The Presidential Candidates: How They View the Middle East

By Allan Kellum

The 1980 Presidential campaign is now in full swing. What will the next President's Middle East policy be?


One year prior to the Presidential election date, November 4, 1980, the polls placed Californian Ronald Reagan first in the Republican race, and Edward Kennedy showing his heels to all other Presidential hopefuls, including the present White House occupant.1

Polls, while increasingly accurate as election day nears, cannot reliably project the final results a full year in advance.

Based on late 1975 polls, Jimmy Carter would have completed his 1976 bid for the Presidency as an "also-ran." Advance speculation about the outcome, as Elizabeth Drew has said in the New Yorker, "does not, because it cannot, anticipate the kinds of goofs, gaffes, accidents, and outside events that have changed the course of past campaigns."9

Regardless of who is in the Oval Office and his rhetoric on the campaign trail, the newly-elected President, once in office, may initiate vigorous diplomatic efforts aimed at furthering the Middle East peace effort. The precedents for such post-election action include: the Roger's Plan of 1969, Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in 1973, and Carter's advocacy of a "Palestinian homeland" in March 1977.

Putting aside, for a moment, the campaign rhetoric, what new initiatives are likely in the early months of 1981? Ha'aretz, the New York Times of Israel's newspapers, reported in a front-page article of September 19, 1979, a Tel Aviv University study that speculates about 1981 United States' initiatives.

According to Ha'aretz, the 233-page analysis by Arieh Shalev, formerly Israel's Deputy Chief of Intelligence Research and a former West Bank Military Governor, "says that Israel will have to be prepared for the fact that the United States will in the future be ready to conduct a dialogue with the P.L.O. and to regard it as representing the Palestinians, and will even recognize the Palestinians' right" to create their own national entity.

The study, viewing such an eventuality as detrimental to Israel, suggests that Israel, prior to 1981, be more forthcoming in the autonomy negotiations. This would be a tactical measure aimed at forestalling the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

In recent years, post-election Presidential initiatives have squared with the four-year term of office. Describing the usual pattern, William Quandt, in his 1977 book, Decade of Decisions, said: "Middle East policy being nearly always controversial, it tends to fade into the background in election years. Such was the case in 1968, 1972, and 1976. Candidates and incumbents feel obliged to outbid each other in terms of their commitment to Israel. A few votes may be won this way, along with other forms of support, but, more important, no votes are lost."

One Presidential aspirant, John B. Connally, has already broken that pattern by boldly thrusting his Middle East peace proposal to the forefront in a detailed speech on October 11, 1979. Connally undoubtedly reasoned that he would gain more than he would lose by
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Our next issue of \textit{The Link} will examine Arab stereotyping on United States television.

John F. Mahoney, Executive Director

highlighting, not subduing, his Mideast views. His campaign aides even placed the complete text of the speech as full-page ads in several major newspapers, such as the \textit{Washington Post} and the \textit{Wall Street Journal}.

In his \textit{New York Times} column of October 19, 1979, James Reston gave one reason why it currently might be "popular and even good politics in the United States" to put forward a proposal that clearly calls for Israeli concessions. "Many people here [in Washington], even in the State Department and the White House," said Reston, "believe that the Israelis have been demanding too much, even in their own interests, and that the American people are tired of their demands." Besides which, inflation and the price of heating oil are, in Reston's view, concerns that to the average American supercede all other problems.  

While the American public may be growing weary of the seemingly constant turmoil in the Middle East, there is nonetheless a greater public awareness than ever about the concessions that all parties, including the Israelis, need to make if peace is to become a reality. Additionally, the dependence of the United States on foreign, particularly Arab, oil sources has caused American business to view regional "instability" as a direct threat to the oil lifeline that helps fuel American industry. "Stability" has become a codeword meaning, in large part, an unimpeded flow of Middle Eastern oil to American cars, farms and factories. The stability constituency is sizable. Furthermore, the Camp David process, now stalemated by the Palestinian issue, has focused American public attention on the Begin government's annexationist West Bank policies—expropriation of Arab land, implantation of new Israeli settlements and enlargement of existing ones. Of particular significance is the growing Israeli resistance to Begin's settlement policy. For example, one Peace Now movement demonstration on a rainy October 1979 evening included 80,000 Israelis—a huge turnout by Israeli standards.  

American Jewish concerns, in accord with internal Israeli opposition to present Israeli government policies, are now being publicly expressed. "If the Begin government were to fall through democratic means, many Jews would be relieved (some of us delighted), since we know the Begin policy on the West Bank to be morally obnoxious and politically indefensible," stated New York author Irving Howe last fall in his speech to a Washington symposium primarily attended by American Jews. One analyst, Stanley Karnow, interpreted the significance of American Jews' increasing public criticism of Israeli policies, as "important because it means United States politicians need not endorse Israel's behavior automatically, as many have in the past, out of concern that they will be confronted by an antagonistic American Jewish community whose political influence is considerable..."  

In short, the constraints imposed on Presidential candidates by domestic political considerations have assumed new, expanded dimensions, allowing the candidates to be more evenhanded on the campaign trail. Nevertheless, almost all the candidates are playing it safe; playing it by the conventional rules so as not to lose votes. While not mentioning the other peoples or countries involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, candidates express their primary commitment to Israel's security, and emphasize their consistent support for economic and military aid to Israel. At the same time, the candidates are reluctant to specify, at least during the campaign, the territorial compromises or other policy shifts that they believe Israel may need to make to achieve peace with its Arab neighbors.

In Tribute

Dr. Helen C. Hilling, a founding director of A.M.E.U., died on December 29, 1979. Dr. Hilling, a pioneer in public health administration, geriatrics, rural medicine, served as a Middle East consultant on health care delivery.

Out of love for the poor and the destitute came her inspiration to found in America an organization to create a deeper understanding of the culture and current events in the Middle East.

"We did it," she wrote recently, "for the people driven and killed and wounded in body and spirit by war, and we still carry their memory and the plight of their descendants."

Her vision, her good counsel, her unfailing encouragement will be missed by all of us at A.M.E.U., directors and staff, who were privileged to know and to love her.
Howard Baker

"To hear them talk in the Senate, Howard Henry Baker, Jr., could bring together a boll weevil and a cotton grower if he tried."

That appraisal by the Chicago Sun-Times heads a piece of Baker's campaign literature. It illustrates the premium he places on political compromise.

No ideologue, Baker of Tennessee was unanimously re-elected Senate Republican leader in 1979.

Just as he is able to smooth over differences in the rival factions of his own party, Baker, a 13-year Senate veteran, often cooperates, particularly on foreign policy issues, with Democrats. For example, the 54-year-old Minority Leader played a central role in Senate passage of three items, claimed as victories by the Carter Administration: the Panama Canal treaties; the three-nation Mideast arms package; and termination of the Turkish arms embargo.

He does not always see eye-to-eye with President Carter's foreign policy. Opposition to the Carter-negotiated and Kennedy-backed SALT II treaty is the centerpiece of Baker's campaign.

He advocates "superiority in strategic arms" and a generally tougher stance on United States-Soviet negotiations.

