Mayhew Reports on Arab-Israeli Facts and Prospects

Text of speech by Christopher Mayhew, M.P.

This January I made a tour of the Middle East. I visited Cairo, Amman and Israel. Anyone who comes back from the Middle East is always asked "Is there going to be a war?" This is of course a silly question because there is already a war in the Middle East. This is the first point we have to register.

When I was in Cairo, Israeli Phantoms were bombing the suburbs. And when I was on the Jordan River front, to an old ex-service man, it was just like any front which is a quiet front at the moment, but which has recently been in action. There were the guns and tanks of the Jordan Army, heavily camouflaged, dug in against the overwhelming Israeli superiority. There were the groups of fedayeen—young men in their Che Guevara camouflage denims. There was the uncanny stillness and emptiness of a war front when temporarily it is not being fought over. I remember from World War II looking through binoculars over the frontier and seeing the other side watching you through binoculars watching them through binoculars. Altogether it was a war atmosphere.

Then I went to Gaza. I was staying in East Jerusalem and asked my splendid, stout-hearted Arab taxi-driver to drive me to Gaza. At first he wouldn’t take me.

"Oh no," he said. "It’s not safe to go to Gaza," and so on. And even the morning we started off he said, "All my friends told me I was very stupid to take you to Gaza. They tried to lend me taxis because mine has an Israeli number-plate" and so on. He was very reluctant to go, very tense.

It’s almost, you might say, a war in Gaza, at the present time. My Arab friends there knew of four or five bomb incidents or shooting incidents a week and my Arab friends advised me very strongly to leave before the curfew. I left about four o’clock, an hour before the curfew began. Even then, as I drove through the main street of Gaza, the streets were empty, the shops were shuttered, there was an Israeli motorized patrol at full alert moving slowly down the street. This was a normal day. Nothing had happened. No bombs had been thrown that day. It was a signal of the tenseness and fear that reigns in Gaza.

So, as I say, the question is not "will there be a war?" the question is "will the war continue, will it escalate, is (Continued overpage)
Partisan Sympathies in Britain

I'd like to try an answer. Let me begin by saying something about what the British people are beginning to feel about the Middle East situation. Now, far more British people, even today, are sympathetic to the cause of Israel than are sympathetic and understanding about the Arab cause. The public opinion polls on the subject aren't very helpful. But on the basis of such polls as there are, I would judge that at the time of the 1967 war, possibly between sixty and seventy per cent of the British people registered Israeli sympathy. And possibly no more than five per cent sympathized with the Arab cause. It is a hard fact, but we have to face the fact.

Since then, the Israeli cause has gone back a good deal, owing to their insincerity and to the increasing toughness of their occupation of the occupied areas. The Arab cause would, I believe, have gone ahead a great deal better in Britain during this period had it not been for the attacks on civilians by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which are not approved by the guerrilla organizations or by the Arab governments. And I would say today perhaps forty per cent of the British people would admit to Israeli sympathies and perhaps something under ten per cent to Arab sympathies, in this conflict in the Middle East. A very large number would be either neutral or indifferent or ignorant.

Now why is it that still in Britain you have this majority of people with Israeli sympathies? It is true that there are still British people for whom the basic Zionist appeal means something. Indeed, one must admit that the idea of a people dispersed as they were by the Romans two thousand years ago should keep alive the dream of coming together again in Palestine and should in fact do so in 1948 is a thing that is bound to stir people's historical imaginations. British people also are very well aware of the sufferings of the Jewish people under the Nazis. They are aware that Israel is a Western-oriented country, that is, anti-Communist. They are aware that it has done pretty well, with financial assistance from the United States, in building up its economic and social development over these years. It also has this image of a smaller country surrounded by the bigger hostile countries.

All this is sustained by a very powerful and effective Israeli propaganda effort, by a very active Israeli Embassy in London. It is sustained also by the efforts of dedicated members of the Jewish community in Britain, including many Jewish members of Parliament.

Unfortunately it is true that there is still too little under-
were among the most developed of the Arab countries, and they produced a spirited and large intelligentsia. Some of these people, after the 1967 war when the frontline was removed between Arab Jerusalem and Israel, immediately went back to their homes and gardens, only to find them occupied by strangers.

