Jordan Steps Forward

By G. Alan Klaum

Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, young Arab Prince Abdullah called upon the British Agent, Lord Kitchener, in Cairo. Scarcely thirty years old, Abdullah, already a figure in political circles, was the foremost Arab deputy in the Ottoman Parliament. His father, Hussein, the Grand Sharif of Mecca, was a scion of the House of Beni Hashem, noblest of all Arab families who traced their descent in the male line back to the Prophet’s daughter. The Hashemite family had been for generations the traditional guardians of the holy cities of Medina and Mecca, the latter under Turkish rule.

Abdullah had spent his boyhood years in Constantinople during his family’s “detention”—a courteous Ottoman ritual of keeping prominent Muslim leaders in sight. During this period he acquired the Turkish tongue and enough manners of well-bred Turks to soften, without emasculating, his native Arab bluntness. His natural aptitude for tribal politics and his ardor to promote the family’s fortunes won the admiration of his father who chose him as emissary and mediator, in preference to his elder brother, the gentle and diffident Ali (afterward King of the Hejaz), or the younger Feisal (afterward King of Iraq), who had sought and won his laurels in exploits of military valor. Abdullah was easily the most famous and popular of the three.

Like his father, Prince Abdullah dreamed of an autonomous Hejaz. His visit to Cairo was a bold move, calculated to sound out Lord Kitchener on England’s attitude in the event open conflict broke out between the Turks and Arabs. He spoke at length of the aims of the Arab movement, of the hopes of its leaders and their growing despair. He talked about the gravity of the issue in Hejaz and about the preparations being made by his father against the anticipated rupture with the Turks.

Kitchener’s answer was discouraging: no encouragement was to be expected from the British Government. If nothing was immediately achieved, the talks opened Kitchener’s eyes to the strength and the depth of Turko-Arab animosity and to the reality of the Arab desire for independence.

Two years later, in 1916, the Hejaz was in revolt. In a series of letters, Sir Henry MacMahon, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, promised Abdullah’s father political support in establishing an independent Arab State in exchange for becoming Britain’s ally. Included also were the
About This Issue

In this issue of The Link, writer and journalist Alan Klaum returns with his third feature article on a country in the Middle East. His previous contributions include: “Egypt: Rediscovered Destiny—A Survey” (Mid-Summer 1976) and “The Yemen Arab Republic: From Behind the Veil” (Summer 1978). A graduate of Columbia University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Alan travels extensively as a consultant on the Middle East and Asia.

Photos were provided by the Jordan Information Bureau, Wide World Photos, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.


The Link also brings to the attention of its readers a recent bibliographic guide on the U.S./Middle East Diplomatic Relations from 1784 to 1978. Especially suited for libraries and those engaged in Middle East research, this book is now available at a discount price through A.M.E.U. For details, see the Books To Order section.

The September/October Link will commemorate this year’s Fourteenth Centennial Observance of Islam, and will feature a special study by sociologist Dr. Yvonne Haddad on Islam in the United States.

John F. Mahoney
Executive Director

military assistance and the military advice of a young, brilliant colonel, T.E. Lawrence. By 1918 Abdullah’s younger brother, Feisal, had defeated the Turks at Aqaba and, with Lawrence and the British Army, was advancing into Syria. (Abdullah himself fought the Turkish garrisons at Taif and Medina closer to home.) With the fall of Damascus, victory was complete, and the Hashemites now expected their reward. Yet the political machinations that drew the lines of peace actually unleashed the forces that have plagued the Middle East ever since. As author Peter Snow described the outcome of the Arab Revolt:

It did not come as cleanly as they had been led to expect. Britain and France had done a quiet deal behind Sharif Hussein’s back at the time he was launching his revolt .... Britain had quietly agreed to leave France alone in Syria and Lebanon, if France would leave Britain alone in Palestine and Iraq. But Britain gently told Feisal—and Abdullah who had an eye on the throne of Iraq—to bide their time, and promised them both that their interests would be reconsidered.

The land was in need of a ruler. Britain, however, preferred to let the tribes and councils in Britain’s new territory manage their own affairs under the eyes of a number of British officers. On a March day in 1921, Abdullah stepped into the vacuum. Smarter from his brother’s expulsion from Syria several months earlier, Abdullah received his father’s permission to attempt to retrieve the family’s position in the north. With a small band of armed followers he set forth from Medina on the old Turkish railway.

Within weeks Abdullah had consolidated his hold on the area. Several months after his arrival, even Winston Churchill, the British Colonial Minister, was ready to recognize the fact accomplished. Churchill met Abdullah in Jerusalem and offered him a budget of $5,000 pounds a month. Abdullah in turn recognized Britain’s mandate over Transjordan. Independence was promised at some later date. Abdullah received enough military and political support to establish and maintain his position in Transjordan and was informed that, while the Jews would be allowed to settle in Palestine, they would not be permitted to move into Transjordan. Abdullah’s brother, Feisal, in addition, would be given the kingdom of Iraq to rule and transfer his son’s loss of Syria.

Abdullah ruled Transjordan in the best Arab tradition, with kindness and generosity toward those who were loyal to him. He spent what money he had almost exclusively on ensuring the allegiance of the sheikhs. If he could not buy them, then he fought them. In the first years of his rule, he put down a number of rebellions. In 1924 the Wahabis of Saudi Arabia, the present Saudi Arabian ruling family, invaded Transjordan and were soundly defeated by Abdullah’s tribesmen with British air support. A year later the Wahabis had their revenge: Abdullah’s family was expelled from the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina for good.

By the late 1920’s the pattern of
Abdullah's rule was established. It was a benevolent tribal autocracy that was dependent on Great Britain for its money and protection. Abdullah simply had no time for democracy. British officials, businessmen and soldiers became a part of the system. In private, if not in public, the British recognized that Abdullah's way was the only way Transjordan could be run.

In 1935 Abdullah's first grandson, Hussein, was born. On May 25, 1946 the British Mandate was officially ended. Abdullah became King of the independent state of Transjordan which he renamed: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

West Bank Annexation
On November 29, 1947 the United Nations recommended the partition of Palestine. The Arabs refused to accept the division of the land in which they had until recently been the overwhelming majority of the population. The Jews in Palestine, reinforced by the exodus of Jews from the European holocaust, now numbered half a million individuals determined to create their own state. The Arabs, under the leadership of the Palestinian Haj Amin Al Hussein, were equally determined to stop it. Abdullah, no friend of Hussein's, remained aloof.

Abdullah's plan was complicated by the decision of the neighboring Arab states to occupy Palestine by force to prevent the establishment of a Zionist state. In the war that ensued, the Israelis occupied much of what Abdullah had hoped would become his "Greater Syria." Abdullah's own Arab Legion had not attacked any territory assigned to the Zionists. Contacts were established with high Israeli officials to assure them of his limited intentions.

In December of 1948 Abdullah convened a congress of Palestinian notables in Jericho, during which he became King of all Palestine. He then formally annexed that part of Central Palestine which his troops controlled. He became ruler of the holy places in Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron, but with them he gained a large population of several hundred thousand refugees that was to become his undoing.

Viewed as an agent of Britain and a traitor to the Palestine cause, he was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952.

The Imprint of Hussein

With the assassination of King Abdullah, Prince Talal, his eldest son, became King. Sadly, a mental illness gradually affected Talal. Within a year, his condition grew more severe, and he was finally forced by act of Parliament to abdicate at the age of 42. The ex-King died in Istanbul in July 1972.