One of Baker's rare differences with Carter's Mideast policy surfaced with the October 1, 1977, joint United States-Soviet Union Mideast statement. Mainly, Baker opposed the "sudden reintroduction of the Soviets into the negotiating process." While favoring a comprehensive peace, Baker opposed reconvening the Geneva Conference until success was assured. Otherwise, in his words, "Russian roulette" would describe the unpredictability of the outcome.1

Baker's voting record reveals consistent support for economic and military aid for Israel.

However, Baker did differ with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Israeli-oriented Washington lobby, on the controversial 1978 arms package for Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The Committee opposed the package concept that seemingly placed Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia on a par politically and hampered efforts to stop the Arab components of it.

Despite the Committee's tactical position, Baker, speaking on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers" prior to the May 15, 1978, Senate vote, said: "I don't think it is consistent with our determination to protect the survival of Israel or to honor the courage of Sadat or to protect our interests in Saudi Arabia."

If Senator Abraham Ribicoff, the widely respected Jewish senator from Connecticut, hadn't taken a similar position, Baker, and others, may not have voted contrary to the Committee's wish. Acknowledging Democrat Ribicoff's pivotal role, Baker said in a Senate speech of May 23, 1978: "We should be grateful for his decision to bear a burden that none of the rest of us can quite share."4

This Baker-Ribicoff combination on Mideast issues dates back to November 1976 when they jointly led a bipartisan 12-member Middle East fact-finding tour.

The resultant evenhanded report of the Baker-Ribicoff trip received high praise. "There is no comparable record of first-hand Congressional familiarization with both sides of any other regional dispute," editorialized the Washington Post of February 11, 1977.

"Its premise," according to the Post's summary of the report's contents, "is that the United States needs the confidence of Arabs as well as Israelis to serve its own interests and theirs. It acknowledges both the political complexity and the emotional/psychological twist of the issues dividing the parties. It notes indications that Arab 'moderates' are ready to accept the existence of Israel as a sovereign Jewish state. It considers ways in which the Palestinians could be brought into negotiations."

Baker and others foresee a comprehensive peace resulting from the following give-and-take: "For Israel, negotiations will mean looking beyond short-term security and heavy dependence on American military assistance to long-term security and recognition by neighboring countries that the resulting agreement was a just one. For the Palestinians it will mean renunciation of terrorism and recognition of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state in return for territory, or the chance to establish a Palestinian state. For Egypt and Syria, peace will involve regaining territories in return for recognizing Israel's right to exist, renunciation of the use of force, and acceptance of a system of guarantees," according to the report.6

Asserting that boundaries are the main issue, the report advocates the rather nebulous formula: "To allow Israel to have militarily defensible borders and to yield non-strategic territory." This principle differs considerably from the Executive Branch's standard advocacy of Israel's return to its pre-1967 borders with minor mutually-agreed modifications.

Nonetheless, Jimmy Carter's Mideast peace efforts have by and large been consistent with the Baker-Ribicoff trip report. No wonder Baker has lavished such praise on Carter's efforts and accomplishments.

"I feel it my duty today, and it is also my great pleasure as an American citizen, to commend my President for the extraordinary efforts he has made in the last few days to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations for peace
between Israel and Egypt." With these magnanimous words, Senator Baker lauded Carter's "enormous courage and determination" in bringing about the peace treaty.18

In the presence of Sadat and Begin, Baker made clear his view that Egyptian-Israeli peace is not the endpoint. "While this treaty represents a towering milestone," said Baker on March 27, 1979, "it is really only the beginning, the first step..." At the same time Baker pledged to Sadat and Begin to "reward every step toward peace which the nations of the Middle East are willing to make."19

Baker, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has met with virtually all of the top leaders directly embroiled in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Only Syrian President Assad is an exception. Baker even met with Yasser Arafat and other P.L.O. officials in May of 1975 in Beirut.

During his meeting with Arafat, Baker sought to learn the P.L.O. leader's position, but also he repeatedly stressed "my belief that Palestinian aspirations would be advanced by the renunciation of terror."18

Arafat's personal style is "mild and genial," according to Baker. "It is the mildness and gentility, I would judge, of a skilful politician."15

Although President Carter claims never to have heard an Arab leader privately advocate creation of a Palestinian state, Baker cannot corroborate that experience. After a 1975 meeting with Saudi Arabian Prince Fahd, Baker reported that the Crown Prince termed formation of a Palestinian West Bank/Gaza state "an excellent beginning of a long-term permanent solution."14

What are Baker's own views about possible United States—P.L.O. negotiations and the creation of a Palestinian state?

His answers will be tempered by any shifts in the P.L.O.'s positions. In reaction to John Connally's Middle East speech, Baker indicated on October 12, 1979, that "Unless and until the P.L.O. will renounce its dedication to the destruction of the State of Israel and the use of force and terrorism to accomplish that end, I do not think it will well serves the United States, our policy, or our national security to advocate negotiations with them or consider the creation of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state."16

Connally's October 11, 1979, Middle East peace proposal was characterized by Baker as not a "careful, prudent and desirable foreign policy formulation."14

Specifically criticizing Connally's plan, Baker has said the United States should not "impose a settlement on Israel," and oil politics should not be "a determinative factor" in the peace process.17

In an indirect, but obvious, swipe at Connally's style, Baker said in his announcement speech: "A President cannot govern without trust and that trust never comes from bluster."

In a 1977 address before the World Jewish Congress, Howard Baker stated his own Middle East policy model: "a skilful, cautious foreign policy...that is reasonably calculated to serve the best interests of peace and to preserve the existence of the State of Israel."18

While many politicians deny their political rationale, Baker acknowledges it and makes no apologies. He even extols politics as "the very essence of the democratic system."19

Baker has fully-formed and definite Middle East views. He is not at the mercy of his advisers as he decides the basic thrust of his Middle East statements. Doubtless though, he will be responsive to shifts in international and especially domestic political attitudes; he will surely gravitate toward the midpoint of the shifted spectrum. In doing so, he, in all likelihood, will be following his father's oft-recounted advice about the electorate: "Sometimes you may doubt their judgment, but don't you ever doubt their authority."20

Jerry Brown

No middle-of-the-road politician, California Governor Jerry Brown's unorthodox political positions are his stock in trade. His political innovations alternate at once to startle and refresh people identifying with a given end of the political spectrum.

Brown is in the process of piecing together a wildly-divergent political constituency. His attacks on big government, support of a balanced budget, and emphasis on job creation all appeal to traditional conservatives. Liberals, on the other hand, tend to support his civil liberties and equal rights positions, military spending cut proposals, and emphasis on a decentralized (community-based) society.

Brown's most notable foreign arms "unorthodoxy" is his call for diplomatic ties with Cuba. "American policy toward

Cuba is an anachronism," said Brown on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers"; "as long as this country has diplomatic relations with Russia and China, it makes no sense not to have diplomatic relations with Cuba."21

Orthodox on the Middle East, Brown has called on all other candidates to be so also. In an October telegram to other major candidates, Brown asked them for a "public affirmation of the United States' Middle East policy."

But, in that telegram, Brown focused almost exclusively on one aspect of our national policy—non-negotiation with the P.L.O.