If the Americans, or the British, had gone through the same experience, we would have made the Palestinians look like pacifists. Palestinian refugees are acting the way any group in the world would react given the experience they have had to go through.

"Arab Zionism" is Growing

There is the beginning of understanding, at last, of what the conflict is about. Now there is growing up an Arab Zionism, so reminiscent of Jewish Zionism. Go around the Palestinian refugee camps. If you talk to any one of them you think you're talking to a Jewish Zionist refugee in the 1930's in London. Tomorrow Jerusalem! It's the same thing. "No matter how long we have to wait, no matter what sacrifices."

I'm very struck by this quotation from a Palestinian refugee writer because it is so terribly the same as so much Jewish Zionist writing: "Every year I shall take my little son, we shall return my son, and you will go with me. We shall return to our land and walk there barefoot. We'll remove our shoes so that we may feel the holiness of the ground beneath. Here is the village square, the beloved mosque, the desolate wall, with the remains of a tattered face, and the building whose traces have been erased. Here are our lives. Do you not remember Jaffa, and its delightful shore, Hafia and its lofty mountains, Nazareth and the Christians' birth, the streets of Jerusalem, my dear Jerusalem, Tiberias and its peaceful shore with the golden way...?"

This is eloquent, but it expresses clearly what I call Arab Zionism. It is terribly, desperately, and tragically like the Jewish Zionism, that all of us are so familiar with, when the Jews were persecuted and sent out. And today it is no exaggeration to say that throughout the world, here in New York, in London, there are thousands of people. People forget that hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees are not in the camps. They are in Kuwait or London or New York or wherever it may be.

The Palestinian Arabs have been dispersed from Palestine by the Jews in a manner extraordinarily similar to the way the Jews were dispersed from Palestine by the Romans. There is no reason to suppose that if their hopes are frustrated, the Palestinians will not still be demanding Jerusalem tomorrow — demanding "Jerusalem tomorrow" two thousand years from now. These are some of the reasons why people in Britain are beginning to see that there's another side of the case. I haven't begun to state the basic Palestinian case. A visitor takes away a vivid impression of the conditions of life in occupied areas, in East Jerusalem, in the West Bank, in Gaza.

Fear, Physical and Psychological

In Gaza the fear is physical. In East Jerusalem it is psychological. In Gaza the targets for the young Arabs are the Israeli military vehicles. If you watch the traffic in Gaza, you see a great gap behind each Israeli military vehicle. My taxi driver kept well behind. And there the fear is of getting involved in the gunfire and of collective punishment.

I was taken to what looked like a bomb-damaged spot in Gaza. There my friends explained that a Jewish businessman had been murdered and robbed of five thousand pounds. The Israelis took the line that it had been done by the fedayeen to get the money. The Arabs took the line that it was straight robbery with murder. But whatever the reason for this horrid crime, it brought Dayan rushing down by plane from Jerusalem. My friends described to me how he walked about and raised his military cane. He pointed to six pleasant houses with gardens and on his signal they were all blown up. Collective punishment. No one suggested that the owners of the houses had anything to do with the murders at all.

Then I went to Latrun and saw two whole villages—one of them Emmaus—which had been razed to the ground by the Israelis, not for collective punishment but for strategic political reasons. They were not only razed to the ground, but the stones and bricks were carted away so that all you could see was empty countryside. The count of houses destroyed punitively up to now is 7445.

In East Jerusalem, the fear is of a different kind, rather, more psychological. My friends told me how when I arrived they hadn't had a party for a long time. They didn't like going out in the evening.

When you pressed them as to why they didn't like even to meet one another, it became clear that they don't know which among them are Resistance people. They fear they might be compromising themselves, exposing themselves to suspicion, to arrest or deportation without trial. The atmosphere is one of fear, psychological fear, in East Jerusalem.

The fact of the Arab refugees complicates all this. They are victims of racial discrimination. It is a fact that if you are a wealthy businessman in New York, with no family or personal tie with Palestine, but if you can prove you are Jewish, that your mother was Jewish, (not if your father alone is Jewish, but if your mother is Jewish) then you have a right to go and live in Israel. But if you are a Palestinian, an Arab who was born and raised there where your family had lived for centuries, you have no right to go and live there because you cannot prove that you have the right ancestors, because you were born in the wrong branch of the Semitic race. This is plain racial discrimination. All of us to whom it is applied, Americans, British, would feel the same. What have the Palestinians done to deserve it? From the Palestinians point of view there are just two simple facts: In 1917 they were ninety-three per cent of the population of Palestine, and now Israel controls all of Palestine and has thrown a million and a quarter Palestinians out.
Prospects for Peace?