On January 8, 1952 during the short reign of King Talal. Despite the parliamentary framework of government it provided, it is the King who wields the final power.

Executive authority is vested by the Constitution in the King and his Cabinet, the Council of Ministers led by a Prime Minister. The Council is

appointed by the King, who may dismiss Council Members at the request of the Prime Minister. The Council acts and supervises the work of the different sections of the Government and establishes general policy. It is technically responsible to the Chamber of Deputies in the National Assembly on matters of general policy and can be forced to resign by a two-thirds vote of "no confidence" by that body.

Legislative power rests in a bicameral National Assembly. The 30-member Senate, appointed by the King for an 8-year term, brings together senators from both the West and East Banks, with no limitation regarding the number chosen from each area.

The 60-Member Chamber of Deputies is elected by the people, i.e. men and women 18 years of age or older who satisfy certain legal standards.
They serve a 4-year term subject to dissolution by the King. Traditionally 30 Deputies are from the West Bank and 30 from the East Bank. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank has not affected this balanced representation. Within the balance, however, 50 seats must go to Moslems and 10 to Christians. It is estimated that about 75 percent of the eligible citizens vote in the elections.

The judiciary is constitutionally independent of the other branches. Judges for the judiciary are appointed or dismissed by royal decree. Three categories of courts are provided for by the 1952 Constitution: civil, religious and special courts. Civil courts include magistrates courts, courts of the first instance and courts of appeals and cassation in Amman, which hear appeals from lower courts. A Special Council exists, much like a Supreme Court, to interpret the laws and pass on their constitutionality.

There are religious courts for both Moslems and non-Moslems. These courts have jurisdiction over such matters as marriage and divorce. The third category, the special courts, consist of land, government, property, municipal, custom and tax courts. At the Governorate and Municipal Council levels, Jordan is divided into eight Governorates, each headed by a Governor appointed by the King. They are the sole authorities for all government departments and development projects in their respective areas.

In the cities, the mayor and his elected council take care of local affairs. Despite the Israeli military occupation in the West Bank, the former municipal councils are almost all in operation, continuing the manner of administration as before.

### Political Parties

The political education of King Hussein, according to biographer Peter Snow, was limited to the intolerant Conservatism of much of the British upper middle class and to the advice and instincts he had inherited from the patriarchal regime of his grandfather. "Not surprisingly," Snow writes, "he had little feeling for the economic and political case presented by the Left, and it was as natural for him to despise socialism and communism as it was for nearly every one of his friends at Harrow [where his father had gone before him] and Sandhurst. Besides, even if he had come into contact with the new political ideas in the Arab world that would have widened his political education, he would only have seen them as threatening his throne. And to Hussein the task of preserving his throne had nothing to do with self-preservation: it was a task that he fervently believed to be in the interests of his people."10

But from his British experience, Hussein also had gained a healthy respect for British institutions. Like his father, he felt that Jordan should have—to a degree—a free press and political parties. There were some efforts in his early reign to liberalize Jordan’s political system. The initiatives failed. The times were becoming too tumultuous, and from 1957, political parties were banned in the country.

### The Military

From the day he became King, Hussein clearly knew where his interests lay: he wanted an army and an air force. An army he already had.

When his grandfather had arrived in the Transjordan, the Bedouin were the dominant political force in the region. When Abdullah formed Jordan’s army it was from the Bedouin that he took most of his recruits. John Bagot Glubb, called in from Iraq as a young British officer in 1930 to put this Bedouin force together, was like a Bedouin himself in temperament—"reserved, intensely self-sufficient, but emotional and sensitive."11 His relationship with Abdullah was immediately close, yet dutifully respectful.

Under Glubb’s management the army had expanded rapidly: from 6,000 in 1948 to 20,000 by the end of 1952. Under the terms of the Anglo-Jordan treaty, a British subsidy paid for the soldiers and their equipment. Britain, however, was building the Arab Legion as a deterrent to communism. Many Jordanians, particularly the Palestinians, wanted it to direct its growing strength against Israel.

Unlike Abdullah, Hussein’s relationship with Glubb was never as comfortable, perhaps due to the problem of generations between them, in terms of age and outlook. On March 1, 1956, after twenty-six years of faithful service to the country, Jordan’s commander-in-chief was dismissed ostensibly over strategy differences with the King and over the role of Arab officers in the Army.12

The period of political liberalization in Jordan transformed the military from a predominantly Bedouin force under Glubb, almost fanatically loyal to the King, to a more Arabized one following Glubb’s dismissal. By 1956, five of Jordan’s ten infantry regiments of the Arab Legion and two of its three armored regiments were Bedouin. These Bedouin units were widely recognized as the spearhead of the Legion. With Glubb’s departure and the immediate resignation from executive commands of all British officers, the Arabization of the army accelerated. New political winds, already at work, entered the military.

In 1952 there was virtually no air force in Jordan. An air force, Hussein felt, would be the most effective demonstration of power. His first three years as King were directed to securing that air force.

The parliamentary crisis of April 1957, in which the King dismissed Jordan’s democratically elected government because of its radical directions, precipitated a series of events that could have destroyed the monarchy. But Hussein asserted control over the army, effectively weeded out the dissident elements, and emerged the victor in a show of strength and ability.

The military henceforth was to be the bedrock in his rule. Hussein never forgot the 1957 lesson. He has worked to maintain the unity of King and Army. Even at the most critical moment of his career in September 1970, when his country was torn by civil war in its battle with the P.L.O., the vast majority of his troops remained loyal, despite opponents’ predictions that as much as half the army would desert.

Jordan’s armed forces today are estimated to number 60,000. They are well-trained with sophisticated arms and weapons and jet aircraft supplied, for the most part, by the United States and Great Britain. Perhaps it is surprising that there is no military conscription, but it appears that many young Jordanians consider it a privilege to join, thus providing sufficient recruits for the armed forces. Even youngsters of school age join as reserves. King Hussein’s two sons, at the age of 9, took two years of reserve training after school hours.
The Land and Its Legacy

"Jordan is a beautiful country," wrote King Hussein in his autobiography, *Lines: Lies the Head*. "It is wild, with limitless deserts where the Bedouin roam, but the mountains of the north are clothed in green forests, and where the Jordan River flows it is fertile and warm in the winter. Jordan has a strange, haunting beauty and a sense of timelessness."

Madaba's Archaeological and Folklore Museum offers fine examples of early Byzantine mosaics.

In contrast to Hussein's evocation is the sterile description provided in a recent report by the U.S. Department of State: a country of rocky deserts, mountains and rolling plains... predominantly arid... 88 percent desert or waste. The latter description summarizes, in a limited way, Jordan's basic topographical features, dominated by the great north-south Jordan Rift Valley (a branch of the great African Rift Valley system) that forms the depression of the Jordan River Valley, Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) and the Dead Sea.

"The Jordan River," the report states, "divides Jordan into two regions—the East Bank and the West Bank. Immediately east of the river and the Dead Sea is the edge of a high plateau, which receives moderate rainfall. The greater part of the East Bank, however, is an extension of the Syrian (or North Arabian) Desert. The small area west of the river is hilly and receives a fair amount of rainfall." The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a country of 36,832 square miles, adjoins Syria in the north, Iraq in the east, and Saudi Arabia in the east and south. Its southwest corner, a mere 17 miles of coastline, looks out on the Gulf of Aqaba and beyond, to the Red Sea. To the west is the land of Israel, with whom Jordan is still officially at war. The fertile West Bank of 2,640 square miles lies west of the Jordan River and has been occupied by Israel since the 1967 War.