Brown's position is clearly seen in the following excerpts from his telegram:

I urge you to issue a statement affirming that you support both the Camp David agreements and the policy of
refraining from negotiations with the P.L.O. until that organization recognizes Israel's fundamental right to exist as a state and agrees to accept United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338...

The United States cannot maintain its credibility when it fails to meet its commitments or breaks them soon after they are made. For example, the United States guaranteed to Israel in September 1975 and reaffirmed in March 1979 that we would not negotiate with the P.L.O. unless the P.L.O. recognized Israel's right to exist and agreed to accept United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. But this past summer the United States apparently moved toward dealing with the P.L.O. and toward alteration of Resolution 242...

The Palestinian Arabs have legitimate rights, as the Camp David Accords recognized, but the basic interests of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza should be distinguished from the politics of the terrorist-dominated P.L.O. Our commitments to Israel and the Camp David Accords must be central features of American policy in the Middle East. This matter should be above partisan divisions in the United States and clearly agreed to by all who actively seek or are considering a campaign for the Presidency.

Teddy Kennedy

"Jimmy Carter has led us to the threshold of peace in the Middle East and given America world leadership in the cause of human rights." Senator Edward M. "Teddy" Kennedy offered this praise in December 1978 at the Democratic Mid-Term Convention. No gratuitous remark, it referred to Carter's accomplishment as the latest pearl added to a string of Democratic Presidential achievements from Woodrow Wilson to the present.

Such an accolade leaves little doubt that the substance, if not the style, of Kennedy's Mideast initiatives would parallel President Carter's. What is more, Kennedy would rely on some of the same Middle East expertise as has Carter.

Robert E. Hunter, currently Carter's top National Security Council Mideast expert, was Senator Kennedy's foreign policy adviser from 1973 until 1977. Reliable sources suggest that Hunter's Mideast advice is still sought by Kennedy and that he would play an important role in a Kennedy Administration's foreign policy.

"If you liked Jimmy Carter, you'll love Ted Kennedy," is, according to the Washington Post's David S. Broder, a highly accurate Republican wisecrack making the rounds about the basic Kennedy-Carter agreement on issues.52 On foreign affairs, it's likely that Kennedy would adopt Carter's arms control and human rights positions, but push their implementation more vigorously than the present administration has.

Kennedy's denunciation of the Shah's regime as "one of the most violent...in the history of mankind" illustrates this point less well than his pre-campaign agreement with George Ball's assertion that "we cannot assure the security of a strategic region by stuffing a backward state with massive quantities of arms."

Ted Kennedy

At the same time, Kennedy said: "I also agree with George Ball that the United States must impress upon the Saudis the critical importance of granting liberties to and improving the conditions of its citizens."

Kennedy's emphasis on strengthening cooperative relationships with other nations might mean greater United Nations and even Soviet involvement, if constructive, in the Mideast peace effort.

After a whirlwind trip in 1966 to North Africa and the Middle East, Kennedy outlined his own peace plan. That five-point plan, now an historical curiosity, quickly fell to the events of the 1967 war and the growing world recognition that the Palestinian problem was not simply a refugee problem.

Kennedy's plan, delivered on December 18, 1966, to the Business Men's Council of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, called for:

1. strictly maintaining the "territorial integrity of both Israel and Jordan."
2. increased development aid to the area,
3. Third World efforts by nations and individuals to encourage direct Arab-Israeli negotiations,
4. joint Israeli-Jordanian patrols on their common border, or, at least, a strengthened United Nations peacekeeping presence, and
5. a "serious effort to negotiate an arms agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States and other interested parties, with effective inspection, to prevent the continued arms buildup in the Middle East."

Since 1966, Kennedy has not ventured to present a new comprehensive peace plan of his own. Nonetheless, a decade later, he clearly has continued to support: positive interaction with the Soviets when possible; a strengthening of the United Nations' role; and arms control.

Although many other senators castigated the October 1977 joint Soviet-American Mideast statement, Kennedy was less negative. "We must expect," said Kennedy in November of that year, "the Soviets to behave responsibly as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference as well as co-signers of last month's joint statement."

An attempt to document Kennedy's
Mideast arms control position reveals a double standard shared with most other Senate liberals. This involves support of any and all sales to Israel alone, but opposition to such arms sales that involve Arab countries, too.

"Our policies should be guided by an unremitting search for peace, not by the supply of arms which could be used in future Middle East war." Those were Senator Kennedy's sentiments expressed as he opposed the nearly $5 billion arms package to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, two months later a reversal came when he voted for a sense of Congress resolution that the United States provide additional advanced warplanes to Israel, i.e. an amount above and beyond those in the package that Kennedy had earlier opposed. 16 Actually, Kennedy's Senate voting record shows consistent support for economic and military aid to Israel.

Rarely has Kennedy questioned Israeli policy. One such occasion was August 1978 when Israeli Prime Minister Begin appeared to be backing away from United Nations Security Council Resolution 242's territory-for-peace formula. Despite his own criticism, Kennedy chose to associate his remarks with Senator Ribicoff's.

"I strongly agree with Senator Ribicoff's suggestion," said Kennedy, "that just as Prime Minister Begin should be expected to negotiate on all fronts including the West Bank, President Sadat should be expected to negotiate without insisting on prior Israeli agreement to return all of its occupied territory." 17 Because Kennedy shies away from expressing criticism of Israel, many of his positions are unknown.

For example, on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press," Kennedy evaded answering the following questions: "Do you agree [with President Carter that]...Israel should not be building settlements in the occupied territory; that the Palestinians should have a homeland?" Instead of answering either of these questions, Kennedy talked about Carter's "muddled and confused" P.L.O. policy.

Later, on the same television program, this dialogue ensued:

**Question:** Here is one you can answer "yes" or "no." The Administration says that Israeli settlements on the West Bank are illegal. Do you believe that?

**Senator Kennedy:** "I am interested in what is going to be the total state of the negotiations. I don't think we can get on into internal matters...."

"Not only did Kennedy evade stating his opinion about the legality or illegality of Israel's West Bank settlements, but he, by calling them "internal matters," indicated that he may not consider the West Bank to be occupied territory!

While avoiding answers to some questions asked, Kennedy, at times, answers unasked questions. Appearing on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers," Kennedy was asked if the United States should be shoring up relations with Mideast allies, "specifically Saudi Arabia."

Without addressing himself to the question, Kennedy responded by skipping from the Iranian hostage situation, to the need for continuing Egyptian-Israeli negotiations with no superimposed conditions, and finally to this statement: "There is concern among Israelis about the Administration's posture and position with regard to the P.L.O., the ambivalence of the Administration's position about the P.L.O., as indicated by the informal contacts in Vienna by Mr. Young's conversations and by Mr. Brzezinski's meetings with Arafat in Algeria, and this is a matter I am sure of concern to the Israelis about what the United States' position is."

Curiously, while Kennedy criticizes Carter's P.L.O. policy, his own, as enunciated in October, is virtually identical with Carter's. According to Near East Report, Kennedy, interviewed by Israeli television, "stated that there should be no direct or even indirect negotiations with the P.L.O. until the organization recognizes Israel's right to exist and accepts United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338." 18

Certainly, Senator Kennedy is thoroughly familiar with the Palestine problem. He has been, in fact, the Senate refugee expert since 1965 when he became chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapes.