Let me come now to the particular questions I wanted to raise. Why is it that the prospects of a just and peaceful settlement are so bad? Is there anything that can be done to improve the prospects?

We all know very well that from the Arab side there is a large section of opinion which does not want a settlement on the terms of the U.N. Security Council resolution or the United States proposals. There is much merit, in my judgment, in a settlement on the lines of either the Security Council resolution or of the American proposal, both of which involve accepting the State of Israel and ending the belligerency, opening the international waterways, giving the refugees the choice of returning to Israel or being compensated and resettled elsewhere, and which also, above all, call for Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. I myself feel that this, though a half-loaf, is of great value to the Arab cause.

In speaking to the fedayeen and Palestinians, I accept and respect their views. They want the whole loaf, a bi-national Palestine, so for them the Security Council doesn’t go far enough. But I also sense in talking to them as individuals, that the liberation of these territories, the liberation of a million Arabs from Israeli oppression, raising of the Palestinian flag, joining the United Nations, calling back to these areas of all the 1967 refugees, will appeal deeply to large numbers of Palestinians, even though, you understand, they do want the whole loaf and not half a loaf. It is my judgment that there are many who would be prepared to make a deal, who would be prepared to accept a solution on the lines of the Security Council settlement. In my view, these people have a lot to be said for them, as Arabs, though of course they are constantly under heavy pressure. I also think it’s still possible that these Arabs could persuade the Palestinians to allow them to let the settlement prove itself.

Nasser’s Position

I have often spoken to President Nasser about this. His position is perfectly clear, and it’s a bold position. He says, “Yes, I’m prepared to do a deal along the lines of the Security Council resolution.” He said this again just before I left London, in an interview published in the London Times and in Le Monde at the same time. Having said that he still maintains his belief that a peaceful settlement would be in the interests of the Arabs, President Nasser was asked whether the opposition of a number of Egyptian officers and a part of Arab opinion would not be an obstacle for settlement. He replied, “I don’t think so.”

He admitted that there would be problems with the Palestinian organizations, but he said this was inevitable: “We cannot help it, but we are determined to face any eventuality. We shall try and convince our Palestinian brethren of the rightness of our opinion.”

Life has been made difficult for President Nasser in that political line by the Israelis over the last two or three years. I was urging on him the line I am taking with you, that it would be in the interest of the Arabs to get to a settlement. He said, “Well, I agree with you, but they are bombing my capital. Did you, Mr. Mayhew, in 1940, when your capital city was being bombed, expect Mr. Churchill to stand up and call for a negotiated peace with the Germans?”

This is a powerful argument. The Israelis for two or three years have been undermining the position of these Arab leaders who are prepared for a peaceful compromise settlement. Nevertheless, our judgment is, and it is the judgment of President Nasser too, that if there was reciprocity, that if the Americans and Israelis were prepared to play the game, then it is not inconceivable that a settlement on the grounds of the Security Council resolution would be accepted by the Arab side.

The real obstacle to a peaceful and just settlement is the policies and actions of the Israeli government.

Israel on Withdrawal

They turned down all the international peace proposals, the Security Council resolution, the Russian interpretation of the resolution, the French interpretation of the resolution, and now the United States government’s interpretation of the resolution and the proposals they have put forward at the end of last year. What they are not prepared to accept is a key point of all those plans — withdrawal from conquered territory to what Mr. Rogers has called the 1948 frontiers, “with insubstantial changes not reflecting the weight of conflict.”

They are not prepared to concede this. It is open to bargaining. When I went to Israel, I thought to myself, “I’ll try and find out whether their attitude on this is simply a bargaining attitude, whether they’re saying No to the American proposals for instance with an eye to getting a better deal later.” And I decided if it were true, as I suspected, that the Israeli chiefs of staff have never even been asked to make a military appreciation of what Israeli security would be like in the event of withdrawal, then I would take it that they were not even considering withdrawal at all. And I did discover in the course of conversations with Israeli leaders, many of them old friends of mine, that in fact the Israeli chiefs of staff have never been asked to make an appreciation of what Israeli security would be in the event of withdrawal to the frontiers which Mr. Rogers has defined. That is quite apart from the fact that they are building Israeli communities in the occupied territories.