The uplands of the West Bank, known for centuries as the Samaritan and Judean Mountains, rise to an average height of 3,000 feet above sea level. Several large valleys cut through the mountains draining west towards the Mediterranean. The shorter valleys draining east consist of deep gorges, with thin, poor soils occasionally offset by alluvial deposits among the hills.

The Jordan Valley, lowest point on the surface of the earth, lies almost 1,300 feet below sea level at the Dead Sea. Its great river, the Jordan, revered by Christians, Jews and Moslems alike, meanders some 223 miles from its origin in the north down to the Dead Sea. The river, in whose waters Christ was baptized by John the Baptist, was known to the Greeks as Aulon. The Hebrews called it al-Yardon, but the Arabs still consider it Ash-Sharjah, the Watering Place. Its three principal sources rise at the foot of Mount Hermon—the Hirsani, the longest, rising in Lebanon at a height of 1,800 feet; the Nahr Baniyas, flowing from the east in Syria; and between them, the Dan with its sparkling fresh water. All three join together in the Hula Basin into which other streams, such as the Einot Enan, flow. On its southward journey to the Dead Sea, the Jordan drains the fresh waters of the Sea of Galilee, the Yarmuk, and the valley streams of the plateau. The Dead Sea, actually a lake, is 45 miles long and 10 miles wide, its waters far saltier than the ocean.

Many archaeologists and anthropologists believe that civilization—when man gave up his nomadic life as hunter and settled down to raise crops—was born here in the warm climate of the Jordan River Valley. The Jordan villages of Jericho and Beidha, each more than 10,000 years old, lay claim to being the world's first settled community.

To the east, across four-fifths of the land, the great Syrian Desert stretches under a blazing sun. Within Jordan's boundaries, it is known as the Jordan Desert. Along the western edge, the East Bank Uplands peer over the Rift Valley from heights of 2,000 and 3,000 feet. Further south the mountains rise still higher to an elevation of 5,750 feet. Many valleys and streams circulate north, east and west, while south of Al-karak seasonal streams run east into a low region known as the Jafr Depression. Still farther south, between Ma'an and Aqaba, stands an unforgettable, breathtaking landscape—the Valley of the Moon: Wadi Rum. It is a vast desert of undulating pale pink sands and eerie, sandstone mountains—

Citadel Hill in Amman offers ancient sites to explore, including the National Archaeological Museum and the ruins of a temple the Romans dedicated to Hercules.
black wind sculptures. It is Lawrence of Arabia country, for here, among the cliffs of the Valley, the British ad- venturer helped the Arabs in their desert fight against the Turks in 1917. It was also the location in 1961 of David Lean’s memorable film epic, “Lawrence of Arabia.”

The country’s climate is basically of two types: a pleasant Mediterranean one in the western part to desert heat in the east. The western areas have a rainy season that usually runs from November to mid-March.

Temperatures in Amman generally range from 44° to 87°F (7° to 30°C). In Jericho, 492 feet below sea level, the temperatures are somewhat warmer—between 61° and 90°F (15.6° and 32°C). Farther south, at the port and resort of Aqaba, the range is approximately the same as Jericho’s. The hottest month is August. Prevailing winds throughout the land are westerly to southwesterly.

Annual rainfall in the northern region of the country averages 16 inches, with only 4 in the south. The fertile Jordan Valley has about 8 inches of rainfall each year. In the Uplands frost and snow do occur in small amounts but seldom appear in the Jordan Rift Valley.

Looking Backward
The huge deserts of the Arabian Peninsula, since the Bronze and Middle Bronze Ages, have been the home of Semitic peoples, shepherds who lived a pastoral existence. As their numbers grew and the deserts became more dry, many tribes moved north in search of water for their flocks. Among them were the Canaanites, who reached the shores of the Mediterranean, building small cities along the coastline and in the Jordan Valley. Other tribes, with Biblical names, moved northward too—the Ammonites (hence the capital of Jordan, Amman), the Amorites, the Moabites and the Edomites—and settled communities that are today Jordan’s towns and cities. Another tribe, the Israelites, under the patriarch Abraham, moved to the land of Canaan and pitched its tents at Hebron where Abraham and his family began to prosper.

The struggle of Abraham’s descendants to reach Egypt, following the famine in Canaan, occurred about 1700 B.C. This was the time of Egypt’s fall to desert invaders from the north, the Hyksos, or Shepherd Kings, who brought with them new weapons of war, the horse and chariot.

By 1560 B.C. the Egyptians threw off the Hyksos’ yoke and expelled them from the land. Abraham’s descendant, Moses, who had emerged as a leader of the Israelites, led his tribe from slavery in Egypt across the Red Sea into the desert. Forty years after, in his last act before dying, Moses pointed out the rich Jordan Valley ahead of them. The Israelites crossed the Jordan, took Jericho and other Canaanite towns, and established themselves in the land of Palestine.

About 1000 B.C. David, one of the children of Israel, became King. Great conquests were made, and Jerusalem was established as his capital. Solomon, his son, beautified the city and built the Temple there.

About 800 B.C. the armies of the Assyrians swept across the land to stay for two centuries. The Babylonians, under the great Nebuchadnezzar, followed, and later the Persians under the Cyrus the Great, who occupied Jordan and Palestine for two hundred more years. In 333 B.C. Alexander the Great strode upon the world’s stage, and all of Egypt, Palestine, Jordan and southern Syria was placed under Greek control for nearly 300 years.

At this time, a quiet conquest of the desert wastes to the south of Ammon was taking place. There, among the precipitous mountains of southern Jordan, a great city was being carved out of solid rock. It was called Petra, and the mysterious Arab people building it, the Nabateans.

Shrewd merchants, the Nabateans dominated the caravan routes that laced the sands between Arabia and Damascus. They built Petra into a rich trade center and ruled for a while as far north as the kingdom of Ammon.

Petra’s wealth and its strategic position attracted the envy of the Greek, then Roman rulers, who succeeded in destroying forever the Nabataean kingdom. As the Romans tightened their control over shipping and the caravans that crossed the desert routes, they were able to divert those passing between Arabia and Damascus from stopping at Petra. With time the Nabataean merchants, losing the trade, moved to Bosra and elsewhere to restore their fortunes. Fewer and fewer monuments were carved in Petra’s rock walls. By the end of the third century, the once great city had been abandoned. The only inhabitants were a small Christian community of hermits who found the desert retreat to their liking. By the fifth century Petra had become a small diocese and a place of pilgrimage.

For more than a thousand years, the city of Petra was lost to the world, completely unseen except for the Bedouin who occasionally visited there. Then, in 1812, “the rose red city half as old as time” appeared
The Rise of Islam

For Jordan, and much of the Arab world, the most important chapter of modern history began in the early seventh century with the advent of Islam. The new and all-embracing faith, with its message of brotherhood, passed over the land. The Byzantine Empire, that had acquired Syria and Palestine with the breakup of the Roman Empire, toppled in the winds. In less than a century a new empire extended across half the known world, from Spain to the borders of China. The new Islamic religion inspired its adherents to create a rich and magnificent civilization that made, during the 350 years of its golden age, invaluable contributions to mankind, in science, medicine, literature, philosophy and the arts.