In 1966, Kennedy's panel did look into Palestinian refugee problems. A staff study headed by George Abrams sought to curb abuses of United Nations refugee relief. In particular, the study urged striking from the relief rolls all refugees trained by the then-emerging Palestinian Liberation Army. 19

"It is incompatible with United States policy and with the fundamental concept of the United Nations," said Kennedy on June 15, 1966, "to supply aid in any way to members of any army whose announced purpose is the destruction of a member nation of the United Nations." 20

Six months later, Kennedy personally visited several Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan.

"Palestine refugees must be the con-
tern of all Americans," said Kennedy at the close of his camp visits. Quoted in the New York Times of December 1, 1966, Kennedy reportedly described the refugee conditions as "bordering on misery and hopelessness. We saw children who never tasted chocolates...."

Since 1966, Kennedy has done little to manifest his concern. One refugee expert calls Kennedy's Palestinian record "distressing."

"He wouldn't touch the damn Palestine problem," said the expert after having repeatedly tried, since 1966, to interest Kennedy's panel in aiding the Palestinian refugee plight.

On his 1966 trip, Kennedy, his wife Joan, then-Representative John Tunney, and his wife visited Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel.

In Algiers, Teddy Kennedy dedicated a plaza in memory of President John F. Kennedy.

In Israel, there was an abundance of Kennedy memorial services, including: unveiling a bronze likeness at the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Memorial, planting a tree nearby, setting aside a planting area for future Kennedy visits, and visiting the Kennedy Building at Haaslahah-Hebrew Medical Center. While in Israel in 1986, Senator Kennedy was entertained by Michael Feldman, a name that surfaces frequently in press reports today. It's seen in a Washington Post article titled: "Kennedy's Fund-Raisers Brag of Speed" and a Newsweek piece headed: "Teddy Woos the Jews."

Washington-based lawyer Mike Feldman is influential both in Israel and the United States. He was President John Kennedy's assistant counsel and liaison with American Jewry. When Teddy Kennedy sent Prime Minister Begin a personal letter in the fall of 1979, Feldman hand-delivered it.

While Kennedy pledged in that letter to Begin "my full support" for Israel's peace efforts, the generalities it contains are surely less than Begin might have hoped for.

Since then Kennedy has given a more tangible signal of support for Israel. Immediately prior to his December 12 fundraising dinner in New York City, Kennedy announced that Israel should receive $550 million more in American aid annually.

John B. Connally

"John Connally Proposes a New Approach to Build Stability and Lasting Peace in the Middle East." This bold-faced headline trumpeted from full-page political advertisements in the Wall Street Journal and five other major newspapers on October 12, 1979.

A "new approach"? Yes, as a candidate's platform, but, in the main, not as a President's policy.

In his detailed October 11 Mideast speech, former Texas Governor Connally was candid. He stated his peace proposals as well as the risks, benefits and responsibilities of all: "First and foremost, I believe the only basis for a Middle East peace settlement is a balanced agreement which will meet Israel's requirements for peace and security within recognized borders, and Arab requirements for the evacuation of their territories occupied in the 1967 war, and some form of Palestinian self-determination."

In marked contrast to candidates in previous years, Connally, in his Mideast speech, is not simply emphasizing Israel's rewards while downplaying her responsibilities: "I did not," Connally avers in a public letter to columnist George Will," as is customary for Presidential candidates, take all my cues on Israel from the Israeli embassy and 'lobby.'"

Putting the rewards and responsibilities on a par, Connally said: "A clear distinction must be drawn by the United States between support for Israel's security—which is a moral imperative—and support for Israel's broader acquisitions."

John Connally

Much of what Connally said was unusual campaign rhetoric but no different than standard United States policy. "I didn't enunciate any new policy," explained Connally on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers": "All I said...with respect to Resolution 242 and the Israelis giving up the occupied territories is the policy of this government. It has been under four Presidents."

But, probed Bob Clark of the ABC program, "Resolution 242 says nothing about self-determination for the Palestinians."

In his response, Connally focused on the type of international political reality that is usually acknowledged after the election. "If you don't think something is going to come out of giving the Palestinians some degree of self-determination, then you are both naive and unwilling to face the facts because I think that is what is going to be required..."

Connally, in his October 11 speech, praised the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a "significant first step" toward a comprehensive peace, but he faulted the Camp David agreements for lacking "the basis for successful negotiations on the remaining issues."

As new bases for negotiations, Connally recommends his nine-point plan as a framework for future direct Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Two controversial aspects of his peace plan are: the notion of beefing up United States military presence in the area, and the linkage between oil policy and Arab-Israeli peace.

Israel, some Arab states, N.A.T.O., Japan and the United States should militarily ally with one another to guarantee the peace settlement and pro-
Connally’s 9-Point Plan

Republican John B. Connally’s Octo-
ber 11th speech at the Washington Press
Club is the clearest, most definitive Mid-
dle East position statement yet by any of
the candidates.

Familiarity with Connally’s statement
is essential to understand his position as
well as the various reactions to it.

The following is the text of Connally’s
nine-point outline of negotiating prin-
ciples “for direct negotiations between
the Israeli and Arab parties with the
United States playing the role of a
diplomatic catalyst”:

1. Except for minor border rectifica-
tions, mutually agreed upon, Israel must
withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza
and Golan, all of which will be
demilitarized. Israel would, however, be
permitted to lease military strong points
in each of these areas for a mutually
agreed upon period of time, and have
guaranteed access to these points.

2. All Israeli civilian settlements, in-
cluding the so-called para-military ones,
must be withdrawn from the West Bank,
Gaza and Golan. The withdrawal should
take place on a phased basis, after the
peace treaties are signed between Israel
and the Arab states, and clear evidence
of good faith is established at each stage.
Financial assistance for the remo-val and
resettlement of these communities in
Israel should be provided.

3. The Palestinian people should decide
for themselves whether they prefer the
West Bank and Gaza to be governed as
an entirely independent entity or to be
an autonomous area within the Kingdom
of Jordan. The latter approach has great
merit and should be thoroughly ex-
plored. It would allow the Palestinians to
exercise their right to self-determination
and self-government within a sovereign
Arab state.

Under any arrangement, however,
there must be iron-clad provisions bar-
ing significant military forces or military
relationships which would threaten
Israel.

4. Jerusalem’s religious significance to
Jews, Moslems and Christians, and the
city’s tragic past, make it an issue of
great symbolic importance. No solution
will satisfy fully the demands of all the
parties. The ultimate resolution of the
status of Jerusalem should, however,
meet the following criteria:

a. Unimpeded access to all the holy
places with each under the custodian-
ship of its own faith.

b. No barriers dividing the city which
would prevent free circulation
throughout it.

c. Substantial political autonomy for
each of the national groups within the
city in the area where it predominates.

The secondary issue of sovereignty
over Jerusalem is something that should
be considered during the actual peace
conference. There are a number of
workable alternatives, including Arab or
Israeli sovereignty based on residence
patterns, a dual sovereignty for the en-
tire municipal region, with individuals
deciding which passport they prefer to
carry, or possibly some third alternative.
Should, after a six-month period, the
negotiators remain deadlocked on this
issue, the United States should step in to
mediate the remaining difference.