You go around Arab Jerusalem and you see huge blocks of flats going up and handsome, big new public buildings built by the Israelis in Arab Jerusalem. Then
there are the big permanent settlements in the West Bank.

Now of course even if they did withdraw, the difficulty for President Nasser, King Hussein, or anybody else, of delivering their part of the bargain, of accepting the existence of the State of Israel and opening the international waterways, would be very hard indeed.

But if they don't withdraw, all talk of a peaceful settlement is a waste of breath. So let us consider why the Israelis refuse to withdraw, and if there is anything we could and should do about it. The first reason that they give is that the new frontiers are more defensible than the old ones. In non-military terms, that is perfectly true and I'll come back to it again later. The second reason is that they don't understand that a deal is conceivably possible with the Arabs, let alone with President Nasser.

Do Israelis Understand Arabs?

One of the things I learned in Israel, which was so obvious and simple I hadn't seen it before, is the reason why the Israelis don't understand the Arabs and have been quite wrong in their predictions about Arab attitudes and actions in the past. The reason is that they have never met representative Arabs and don't meet them now. They would like to meet them, provided they could meet them on their own terms, which is an occupying power. But this is something the Arab leaders can't accept. But the fact that they have never met them and don't meet them means that they don't understand them and predict their reactions wrong.

They thought in June 1967 that Nasser actually wanted an intended war. They were wrong. They thought after 1967 that Nasser would fall and that the Arab States would fall apart. They were wrong again. Then they thought that Nasser was their worst enemy and that the Arabs can be cowed by bombing and military means. They are wrong again on all those counts. The reason is they don't see, they don't talk to, they don't meet with the Arabs that matter. Worse still, they meet a whole lot of Arabs who are not representative.

One of them is my dear old taxi driver whom I have mentioned already. He said to me, "You see, sir, the Israeli fares who come into my taxi are desperately keen to ask me my views about a peaceful settlement, about the Israeli government and so on, but what I've learned over the years is if I say what I think, I don't get a tip." I had appalling visions of thousands of Israelis going into this nice fellow's taxi and then dining out thereafter on what the Arabs are really thinking.

I was very much reminded of a visit I once paid to East Africa. It must have been about fifteen years ago. Besides being an MP then, I was one of the BBC's television commentators on world affairs. I remember going to see the General Secretary of the African Mine Workers Union and then the President of the African National Congress and so on.

Then I talked to some British settlers. The British settlers would not have met these people because of the color bar but they sit you down and tell you what the Africans are thinking. They tell you that the heart of the African is perfectly sound—because they picked this up from their houseboy—and if only you could get rid of the troublemakers, unrepresentative little men like Kenyatta and people like that, everything would be all right.

It is no exaggeration to say that in talking to Israelis about Arabs I sometimes get the same impression. I have in mind a conversation with an old friend of mine, a charming man, very articulate, very intelligent, very high-up in the Israeli bureaucracy. We hadn't met for years and I had just come from seeing President Nasser and King Hussein and all the rest of them, whom I know quite well, and the first twenty minutes were occupied by his telling me what the Arabs were thinking and what the Arabs were going to do. He had never met any of them. It was an extraordinary thing. This then, is the second reason why I think they reject all talk of a settlement—because they haven't got the inward understanding of the various Arab states which would enable them to see what the opportunities are.

The U.S.A. and the Arms Race

The third and final reason I give for their refusing to withdraw, is the United States policy on arm deliveries. I speak as an old and loyal friend of the Anglo-American alliance, but I claim the privilege to say some hard things about American policy in the Middle East today. The Israelis are able to reject all the international peace proposals, they are able to throw them back in your faces, your own U.S. peace proposals for the Middle East for one reason and one reason only: they know that no matter what they do you are going to give them the money and the arms to go on defying you and the rest of the world.

