U.S.—Israeli Relations:  
A Reassessment

By Allan C. Kellum

Israel's military actions, particularly its excesses in Lebanon, have caused Americans to rethink the fundamental assumptions about U.S.-Israeli relations. The changes, though possibly temporary, are reflected in opinion polls, senators' statements and Presidential policy.

In his Presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan stated that Israel is "the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely." U.S. public opinion polls now show that Egypt is viewed as more reliable.

The United States is Israel's principal patron, and the time has come for Israel to give some attention to our interests and those of the industrialized world in general.

Former U.S. Senator Jacob Javits

Candidate Reagan, in what was seen as a promise of American military support for Israel, warned against weakening Israel by providing it with "insufficient military assistance." Israel's unilateral military adventures in possible violation of U.S. arms export control laws would later force Reagan to halt the supply of certain military items to Israel. In July 1981, for example, the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor caused Reagan to temporarily halt delivery of American fighter aircraft. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon prompted him to delay the Congressional notification and review of a possible sale of 75 F-16 aircraft to Israel, a $2.7 billion sale and the largest to Israel ever. Finally, Reagan stopped, perhaps permanently, shipment of cluster bomb artillery shells to Israel pending a review of a U.S.-Israeli agreement restricting their use.

Thus, the penchant of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to substitute naked military might for diplomacy—might that stems from sophisticated, made-in-America hardware—is directly counter to American interests and can only damage the United States in the world's eyes. That message to Israel is coming from some of its long-time supporters.

Urging Israel to halt further settlements and be more forthcoming in the Palestinian Autonomy Talks, Jacob Javits, one of Israel's strongest backers while serving as a U.S. Senator from New York during 1957 to 1980, said, in a New York Times article: "The United States is Israel's principal patron, and the time has come for Israel to give some attention to our interests and those of the industrialized world in general."

With Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Senator Paul Tsongas, also a strong supporter of Israel, was one of the first senators to raise an impassioned cry about the carnage in Lebanon. On June 21, Tsongas, a Massachusetts Democrat, advocated that the U.S. simply say: "This is wrong. We recognize the historical devastation of the Holocaust; we recognize the atrocities committed by the Palestinians on Israel; we recognize Israel's right to survive and right to be secure; but ... for God's sake enough is enough."

Publicly, President Reagan gradually escalated his own rhetoric. Presidential "outrage" on August 12 at the Israeli bombing of West Beirut preceded his "horrified" reaction September 18 to news of the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Killings at the hands of Lebanese militiamen in an area lighted by Israeli flares and controlled by the Israeli military. Upon learning of the massacre, President Reagan summoned Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arens and demanded "that the Israeli Government immediately withdraw its forces from West Beirut."

America's new willingness—from the man in the street to the occupant of the Oval Office—to speak plainly about U.S.-Israeli differences is, in Meg Greenfield's view, "a turn for the better, the more normal." Now that those issues of dispute are no longer obscured, the peace process hopefully will be advanced.

That is the vision which President Reagan expressed in his September 1st Mideast peace initiative as he acknowledged that "we have avoided public comment on the key issues ... But it has been there all along."

Allan C. Kellum is publisher of the Washington report, The Mideast Observer. His previous contribution to The Link appeared in January/February 1980 on "How the Presidential Candidates View the Middle East."
About This Issue

Reassessment, one of those catchall words, implies anything from substantial change to a slight variation on an old theme. In the lexicon of U.S.-Middle East diplomacy, it is a word not without its own lineage. Have events of the Summer of '82 forged a reassessment in America of the U.S.-Israeli relationship? If so, what are its causes, what might be the effects, and where do analysts place it on the scale of slight to substantial?

For answers A.M.E.U. went to Allan Kellum, publisher of The Middle East Observer, an independent, twice-monthly Washington report which focuses on United States Middle Eastern policy. His vantage point is Capitol Hill, and his assessment of the reassessment is presented here both as a review of the catastrophic events of the past year and as an attempt to evaluate the impact of these events on future United States-Israeli relations.

The Notice section, page 15, offers information on Project Loving Care (sponsorship of Palestinian children under Israeli occupation); Musa Alami and the Arab Development Society (a unique vocational training center in the Jordan Valley); and a Middle East study guide and filmstrip (new from the Presbyterian Church Office of World Service and World Hunger).

The review of American Church Politics and the Middle East appears on page 14. This, and other significant books on the Middle East, may be obtained at substantial savings from A.M.E.U.; see page 15 for details.

The Link article on "Biblical Prophecy and Modern Day Israel," intended for this issue, has been rescheduled for later next year. In light of America's deepening military presence in Lebanon, our January-February issue will focus on "Military Peacekeeping in the Middle East."

John F. Mahoney, Executive Director

become evident to me that some clearer sense of America's position on the key issues is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process."8

A discussion of those key issues follows a look at the economic, military and diplomatic dimensions of the American-Israeli special relationship.

U.S. Aid To Israel

No other foreign country has ever received more Congressionally approved foreign aid than Israel. Vietnam held the record with a total of slightly less than $25.4 billion. In early October 1982, with the final passage of the fiscal year 1983 Continuing Appropriations Resolution, Israel took the lead with a cumulative total of $25.5 billion in U.S. aid (see chart).

Such large sums for Israel are a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back only to the 1970's. Not until 1952 did Israel receive more than one million dollars per year in U.S. economic assistance. Military aid to Israel had not yet begun and, when it did start in the late 1950's, it was still several years until it broke the million dollar per year mark in fiscal year 1962.

Admittedly the current figure, $25.5 billion, can be shown to be even higher if one considers the U.S. pattern of deficit spending which necessitates U.S. borrowing to finance charges on monies that the Treasury spends. Or the Israeli drain on the U.S. Treasury can be shown to be less than $25 billion if one subtracts the amounts that Israel repays on U.S. loans it has received.

The fact remains that total U.S. loans and grants to Israel, as approved by Congress, now exceed $25 billion, about one-tenth of all aid dispersed by the U.S. abroad since Israel's creation in 1948.

Aid to Israel now amounts to about one-fourth of the total annual U.S. foreign aid program, rivaled only by Egypt. But, considering that Egypt is about 10 times more populous than Israel, Israel is far and away the largest recipient of U.S. aid on a per capita basis.

Writing in the New York Times, James Reston has accurately described U.S. aid to Israel as amounting to "between $3,500 and $4,000 for every family of five in Israel—more than the unemployed get in Detroit."9

Israel, with a per capita GNP on a par with Ireland, Spain, and Italy, has more than 100 countries below it, many far below it, in a list ranking nations by their GNP per capita.10 The emphasis on helping Israel strains the credibility of American interest in the "poorest of the poor."