5. A customs union between Israel, the
Palestinian homeland, and possibly other
Arab states should be established as part
of the final settlement. This would en-
sure the free flow of goods and people
and integrate the region economically to
the advantage of all.

6. A joint Israeli-Palestinian develop-
ment bank should be established in
Jerusalem. It should be supported pro-
portionally by: the moderate Arab
O.P.E.C. states, Western Europe, Japan
and the United States—all of whom
share an intense interest in the Middle
East peace and stability. This bank
would have three primary functions:

- The oil-bearing region in Connally’s
view.

- Furthermore, his military vision,
which he has called the “critical key,” in-
volves United States air bases in the Sinai
and a Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean,
perhaps stationed at Masirah Island or
another site near the strategic straits of
Hormuz.

- Connally, projecting a tough-guy
image, proposes a foreign policy to
match. Blaming the crisis in Iran on
President Carter’s “weakness in foreign
policy,” Connally, on ABC- TV’s “Issues
and Answers,” was reminded by a com-
mentator that the United States is the
world’s strongest military country.

- Connally’s comeback: It’s “not so
much a question of military strength; it
is a question of the will to use the
strength of a nation: military,
diplomatic, economic, and otherwise.”

- Such tough talk, appealing to some,
is seen as negative by others. Recognizing
this his campaign staff, according to an
Evans and Novak syndicated column,
agreed “that he should cool his own
rhetoric.”

- The other controversial section of his
speech linked Arab oil policy and Israeli
withdrawal from occupied Arab ter-
ritories.

- This linkage, more than any other
part of his Mideast position statement,
caus ed the immediate evolution of his
American Jewish support.

- New York lawyer Rita Hauer, inter-
viewed in the Washington Post about her
sudden exit from Connally’s camp,
explained: “What he did that is inex-
cusable is the equation of oil and
Israel.”

- Pursuing the same theme, Near East
Report, the Israeli-oriented Washington
newsletter, speculated that Connally’s
political views had been “influenced by
his business dealings with Arab nations
and oil companies,” and that “his ‘peace
plan’ smacks of an imposed solution
along pro-Arab lines.”

- Connally and his aids particularly
dislike the “anti-Israel” label that some
are trying to pin on him. He is resisting
such narrow categorization of his Mid-
east proposal.

“One of the really bun raps in this
thing is to say that this is an anti

a. Contribute to the economic development of the region through the funding of the economic infrastructure projects.
b. Serve as a vehicle to make restitution for lands and property claims which have arisen over the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This will include Palestinians who lost land and property as a result of Israeli actions, and Jews who lost land and property in Arab nations as a retaliation. A special international commission would be established to weigh and judge the individual claims.
c. Act as a financing agent for the relocation of Israeli settlers from the occupied territories, and to assist in the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees.

7. We must secure a clear understanding from Saudi Arabia and other moderate oil-producing nations in the region that a just and comprehensive peace settlement means a return to stable oil supplies in real terms. The Arabs must, in short, foresake the oil weapon in return for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories.

8. The United States should organize a new treaty alliance to cover the Middle East, as a further guarantee of the ultimate settlement, and to protect regional oil fields and shipping lanes from Soviet or terrorist interference. The alliance should include Israel, the moderate Arab states, N.A.T.O. and Japan. The geostrategic vortex of the struggle between the Free World and Communion has shifted to the Middle East and all of the states with a critical interest in its outcome should bear their share of the defense burden.

9. Finally, it should be clear from what I have said that military and economic stability in the Middle East is a prerequisite to peace, and without greater assurance of military security which translates into the very survival of Israel, the Israelis understandably will not give up the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the military security they provide. Equally certain, failure to withdraw from occupied territory prevents Israel's antagonists from recognizing the existence, much less the security, of Israel.

No Palestinian self-determination can be achieved under such circumstances, and no reasonable resolution to the status of the holy shrines of Jerusalem will occur except as part of an overall settlement.

As a prelude to peace, who but the United States can provide the political, economic and military stability that will assure time for logic and reason and understanding to overtake and overcome fear, distrust and intransigence?

Therefore, for the critical key that can make a reality of the previous eight points, the United States should maintain a strong military presence in this vital area, including major Air Force components. It may be possible, for example, to lease the former Israeli airfields in the Sinai.

I would propose further that we take elements of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the Far East and, with such augmentation as necessary, create a Fifth Fleet to be stationed in the Indian Ocean.

An immediate approach should be made to the Sultan of Oman with a proposal to develop Masirah Island or other appropriate site into a United States naval base to support the new Fifth Fleet and provide security for the Arabian Sea and the strategic Straits of Hormuz.

These steps would demonstrate to further the peace and to protect our other vital interests in the area. Since World War II, we have maintained military forces in the Far East and Western Europe for the same purpose. We must now provide a military shield for our Middle East interests as well.

Israel speech," declared issues adviser Sam Haskinson in a New York Times interview. In the same article, Connally spokesman Jim Brady went a step further: "It is pro-Israel when you put it under a microscope."

"I'm a friend of Israel," Connally said in the Times. "I don't intend to give up on the Jewish vote. I can defend my position, and I will defend it before every Jewish group in this country."

Thousands of brochure-size copies of the full text of Connally's Mideast speech are being circulated.

"But have you read the text?" is the standard rejoinder Connally people make when questions or criticism pop up about the speech. Speaking of Jewish leaders on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers," Connally said: "They are beginning to read what I said and understand what I said.... I think out of it is going to come a much clearer understanding, and even a growing support for the position I took."

Maybe so, but doubts about the proposal are, in many minds, inseparable from doubts about the character of John B. Connally himself.

One American Jew, frankly acknowledging that his doubts about Connally cloud his perception of the proposal, said: "If the plan had been introduced by Ted Kennedy, we would have liked it."

But distrust of President Nixon's Secretary of Treasury is not limited to one group. Among Republicans there are lingering suspicions of Connally's May 1973 formal switch to the G.O.P. from the Democrats.

Connally's trust-to-distrust ratio of 2-to-1, as measured by an NBC-Associated Press poll of Florida Republicans, compared unfavorably to Reagan's 9-1 and about 7-1 for Bush. Connally, in the words of a November 18, 1979, New York Times Magazine article, "is the first serious Presidential candidate in history whom prosecutors and grand jurors have believed to be a felon."

The milk-fund scandal is Connally's Chappaquiddick. It casts a dark shadow of doubt about the man's character, doubts that are unlikely to be easily dissipated.
Ronald Reagan

One such foreign affairs aide said that Reagan is "intellectually very quick to pick up new information and willing to listen to a variety of viewpoints."

1. The paramount American interest in the Middle East is to prevent the region from falling under the domination of the Soviet Union.
2. The fall of Iran has increased Israel's value as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely."

Reagan warns, in the article, against weakening Israel by fostering the creation of a "radical Palestinian state" or by providing Israel with "insufficient military assistance." At one point Reagan asserts that "conflict and tension are endemic" in the Arab world, but later he does allow that "specific Arab states such as Egypt — friendly to us at a particular moment — may well be able and prepared to take a front-line position in defense of Western security interests."