This mystifies the friends of the United States abroad. To begin with, the Israelis have the dominant military force in the Middle East and have had for twenty years: dominant in the air, dominant on the land. The efforts that the Arabs make to arm themselves never succeed in achieving a balance. The Soviet arms that they are sent are quite inadequate to bridge the gap. Thus, the arms you send Israel are an escalation, they are an increase. They are not balancing up anything, they are further unbalancing the military situation in the Middle East.

The Russians are not scrupulous people. But they have at least not given the Arabs long-range rockets or the long-range bombers with which to attack Tel Aviv. It is you who have put the offensive weapons into the Middle East. You have sent Phantoms to Israel with which to bomb Cairo.

I am a genuine friend of the United States, but to a stranger it seems very odd to come and to read the papers and to watch the television and to see all this enormous maclstrom of protest about France sending Mirages to Libya and not a word about your Phantoms going to Israel. This is extraordinary.

Serious Dangers Ahead

For all these reasons, frankly, I think that unless some new factor is injected into the situation, there is no prospect whatever of a peaceful and just settlement. We can predict certain things, unless new factors are injected, with some confidence. First we can predict a continuation of Israel's spectacular military successes, which

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strengthen the Arabs’ will to resist even though they may weaken the Arabs’ capacity to resist for the short-term. Second, we can predict a continuing weakening of the more moderate forces in the Arab world, those who would like to see a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

We might also predict that some other Arab countries might go radical in the way Libya or Syria did. In the absence of any move towards a settlement on the part of Israel or the United States government, this seems to me very likely. We can certainly forecast a continued strengthening of the fedayeen. And in general, we forecast an increase in the fighting, with an increasing chance of the Soviet Union feeling compelled, like China in Vietnam, to intervene more deeply with supplies and perhaps also with their own anti-aircraft personnel.

That I judge would take us up to about the mid-seventies, when, inevitably, the balance of power will start shifting in the direction of the Arabs. There is no doubt that the fedayeen can and will, in due course, improve their techniques, their training, their strategy. I am speaking as a former counter-intelligence man, an expert in dirty work of all kinds.

I deplore the attacks made on civilians by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. I don’t think they do any good for the Arab cause at all. But after saying that, I feel free to say that, of course, in less than two years they have graduated from shooting at aircraft with small arms on the aprons of airports in Europe to placing barometrically triggered bombs on planes by post from Germany. We must therefore assume that just as the French Maquis, just as the Viet-Cong, learned from terrible lessons, so I judge that there will be continued improvement in technology and effectiveness by the fedayeen as they get towards the middle of the seventies. As we get towards the end of the seventies, the demographic disparity between Israel and the Arab countries will become more real. Frankly, it does not make much sense today talking about how there are thirty Arabs to one Israeli, because, if you go around looking at all the thirty, including the camel drivers in the south of the Sudan, although they are good men and true, they hardly count in the balance of power between the Mirages and the Phantoms.

By the end of the seventies, as tens of thousands of young, dedicated Arabs come out of the schools and the universities of the Arab world, this disparity of population will become very telling indeed. This is the final answer, I’m quite sure. Why in due course the balance of power will swing toward the Arabs.

Vietnam Parallels

What your friends abroad ask of themselves is, what will be the attitude of the United States if and when this swing comes about? Today, Israel can sustain herself without the aid of American troops. Today, to send arms, to give financial and diplomatic support, is enough. Direct American intervention in the Middle East in support of Israel is unthinkable today. But then direct intervention in Vietnam was unthinkable in 1955. I visited Vietnam that year. Then you had in Vietnam a Westernized, anti-Communist tough little regime, well worth sending arms to, well worth sending money to, which was capable of sustaining itself without the help of American troops.

Then the balance of power shifted against President Diem and the South Vietnamese. Then the United States was faced with this fearful problem, this fearful dilemma: whether to let her friend and ally go under, a friend and ally whom, strangely or not, should be encouraged to be uncompromising, to reject a negotiating attitude towards its enemies, whether to let it go under or to take the other, appalling course of going to the assistance of the regime with direct military intervention by the United States. In 1955, I recall, I met Diem and studied American policy and intervention at that time. The Viet Cong then were just a lot of boys with guns. How could they possibly take on the sophisticated army of South Vietnam? You see there are parallels. Who can deny it?

