diplomatic ends can be seen best through the issue of family reunification. Israeli immigration law, which allows only individuals belonging to the Jewish faith to immigrate to Israel, was used to justify Israel’s unwillingness to allow almost one-third of the Golanians who were not present in the region when it was occupied to return. The only way to circumvent this discriminatory law is to use two provisional exceptions stated by the law: allowing immediate family members or new spouses to return through family reunification. These two exceptions can also be suspended for “security” reasons.

In the case of the Golan, the infrequency of approving applications is consistent with Israel’s overall policy towards the community. When the state wanted to demonstrate its “good faith” intentions towards the community between 1967 and 1972, many applications were approved. Of course, no application was approved on its merits or through a standard legal process, but rather through interventions from local leaders with the authorities. When the community rejected the proposed annexation, and later resisted its enactment, few applications were approved. After 1989, with the institution of new policies, the rate of approval has risen again. In fact, between 1992 and today, more applications were approved than between 1975-89.

This manipulation of family relations and reunification is compounded by the fact that the vast majority of the population belongs to the Druze sect of Islam, which forbids marriage with non-Druze. The only options are to marry within the community or with Druze from Israel. But given the stark political differences with Israeli Druze, this option has been rarely pursued by Golan. Now, after 33 years of intermarriages within such a small community, the risk of hereditary diseases continues to rise. Israeli medical researchers have identified a form of hereditary diabetes that is unique to the Golan community, and a study by the Arab Association for Development indicates that the risk for heart disease is more prevalent within certain extended families, pointing to a possible hereditary cause.

This blatant violation of the right of freedom of travel and movement that has persisted since 1967 has always been rationalized by Israeli officials as a security necessity. However, such indiscriminate labeling of all members of the community as a security threat demonstrates the transparency of Israel’s actual intentions towards the Golan community. Whether individuals actively protest the occupation or take a more passive position, or even collaborate with it, the end result will still be indiscriminate subjugation and collective punishment such as restricting freedom of travel, land confiscation and denial of basic services.

Shouting Hill. Golan man waves to his family across the Demilitarized Zone. In background, a hill in Majdal Shams, confiscated by Israel in 1967, now surrounded by a mine field. Source: Arab Association for Development
Forms of Resistance to the Occupation

Disenfranchised communities, whether under occupation or not, utilize the little power they have to resist the injustice inflicted upon them. The form of resistance usually emerges from their lived reality and their available resources. In the Golan context, resistance was shaped by the types of repression employed by Israel and the community’s resources. Given its small size, armed resistance was not an option. Hence, throughout the occupation, communal resistance has been nonviolent.

One strategy was to extend farming lands to prevent Israel from confiscating them. While farming irrigated land was economically beneficial, a large portion of the villages’ land had no access to water or was located in hilly terrain. According to Israeli law, land not cultivated for five years in a row automatically becomes state land. To avoid losing these lands, community members labored to transform fallow lands into cultivated lands.

After 1978, when Israel made clear its intentions to annex the Golan and impose Israeli citizenship, the community realized that more assertive forms of resistance were needed to confront the new threat to their national and political identity. Public declarations by the leadership, accompanied by communal strikes and demonstrations, emerged as the new strategy to deal with occupation. The 1978-1982 period, when the community’s identity was under immediate assault, turned out to be one of maturation of the Arab national identity within the community. The new resistance also brought to the political forefront a younger, less traditional leadership.

The first signs of this emergent leadership can be traced to the late 1970s, when the only existing communal institutions, sports clubs, began carrying out political and social activities directed towards protesting the possible annexation.

In 1981, the Golan Academic Association was established. It was concerned exclusively with protesting the occupation and creating communal solidarity and resistance. This meant that the resistance, which had been managed by traditional and religious leaders until the late 1970s, now had an institutional dimension by the early 1980s.

In 1982, during the strike, the Women’s Committee was formed with a declared commitment to solidify resistance through advocating and enabling women’s participation. Both the Golan Academic Association and the Women’s Committee established kindergartens in 1983 in all villages. These were attempts to challenge Israeli monopoly over the educational system. In addition, the Golan Academic Association and the sports clubs organized the first summer camp in 1983 with the declared mission to compensate the younger generations for the biased presentation in the schools of Arab history, politics and culture. The camp became an annual event, providing an alternative site of education to raise Arab national consciousness and Arab identity.

Israel saw the camp as a threat to the application of its policies in the Golan. The police and the collaborator-run local councils intimidated those who rented rooms for the kindergartens by imposing high fines under the pretext that these places were not designated as rental property or safe for children. The community raised funds to pay these fines but, when this strategy failed, local councils established their own kindergartens. Most Golanis boycotted these schools because they felt that they undermined a popular initiative. When Israel succeeded in closing two kindergartens in the village of A’in Qinya, the local council closed its kindergarten too, proving that it had been established not to serve the community but to compete with the community-run ones.