Regarding the fall of the Shah, Reagan blamed "United States' indecision. "I believe there was a time when the revolution in Iran could have been halted," said Reagan at a November 14 Washington press conference. He ruled out American military intervention, but suggested that the Shah's forces could have more effectively separated the revolution's leaders from the masses during the revolution's early stages.

With the Iranian hostage situation, Reagan's penchant for tough talk won cheer as he declared: "We're going to be so respected that never again will a dictator dare invade an American embassy and hold our people as hostage."
George Bush

"The security of our own country is linked to Israel's security as a bastion of democracy in a strategically vital area," said Republican Presidential hopeful George Bush in an October 14, 1979, speech to the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

While many candidates stop at this point, Bush showed a degree of even-handedness as he told the audience: "Let's face it - those delayed homeless children in the refugee camps in Lebanon must have our compassion and concern."

As United States Ambassador to the United Nations from 1971 to 1973, Bush notes that he cast the second United States veto in history. The vetoed Security Council Resolution condemned Israel's attack on Lebanon but failed to even mention the prior Palestinian terrorist action against Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics.

"I made clear," said Bush to a campaign audience particularly supportive of Israel, "that the United States did not condone Israel's move into Lebanon, and I mourned the deaths of those killed in the air raid: but, any conscience, any concern, any fair play would dictate that the United Nations speak out against world terror."

The underlying theme of his campaign, said Bush in his May 1, 1979, announcement of candidacy, is that Presidential aspirants "must level with the American people. On the Middle East issue, Bush is more candid than most.

While many candidates are ducking the question of Israel's West Bank policy, a solution to the Palestinian question, rejected any "heavy-handed imposition" of Middle East peace terms, and strongly disapproved any economic conditions (oil prices) and the United States commitment to an ally (Israel).

Bush places particular stress on the importance of the United States keeping its commitments. It is on this basis that he supports the present policy of non-communication with the P.L.O. "If we officially talk to the P.L.O. before they take the fundamental step of recognizing Israel's right to exist, we add to this perception of the United States [as a "faithless ally"]." Bush has said.

Categorizing the P.L.O. as "an international Ku Klux Klan," Bush pulls no punches in his opposition to terrorism. "The P.L.O.," states Bush, "must change its character: it should remove terrorism as an acceptable weapon to effect political change."

A long resume, along with excellent organizational skills, are Bush's long suits. Besides having been ambassador to the United Nations, he has served stints as a Congressional Representative from Texas, Chief of the United States Liaison Office in the People's Republic of China, Republican National Committee Chairman and C.I.A. director. With these jobs as his base, George Bush has confidently said: "I know foreign policy in the Middle East."

Jimmy Carter

More so than any other candidate, incumbent Jimmy Carter is a known quantity. His positions and accomplishments (see box on page 13) provide his record.

The Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty are achievements for which he has received praise, in varying degrees, from all of the other major candidates. The peace treaty is the central foreign policy accomplishment of the Carter Administration.

Nonetheless, if reelected, President Carter's oft-stated commitment to a comprehensive peace won't allow him to rest on his laurels. In 1981 as in 1977, new initiatives, vigorous ones are required.

In 1977, the Geneva Peace Conference, co-chaired by the United States and Soviet Union, seemed the only obvious path. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the subsequent triangular negotiations, involving Israel, Egypt and the United States, changed the diplomatic course drastically.

Today the West Bank/Gaza autonomy talks are the obvious existing venue for action. Considering President Carter's
policy statements, he will likely seek to break the deadlock by: getting Israel to halt its settlement activity in the occupied territories; insisting that the territory-for-peace formula of United Nations Resolution 242 applies to the West Bank; and encouraging Palestinian participation in the negotiating process. As in 1977, a change of circumstances could place the peace process in a wholly new context.

No other President has placed the priority on the Palestinian issue that President Carter has.

About a year before the general election of 1976, candidate Carter said: "I think one of the integral parts of an ultimate settlement has got to be the recognition of the Palestinians as a people, as a nation, with a place to live and a right to choose their own leaders."48

During the 1976 campaign, he abandoned his rhetoric about Palestinians to the point that he was calling for no more than Palestinian rights to be included in some vague way in a comprehensive settlement.

But, only a couple of months after his inauguration, President Carter, in Clinton, Massachusetts, declared: "There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years."49


In November 1979, a third signer of that document joined the Carter Administration as Commerce Secretary, Philip Klutznick, a respected elder statesman of American Jewry, helped to immunize the Brookings Report from public attack by American Jewish organizations, according to Mark Brzensky.49

Testifying before a Senate panel in 1975, Klutznick called for "the P.L.O. to give up its terrorist activities, pledge itself to do so and Israel to give up its counteraction. In light of that, to go to the [Geneva] Conference in full faith and respect for each other's ambitions, national and peoplehood ambitions."49

If President Carter does continue to push the Palestinian issue, and there is every reason to think that he will, he will have important support from Philip Klutznick.

Equally important will be Robert Strauss' support. Strauss, heading the Carter-Mondale re-election campaign, is well-briefed on the Middle East. In what amounted to an eight-month briefing period, Strauss was the chief United States Mideast peace negotiator. Strauss can now effectively defend American Mideast policy. For example, speaking to a predominantly Jewish audience in Miami in October, Strauss said: "This President is committed to the proposition that the foundation of a stable Middle East is a safe and a strong and a sound and a secure state of Israel. And anybody that represents to you that the contrary is true is a liar or a fool or confused or a mischief-maker."51

President Carter answers questions at a town meeting in Clinton, Mass., during which he endorsed the idea of a homeland for Palestinians.

Along with such blanket assurances, the Carter Administration will continue Israeli-American dialogue "on matters that", using Carter's words of October 10, 1979, "were previously avoided because they are controversial."52

All indications are that a Carter Administration, in 1981 as in 1977, would continue to move toward a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict.

NOTES

2. The New Yorker, November 26, 1979, p. 176.
President Carter's Record Position Statements

Carter’s Peace Priorities
“First of all, the existence and security of Israel; secondly, the effectuation of peace between Israel and her neighbors, all her neighbors; and third, a recognition that a resolution of the Palestinian question has to be a prerequisite to a permanent peace in the Middle East.” (October 10, 1979)

Palestinian “Homeland” Statements
“...There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years.” (March 16, 1977)
“We’ve never espoused an independent Palestinian state. I think that would be a destabilizing factor there.” (May 29, 1979)
“I’m against any creation of a separate Palestinian state.” (August 10, 1979)

United States-P.L.O. Interaction
“As soon as the P.L.O. itself, as an organization, is willing to accept these bases [U.N. Resolution 242 and Israel’s right to exist], then we’ll immediately start working directly with that organization as such.” (March 22, 1979)

Chronology of Events
Palestinian Homefront Statement
March 16, 1977: At a town meeting at Clinton, Massachusetts, President Carter endorsed the concept of a “homeland” for Palestinians.