As John Gilligan, when he was head of the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) said: "When we go to international conferences and tell people from the underdeveloped nations that we're sincerely concerned about their plight, they just roll their eyes and say: "Oh, sure you are."11

Not only does Israel receive large amounts of U.S. funds, but, in the process, it is accorded special treatment. A lengthy list could be made of special loan rates, "forgiven" loans, and special programs that benefit only Israel. Amply illustrated in the Continuing Appropriations Resolution that provided stopgap funds for fiscal year 1983, Israeli aid was based on one standard and aid to the rest of the world was pegged to a second, less advantageous standard. The legal wording guaranteed that Israel would receive funds at the same rate as in fiscal year 1982, but other nations would draw from a smaller pool than in fiscal year 1982 and under criteria that ensured the amount would be "lower and under the more restrictive authority."
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TOTAL: 251,286 25,308.3 2,105.0 5,792.3 10,262.5 6,850.0 277.5

1. Does not include Export-Import Bank Loans.
2. Less than $50,000.
3. This figure includes $21 million in economic assistance reprogrammed from the Israeli account in FY81.

In 1978, the General Accounting Office (G.A.O.), the Congressional watchdog of financial matters, conducted a special study entitled "U.S. Economic Assistance for Israel." That report noted in several cases that economic aid programs for Israel extend beyond monies provided by the foreign aid bill itself. Included in that listing were:

- A $55-million Ashdod-based water desalination project.
- Public Law 480 food sales.
- Export-Import Bank loans and Overseas Private Investment Corporation investment guarantees.
- More than $10 million in grants to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration to help transport refugees to Israel and other countries.
- Through 1976, about "$120 million in grants to the United Israel Appeal to help resettle Soviet refugees in Israel."

In 1978, as of October 8, 1982, formally submitted its request for American aid for fiscal year 1984. Although the State Department declined to comment either on its content or the amount that the U.S. may ultimately agree to provide, diplomatic correspondents in Washington have learned that the request was for $3.2 billion — $1.97 billion in military assistance and $1.25 billion in economic aid.13

In its 1982 annual report on the Israeli economy, A.I.D. pointed out that "U.S. assistance was Israel's largest single source of capital inflows," that its foreign currency reserves actually grew in the previous year, and that Israel's economic program "would only be successful in the absence of further unforeseen stresses to the Israeli economy."

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was an "unforeseen" economic stress on Israel, a stress not taken into account in the March 1982 A.I.D. study of Israel's economic health. Israel, rather than asking the U.S. to cover the costs of the Lebanese invasion, claims to be raising $1.5 billion in new Israeli taxes. "But in doing so," states Philip Geyelin in a Washington Post commentary, "it is also raising a question for some Congressional critics: if Israel is rich enough to pay for Lebanon out-of-pocket, what does that say about its need for U.S. aid at current levels?"15

David Becomes U.S.-Supplied Goliath

Israel has become the most powerful military force in the Middle East, thanks largely to American assistance. The supply of arms is even more recent than the economic aid connection. Adhering to the April 17, 1948, U.N. Security Council embargo on arms sales to the Palestine area, the U.S. provided no direct military aid to Israel in its early years. Not until fiscal year 1962 did U.S. military aid to Israel exceed the one million dollar mark.

Prior to the October 1973 Middle East war, also known as the Yom Kippur War, military aid ("forgiven loans") were non-existent. Since then such grant aid
Foreign Military Sales Financing Program Israel
(Fiscal Year — U.S. $ Billions)

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*Includes Transitional Quarter (FY 1971)
Source: Congressional Presentation Document, FY 1983

Major Weapon Systems Provided
FY 1974–FY 1981

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*Includes Super, Sub, Heli, Other A/C
Source: DSAA as of June 9, 1982

has averaged more than one-half billion annually, more than Israeli aid totaled in any year prior to 1971.

The big jump in military aid dates to Senate and House votes in December 1973 providing $2.2 billion to resupply Israel in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. The 1975 Sinai II Disengagement Agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace in 1979 were each followed by a flow of arms.

The inescapable conclusion is that the 1975 and 1979 agreements were “bought” largely with the currency of arms. After the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, Israel, as part of the “peace package,” received an extra $3 billion—$2.2 billion for arms and $0.8 billion to move two military airbases from the Sinai to the Negev. Voting against that “peace package” along with a handful of other senators, William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, called it “a new round of the arms race in the Middle East dressed as the dove of peace.”

In truth, the arms larges to Israel has also been to offset huge sales from the United States, the Soviets and others to the Arab world. In 1981 alone, President Reagan’s first year in office, Congress approved more than $15 billion in arms sales and military construction for Saudi Arabia. Such large amounts have provided Israeli partisans with potent arguments for sustaining or increasing Israel’s military acquisition program. For example, the proposed AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia was announced at about the same time as the Administration’s promise of an additional $300 million in arms aid for Israel for fiscal year 1985 and again in fiscal year 1984.

A new GAO study, due out in February, is expected to shed new light on the Israeli-U.S. arms relationship. One news report of its preliminary findings revealed that an Israeli arms purchasing center located in New York “has a staff of 240 and an annual budget of about $8 million.”

Unlikely other countries that rely on the government-to-government purchase of arms through the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, Israel is increasingly making its own commercial deals with U.S. arms manufacturers. In fact, an August 15, 1980 study by the Middle East Observer revealed that Israel had far more commercial arms purchases from the U.S. than major FMS buys during that fiscal year.

From the U.S., Israel has acquired the latest and best. Writing in the Washington Post, Phillip Geyelin reports that “Israel pretty much gets what it wants under a procurement arrangement so impenetrably complex that the most knowledgeable members of Congress cannot explain it.”

Despite the high visibility of the halt on the cluster bomb artillery shells and the hold on the pending announcement of a $8.7 billion sale of 75 F-16’s to Israel, some other items in the U.S. arsenal continued to flow to Israel after its June 6 invasion of Lebanon. Reportedly these included 15 tanks, howitzers, various munitions including “smart bombs,” and armored personnel carriers.

If in the past such military aid to Israel could be justified as contributing to the peace process, that argument rang hollow in 1982.

The year before, the foreign affairs leadership gained passage of the foreign aid authorization bill by arguing that “encouraging the peace process in the Middle East region is a major objective” of the monies in that bill. In 1982, that argument was dusted off for use as the bill headed for floor debate in early June. But the bill and the argument, both casualties of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, were shelved, never to appear again during the 97th Congress.
U.S. Diplomatic Support

The 1970's also became a time of increasing U.S. diplomatic support for Israel at the United Nations. As Herbert Drucks relates in his diplomatic history of U.S.-Israeli relations, up to the early 1970's "the U.S. would time and again respond to Arab complaints by supporting [U.N.] resolutions of censure condemning Israel, but Israeli complaints seldom received support." 21

All that changed when Ambassador George Bush, now Vice President, cast the first United States veto of a Middle East-related Security Council resolution on September 10, 1972. The issue then was an Israeli air raid of Lebanon in retaliation for Palestinian terrorist action against Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. Bush, in his 1980 campaign, cited the lack of mention of the prior terrorist act as the reason the U.S. vetoed that resolution condemning the Israeli bombings. 22 That reason—lack of balance—has subsequently been cited as the reason for several U.S. vetoes.