The great hunting lodges, qasrs or castles, that dot the wide desert east of Amman were built centuries ago by the caliphs, the successors of Mohammed who were spiritual and earthly leaders of the Arab realm. In Jerusalem the Ommayyad Caliph, Abd al Malak Ibn Marwan, built the famous Dome of the Rock. The Ommayyads, an Arab dynasty, ruled from their capital in Damascus for 100 years. In 750 A.D. the Abbasids, a rival group, fought and conquered the Ommayyads, moving the caliphate to Baghdad.

Late in the 11th century, the caliphs lost control of Jordan and Palestine. This was the time of the Crusades, the mission to restore the Holy Land at whatever cost to Christian rule. In 1099 A.D. Jerusalem fell into Crusader hands. Hundreds of new churches and Christian shrines dotted the land, while great castles were built north, south and west to control the caravan routes. Removal of caravan spices, ivory, jewels and brocades, brought a vital source of income to Crusaders' military outposts.

On the awesome rim of a plateau, 3,400 feet above sea level, is Kerak, the most impregnable part of the castle-fortress chain built by the Crusaders. One of the most renowned castles in all the Middle East, Kerak is an outstanding example of medieval military architecture. Built by the Crusader leader, Godfrey of Bouillon, in the 12th century, Kerak lay across the trade routes that led from Arabia to Egypt and the Mediterranean. Saladin, the Saracen, and his Moslem forces made numerous attempts to storm the great fortress. In the final battle of Hittin near Lake Tiberias, Saladin's Arab armies proved victorious. The Crusaders were forced to leave the land forever.

By the early 1500's the mantle of the Ottoman Empire spread its fold across the Arab world. Under Suleiman the Magnificent, Ottoman dominion extended without a break from Algeria to the Persian Gulf and from Aleppo to the Indian Ocean. It included the heart as well as the head of Islam: the sacred cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem; Damascus, first capital of the Arab Empire; and Baghdad, whose science had illuminated the world. Ottoman authority was generally loose and insecure and was sometimes openly flouted. With varying fortunes, frequently accompanied by wars, revolts and massacres, the Ottoman rule remained in those extended frontiers until the close of the 18th century.

It was at this point in history that the Arab Awakening began.
The People in Perspective

Jordanians are a people primarily of Arab stock. Their main tongue is Arabic, with a number of dialects differentiated by local accents and various inflections. English is used widely in commercial and official sectors. Literacy is estimated to be 65 percent. Life expectancy is 52 years. Jordan is a youthful country, with more than half the people under the age of 15.

Slightly more than 50 percent of an estimated 3 million total population is rural, with 44 percent fully urban and less than 6 percent nomadic or semi-nomadic. About one-third of the population lives under Israeli military occupation on the West Bank of the Jordan River (a portion of former Palestine). The remainder, including more than 850,000 registered refugees and displaced persons, reside on the East Bank. All Palestinians living in Jordan hold Jordanian citizenship. 

The Circassians, a Sunni Moslem group and one of the largest minority groups, number about 10,000. In the 1860's and 1870's Russian power in the Caucasus and the Russo-Turkish War forced many Circassians from the Caucasus region into Turkey to find a refuge in a Moslem country. The Turks established considerable groups of them as colonies in Jordan to reinforce the settled population.

The Refugee Problem

The influx of Palestinian refugees profoundly affected Jordan's political, social and business life. By 1966 approximately 700,000 refugees had fled to Jordan. The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 brought another 350,000. Thousands live in Jordan's 29 refugee camps, some in huts and tents—many of them crude and makeshift. Others live in small, sturdy houses within the camp area. Those with more money settled upon arrival in Jordan's cities and towns and entered the mainstream of the country's life—in business, in government, in social work.

Largest of all the refugee camps is Aqabat Jaber, which houses 32,000 people. Schools, clinics and other health facilities are built around the camp. The teenagers are being taught useful trades, and many of the young girls specialize in fine Palestinian needlework.

Because a majority of inhabitants of the camps insist on eventually returning home, they have been classified as "displaced persons who resist efforts at resettlement." As such, they are partially supported by the United Nations Relief Agencies for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East.

In his autobiography, Untold Lies the Head, King Hussein was justifiably proud of Jordan's handling of the refugee situation, and proud of the U.N.R.W.A. work inside the country. In 1962, U.N.R.W.A. established 47 food centers, 174 milk centers, 171 schools in cooperation with the Jordanian Government, 2 hospitals for refugees, 3 mobile clinics and 21 clinics administered by volunteer physicians.

In response to Arab criticism of Jordan's approach to the refugee problem, Hussein in his autobiography defended his policy and indicated that he did indeed understand the real problem:

"Because of our different approach to the refugee problem, we have been consistently attacked by some other Arab states. They even accuse us of trying to solve the Palestine problem by settling Palestinians and giving them a chance to live so that they can forget their cause and lost homeland.

But what we are doing for the refugees is no real solution. It is at best a palliative. While the refugee is mainly the most obvious result of some Western powers' abandoned principles, it is a result only, and I do not believe that a policy directed solely toward solving the refugee problem will necessarily achieve a real solution to the original problem—that of ousting the inhabitants of a country which for two thousand years has been Arab."
The Bedouin

When Abdullah arrived in the Transjordan in 1921, the Bedouin were the dominant political force in the region. The Beni Hashim family tree of Abdullah gave him a religious and tribal legitimacy in the eyes of the deeply traditional Bedouin. Abdullah was a Bedouin, and he knew how their loyalties worked. He always made himself accessible to them: he was always generous to them. When he formed his army it was from the Bedouin that he took most of his recruits. The principal tribe was the Bedouin force fiercely devoted to the ruler, who was one of their own stock and descended from the Prophet himself. Their loyalty was to be the key to Abdullah's power within Transjordan.1 For Hussein, his grandson, it has meant survival.

Three principal tribes exist in Jordan: the Beni Sakhr, the Huwayyats, and the Sirhans. Despite Jordan's successful efforts at settling some of the Bedouin in permanent locations, the tribes still wander across the caravan routes of the kingdom. In the desert, dotted with oases and wells from Arzaq to Wadi Rum, the Bedouin still dominate. Their life is based on three virtues—honor, courage and hospitality. To be an honorable man, you must have the courage to defend your honor. You must always show hospitality. What is yours belongs also to your guests. Even an enemy has the guarantees of shelter and food once he reaches the camp of any enemy tribe.13

The living patterns of the Bedouin tribes vary according to size. Some tribes consist of a few families, perhaps only of a father, the families of his sons and his unmarried daughters. Others, like the Beni Sakhr, have 2,000 to 3,000 inter-related families who owe allegiance to the tribal sheikh, the ruling head of the family. In such a tribe there may be a dozen sheikhs.14

Education

Because half the population of Jordan is under 15, every third person is a student. It has been one of the King's great dreams to see every boy and girl at school. His dream is in the making.

Schooling is free and compulsory to the ninth grade today, and, since 1952, enrollment has more than doubled. Facilities and teachers have been added at an equal pace. Education, within the modernization taking place, has received top priority. The Government spends 8 percent of its annual budget on education, and schools are now found in the most remote stretches of the southern and eastern part of the country. Today Jordan's literacy rate—60 percent and rising—is one of the highest in the area.