Joint United States-Soviet Statement

Joint United States-Israel Statement

Sadat’s Jerusalem Visit
November 19, 1977: At a subsequent press conference, President Carter said: “Two of Israel’s most cherished desires have already been met:...face-to-face negotiations...and...recognition by a major Arab leader...” (November 30, 1977)

Saddat’s Keneset Speech
November 20, 1977: Referring back to the event, Carter later said: “For the first time the Arab position on those controversial issues has been spelled out very clearly for worldwide understanding...” (November 30, 1977)

Three-Nation Arms Package
May 15, 1978: Carter praised the Senate vote permitting a $5 billion package of military aircraft to go to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Camp David Agreements
September 17, 1978: President Carter, Sadat and Begin signed the Camp David Agreements—a framework for Egyptian-Israeli peace and a framework for a comprehensive peace.

Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty
March 26, 1979: Carter, Begin and Sadat signed the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty at a White House ceremony.

Arms-for-Peace
July 20, 1979: President Carter signed into law a $4.8 billion authorization of aid—93 percent of it military-related—for peacemakers Egypt and Israel.
Jimmy Carter's Mideast Humor

Humor can be remarkably revealing. President Carter, in the manner of a stand-up comic, delivered the following string of jokes at Democratic Party fundraising dinners. Robert S. Strauss, formerly Carter's Mideast peace negotiator and now his campaign head, is the Bob referred to in these excerpts.

May 9, 1979: And I said, "Bob, it's not an easy job. It's one of the most difficult jobs on Earth."

I said, "I want you to be responsible for establishing peace between people who have been at war since ancient times, filled with hatred, combat."

And he interrupted, "Mr. President," he said, "I have already been chairman of the Democratic Party once."

(Laughter)

But I think you know he's helped those fine fundraisers on my left, using his new job as the Mideast negotiator as kind of an unofficial king in his inimitable style. I understand that he's even sold five tables worth of tickets, jointly, to the Egyptian and the Israeli Embassies—(laughter)—and got the Saudis to pay for it. (Laughter)

He told them that Arafat was the main speaker, unfortunately. (Laughter)

And this afternoon they tried to stop payment on the check but were unsuccessful. I know from experience how fast they can move down at the National Bank of Georgia in Atlanta. (Laughter)

September 26, 1979: If there's one thing you can say about Bob Strauss, he's always loyal to the Democratic Party, and I thank him very much.

Sometimes he goes too far. I had a call this morning from Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who said—he said, "Mr. President, I am willing to take on new friends, to meet with President Sadat, who was an enemy of mine for the last 20 years." He said, "I am willing to give up the Sinai, because you and although he returns again and again to "I am willing to put my political future on a piece of paper, the treaty between us and Egypt, but I am not willing to buy a table to the Democratic National Committee fundraising banquet this evening." (Laughter)

He said, "As you well know, the people of Israel have never had any interest in United States politics." (Laughter)

Reprinted from the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, for 1979, pages 827 and 1767.

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Candidate Profiles

The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, available at most libraries, has done an excellent series of profiles on the Presidential candidates. Each profile compactly presents the candidate's positions on a variety of issues, personal background, political history and campaign strategy.

Additionally, pertinent data, such as campaign headquarters names, addresses, and positions of staff members, and ratings by special interest groups, are listed.

The following profiles have appeared in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report on the dates noted:

James E. Carter, Oct. 13, 1979
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Oct. 20, 1979
Edward M. Kennedy, Oct. 27, 1979
John B. Anderson, Nov. 3, 1979
Howard H. Baker, Jr., Nov. 10, 1979
George H.W. Bush, Nov. 17, 1979
Philip M. Crane, Nov. 24, 1979
John B. Connally, Dec. 1, 1979
Ronald Reagan, Dec. 8, 1979

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Book Views

Jews and American Politics

By Stephen D. Isaacs


Stephen D. Isaacs' Jews and American Politics offers valuable insights into the role of American Jews in American politics and how Jews see themselves in that role. A key referent is the author's assessment "that those in politics - Jews and non-Jews - view the Jews as an ethnic culture and treat them as a bloc in their planning of strategy, campaign literature, speeches, pleas for contributions, polls, and judgments." Scattered throughout the book are statistics that indicate the high level of involvement of Jews in the political process: (1) "they normally donate more than half the large gifts of national Democratic campaigns"; (2) "they vote far out of proportion to their percentage in the population"; (3) "(they cast) nearly half the votes in Democratic primaries in New York City"; and (4) "Jews comprise about 10 and 20 percent of all those actively involved in the Democratic side of American politics today."

Isaacs examines a number of the motivations of Jews for political activism, although he returns again and again to a basic premise: "Fear undoubtedly is the greatest single factor accounting for Jews' high level of political activity." He documents the extent to which the traumatic experience of Jews has scarred even the most assimilated and well-to-do American Jews, with the result that Jews put more - in every sense - into politics in America than any other group. They do so in order that American political and social values will remain constant, i.e. protective of the rights of Jews as a minority in a democratic society. Other motivations cited by Isaacs for Jewish involvement in politics include: the substitution in many cases of secular, political drives for the religious drive that many Jews no longer feel, as well as the obligation to contribute financially, which is an extension of a strong ethic in Jewish community life. Isaacs additionally describes a contemporary American counterpart of the "court Jew" role in past years, in which Jews active in modern politics are seen as equivalents of Jews who served as advisers to non-Jewish rulers and princes in times past.

Isaacs also traces other aspects of Jewish activism, pointing out that Jews play a prominent role in, if not actually dominate, radical politics in America. Isaacs describes the Jewish tradition of opposing the powerful in the name of social justice. Jewish labor organizers fleeing Russia reflected this in the first part of this century when they continued their organizing from the day they landed in New York. (Certainly the doctrinaire, pro-Israel stance taken by George Meany and the A.F.L.-C.I.O. over the years suggests the important influence of Jewish union leaders.) Isaacs also points out that many younger Jewish radicals came from well-to-do families whose theoretical liberalim came into conflict with their conservative reality. The children of such families, alienated by the hypocrisy, left comfortable surroundings to go out and oppose - but in most cases the target of opposition was easier to identify than the practical alternative.

The final chapter in the book deals with...
with a recent change in Jews' perception of their role as a community in the United States. Isaacs describes it as "a manifestation of an evolutionary change in Jewish history" that has seen American Jews identify much more strongly with "Jewish issues," particularly Israel. The new activism is a rejection of the "court Jew" mentality, which saw representatives of the Jewish community requesting lenience or rights in a rule-to-ruler relationship. The new attitude is one of confidence by Jews in representing their own interests and using all tools available to them, something that as Isaacs points out has been done by every other politically concerned group in America. The tools include money, social and political access, and hard work.

Isaacs attributes the development of the new attitude to significant events in the world of Jewish experience, beginning with the Nazi Holocaust and the determination that it would never happen again. The 1967 Middle East war gave Jews a sense of vicarious pride in Israeli military prowess; the 1973 war, on the other hand, provided the catalytic proof for the necessity of Jews to take the lead to insure support for Israel. Events since that time have reinforced Jewish fear that the United States might reduce its support for Israel in light of growing reliance on Middle East oil.

**Jews and American Politics** is a valuable book on a topic of particular importance to Americans concerned with the Middle East, because it provides in-depth interpretation of how American Jews perceive the world and what they do about it. Although the book was published more than five years ago, it is just as pertinent today as it was then.