As for the summer camp, every year Israeli security forces arrest some of the activists who run it to intimidate participation and support. When Israel attempted to compete with the camp by organizing its own camp, only a few teenagers registered and the camp was canceled. On at least three occasions, large police forces raided the camp attempting to close it, but all failed. In one instance, in 1989, when hundreds of policemen surrounded the camp, more than 2,000 men and women from all the villages rushed to the camp and forced the police to leave.

Among other things, communal support for the camp, the largest summer camp in all the Israeli-occupied territories, demonstrates the community’s acceptance and embrace of institutional activism. Still, this community-based activism has its limitations in light of the grave lack of social services in the Golan under Israeli occupation. By itself, the community could not mobilize or financially afford to establish a credible healthcare system or other types of projects that can improve living standards in the Golan.

To redress this lacuna, in 1991 a group of activists decided to establish the Arab Association for Development (AAD), the first and only registered non-governmental organization. The AAD started its work by initiating a health project with a very modest budget from donations in the community and equipment donated from the Jerusalem-based Palestinian al-Maqased and Augusta Victoria hospitals. Local physicians agreed to work for the new health center at 40 percent of their standard salaries, with the 60 percent to be paid when the clinic became successful. Until the opening of the polyclinic in 1993, healthcare services were severely inadequate. For example, Majdal Shams, with a population of 7,500 in 1991, was served by one Israeli-run clinic, with one general physician who worked six hours a day, five days a week. No services were available to handle emergency cases. Many people involved in car or work-related accidents died as a result of the total absence of local emergency services. Pregnant women had to travel by car almost one hour to reach the nearest hospital to deliver their babies. Medical measures like blood tests and X-rays required the patient to travel for 45 minutes to the nearest medical lab in the Israeli town of Kfar Shemona.

Within a few years, the AAD’s health center succeeded in overcoming most of these problems. Today, the center, with branches in four villages, provides 24-hour services for over 70 percent of the community’s health service needs. When AAD tried to establish a fifth branch in the village of Ghajar, Israeli security, with the help of collaborators, initiated an intimidation campaign against landlords who expressed willingness to provide a place for the clinic. AAD has encouraged the Ghajar community to use the new health services in the other four villages, and today scores of families are insured with the health center.

Most of the center’s employees are local specialists. Services include a medical lab, X-ray room, and a physiotherapy center. During its early stages, the center received funding from a few European non-governmental organizations, but eventually it became self-sufficient, maintaining itself from patient fees. Profits are reinvested to expand the scope of its services.

(Continued on page 13)
Syrian Villages on the Golan Heights Destroyed by Israel

A'abnine
A'adessa
A'alime
A'amoudiya
A'amret el Freij
A'asha
A'ayoung Hadid
A'ayoung Hamood
Abou Foula
Ahmediya
Ain el Hajal
Ain el Haour
Ain el Kourra
Ain el Wardiya
Ain Fite
Ain Sensem
Ain Zouan
Aishyey
Atleiga
Bab el Haoua (1)
Bab el Haoua (2)
Banass
Barha
Bassa
Beir Shoume
Bir A'ajam
Bira
Bjouriya
Boutmiya
Briqa
Cheikh Ali
Daboussiya
Dabia
Dahoura
Dalhanyia
Daloua
Deir A'aiziz
Deir Brass
Derdara
Doula
El A'al
El Faham
El Razaneya
Fakhoura
Farj
Fazara
Fig
Heitel
Houssainyat Cheikh Ali
Houssainnia
Houtya
Jdeya
Jalme
Jouaaza
Joubbata el Khashab
Khushniya
Kooufeir
Ma'alqa
Ma'araya
Mahar
Majami'a
Majdoulya
Mannoura
Maz Kanef
Mazra'a
Mazra el Nabo
Mazra el Quntr
Mlihia
Mnaitmata
Moumsiya
Mourhr
Mourhr Sheba'a
Na'ane
Nukhia
Oumm el Dannir
Qudriya
Qanaraba
Qarine
Qousiya
Qualta
Qilez Wawi
Qtrama
Qafaneya
Qurnitra
Rafid
Ramatniya
Raouia
Razaneya
Rouaneya
Sa'ada
Samulnya
Sanaber
Sehla
Shibba (1)
Shibba (2)
Sindiana
Skake
Skoufia
Siar el Kherfane
Slouanya
Soubahiya
Sourmae
Subah
Taiba
Tannouriya
Tel Azziziyate
Tranja
Ya'a roubyia
Yaqouassa
Zaait
Zaouara

Remains of the Syrian village of Khushniya, destroyed by Israel after its occupation of the Golan Heights.

Source: Arab Association for Development
Another ambitious project the AAD is pursuing is a cultural center that provides younger generations with the chance to develop artistic and musical talents. The music project provides courses in Arabic and classical instruments, with the assumption that Arabic music is a fundamental component of community's cultural identity. Such options are not only absent in the Israeli-run schools, but are deemed unnecessary and insignificant compared with "conventional" subjects like math and history. Currently, AAD is considering expanding this project to include theater, Arabic poetry and writing.