In 1975 Henry Kissinger assured Israel that the United States would "not 'recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization' and also agreed that America "will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council" that alters the terms of the peace process.

Thus, on January 26, 1976, the U.S. vetoed a resolution that, according to a U.S. State Department description of its contents, affirmed that the "Palestinian people...should be enabled to exercise self-determination and that Israel should withdraw from territories occupied since 1967." 23

As of this writing, in November 1982, the most recent of roughly 12 U.S. vetoes of Mideast resolutions was the August 6th veto of a resolution calling on all United Nations member states to "refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons and from providing it with any military aid until the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory." 24

On June 8 and 9, 1982, the U.S. vetoed Security Council resolutions calling for sanctions aimed at altering Israeli behavior, and, with 127 nations in favor, Israel and America stood alone in opposing a June 26 General Assembly resolution calling for economic sanctions against Israel and Israel's immediate withdrawal from Lebanon.

"No to U.N. sanctions against Israel, but "yes" to sanctions against the U.N. appeared to be the American position as Secretary of State Shultz vowed on October 16 that "if Israel were excluded from the General Assembly, the United States would withdraw from participation in the [General] Assembly and would withdraw payments to the United Nations, until Israel's right to participate is restored." 25 That threat plus what American officials termed an "all-out lobbying effort" resulted in a 75-to-9 defeat, on October 26, 1982, of the effort to unseat Israel.

Although economic leverage works when applied to most other nations, the United States has, for the time being, ruled it out as a means of pressuring Israel to be more forthcoming in the peace process.

Disenchantment With Israeli Policy

U.S. opinion polls following the Sabra-Shatilla massacre indicated a marked increase in negative views towards Israeli policy. The focal point of the discontent appeared to be Prime Minister Menachem Begin, as Begin's ratings dipped to a greater extent than did those of Israel itself.

For example, a Washington Post-ABC News poll showed that 47 percent of the respondents rated their feelings towards Begin as "unfavorable" in September of 1982, more than double the 22 percent unfavorable rating that he had received in an earlier March poll by the same organization.

Asked about their basic sympathy towards Israel in comparison to the Arab nations in general, 55 percent of those polled registered more sympathy for Israel in March. By September, this sympathy rating for Israel had dropped only 7 percentage points to 48 percent.

However, when the question was whether "Israel is a reliable ally of the United States or not," the shift in American perceptions was, paralleling attitudes toward Begin himself, decidedly toward the negative end of the scale. From October 1981 until September 1982, the drop in those responding that Israel is a reliable ally was from a 64 percent majority to a 40 percent minority.

At the same time, Americans shifted their perception of Egypt, which according to the Post-ABC News poll, was viewed as being more reliable than Israel.

A clear majority, 59 percent, agreed that "the United States should stop supplying Israel with military arms," while only 35 percent disagreed and 6 percent expressed no opinion.

Similar results were illustrated in a Newsweek poll conducted by the Gallup Organization in September of 1982. Fifty percent of those polled responded "yes" when asked if U.S. aid to Israel should be suspended or reduced in order to force a pullout of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

Asked to compare their degree of sympathy with Israel to what they felt one year previously, 51 percent stated that they were less sympathetic. Furthermore, the Newsweek poll found that 56 percent of the American Jews polled had become less sympathetic with Israel in the span of a year.

An even larger percentage of Jews and non-Jews blamed Prime Minister Begin's policies for the decline in U.S. support for Israel. Seventy percent of the national sample and 78 percent of the Jewish sample (compared with 53 percent one year earlier) placed the blame on Begin.

The Newsweek poll registered a larger shift in sympathy toward the Arab position than did the Washington Post-ABC News poll. Newsweek found that whereas in July of 1981 those polled were more sympathetic towards Israel than the Arabs by a 5-to-1 margin (49 percent to 10 percent), its new data
showed Israel only slightly more favored than the Arab nations (32 percent to 28 percent). Commenting on this change, Newsweek noted that this was the "first time ever that Israel has not been heavily favored." The majority of the national sample in the Newsweek poll favored some form of Arab sovereignty for the West Bank as opposed to Israeli sovereignty. The figures were 54 percent favoring either an independent Palestinian state (25 percent) or returning it to Jordan to be a demilitarized zone (31 percent) as compared to 21 percent nationally that favored complete Israeli control (9 percent) or Israeli military control with Palestinian civil control (12 percent).

If the Israeli invasion of Lebanon tarnished Israel's image in the U.S. and other parts of the world, it did not have that effect in Israel itself. To the contrary, Begin's image was enhanced. An opinion poll conducted in mid-August by the Mod'in Ezrachi Research Institute of Tel Aviv concluded that Begin's party would gain 66 of the Knesset's 120 seats and, for the first time ever in Israeli electoral politics, control of an absolute majority of the Knesset would be gained by a single party with no need to find coalition partners. That 66-seat figure compares the 65 Knesset seats that Begin's coalition now controls and is also 15 more than a similar pre-invasion poll indicated that his party would have received. By contrast, the post-invasion poll found that, if elections had been held at that time, the Labor Party would have garnered only 35 Knesset seats, trailing Begin's Likud Party by 31 seats.

In the wake of the Sabra-Shatila massacre, polls showed that, while the popularity of both Prime Minister Begin and his Defense Minister Sharon dropped slightly, they still were the top choices among those polled for their respective positions.

In a Jerusalem Post poll conducted before and after the massacre, nearly half (49.8 percent) responded that Begin was best suited to be Israeli Prime Minister beforehand and his popularity slumped only slightly to 42.9 percent after the massacre. No other Israeli political personality registered more than 15 percent in the poll, either before or after the massacre.

Similarly, the Jerusalem Post poll showed that Ariel Sharon dropped from 49.0 percent to 42.4 percent as the choice of voters as the person best suited to be defense minister. In his case, the gap between him and the next most popular persons (Yitzhak Rabin with 8.9 percent and Ezer Weizman with 8.8 percent) was even greater. No other personality registered more than 10 percent.