The portrait Stephen Isaacs has painted of the American Jewish community's role in America's Middle East policy is but half the story, however. The other half is how groups and individuals with a different view of the proper United States' role in the Middle East are affected by what the Jewish community does about Israel. Put simply, anyone working for a Middle East policy more responsive to America's interests in the Arab world must conclude that supporters of Israel are determined not only to make sure that Israel's wishes are met but also that other points of view are blocked or at least neutralized. The tradition of liberalism, pluralism, and tolerance in the Jewish community is stood on its head by many Jews as they "deal with" Americans who disagree with their perspective. The response to opposing views covers the full range of "tools" described by Isaacs. It is a sad fact, however, that these "tools" go far beyond moral and ethical conduct in efforts to suppress dissenting voices. Political columnist Dorothy Thompson, Secretary of State James Forrestal, and other Americans who have challenged the Zionist definition of America's Middle East policy were savaged in the process; Secretary Forrestal paid with his life. In most instances, individuals who dared to speak up have been so overwhelmed by the response, often massive and ugly in tone, that they never speak up again. This, of course, is what their critics want.

Yet, despite deplorable attempts to stifle free speech and the airing of opposing views, the situation is changing in favor of the traditional minority on the subject. The change will occur regardless of what anyone does to block it, because America's national interest lies in the direction of strengthening ties with the Arab world, while assisting Israeli security within pre-June 1967 boundaries. America's national interest in the Middle East has always been with the majority of people of the region, for obvious reasons. The attempt to establish Israel as the core of the American interests was successful only because of concerted efforts at the domestic political level—a foreign policy anomaly not repeated in any other region of the world.

As Isaacs points out, American Jews have moved into the foreign policy arena through direct advocacy for Israel. Having done so, however, they must accept the fact that there will be substantive disagreement with the merits of their position by Americans looking at the region through different lenses. The record suggests that Jews often assume that a critic of Israeli policies is an anti-Semite to some degree. Some critics of Israel are indeed anti-Semites adopting the more respectable garb of anti-Zionism to hide their anti-Jewish prejudice. But garden-variety anti-Semites comprise only a tiny fraction of the growing number of voices urging a shift in American Middle East policy, and most of the anti-Semites are known for what they are.

American Jews are going to have to face up to the fact that the days of un-critical support for Israel are numbered. For the first time in memory a major Presidential candidate, John Connally, has taken the high road on the Middle East, refusing to compete with other candidates in the contest over who can do more for Israel. On the contrary, Connally has thrown down a challenge to all the other candidates by defining a Middle East policy that clearly protects Israel but does a great many other things, too. The ritual noises of a Ted Kennedy or a Ronald Reagan sound all the more like anachronisms out of a period when thinking about the Middle East was not a prerequisite to speaking about it.

In light of Jewish experience, it is easy to understand how many American Jews must be distressed at increasing criticism of Israeli policies and of our nation's traditional Middle East policy. The United States is moving into a new era in its relationship with the Middle East, and Israel's relative weight in future considerations will be diminished. As a small state created at the expense of large neighbors, Israel will remain a small state in the Arab world, maintaining a special relationship with the United States but no longer possessed of a blank check with which to work its will on everyone around it. Americans are going to have to come to terms with that reality as it emerges. As an important first step, the Jewish community should try to understand that there are Americans who, with a commitment to the best interest of the United States and the pursuit of justice, arrive at dramatically different conclusions about the proper United States' role in the Middle East.

Reviewed by John P. Richardson

**NOTICES**

Our appreciation is extended to those readers who responded to request for a $5.00 voluntary subscription fee to *The Link* and A.M.E.U.'s Public Affairs Pamphlet Series. This source of income has become necessary in order to offset the soaring cost of production. The $5.00 voluntary fee may be sent to A.M.E.U., 475 Riverside Drive, Room 771, New York, NY 10027.

We bring to the attention of our readers the new *Arab Studies Quarterly*, edited by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Edward Said, and published by the Association of Arab American University Graduates. This is a multidisciplinary journal intended to present a critical Arab-centric approach to the study of the Arab people, their achievements and problems. Subscription: $16.00 a year; institutional rate $45.00. Address: A.A.U.G., P.O. Box 456, Turnpike Station, Shrewsbury, MA 01545.
New Selection

- Stephen D. Isaacs, Jews and American Politics, Doubleday & Co., 302 pp. An investigation into the role Jews play in American politics. It explores many myths on this subject and shows how Jews have recognized and exerted the power they have. Our price, $3.85.

- Uri Avnery, Israel Without Zionists: A Plea for Peace in the Middle East, Macmillan Publishing, 278 pp. $1.95 (paperback). A remarkable description of Israeli politics, as presented by a member of Israel's Knesset and the sole representative of a party that believes in the transformation of the Jewish state into a pluralistic and secular one that is able to achieve reconciliation with the Arabs. Our price, $1.70.

- Robert B. Betts, Christians in the Arab East, rev. 1978, John Knox. 318 pp. $12.00. A comprehensive study of the Arabic-speaking Christians and the role they have played in the Middle East from the time of the Islamic conquest up to present day developments. Valuable demographic statistics and a comprehensive bibliography included. Our price, $7.75.

- John H. Davis, The Exusive Peace, revised 1976, Dillon/Liederbach Inc. 136 pp. $5.95. Factual background to present Arab-Israeli dilemma, with a prescription for peace in Middle East. Our price, $3.60.

- Simha Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, Croom Helm (London) 361 pp. $24.95. Spells out Zionist views on the Palestinians prior to 1948 by outlining assumptions shared by most Zionists. In spite of differences within the Zionist movement, these assumptions continue in the present. Our price, $15.50.

- A.C. Forrest, The Unholy Land, Devin-Adair Co. 178 pp. $3.95 (paperback). The author's personal, informed and uncompromising stand against what he believes to be an imbalance and distorted news coverage of the human tragedy brought about by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Our price, $3.60.

- David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, Faber & Faber. 567 pp. 6.50 pounds. Aptly titled "The Roots of Violence in the Middle East." In tracing these roots, the author explodes a number of myths about both Arabs and Zionists. A carefully researched and documented account. Our price, $8.05.


Middle East Mosaic series, Friendship Press.

- David H. Bowman, Conflict or Community, 47 pp. $2.75. Our price, $1.85.

- Robert A. Elfers, Sojourn in Mosaic, 88 pp. $2.95. Our price, $2.00.


- Anthony Pearson, Conspiracy of Silence: The Attack on the U.S.S. Liberty, Horizon Press. 179 pp. $9.95. An account of the Israeli attack on the Liberty during the June 1967 Middle East War and the ensuing lack of publicity and information. The author believes it was not an accident, as the Israelis claimed, and gives reasonably certain conclusions as to why the attack took place and the reasons for the cover-up. Our price, $6.85.

- Ephraim Sevela, Farewell, Israel, Gateway Editions. 299 pp. $12.95. The author's disenchantment with Israel, which he had thought would be the fulfillment of his dreams, is emotionally expressed in his treatment of what he calls Israel's "racism" and the disintegration of the world's Jewish communities. Our price, $8.10.

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Corrections

In the November/December 1979 issue of The Link, the April 29, 1979 reference, on p. 11, to the meeting between Muhe Dayan and Dr. Shafi should have read: August 29, 1979.

The photograph of graffiti, on p. 4, titled: Arab Palestine Lives, was inadvertently reversed.