A third project that AAD has been carrying out for the past four years is an agricultural laboratory that provides consultation to farmers on the use of fertilizers, pesticides and improvement of production. In addition, the project has rented lands from local farmers to examine the prospects for crop diversification in order to avoid the weaknesses of a single-crop economy (apples), which is vulnerable to weather problems and market prices.

Since its establishment, the AAD has been subject to strict scrutiny by the Israeli security services, which seeks to close the organization. As part of this effort, all AAD members were summoned for interrogation by the Israeli police at one time or another, and at least in one instance the police accused the AAD of being a cover organization for "illegal" pro-Syrian activities.

But the unconditional communal support has made it difficult for Israel to close the AAD so far. As a result, currently Israel is following a different strategy. Like the case of the kindergartens in the 1980s, Israeli authorities decided to establish parallel health centers in two of the villages to compete with those of the AAD. While AAD was consistently denied permission for an ambulance, these new health centers were given permission months before they opened. The community, however, which is fully aware of the motives behind establishing the new centers, has remained faithful to the AAD's health center. Furthermore, given the non-profit nature of the AAD's projects, it is doubtful that the new centers, which are under the jurisdiction of the Israeli health ministry, will be able to compete, given the profit-oriented policies of the official healthcare system.

In addition to these types of AAD activities, the older forms of resistance are still as evident as ever. Community based kindergartens are still running despite all of Israel's obstacles. Last year's summer camp broke its old attendance record, hosting over 450 children between the ages of 8 and 15. The community continues its annual commemoration of the 1982 strike every February 14, as well as its celebration of Syria's Independence Day every April 17th.

Throughout 33 years of occupation, the community has succeeded in coming up with efficient non-violent responses to Israeli assaults on the independence and identity of its members. But given the disproportionate power that Israel has over this small community, activists argue that the longer the occupation lasts, the harder resistance becomes. Meanwhile, the recent revival of negotiations between Israel and Syria has triggered new hopes for a permanent resolution to the Golan problem by returning it to Syrian sovereignty.

The Future: Two Possible Scenarios

The resumption of negotiations between Israel and Syria marks a transition to a new era in the history of the community. Two possible scenarios could result from these negotiations: either the Golan will be returned to Syria as part of a larger peace agreement, or it will remain under Israeli occupation and the conflict will continue. Whatever happens, there is no doubt that the life of the Golan community will change dramatically.

If the Golan or portions of it including the villages are returned to Syria, new challenges will emerge. Basic, day-to-day functions will be radically altered. No one knows what the economic and political implications would be. Young generations of Golanis will be drafted into the army for the first time in over thirty years. Syria's present social and economic problems will become Golan problems. And many old problems will diminish.

If Israel retains the Golan for an indefinite period, the life of the community and its collective identity will definitely face new challenges. Learning from Israel's historic policies towards non-Jewish populations under its control, one can expect that the state will move fast to exploit the vulnerable situation of the community after another disappointment of a failed reunion with Syria. It will try to crush its young secular leaders in particular, since they challenge the very traditionalism that Israel seeks to maintain and exploit. At the same time, it is very likely that more economic and social incentives will be provided to the traditional leadership to win its support. But given the lessons of the recent history of the Golan, it is difficult to imagine that Israel will ever be able to win any real loyalty from this community, much less induce it into accepting permanent Israeli rule.

Endnotes

2 Salmon Fakhir al-Din, in "Twenty-five Years of Israeli Occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights" (Maajal Shams: Arab Association for Development, Lise Hajjar, ed. 1992), pp. 14-25. The six post-war Syrian villages that remained inhabited were: Maajal Shams, Mas'adeh, Bugatha, Ain Qinya, Ghajar and Shta. In 1969, the residents of Shta were forced by the Israeli military to relocate to Mas'adeh and Bugatha and the village was destroyed to make way for an Israeli military base.
4 Ibid., p. 277.
5 Historical evidence shows one reason this population remained in the Golan is that its spiritual leaders and community elders dissuaded those who wanted to flee by reminding them that when they fled in 1925, when the French overpowered the resistance, their villages were burned. Another reason is that this was the only population that relied on fruit-based agriculture, something that provided economic incentive to remain.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Jerusalem Post, August 22, 1983.
### AMEU’s Book Selections

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- Masri, M., Hanan Ashrawi: A Woman of Her Time (1995, 51 minutes). One of Palestine's most articulate representatives shows that Israel's occupation is far from over -- and far from benign. List: $65.00; AMEU: $35.00.
- Middle East Council of Churches, Disabled for Palestine (1993, 21 minutes). A Palestinian doctor shows cases of Palestinian civilians who have been maimed for life by Israeli bullets, beatings and tear gas. List: $25.00; AMEU: $10.00.
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