While Sharon and Begin's unpopularity among some segments of Israeli society is intense (evidenced by the mass demonstration of 10 percent of Israel's entire population demonstrating in Tel Aviv on September 25, 1982), they have a reservoir of support which the Jerusalem Post describes, in Sharon's case, as being "young voters (18-22), Israelis born in Asia and Africa, with primary schooling, and voters for the Likud and religious parties." In the 1970's supporters of Israel could regularly get about three-quarters of the Senate to sign letters and resolutions backing Israel—the most notable being the May 21, 1975 letter of 76 senators to President Ford recommending that the U.S. be "responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs." This letter was instrumental in ensuring that the 1975 Ford-Kissinger "reassessment" of U.S.-Israeli policy ended without adversely affecting United States aid for Israel.

As Begin's policies have repeatedly clashed with American interests and, as the American public's attitudes have changed, so has that of Congress. Now, the senator's missives objecting to policy are increasingly sent to the Israeli Prime Minister rather than to the U.S. President. For example, within the week after the Sabra-Shatila massacre, Senator Alan Cranston, one of Israel's staunchest defenders, publicly distanced himself from the Begin Government by issuing a letter to the Israeli Prime Minister accusing him and Defense Minister Sharon of substituting "naked military force for a balanced foreign policy." Upon release of the letter on September 22, 1982, the California Democrat pointedly stated that the Begin Government's actions "in Beirut are wrong and are hurting Israel's standing in the United States Senate." Considering Senator Cranston's role as the leading defender of Israel's bombing of the Iraqi reactor in the summer of 1981 and as a leader of the fight to block the Saudi AWACS sale, these words are strong indeed.

The turnabout in Cranston's position is all the more stark in contrast to his effort to provide Israel with a virtual blank check only months earlier. On May 25, 1982, Cranston had introduced an amendment to the foreign aid bill that would have ensured that U.S. aid to Israel would have matched the interest Israel owes annually on its debts to the U.S.

All eight Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of Cranston's amendment modified to apply only to fiscal year 1983. The ninth vote, providing a majority on the 17-member committee, was that of Rudy Boschwitz, a Republican from Minnesota. Other Republican senators, voted against the proposal; several spoke out strongly against it. Committee Chairman Charles Percy of Illinois called the Cranston proposal "earth shattering." Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland warned that it was not wise to put "an ally and a friend" like Israel "into a more favored, preferential status than any state of the United States.

With Israel's invasion of Lebanon, most of the eight Democrats, including Cranston himself, publicly distanced themselves from Israeli policy. For example, Paul Tsongas, Claiborne Pell, Joseph Biden and John Glenn all expressed objections to Israeli settlement policy. And Senator Edward Zorinsky of Nebraska suggested that relief aid to Lebanon be subtracted from monies that had been destined for Israel.

But it was Israeli Prime Minister Begin's June 22 meeting with about 40 senators during his post-invasion Washington visit that revealed just how sour American-Israeli relations had become as the senators' pent-up discontent with Israeli erupted. It was, in New York Senator Patrick Moynihan's view, "the most difficult meeting with a head Congressional Attitudes Change
On September 22, just days after the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila camps, Senator Alan Cranston publicly issued the following letter addressed to Israeli Prime Minister Begin and critical of his actions.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

For almost two generations my country has joined with yours to build an Israel which can provide its people with increasing opportunities for human fulfillment within peaceful borders, and to work for a peace and a stability in the Middle East that will benefit your people, our people, all people. This history does not permit Americans to direct Israel’s actions. However, our share in the chronicle of your country does entitle us to be known as your friend. And the trust we share of friendship is not flattery or unquestioning support, but honest counsel. Indeed, it would be a betrayal of friendship to conceal criticism of actions we think likely to defeat the goals we have shared for so long.

As you well know, the State of Israel has no stronger supporter in the U.S. Congress than I. Repeatedly through the years, during both Democratic and Republican Administrations, I have helped lead battles in the U.S. Senate to defend the mutual interests of our two countries, to augment Israel’s strength and security, and to oppose the enhancement of the military power of Arab nations hostile to Israel.

I do not doubt that the root cause of all the violence in the Middle East lies in the Arab holy war against Israel, lies in the refusal of so many Arab nations to recognize the right of Israel to exist and in their refusal to make peace with her, and lies in P.L.O. terrorism.

I do not believe that the United States would sit idly by if Cuban forces defied one of our neighbors and massed thousands of armed guerrillas on one of our borders, commenced transforming them into military units replete with increasing supplies of Soviet equipment including tanks, rockets and artillery, and proceeded to wound and kill Americans in terrorist attacks launched across our border upon our communities and our citizens.

After all, we sent U.S.-trained forces into hostile action at the Bay of Pigs, and we risked a nuclear confrontation because of our concern over military developments in Cuba—an island 90 miles off our shore—that we considered a threat to our national security.

Even now, every Soviet infant, child, woman and man is targeted by American nuclear missiles. They are held hostage, threatened with instant death if those who rule the Soviet Union attack us or our allies. And every American, in turn, is targeted and held hostage by Soviet nuclear weapons. Indeed, every human on God’s earth is held in thrall by this threat of the holocaust of all holocausts, one that would consume Jew and Gentile alike, one that would not discriminate between faiths and races. There is no longer any exodus to a place which cannot be reached by the missiles of man. Until the United States moves with more resolution, determination and creativity than we are now displaying to terminate this threat to each and all of us, our own hands are not clean.

Israel is not alone in its use of military force to defend its perceived interests. There is a terrible global drift toward war. Violence is endemic in the world.

The U.S. has itself resorted to force to advance its perceived interests. In Vietnam, we too suffered the harsh consequences of over-estimating the utility of force. We learned in Vietnam that violence begets violence; that expanding of state” in his memory.97 What is yet to be seen is the permanence in the change in political climate. Now that the “difficult” issues are on the table and frankly discussed, will they be resolved or simply recede again as the memory fades of Lebanon’s tragedy fades. Time will tell.

U.S.-Israeli Policy Differences

U.S.-Israeli tension “is in its worst state in 30 years” and the U.S. “ought to move to get some dialogue going,” said California Representative Robert Dornan at a Capitol Hill hearing September 29, 1982.

“I don’t think the problem is a lack of dialogue,” responded Nicholas Velonis, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia. “We’ve had some very serious substantive differences.”

Interestingly, in a pamphlet published in Hebrew in 1953, Menachem Begin, perceiving that American-Israeli interests in the region do not coincide, warned the Israeli leadership of an imminent catastrophe and advised Israel’s leaders of the 1950’s not to give the “green light” to U.S. policy initiatives that Begin viewed as against Israeli interests.98 Nearly 30 years later, those conflicting interests have pushed themselves to the forefront of public attention. One of many indicators of this is the Library of Congress’ Congressional Research Service (CRS) which has added this general topic to its Issue Briefs. Members of Congress look to CRS for an in-house informational source for answering constituent correspondence, preparing speeches, and performing their legislative duties. The appearance of the Issue Brief entitled “Israel-American
force has an impulse of its own, beyond the control of those who sit in government offices; that the unleashed beast of brutality cannot separate the innocent and the helpless from the armored enemy.