Approximately 70 percent of Jordan's children go to public schools. Villagers traditionally against education for girls no longer object to their daughters sitting in co-educational, one-classroom schools. For most Jordanians, education has become a status symbol, a source of social prestige. Many parents now consider education as the best means to leadership and higher position.

The Ministry of Education runs the schools and establishes the curriculum. Many of those seeking higher education continue their studies at the universities in Jordan, while others attend colleges and universities in the West. In 1977, 10,000 Jordanians graduated from universities at home and abroad. The University of Amman, begun in 1962 with one faculty, has since added science, economics and commerce, medicine and Islamic law. From an original enrollment of 167, the student body grew to 6,000 in 1977. A second university, the University of Yarmouk, being built in Irbid near Lake Tiberias, will accommodate a 20,000 enrollment by 1985.

There are more than 30 vocational and technical training centers in the country. Jordan additionally has its own Royal Air Academy, soon to become a full-scale university, which will serve as the aeronautical center for the entire Middle East.

In 1971 a vast complex of sports and cultural facilities, Hussein Sports City, was completed for the youth of Jordan just outside Amman, largely through donations from the people of Jordan. King Hussein envisioned a city within a city for youth of all ages, designed to Olympic Games' standards in the hope that one day it would attract the Olympics to Amman.

The Role of Women

In the early 1900's women in Jordan were not allowed by their families to go to business or to work. Even domesticities at the time were men, because strict Moslems do not permit their wives to be seen by other men, with the exception of relatives. Those customs have changed a great deal. Today more than 20 percent of the country's factory workers are women. In the cities young women work as secretaries, in public relations jobs, in television and radio stations, as clerks and saleswomen. Some more affluent families own boutiques run by women, and it is not uncommon to find a woman, perhaps widowed or divorced, who has opened her own business.

King Hussein has taken a lead in recognizing the contribution women are making toward national development. In Jordan women have had, since 1973, the right to vote. At a 1975 conference on women's development attended by representatives from all over the world, the King "gave a determined push forward to his belief that social, cultural and economic development must go hand-in-hand and that there can be no success without the full participation of women."14

Social Progress

One of the five basic tenets of the Islamic faith is the practice of alms-giving and care the needy. Jordan's social structure and its welfare services are based on a blend of these ancient religious tenets, together with the modern concepts of civic consciousness and governmental concern. Today, government agencies and a large number of voluntary organizations cooperate in the care of the sick and the aged, orphans, the handicapped, and those less privileged. In former times such services were dispensed by private organizations.

The Anna Spafford Memorial Children's Hospital, a fine example of private initiative, has cared for
The Economic Climate

A Five-Year Plan, covering the period 1976-80, has been implemented to follow the Three-Year Plan of 1973-75. This earlier effort was the first attempt, since the 1967 June War, to set macroeconomic targets for the country. If its goals proved hard to achieve, it taught the planners important lessons.

The Five-Year Plan, produced under the guidance of King Hussein’s brother, Crown Prince Hassan, is an impressive blueprint. Its broad aims resemble those of its predecessor: the creation of new employment; sustained high growth rates; a reduction of the trade deficit; a reduction of the country’s budget support from abroad; and a significant shift of resources into export-oriented productive sectors of the economy.

The Plan’s targets include an average annual real growth rate of 12 percent (an ambitious increase over the 6 percent achieved under the Three-Year Plan. Projected domestic revenues will increase annually by 16.5 percent, while increases in defense spending (recently 40-50 percent of the budget) will be held to a 5 percent yearly increase.

Investment priorities of the Plan show a shift of resource allocations toward industry and agriculture, chiefly at the expense of social services. The powerhouse of the economy—mining—is expected to generate the bulk of increased export receipts as well as the lion’s share of domestic revenues.

Phosphate Wealth

The key to the success of Jordan’s ambitious Plan is its phosphate production, which accounts for more than half of the country’s total exports.

Growth rates of economic sectors during the plan period (1976—1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Overall growth (%)</th>
<th>Average annual growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and manufacturing</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and water supply</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total productive sectors</td>
<td>161.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (wholesale and retail)</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Institutions</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of dwellings</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration and defence</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total services sectors</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP at factor cost</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect taxes</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net factor income from abroad</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP at market prices</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jordanian National Planning Council

Geologists now estimate that up to 60 percent of Jordan may be endowed with phosphate rock. The new airport site south of Amman is reportedly sitting on a giant bed of the mineral, as is the city of Zarqa, north of Amman.

The Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (J.P.M.C.), the main producer, which is 93 percent Government-owned, plans to increase production to 3 million tons at its two mine sites—at Ruseifa, just 10 miles north of Amman, and at Hasa, 100 miles south—with an ultimate target of 10 million tons per year by the 1980’s.

Sales of Jordanian phosphates through the expanded port of Aqaba to the Far East have risen sharply. But the major breakthrough, due to aggressive marketing, has been to markets in East Europe, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia—where shipments increased from 101,000 in 1972 to 636,000 tons in 1976. The biggest customer, however, remains Taiwan.
J.P.M.C., which employs 52 engineers with degrees in mining technology or mineral sciences, has been requested by Syria and Iraq to provide technical aid for their own nascent phosphate industries. Already J.P.M.C. is feeling the pressure of labor-poor oil producers in the Gulf region, looking throughout the Arab world for qualified technical personnel.

At the company’s Hasa site, the workers and their families live in a handsome town complete with private homes, clinic, school facilities, recreation center and bus, which take the single men to Amman for weekends with their families.16

East Bank Industry

Until 1967 the country appeared to be well on its way to becoming a viable entity. The loss of the West Bank in that year—2,000 square miles of land (of a total of 38,000) and perhaps half of the country’s resources, including much of its best farm land, and all of its once thriving Holy Land tourist industry—brought a severe setback.

It was on the East Bank that: the Ministry of National Economy was set up in the 1950’s; the Jordan Petroleum Refinery was built at Zarqa; the Jordan Electric Power Company built the country’s first modern power plant; the Jordan Phosphate Mine Company was reorganized and recapitalized; and a modern cement plant northeast of Amman went into operation.

Most of Jordan’s larger manufacturing industries are located on the highway between the capital and Zarqa. The wide range of industry includes, among other things, textiles, leather, batteries, paper, pharmaceuticals, bottling and brewing, foodstuffs, matches, plastics and a pilot half-million dollar steel pipe factory.

Up to the present, The Jordan Tobacco and Cigarette Company has probably been Jordan’s largest industrial undertaking after the phosphate mines, oil refinery and cement plant. In the past decade the domestic market has increased from 715 million cigarettes a year to more than a billion, for export to much of the Middle East. With $635,000 worth of modern machinery, the company produced $13.4 million worth of cigarettes in 1974, $7.6 million of it tax money that went straight to the Government.17

Next in size is the Jordanian Commercial and Agricultural Company, the complex also know as Hussein Industrial City. In 1963 J.C.A. began producing biscuits on its own, followed by a paint factory in joint venture with two British firms, and a tin can factory for packaging its own products. By 1965 the company was producing soap under Lux, Lifeboy and Vipol brands names, Sunsilk shampoo, Pear’s baby powder, Erasmic shaving cream, Pepsi-dent and Signal toothpaste, and even ice cream. In its first decade of operations, the company’s turnover increased five times to $3.2 million a year. The firm is now involved in producing cardboard boxes and oriental carpets and is 1 percent owner of the Confec-tionary and Chocolates Company, a firm capitalized at $500,000, of which $135,000 is in Government-owned shares.18

A host of new projects in varying stages can only help to accelerate the kingdom’s continued growth.