When I was last year in Algeria, I had a long discussion with President Bemedine, who is one of the most articulate, militant, and doctrinaire of the Arab leaders. I had many talks with him and his cabinet members. They drew the analogy between your involvement in Vietnam and your involvement in the Middle East. I remember one of them saying, “The Americans have a puppet state in Southeast Asia, South Vietnam. It’s Westernized, anti-Communist, and not opposed to American imperialism. They have a puppet state in the Middle East, Israel. It’s Westernized, anti-Communist, and not opposed to American imperialism. In both countries American policy, American intervention, has outraged the nationalist, anti-colonialist feelings of the masses. In both countries liberation movements have arisen; the Viet Cong and Fateh. Starting from nothing but their bare hands, and they are now challenging successfully the sophisticated military might of the United States and its stooges.”

I never contended this up to a year ago, but the way things are developing I don’t feel so confident that there is not a powerful analogy to be drawn. I must say that reading my New York Times, I see the same leaders of public opinion who helped drive the United States into disaster in Vietnam are helping to drive the United States to disaster again in the Middle East. “There is a good stout, anti-Communist little regime, Westernized, our friend, our ally,” they say. “We’ve only got to send them weapons, we’ve only got to send them Phantoms and they’ll stave off the Communists” and so on. Recognition of a deadly similarity is growing in my mind.

Security for Israel?

The outlook in my view is probably very depressing. But what I have been talking about is the likeliest outcome. Now I am asking if it is not possible to inject any new factor or idea into the situation, even at this last moment, to make some sense and to get some sense behind a settlement. I would like to suggest two things. First, if Israel does withdraw to her frontiers, I maintain
that she is entitled to maximum security on her frontiers. I would therefore like more thought given to what can be done in order to encourage Israel to withdraw, which is a key to everything. What can be done to give her a greater sense of security if she withdraws to her own frontiers?

I would like to see thought given to a demilitarized zone on both sides of the frontier, a demilitarized zone of ten to fifteen kilometers on both sides, covering the Golan heights for instance, with a United Nations force inside it. I would like that United Nations force to include substantial French and British contingents with the power, if necessary, to call up air and naval forces from the Eastern Mediterranean. This isn't just my own thinking. I have discussed it with a number of people, including the Arab leaders and advisors. President Nasser's reply was "It's easier for us to accept the French than to accept you. But if it was a part, genuinely, of a withdrawal under the terms of the Security Council resolution, we would present it to our people as a guarantee to us against future Israeli expansion. Then we'd have no objection to it."

That I'm sure would be the attitude of the Arabs in these circumstances and I doubt if the Russians would object. When I put it to the Israelis, since they weren't intending to withdraw, they found it very academic. But I did say to Mr. Eban that if ever his policy changed and he intended to withdraw, let him not forget that this offer was, in my view, practical, and might help to sway the balance in the Israeli Cabinet. That's the first point I'd like to make.

**Pressure from the Big Powers?**

The second point is that you're not going to get a settlement unless some kind of pressure is brought towards a settlement by the Big Four powers. It is absurd to think that more journeys by Ambassador Jarring, more formulas, more talk, will secure a settlement without some pressure on the Israelis to toe the line and come in on the kind of settlement I have been describing.

What I would like to see is this: I would like to see the four powers agree to cut off all arms supplies from any Middle Eastern country which does not conform with the Security Council resolution, or if you like, with the proposals of the United States government. You may say to me that the American government will go on sending arms to Israel unconditionally, no matter whether she throws back the United States government's peace plans. You are probably right. I am not naive. All I am saying is if you do that, all the rest follows—the war, the continued increase of Soviet power in the Middle East, the increased Vietnam-like involvement of the United States. Whatever you do, you are really the key people.

If you have a goal along the lines I am suggesting, you might pull something out of the fire. If you don't, you will bear a heavy responsibility for the escalation of war and violence and injustice in the Middle East. Speaking on behalf of a country, Britain, which for a long time had to face this kind of difficult decision, I give you my warmest sympathy. But in my view, the ball is in the United States' court at this moment, and it is up to you. Take care.

**QUESTIONS & ANSWERS**

A lively question period followed the above presentation for almost an hour. From it we've selected three of the more immediate issues raised and dealt with:

Q.: Isn't Israel our best bulwark against Communism in the Middle East?