I did not condemn Israel's initial move into Lebanon for the avowed purpose of protecting Israeli citizens against repeated P.L.O. attacks launched from that country.

And I refrained, despite deep misgivings, from commenting publicly on your siege of Beirut and your entry into its western section. I am reluctant to criticize a treasured friend and ally—especially when that friend and ally is in the midst of a military struggle.

But the massacre of hundreds of men, women and children is another matter. It will be some time before we accurately know who was to blame for the massacre. We may never know.

The question of responsibility is easier to answer. By moving Israeli forces into West Beirut for your declared purpose of restoring stability and preventing bloodshed, your government took on certain responsibilities.

You assumed responsibility for preserving order and protecting human life in Beirut—in this you failed.

Mr. Prime Minister, the recent behavior of your military forces in Beirut is causing deep concern and expressions of outrage among many of Israel's friends. This concern threatens to erode support for Israel in the U.S. Senate and among the American people. As a matter of conscience, I, too, must now speak out.

I am troubled by the methods you should write to the Washington office of their Congressional representative.)

Interestingly, the political section in the upcoming General Accounting Office report will draw heavily on CRS's Issue Brief.

Israeli actions, particularly its continuing settlement policy in the territories, are signs of its unwillingness to trade off these territories for peace. That is a switch from Israeli policy prior to Prime Minister Begin's election in 1977.

According to the CRS report: "The Begin Government maintains that its acceptance of full withdrawal from the Sinai as part of the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty fulfills the Israeli pledge to withdraw from occupied territories. According to the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem are Israeli sovereign territory and are not subject to negotiation." 41

The Israeli Knesset has already formally annexed East Jerusalem, and, on December 14, 1981, it voted to apply

national forces who are to assist the Lebanese Army in assuming security responsibilities.

2. I urge your government to cooperate in achieving the swift withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon—Syrian, P.L.O. and Israeli. And I urge that your government exercise the utmost restraint in the use of your superior military strength against Syrian and P.L.O. forces still in Lebanon until such an agreement is reached.

3. I urge your government to return to Israel's traditional concern over only immediate threats to its own borders and that your government abandon its reliance on military force for the solution of essentially diplomatic problems.

4. Finally, though I myself have reservations about elements of President Reagan's proposed peace plan, I urge your government to reconsider promptly its outright, precipitous rejection of his entire proposal.

Perhaps the most somber consequence of the current strife in Lebanon is the dimming of the inspiring moral beacon which has shone so brightly from beleaguered Israel.

Some day the turmoil and the killing in Lebanon must end. Israel will still be surrounded by hostile neighbors. Will you then be more secure if you have dispensed with the moral strength which armed your people and enlivened your friends? A bold vision of peace and reconciliation is essential in the days ahead if we are to leave a safer world for our children.

Your in peace.

(signed) Alan Cranston

Relations." primarily examining "diverging perspectives on major bilateral issues," is a sign that the American body politic is fundamentally reassessing that relationship. 39 (Readers wishing a copy of Issue Brief No. IB890208

Territory For Peace?

A major difference between the U.S. and Israel concerns the disposition of the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war. "It is the United States' position," President Reagan stated in his September 1st Middle East peace initiative, "that—in return for peace—the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza." 40

...
Israel’s “law, jurisdiction, and administration” to the Golan Heights, an action tantamount to annexation.

Strongly disagreeing with the Israeli position in each case, the United States position on Jerusalem, as reiterated by President Reagan on September 1, is that Jerusalem’s “final status should be decided through negotiations” (not unilaterally imposed as Israel has sought to do).

Objecting to Israel’s move on the Golan Heights, the United States expressed the view that the Israeli action violated international agreements, the spirit of Camp David and the U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Strategic Cooperation.

Although the United States vetoed a proposed United Nations resolution that called for sanctions against Israel, the United States did suspend implementation of the MOU that Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and U.S. Defense Minister Caspar Weinberger had signed in Washington on November 30, 1981. The United States viewed the Israeli unilateral action in the Golan as contrary to the MOU’s principle of bilateral consultations and therefore halted discussion of other areas of cooperation called for in the MOU, such as joint naval and air maneuvers, pre-positioning of U.S. medical supplies in Israel, and the possible U.S. purchase of Israeli made military supplies.

The West Bank and Gaza remain available for the territory-for-peace trade-off, but not for long. Israel is rapidly taking land for its own use. In his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State-designate George Shultz noted in mid-July that Israelis now use about 30 percent of the occupied territories.

That figure is outdated already. “The Israeli Government already holds, or can easily take under a procedure it now uses, between 55 and 60 percent of the land in the West Bank,” states Anthony Lewis. Lewis’s figures are from a recent study by Meron Benvenisti and other Israeli social scientists. Benvenisti, a former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, concluded that it is “five minutes to midnight” for resolving the disputed West Bank/Gaza territory before there is no more of it to negotiate.

Begin totally rejected this message and Reagan’s entire peace initiative. Providing a tangible “no” to Reagan’s call for a settlement freeze, Begin’s government funded three new West Bank settlements and announced the plans for seven more.

The long-standing U.S. premise for a Middle East peace has been the principle of territory-for-peace—a rapidly evaporating premise as Israel’s settlements expand. With Israeli settlement, the territorial base for providing a homeland for the Palestinians is dwindling. As Secretary Shultz said in his confirmation hearings: “If we are going to meet the problems of the Palestinians, certainly the West Bank and Gaza are going to be a part of the terrain on which that is going to be done.”

Settlement Policy

Through its settlement policy, Israel is providing tangible evidence that Begin is carrying forward his intention, as stated in his government’s election platform, to permanently retain “Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District,” Begin’s nomenclature for the occupied areas.

At Camp David, President Jimmy Carter thought that he had Prime Minister Begin’s agreement to halt Israeli settlement activity. But, in Carter’s view, Begin did not keep his word. “The massive settlement program in the occupied territories, launched by the Israelis contrary to repeated assurances by their leaders,” said Carter in a recent article, “has been an extremely unpleasant surprise to all of us who had such high hopes for a peaceful resolution of the major Middle East issues.”

On the settlement issue, Carter, while President, was not as clear and forceful as he needed to be to make the general public aware of the U.S. stand. Particularly confusing was the infamous “glitch” on a U.N. Security Council vote, a vote the U.S. initially intended to use to emphasize, as the resolution stated, the deep concern “over the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing this settlement policy in the occupied territories.” Instead, the U.S. position, not just on settlements but also on Jerusalem, got completely lost in the political flap that ensued when on March 5, 1980, 48 hours after the vote, Carter announced that the U.S. had erred and intended to abstain from the vote.