In Salt, a small town close to Amman, the Arab Pharmaceutical Company will invest an estimated $45 million during the next seven years on a plant to manufacture more than fifty types of medicines as well as household disinfectants, agro-chemicals and cosmetics.

The Jordanian Ministry of Supply plans to start construction this year on a large flour mill—and later a feed mill nearby—on a site close to the Hejaz railway south of Amman. The flour mill, being designed by Swedish consultants, will be financed by the West German Development Bank at a cost of more than $7 million.

Plans to export the potash of the Dead Sea, as Israel is doing on its western shore, were continually being held up. In early 1976, however, the project was finally approved with the announcement that the United States would lend Jordan $6 million to help finance its first phase. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will contribute $1 million and the Jordanian Government $3 million. The new company, the Arab Potash Company, has been lining up major international firms to handle marketing in various regions of the world. When the new plant is in full operation by 1985, 1.2 million tons of potash are expected to be produced.

Of major significance to the economy will be a fertilizer processing plant to be built by the Jordan Fertilizer Industry Company at a cost of $300 million. Besides the main processing plant, storage facilities, a power plant, water-cooling and treatment stations will also be constructed. The project, one of the biggest of its type in the world, will be constructed close to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba and represents a major international financing endeavor. As reported in the January issue of Middle East Construction this year, an international loan consortium of banks and other financial institutions has been organized to handle the...
With nearly 15 percent of the Five-Year Plan's $2.4 billion in investments earmarked for agriculture, the expectations for a revived agriculture are great. The Jordan Government will be increasingly involved and has already given top priority to developing the country's water supply. Because of scarce and irregular rainfall even in fertile areas, farmers depend almost entirely on irrigation. Nearly $216 million is being allocated to irrigation systems, dams, reservoirs and canals in the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea basin and the northern uplands. When completed, these projects will double the acreage under permanent irrigation for a total of 8,500 acres.

Already constructed are a $36 million dam and a 1.7-billion-cubic-foot reservoir on the Zerka River. The Government has also initiated construction of various water-diversion projects on the Wadi Arab, the Wadi Hisban and the Wadi Jarum, with further plans to construct a $75 million dam on the Yarmuk River. To channel the extra water on to farms, Jordan's planners are also developing an expanded network of pumping stations, carrier canals and pressure pipes, including a $52 million, 11-mile extension of the East Ghor Canal to the Dead Sea. Funds for a feasibility study have already been granted by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

In an even bolder move, Jordan is installing sprinklers along the entire 65-mile length of the Jordan Valley. In December 1977 the first of the sprinklers was turned on. With its present system of canals, pipes and ditches carrying water, the Jordan Valley now produces more than half of the food grown in all Jordan. Agriculture planners hope to quadruple this production. Two harvests a year can be supported in various parts of the fertile valley, and its long, hot, humid summers and mild winters are perfect for growing a wide variety of fruits and vegetables—cucumbers, tomatoes, eggplants, broad beans and melons.

A decade of conflict wrecked many of the valley's key agricultural installations and forced large numbers of farmers to abandon their land. Jordan's Government has been making an extraordinary effort to rebuild and rehabilitate the Valley. In 1973 the Government set up the Jordan Valley Commission to coordinate all development activities within the valley. The Commission's special emphasis was agriculture.

In one of its first moves, it brought the farmers together under the Jordan Valley Farmers Association. Its objectives are to increase production and to help the farmers raise the $225 per capita income of farm families (only half the national average) to an above-average level. The Association plans to: build new farming communities; re-equip existing communities with roads, schools and clinics; provide electricity and drinking water; and organize the farmers into cooperatives that can share equipment and market crops.

In an effort to avoid using middlemen and to produce more income, four regional fruit and vegetable packing centers have been set up. Their produce is collected from individual farms and readied for direct sale to wholesale markets both inside and outside Jordan.

Other activities include pest control and harvesting, with $1.5 million allocated for purchasing jointly owned farming equipment. Import duties on fertilizers, pesticides and seed and taxes on land and farm income are all being waived to encourage expansion. Jordan's Government has been encouraging new approaches to farming not only to generate productivity but to improve the farmer's own life. Within new plastic greenhouses and tunnels throughout the Jordan Valley, farmers are producing out-of-season vegetables and fruits. Investment is minimal. The return is quick and profits are high. But there are some farmers who do not approve of the development. They argue that the country does not need expensive cucumbers in January, but rather enough moderately-priced food year round. The Ministry of Agriculture apparently agrees.

The Ministry prefers that farmers change crop patterns to make more efficient use of the land. Farmers are encouraged, for example, to limit production of citrus and bananas, which require a great deal of water, and discouraged from growing wheat in high-risk marginal rainfall areas. They are being pressed to grow fodder, improve their livestock production, to plant fruit trees other than citrus and banana, and to arrest soil erosion. Although that approach obviously reduced wheat acreage, it does not necessarily reduce the size of the wheat crop. By intense cultivation of other short- and long-term financing needed.

The project, expected to bring in annual export sales of about $200 million, should provide a financial rate of return on equity of more than 20 percent by the time the plant is working at full capacity. The cost of providing the related infrastructure, such as a water pipeline and a marine terminal, will be borne by the Saudi Development Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, the British Government, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Jordanian Government. It is an impressive international-Jordanian undertaking that will generate not only huge export earnings but a considerable number of new jobs.14

Agricultural Upswing

While minerals may be the biggest export in value, agriculture remains the most important sector of the economy. It accounts for 14 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (compared with some 10 percent from mining and manufacturing) and provides employment for 25 percent of the total labor force.

Much of Jordan's land is desert. Only 10 percent is cultivated and the cultivable land available for further expansion is very limited. But the irrigated area, most notably the fertile Jordan Valley, is steadily being increased.

Prior to 1967 Jordanian farming was concentrated in the West Bank. There, in fertile fields adjacent to the Israeli frontier, farmers grew 60 percent of Jordan's fruit, 65 percent of its vegetables and 30 percent of its cereals. Israeli occupation of the West Bank left Jordan with a measer 800,000 acres of East Bank land suitable for agriculture. There were more problems in subsequent years: further fighting disrupted farming on the East Bank; the vital Ghor irrigation canal was badly damaged; drought in three of the past four years brought further havoc.15

"Jordan now imports more than half the food it consumes," commented Aramco World Magazine in a mid-1976 report on the state of farming. "It is wholly dependent on foreign purchases of sugar, rice and date, relies heavily on imports of wheat, meat, dairy products and vegetable oils, and buys from abroad substantial quantities of potatoes, onions and garlic.16
higher-yield seed, the Ministry hopes to double the output of wheat. And to make more economic use of its manpower, the Government is turning Jordan's nomadic Bedouins into settled farmers; eight settlements are already operating successfully in the desert south of Amman.