Mayhew: Israel is not an anti-Communist state, in fact, and I would say this: that I do think it's very misguided to suppose that by supporting Israel the United States is helping the cause of the defense against Communism. It really is exactly the opposite in practice. What has happened has been that the policies of the United States and to some extent Britain have in fact thrown the Arabs into the arms of the Russians. This is what has happened, and the Arabs don't want it. I remember President Nasser saying to me: "Well frankly, every week I had to ask them something on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, They haven't asked for much back yet." But it is a fact that the Russians are becoming in a position to make great demands, if they wish, on the Arab world. Already they have some limited naval facilities in the Mediterranean. Already they are, therefore, undermining the southern flank of NATO and if ever they were decided by them to ask more, I think they would get it. With a Russian air-base on the North coast of Africa, the strategic implications for NATO, for your Sixth Fleet, for our British Fleet in the Mediterranean, would really be quite catastrophic. Nothing could be more short-sighted than to think that by supporting Israel, one is doing anything to support the cause of defense against Communism.

Q.: To some extent the Russians benefit from war in the Middle East. Do you think the Russians are sincere in their proposal to make peace there?

Mayhew: The consensus, in Britain as well, I think, as in America, is that the Russians don't want a war in the Middle East, but that they do want to keep the pot boiling. I have some doubts about this thesis because I really think it's un-commonsense to assume that the Russians want trouble simultaneously both in the Middle East and on their eastern frontier with China, where their border is very firmly fixed, and where their greatest fears and greatest concentration goes at the present time. I don't believe it is sensible to assume that they really want to tangle with you in the Middle East at the same time as they are confronting the Chinese in the East. That is the first point I have to make.

The second point is that in practice the Russians undoubtedly are exercising a restraining influence on both of the sections of Arab opinions I have spoken about. They are publicly opposed to the fedayeen, to the Palestinian argument, and to the idea of a united bi-national Palestine. As far as the Egyptians and the Jordanians are concerned, I can give you an assurance that the Russians are constantly pressuring them to be accommodating towards the kinds of peace proposals put forward by the United States of America.

Q.: How many Arab refugees do you think would go back if they had a choice?

Mayhew: There are of course two waves of refugees, those who left in 1948 and those who left in 1967, and some poor people who were actually made refugees twice. So we have to separate these out. In the event of a settlement, of course, the 1967 refugees could go back to the liberated territories and that's a splendid thing and that would be a very happy solution. But 1948 refugees would get a choice whether they wanted to go back to Israel or whether they would prefer to be compensated. It is difficult to say what proportion of those refugees who are entitled to go back would go back. Some estimates put it as something like ten or fifteen per cent.
MIDDLE EAST MEETINGS STRESS COMMUNICATIONS

The aborted attempt by Dr. Nahum Goldmann to establish contact between Israeli and Egyptian officials has led to increasing appreciation of such steps as are being taken on non-governmental levels to put the arts of communication more vigorously to work in Middle Eastern human relations.

The World Association for Christian Communication brought sixty church leaders—Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic—to Cyprus April 30-May 2 to study how the mass media may be used to more constructive advantage. The findings were presented to the Near East Council of Churches' Triennial Assembly on Cyprus, May 4-8, and played an important part in the World Conference of Christians for Palestine in Beirut, May 7-10.

On a secular level: from May 31 to June 6, the Tel Aviv Hilton Hotel will be headquarters for the successive and interlocking International Public Relations Association General Assembly and the V Public Relations World Congress. The over-all theme is "Public Relations—Bridge to International Understanding."

QUAKER STUDY AVAILABLE

The long-awaited Quaker study on "The Search for Peace in The Middle East" is due off the press late in May.

It has gone through 17 confidential mimeographed editions, each submitted for revision to a variety of authorities, including religious leaders and heads of all states involved in the conflict. For your copy send 75c to The American Friends Service Committee, 160 North 15th St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19102.

U.S. OUTLET FOR BEIRUT PUBLICATIONS

The research papers and other books published in Beirut by the Institute for Palestine Studies have been imported in quantity by Palestine Books, Box 329A, R.D. #1, Oxford, Penna. 19363, which will be glad to send you a printed list of its offerings.

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