Saying that Israel’s settlement policy is “the single thing that can undermine U.S. longstanding political support for Israel,” Senator Biden advised Carter that he would be better served by making a simple, direct statement, such as: “We’re mad as the devil with Begin for moving forward with these settlements.”

President Reagan also sent Begin mixed signals on this issue. By claiming that the settlements were “not illegal,” Reagan first flashed Begin the green light, which changed to caution as his spokesmen maintained that, legal or not, they harm the peace process.

Finally, in his September 1st peace initiative, Reagan plainly stated the long-standing U.S. policy toward settlements as he said: “The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transition period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.”
Begin's government, to its credit, took the politically difficult step of dismantling settlements in the Sinai. Reagan now is not asking for dismantlement, only a halt on new settlements. The settlement count? As of November, "More than 20,000 Jews now live in more than 100 such settlements." "This is just the beginning," said Benvenisti in a New York Times interview, "because since 1979, the Israeli Government has adopted a new approach toward land ownership, which has enabled it to seize practically any land needed for unlimited Jewish settlement in the West Bank." 38

According to Benvenisti, as described by Anthony Lewis: "The Begin Government aims to have 100,000 settlers in the West Bank as soon as possible. That figure would be, it says, a 'critical mass'—so large a number that no Israeli Government could agree to withdraw from the territory." 39

America's territory-for-peace approach was shared by all the Arab-Israeli confrontation states, including Israel, until Begin came to power. Now, if Begin has his way, the territory-for-peace formula is headed for a dead end and there is no other peace approach in sight.

Relations With The Arab World

The U.S. and Israel frequently differ on how the other should relate to the Arab world. The U.S. wants Israel to be responsive to legitimate Arab claims, to settle conflict at the bargaining table rather than the battlefield, and to take initiatives that are positively oriented. Israeli interests, however, more narrowly center on gaining advantage in the Arab-Israeli dispute. These differences also produce conflicting threat assessments. The U.S. perceives the Soviet Union's challenge to U.S. interests higher than the Arab threat to Israel, particularly that from countries such as Saudi Arabia. These differing perspectives have been most dramatically highlighted by Israeli opposition to America's decision to sell AWACS radar planes and other military equipment to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. seeks to deal "even-handedly" with the Arab world, but Israel wants the "special relationship" to be more exclusive.

Thus, in mediating the Arab-Israeli dispute, the U.S., striving for credibility in Arab eyes as the honest broker, has at times frustrated Israeli military or political goals. A recent example was President Reagan's firm demand that Israel remove its forces from West Beirut. Reagan's view, as expressed by White House spokesman Larry Speakes: "This is contrary to the assurances given to us by the Israelis both in Washington and in Israel... There is no justification in our view for Israel's continued military presence in West Beirut, and we call for an immediate pull-back." 32

Such plain-speaking is reminiscent of President Eisenhower's oft-cited insistence that Israel, along with her erstwhile allies, Britain and France, withdraw from their military conquest of the Sinai in 1956. Similar U.S. demands occurred in Israel's first year as a modern state. In his diplomatic history, Herbert Drucks relates that Gaza and El-Arish remained in Egyptian rather than Israeli hands due largely to American pressure in the form of a communication that Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion received on December 31, 1948, warning of a possible U.S. re-examination of "the character of its relations with the State of Israel." 33 At the same time, the U.S. asked about reported Israeli threats of continued warfare with Jordan to force it to sign a peace treaty, and the U.S. cautioned Israel that, if so, the U.S. "would have no other course than to undertake a review of its attitude toward Israel." 34

On the peace process, the U.S. believes that Israel should place its emphasis on giving Arabs some positive inducements to join the negotiations, particularly by demonstrating flexibility on territorial issues. For instance, in the Palestinian Autonomy Talks the U.S. now advocates publicly, as it has privately with Israel for some time, the following positions stated by Secretary of State Shultz in his September 9th testimony before a House panel:

- "...definition of full autonomy giving the Palestinian inhabitants real authority over themselves, the land, and its resources subject to fair safeguards on water..."
- "Participation by the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the election for the West Bank/Gaza authority..." 35

Instead, Israel has another view of
how to "deal" with the Arabs. In the last few years, instead of an outstretched hand and more enticing peace offers, Begin's government has frequently used military might, preemptively in several cases, and, in the U.S. view, such use of U.S. supplied arms "may have been in violation of U.S. arms export control law.

For example, on April 22, 1979, Israel changed its policy toward Lebanon "from one of retaliation to one of preventive strikes." 62

While preventing casualties on Israel's side of the border for about a year, the Israeli cross-border attacks took a heavy toll in casualties on the Lebanese side. At the U.N. the U.S. Ambassador opposed the Israeli policy saying: "We cannot and do not agree with Israel's military policies in Lebanon... They are wrong and unacceptable to my government. They are painfully at variance with the values which Israel has traditionally exposed." 63

Those policies, though, are not at variance with Menachem Begin's values and actions dating back to his declaration of "armed warfare" 64 against the British mandatory government in 1944. Begin's personal history is rooted in such violence. His role as the underground commander of the Irgun activities earned him a price on his head and the "terrorist" label. "Terrorist No. 1"—as they called me," says Begin in his memoirs. 65

In The Revolt, his autobiographical account of his underground days, Begin dates the inception of the Jewish revolt to regain Palestine to an act of violence by his hero Vladimir Jabotinsky against an Arab. Said Begin, in an English version translated from the Hebrew by his Irgun commander and friend Samuel Katz: "In historic perspective the revolt will be seen to have begun in 1920, when Jabotinsky fired the first shot in the defense of the Old City of Jerusalem. Though the immediate target of that shot was the Arab rioter, it struck indirectly at the regime and its plans..." 66

Jabotinsky and his military command began full-blown operations in 1938. Describing their modus operandi vis-a-vis the Arabs, Begin said that "they revolted against the heritage of the Diaspora, they broke with the policy of 'self-restraint' and went out to attack." 67

Following in Jabotinsky's footsteps, Begin's methods in the 1940's alienated many of the Jewish Diaspora. In a letter to the editor of the New York Times published December 4, 1948, 28 prominent American Jews, including Albert Einstein, Sidney Hook and Hannah Arendt, wrote of Begin's "fascist" world view and "terrorist" methods. They related how, on April 9, 1948, the Stern Gang and Begin's Irgun "terrorist bands attacked the peaceful village [of Deir Yassin], which was not a military objective in the fighting, killed most of its inhabitants—240 men, women, and children—and kept a few of them alive to parade as captives through the streets of Jerusalem." In their view, Begin's actions, if not his words, and the actions of his Herut party bore "the unmistakable stamp of a Fascist party for whom terrorism (against Jews, Arabs, and British alike) and misrepresentation are means, and a 'Leader State' is their goal." 68

Further, Einstein and others in 1948 warned of the need to expose "the dangers to Israel from the support to Begin." 69

After Begin made peace with Egypt in 1979 and subsequently received the Nobel peace prize, the memory of his terrorist past faded from the public consciousness. The invasion of Lebanon, the siege of Beirut, and, particularly, Israel's share of responsibility for the massacre of hundreds of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila reverberate with reminders of Begin's past.