Inflationary Times

The country has a small labor force, an estimated 400,000. To replace the labor force that has left the farms, Egyptian and Pakistani immigrants are now being brought in during the picking season. At least 150,000 Jordanians are estimated to be living abroad. Many of them tend to be in highly-skilled professional or managerial positions and are attracted by the high salaries offered in the oil-rich Gulf states. There are no serious labor shortages in many key areas, particularly in the construction industry, a gap being filled mostly by Syrians who worked in Lebanon before the civil war. They have brought with them the usual problems of housing, health, food, and, in some instances, even crime.

With the shortage of skilled manpower, wages have sharply risen. Most Jordanian companies, and indeed the Government, are not able to compete with wage scales in the Gulf. The fact that some try to do so has caused a worrisome imbalance in the labor market.

Jordan's construction industry clearly reflects the dilemma being posed by the growing labor problem. Although the construction sector in relation to the Gross Domestic Product grew from approximately $22 million in 1971 to $81 million last year, the year 1977 saw a slow-down in the rate of expansion.

The housing sector has been growing considerably more slowly than the rest of the construction industry. But the problem of housing in Jordan is not just the shortage of investment but is rather a labor-intensive part of the building industry. It is here that the country's shortage of skilled manpower and the high cost of labor has had a specially marked effect.

There are at present only two industries in the country which are manufacturing precast building elements and two local contractors who use fast building techniques. More are being encouraged. With Jordan's population expected to double at the present growth rate within 17 years and with the housing program already lagging behind, the problems now appearing can only become more difficult and may very well prove intractable unless positive steps are taken to solve them.

Higher prices, and in the Government's case a higher public sector deficit, are a consequence of high wages. Price pressures began to surface as early as 1972, gradually gaining momentum, so that by 1974 inflation (according to the Amman cost-of-living index) reached 20 percent for the year. It dipped to 12 percent in 1975, but by the end of 1976, the rate had surpassed the inflation of 1974.

Modernization of Amman

The face of Amman is quickly changing. New hotels, apartments and buildings are all rising skyward. The new Queen Alia International Airport, 30 kilometres south of Amman, is being constructed to replace the present Amman International Airport, now far too small. (A $90 million contract for the new airport was awarded to Bechtel International of the United States in early 1976.) ALIA, the Jordanian national airline, purchased two Boeing 747's in November, 1975 at a cost of $28 million each (a gift from Abu Dhabi) to open new air routes to North and South America, Japan and Australia in conjunction with Syrian Arab Airlines.

The Government has also been expanding telecommunications and grants breaks on taxes and import duties to foreign companies. In November 1975 the Cabinet approved exceedingly attractive legislation enabling a foreign company to establish an office immediately after authorization from the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Such companies are tax exempt from income tax and social services tax on profits derived from business activities abroad. They are not required to register with chambers of commerce nor to pay customs duties on imported office equipment and furniture. The salaries of the non-Jordanians employed are also tax exempt. The companies are allowed to open non-residential accounts in Jordanian currency or any other convertible currency. They also may deposit or withdraw any amount of money in these accounts without obtaining permits in advance.

A substantial share of Beirut's businesses have established themselves in the Jordanian capital. Yet, the influx of people from Beirut, including some 25,000 refugees dislocated by the civil war, are severely taxing the city's services. Inflation is climbing. Rents are soaring. A furnished two-bedroom apartment rented for $15,000 two years ago. Bidding for office space and apartment buildings still under construction is getting worse. Bechtel Corporation, reportedly needing housing for the families of employees working on the new airport, paid one year's rent in advance to reserve an unfinished building. A worried Government was planning to try to curb speculation by imposing a capital gains tax.

Hopes for Tourism

Jordan's $35 million in tourist receipts in 1966 fell to $9 million in 1970. By 1974 recovery began as 550,000 visitors visited the country and receipts climbed dramatically to $50 million. In 1975 there were 707,662 tourists—more than 431,000 Arabs and a third of these Syrians—topping the pre-1967 figures for the first time. By 1980 the aim is to have 12,000 hotel, motel, resthouse and tourist village beds, more than one million visitors, and an income of $120 million.

Port of Aqaba

Jordan's development program is hardly limited to Amman. The Red Sea port of Aqaba, the country's only outlet to the sea and a major beach resort for its tourism, is rapidly being developed to cope with the continued increase in both exports and imports.

The opening of the Suez Canal in June 1975 saw a sharp increase in Aqaba port activity. In that year, 516 ships docked at the port, compared to 299 the previous year. Imports through the port rose from 367,423 tons to 682,795 tons. The need to expand port facilities became urgent and, in late 1976, the Government set into motion its plans to build four quays with a total length of 720 meters and a number of new warehouses to double the present capacity. Money for the $72 million port expansion has been loaned by neighboring Iraq together with additional funds to build a modern highway linking Aqaba to the Iraqi capital.

The only railway in the country—a stretch of the old Hejaz railway from
Deraa on the Syrian border to Ma'an in the south—has now been linked up with Aqaba. When it became operational in October 1978, the Government, in an effort to stimulate Lebanese and Syrian trade through Aqaba, imposed a 20 percent ad valorem duty on all goods imported through Lebanese and Syrian ports. Further widening of the railway between Hasa and Aqaba, to increase the phosphate transport capacity and further port improvement, has been undertaken with the aid of the West German Government.19

Future Economic Management

Underlying the entire range of policies being advanced under the current Five-Year Plan is a strong desire by the Government to reduce Jordan’s serious dependence on outside finance. The country has traditionally enjoyed a strong balance of payments, mainly due to the sizeable foreign currency remittances of her nationals living abroad (presently $300 million a year) and the large inflow of capital from foreign governments who support King Hussein’s moderate policies (an estimated $90 million a year).17

Until the cancellation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty in 1957, Britain was Jordan’s main source of Western aid. In taking a more pro-Arab position at the time of the rupture with Britain, Jordan had a preliminary understanding with Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia that they would assume its financial obligations. But the political cartwheel continued to turn, and Jordan, unprepared to join her nonaligned brothers, turned instead to the United States. In the ten years 1958-67 the United States Government provided Jordan with a total of $560.7 million in grants and loans. Great Britain during this same period provided $35 million.18 U.S. aid continues to be a prime source of foreign funds along with West Germany, Great Britain and Kuwait.

In 1975, due to a reduction in aid and investments from abroad and a backlog of oil payments, the country’s payment surplus proved smaller than usual. By the end of 1976 the Kingdom’s reserves represented roughly 90 percent of her imports in that year. The 1976 export total rose as well (23 percent to roughly $870 million—largely due to the rise in phosphate exports), while Jordan’s imports alarmingly almost doubled to $1.02 billion! As so many other developing economies have demonstrated, the demand for more and more goods generated by a high, rapid growth rate is most often filled by increased imports in the short run. For the immediate future then, Jordan can expect to face a deteriorating trade deficit with a continuing dependence on external finance.

The task of developing the country’s economy at a measured pace is a highly complex one for Jordan’s planners. The political underpinnings must be considered. The authorities, only too aware of the pivotal role of the private sector in the Jordan economy, may have to take firm action to shift the country’s limited resources to more productive sectors.

Book Views

Zionism and the Palestinians

Twenty-two years ago the first issue of New Outlook appeared. Committed to “the clarification of problems concerning peace and cooperation among all the peoples of the Middle East,” it emerged as a needed forum within Israel on the prospects and alternatives for peace. New Outlook continues its contribution to this day, almost 100 issues later.

Simha Flapan, New Outlook editor since its inception, is a Zionist as well as a persistent dove. Flapan believes the future of Israelis and Palestinians are interlocked and thus, mutuality and reconciliation are the critical paths to any ultimate peace.