Reminiscent of the 1948 warning by Einstein and others is a letter by Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, former president of the American Jewish Congress, to the New York Times on September 9, 1982. "Begin and Sharon can no longer govern," wrote Hertzberg, "because they have lost the trust and regard of the moral and political elder statesmen of Israel and of world Jewry... The most precious asset of Israel, its credibility, is now severely damaged... On the highest levels in Washington, the personal word of Begin and Sharon is not trusted. This has not happened before to any Israeli leaders... Israel is a great and moral country; it deserves better leaders. Begin and Sharon must go." 70

If Israel's close friends hold such views, what of those Palestinians who have lived under Israeli occupation for the past 15 years? Time magazine, in an opinion poll in the occupied territory, found that not only is Israeli rule viewed very negatively, but, by association, the U.S. image has been tarnished as well. The Time poll, published May 24, 1982, found that less than 2 percent of the West Bank Palestinians polled admired the United States more than the Soviet Union. Examining that poll data, William F. Buckley, Jr., has asked three penetrating questions: "What will be the situation in southern Lebanon a few years hence if Israel stays on as an occupying power? Does it follow that that which Israel dominates brings on anti-American, pro-Soviet and anti-Israel sentiment as ferocious as these figures would suggest? And, if so, isn't it time for responsible Israelis to move on the matter of the Camp David accord?" 71

Clearly, whatever the United States can do to encourage Israel to respond fairly to the legitimate concerns of its Arab neighbors will enhance the interest of the United States and advance a peace process that ultimately can lead to true security for Israel, security based on the mutual respect that comes from neighborly behavior.

In the meantime though, Israel plans to expand its military reach and influence beyond the Arab world. That is the plan, according to no less an authority than the Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. Sharon has said that "Israel's sphere of strategic interest must be broadened to include in the 80's countries such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and regions such as the Persian Gulf and Africa, particularly the countries of North and Central Africa." 72

Surely, Israeli and American interests would both be better served by first diligently working towards peace between Israel and all of its near neighbors, foremost of which is the Palestinian people.

How will the Palestinians be dealt with? Israel wants the Palestinians to be a dispersed ethnic minority, or, as General Sharon has suggested, they could establish a Palestinian country in Jordan.

While not favoring an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, the U.S. holds the view, as expressed by President Reagan in his September 1 initiative, that "self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace." 73

There are obvious U.S.-Israeli disputes built into these differing approaches to the Palestinian issue.

With the replacement of Alexander Haig with George Shultz as Secretary of State, the United States has embarked on a much more active effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Shultz stated in his confirmation hearing: "The legitimate needs and problems of the Palestinian people must be addressed and resolved—urgently and in all their
Middle East: Documents and Statements, 1967-79; p. 16.
29. Ibid.
32. Ibid., back page.
35. Ibid., June 1, 1982, p. 1.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., July 1, 1982, p. 2.
38. Menachem Begin, On Foreign Policy, in Hebrew (Tel Aviv: Herut, 1953), pp. 56.
41. CRS, p. 8.

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3. Ibid., August 15, 1979, p. 25.
23. The Link, January/February 1980, p. 11.
24. CRS report for the House European and Middle East Subcommitte. "Search for Peace in the

NOTICES
☐ The United Holy Land Fund, on behalf of Project Loving Care, has issued an urgent appeal for help in caring for a growing number of needy and through Palestinian children currently living under Israeli occupation. Project Loving Care provides these children, many of them orphans, with badly-needed financial assistance for food, clothing, education and travel expenses. You may sponsor a child by donating $15 per month and, in exchange, receive the child's name, biography and photograph of the child you are sponsoring. This is a unique way of showing these children that someone cares about helping to establish a personal relationship between you and "your" child through direct correspondence. Your contributions and letters will reach the child with the help of care workers at the Red Crescent Society of Jerusalem. For free brochure and sponsorship application write: Project Loving Care, P.O. Box 5441, Chicago, IL 60680, or call The United Holy Land Fund at (312) 663-9056. Contributions are tax deductible.

☐ Musa Alami and the Arab Development Society of Jericho (ADS) is a home for 150 boys who receive a special farm and vocational training that the school has developed over three decades of accomplishment, catastrophe and steadfastness. Its survival in the Jordan Valley, however, now depends on generous friends in Jordan, the Gulf, Sweden, England and in America. Because its overhead is minimal, anything given to ADS is of direct benefit to these brave youngsters on whom so much will depend in the years ahead. Tax deductible contributions may be sent to Musa Alami Foundation of Jericho (USA), 1522 K Street, N.W. Suite 202, Washington, D.C. 20005.

☐ The following items are available from the Office of Foreign Service and World Hunger of the Presbyterian Church, 341 Ponce de Leon Ave., N.E. Atlanta, GA 30365: Middle East Study Guide Provides pasters with easy-to-use seminar plan on the Middle East; price, 75¢; Jordan's Stormy Banks: Toward Understanding the Middle East (color filmstrip, cassette tape, script and guide); Explores religious and historical background of current Middle East crisis. Price, $10.00. Middle East Study/Action Packet Provides updated material on Lebanon situation, with focus on aid assistance and political advocacy. Price, 5.00. 

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American Church Politics and the Middle East
Basheer K. Nijim, Editor
Association of Arab American University Graduates, Belmont, MA, 1982, 156 pp., $6.95.

By David D. Van Strien

This collection of essays, gathered under the title American Church Politics and the Middle East, fills a void in the understanding of the Middle East equation.

Religion plays a complicating and pervasive role in developing the attitudes and perceptions that people have when they deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This book helps us to understand why the principles, values, standards and ideals that persons use to evaluate and develop positions on critical problem situations are oftentimes disregarded in dealing with the Middle East. It is a helpful tool to both the scholar and the general citizen in comprehending what is often behind the expressed opinions on this issue.

Each article is a self-contained unit, but each blends into and complements the other in orderly progression so that the reader can get a good view of how the various religious groups, Jewish, mainline Protestant, Fundamentalist and Catholic, have developed their individual positions in regard to Zionism and the State of Israel. The articles are brief, adequately documented, and to the point.

The section, "The Bible and the Question of Palestine: The Roots of Injustice," traces the attitudes of primitive biblical Israel, and its pre-Prophetic religion, towards the land and towards the native Canaanites who did not "belong" in the ancient Israelites' exclusivist view of life. These same attitudes and perceptions have been carried over into modern times by many of the devotees of modern Zionism. The subject is clearly and succinctly presented. The development of the "favored person" concept carries with it, as a corollary, the concept of the "non-person" with the tragic implications for those not "blessed" or "chosen," be it the Indian in America, the Black in South Africa or the Palestinian in Israel.

The reader can find an excellent survey and comparison of the salient characteristics of both ancient biblical Zionism and modern political Zionism along with maps of the area "promised by God" about which one hears so much. When one realizes how reticent the modern State of Israel is to define its borders and then looks at these maps, it is obvious why some of the surrounding Arab states become exceedingly nervous about Israeli expansionism and why they fear it much more than Soviet expansionism.

Rabbi Berger's discussion of the divergent views within the Jewish community over the issue of Zionism and the history of tactics used by the "establishment" Zionist organizations, who have assumed the right to speak for all Jews, is both interesting and revealing. His brief vignettes reflecting the type of social and economic pressure placed upon those Jews who have defected from the "establishment" line draw from us a new sense of respect and optimism: respect for those who have been willing to speak truth to power; and optimism that, in the end, the great values and insights of prophetic Judaism will again gain an expanded support within the religious community, both Jewish and non-Jewish.

The role played by theologians, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, and the influence of the educational and evolving humanist emphasis of the churches involved in the National Council of Churches, are given a hearing—enough to provide understanding to the general reader and sufficient to give guidance to the scholar.

Historian Hassan Haddad, of St. Xavier College (Chicago), gives a good insight into why the Fundamentalists, with their eschatological hopes for the Second Coming of Christ, are so eager to support the development of Israel. It has little to do with sympathy for Jews or Judaism, but, rather, they see the new State of Israel as a sign that the "Coming" is near. Israel, and its pro-Zionist supporters in this country, have been cognizant of this Fundamentalist support, and Jerry Falwell and similar types have been given their highest honors. One gets the feeling that the Zionists have failed to read the end of the eschatological tale—the destruction of the Jews and all others who do not take advantage of this second chance "to accept Jesus." These are but some of the contradictions that make the religious factor in the Middle East affairs such a fascinating subject.

This book does not discuss the two denominations on the "liberal" end of the religious spectrum—the Quakers (Society of Friends) and the Unitarian Universalists. These two groups, so similar in many ways, especially in their actions on social, economic and political issues, have reacted so differently in dealing with the Middle East. The Quakers have courageously been willing to study the issue and to make fair, balanced suggestions for a peaceful solution with as much justice for all as can be expected from this complicated situation. The Unitarian Universalists, who have largely "averted their eyes" from the entire subject, did recognize a distinction prerequisite for any honest discussion of the subject, when its Board of Trustees, meeting in Boston in October of this year, resolved that: "Criticism of the policies of the government of Israel should not be equated with or confused with anti-Semitism." An examination of the different responses of these two small but influential groups would have been interesting and revealing.

David D. Van Strien is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Unitarian Universalist Association and minister of the Unitarian Church, Peterborough, N.H.
New Selections


- Michael Janzen, The Battle of Betar. Zed Press, London, 1982, paperback, $8.50. Writers in conjunction with Geoffrey Janzen, the Lavant correspondent of the Economist, the book analyzes the war from its start in June 1985, to the massacre at Sabra and Shatila in September. It explains the content of a "limited operation" and "minimal civilian casualties," and exposes the longer term ambitions of Israel. U.S. policy is also examined, especially the degree of collusion between Alexander Haig and the Israeli leaders. A.M.E.U. expects to receive its first shipment by late January or early February 1985. Readers may place advance orders at this time. Our price, $5.95.


- Dewey Beegle, Prophecy and Prediction, Prior Petroselli, 574 pp., $5.95 (paperback). Refutes the biblical claim of Zionists to the Promised Land by discussing what the Bible teaches about prophecy, especially concerning the predictions of events which already have occurred and those which are to come. Our price, $5.25.


- Jonathan Dimbleby, The Palestinians, Quartet Books, 1979, 256 pp., $25.00. Explores the crisis of a people without a land, demonstrating that the "Palestinian problem" is not an abstract issue but an urgent human tragedy. Fully illustrated with moving, dramatic, often harrowing photographs by Donald McCullin. Our price, $17.50.

- Saad El Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez, American MidEast Research, 335 pp., $14.00. Egypt's former military commander-in-chief tells how the Egyptian army executed its brilliant 1973 crossing of the Suez and how Egypt's political leaders turned that success into disaster. Our price, $10.95.

- James Ennis, Jr., Assault on the Liberty, Random House, 301 pp., $13.95. The author served as lieutenant among the officers of the U.S.S. Liberty on her fatal voyage. He was on watch at the bridge during the day of the Israeli attack. Our price, $9.95.


- Stephen D. Isaacs, Jews and American Politics, Doubleday & Co., 392 pp. An investigation into the role Jews play in American politics. It explores many myths on this subject and shows how Jews have exercised the power they have. Our price, $3.85.


- Alfred Lilenthal, The Zionist Connection: What Price Peace?, Dodd, Mead & Co., 600 pp., $9.95 (paperback), Covers the Arab-Israeli conflict from the time of Herzl to Camp David. Research involving is monumental. Contains much information of which most Americans are unaware. Our price, $8.25.

- Ian Lustick, Arabs In the Jewish State, University of Texas Press, 1980, 400 pp., $22.50. A systematic, scholarly analysis of the strikingly low level of Arab political activity in Israel. Author examines success with which Israeli authorities have cooperated Arab elites, maintained the backwardness of the Arab economy, and promoted parochial rivalries within the Arab sector. Our price, $17.50.

- Donald Neff, Warners at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East, Linden Press/Simon & Schuster, 1981, 489 pp. $17.95. Reveals for the first time the bizarre nature of the Suez Crisis of 1956. This episode saw France, Britain and Israel in collusion to overthrow the Nasser regime without the knowledge of the United States until 24 hours before the attack. The author, an award-winning Time correspondent, reveals how Eisenhower's showdown against Britain, France and Israel ultimately marked the end of Britain and France as colonial giants and the beginning of Israel's repeated aggression against the Arabs. Our price, $12.75.

- William Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1981, 190 pp., $8.95 (paperback). Dr. Quandt, who has twice served on the staff of the National Security Council, argues that the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia in the 1980's will depend to a marked degree on actions taken by the United States regarding the Palestinian cause. Our price, $7.50.

- Livia Rokach, Israel's Sacred Terrorism, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980, 68 pp., $2.50 (paperback). Examines the 1953-57 diary of Moshe Sharett, founding member of Israel's Labor Party, his country's first foreign minister and its second prime minister. Our price, $1.95.
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