No serious study to date considers Zionism and its relationship to the Palestinian people. Instead, a proliferation of books paint the region and its history in blacks and whites.

Zionism, according to one viewpoint, is a colonialist-settler movement that serves Western imperialism as a wedge in the side of the Arab East. Others see Zionism as the liberation movement of the Jewish people, seeking freedom from the legacy of anti-semitism and the Holocaust.

Zionism and the Palestinians is a thoughtful, potent challenge to the litigies of political partisans. It documents the multifold failure of leaders on all sides to take the necessary initiatives to bring about a mutual accommodation. It is painfully clear that the key decisions at the key times were made by very few leaders. Most were dominated less by vision, imagination, and trust, and
more by fear, ignorance and political blindness.

Two-thirds of the book examines in detail the policies of Zionist leaders in relation to the Palestinian people. Flapan includes chapters on Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Goldmann, Jabotinsky and the bi-nationalists, and appears to have done a credible job in scouring the sources for the speeches, articles and memoirs that provide a context for the policies each represented.

At one pole of the Zionist spectrum was Goldmann. Committed to partition, he believed “that the rise in power of the Arab states surrounding Israel was therefore inevitable, and that Israel’s protection by a great power likely to be transitory and destabilizing.”

With the exception of the bi-nationalists, the remaining policymakers tried assiduously and successfully to ignore the Palestinian dimension of the conflict, predating their policies on arrangements of convenience with the British mandatory regime and the Arab leaders. The Palestinians were simply a nuisance to be isolated while Zionists built their power base fueled by increased Jewish immigration to Palestine.

A constant theme is parity: the pre-disposition towards a policy of mutuality, i.e., a government based upon equality according to the numbers of the population of each. In retrospect, it appears that the concept of parity, as the ideological precursor of a binational state or perhaps partition, was doomed to failure, at least by the time of the Arab revolt of 1936. The second part of the book uses three themes to critically examine specific policies that might otherwise have brought about a more amenable solution: the policy of the economic and social separation of Jew and Palestinian, the Arab revolt of 1936, and the 1948 War.

However well-intentioned the early, more idealistic Zionists may have been, the policy of 100 percent Jewish labor, coupled with a land policy that displaced numbers of Palestinian fellahin, precluded any joint economic projects. As Flapan notes, some economic cooperation might have reduced Palestinian Jewish tensions.

The polarization of Palestinian and Jewish attitudes, fomented by the Arab revolt and ensuing clashes through 1939, created a watershed of pro-partition sentiment. In any event, the Mufti’s support of Hitler prevented any practical steps towards partition. While this reality was reflected in the Biltmore program adopted by the Zionist movement in 1942, partition and perhaps peace might still have been attainable in 1948. Flapan notes “That the postponement of the declaration on the State of Israel could have led to a negotiated truce with the Arab states, with in calculable consequences for Israeli-Arab relations and the development of Israeli society generally.”

This he supports by detailing the division within the ranks of the Arab leaders, reticent to mobilize for a conflict, and yet in small numbers able to mobilize. There is, of course, far more to the book. Zionism and the Palestinians is the first serious effort in dissecting the tragic short-sightedness of Zionist policy. Hopefully its ambitious effort will break the ground for a new look at that history which is being used as an excuse to perpetuate the suffering of both peoples.

Reviewed by Allan Solomonow

Books To Order

- New Selections

  - Uri Avnery, Israel Without Zionists: A Plea For Peace in the Middle East. Macmillan Publishing. 278 pp. $1.95 (paperback). A remarkable description of Israeli politics, as presented by a member of Israel’s Knesset and the sole representative of a party that believes in the transformation of the Jewish state into a pluralistic and secular one that is able to achieve reconciliation with the Arabs. Our price, $1.70.

  - Thomas A. Bryson, United States/Middle East Diplomatic Relations 1784-1978: An Annotated Bibliography. Scarecrow Press, Inc. 219 pp. $10.00. A guide for students, scholars and libraries. Classified into units according to era. Treats relationships between various Middle Eastern and North African countries and the U.S. Well-compiled for easy reference. Our price, $8.05

  - A.C. Forrest, The Unholy Land, Devin-Adair Co. 178 pp. $3.95 (paperback). The author’s personal, informed and uncompromising stand against what he considers to be imbalanced and distorted news coverage of the human tragedy brought about by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Our price, $3.60.

  - R. Afifi, A. Al-Qazzaz & A. Shabbas, The Arab World: A Handbook for Teachers, Najda, Albany, Calif. 128 pp. $5.00 (paperback). A book of interest not only to teachers but to all having an interest in the Arab world. The authors offer it as an antidote to the prevalence of distortions, stereotyping, etc., found in most school texts covering the Arabs, their culture, history and society. Our price, $3.35.

  - Robert B. Betts, Christians in the Arab East, rev. 1978. John Knox. 318 pp. $12.00. A comprehensive study of the Arabic-speaking Christians and the role they have played in the Middle East from the time of the Islamic conquest up to present day developments. Valuable demographic statistics and a comprehensive bibliography included. Our price, $7.75.


  - Ray Cleveland, Middle East and South Asia, revised 1978, Stryker Post Publications. 96 pp. $2.75 (paperback). The author gives a short historical background on the early empires in these areas, followed by a treatment of each of the present countries. This treatment consists of a set of statistics, a short history, a description of the culture, an outline of economy and finally an analysis of the future prospects. Maps included. An excellent study book. Our price, $2.60.
The Evasive Peace, revised 1976, Dillon/Liederbach Inc. 136 pp. $5.95. Factual background to present Arab-Israeli dilemma, with a prescription for peace in Middle East. Our price, $3.60.

Philip Gabriel, In the Ashes, Whitmore Publishing. 249 pp. $7.95. Begins with a concise, fascinating account of the forces molding Lebanon from 1900 B.C. on. Largely deals with the tragic story of waste and destruction in Lebanon, set in the context of overall Middle East conflict. Our price, $4.85.

David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, Faber & Faber. 367 pp. 6.50 pounds. Aptly subtitled "The Roots of Violence in the Middle East." In tracing these roots, the author explodes a number of myths about both Arabs and Zionists. A carefully researched and documented account. Our price, $8.05.

Alfred Lilenthal, The Zionist Connection: What Price Peace?, Dodd, Mead & Co. 800 pp. $20.00. Covers the Arab-Israeli conflict from the time of Herzl to Camp David. It treats the subject from every angle. It is well-documented; the research involved is monumental. Contains much information of which Americans are mostly unaware. One authority has said that it should be read by every responsible citizen in the West. Our price, $12.85.

Anthony Pearson, Conspiracy of Silence: The Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty, Horizon Press. 179 pp. $9.95. An account of the Israeli attack on the Liberty during the June 1967 Middle East War and the ensuing lack of publicity and information. The author believes it was not an accident, as the Israelis claimed, and gives reasonably certain conclusions as to why the attack took place and the reasons for the cover-up. Our price, $6.85.

Ephraim Sevela, Farewell, Israel, Gateway Editions. 295 pp. $12.95. The author’s disenchantment with Israel, which he had thought would be the fulfillment of his dreams, is emotionally expressed in his treatment of what he calls Israel’s “racism” and the disintegration of the world’s Jewish communities. Our price, $8.10.

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