England And The United States In Palestine: A Comparison

By W.F. Abboushi

Until World War I, there was no such political entity as Palestine; the people of Palestine considered themselves Syrian Arabs. Their territory, much of it part of the Beirut province, had been under the Turkish Ottoman Empire for the previous four centuries.

In December 1917, the British Army occupied Jerusalem, and by September 1918 the whole country was under British control. Until 1920 a military administration ran the country under Gen. Edmund Allenby, who had led the British forces into Jerusalem.

At first, the British divided Palestine into thirteen administrative districts; in 1919, this number was reduced to ten. Each district had a British military governor assisted by mostly British officials, along with a few Arabs. By law the military administration was required to preserve the status quo which existed under the previous Turkish administration until the international legal status of Palestine could be determined and a permanent civil administration established.

In April 1920, the Allied Council of Four met in San Remo to divide the Ottoman Empire. Britain was assigned the Mandatory power in Palestine. In July 1920, the military administration of Palestine was replaced by a civilian administration under a British high commissioner.

The international status of the country was not determined until July 24, 1922, when the Council of the League of Nations approved the Mandate Agreement for Palestine, effective September 29, 1923.

From then on, England's experience in Palestine was one of mounting frustration. The Arabs were almost in

Illegal Jewish arrivals into Haifa, May 1948. British soldier watches from rooftop.

About This Issue

The Tower Commission Report, in analyzing causes of the Iran-contra debacle, cited the failure by U.S. officials to realize that Israel's foreign policy goals at times stand in direct opposition to those of the United States.

It's a lesson we could have learned from the British. They made promises to the Arabs, then broke them. They sanctioned Zionist colonization of Palestine, then tried to control the damage in the White Paper of 1939 but couldn't. They left Palestine in 1947. The U.S. then made promises to the Arabs, and broke them. We sanctioned Zionist colonization of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Syrian Heights and South Lebanon. Then, when we tried to control the damage in the Camp David Accords of 1978, we couldn't. The parallels are striking but not surprising, notes Professor Abboushi, in this issue of The Link; they also explain why U.S. officials and the U.S. media generally regard Israel's goals as ours.

Authors whom we select for our feature articles often come out with books on the same Link subject. Five such books have been selected for A.M.E.U.'s Book Program and are reviewed by us on pages 11-14. These and many other new titles are offered at substantial discount prices on pages 14-16.

John F. Mahoney, Executive Director

constant rebellion, while the Zionists were often violently aggressive. In the 1930's and 40's many of the Zionists, including Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, who later became prime ministers of Israel, used terrorism as a political weapon, killing innocent civilians in a number of bombings such as the one in July 1938, when 74 Arabs were killed in a fruit market in the city of Haifa, and in 1946, when over 90 people were killed in a blast that brought down a section of the King David Hotel. In 1947 England decided to cut its losses and, in April of that year, it turned the whole problem over to the fledgling United Nations.

At this point the United States took over where the United Kingdom left off—with much the same results. Today Americans give away billions of their tax dollars each year in support of a Middle East policy which earns them the growing resentment of most Middle Easterners.

How did England, then the United States, two powerful nations, incur such hatred in an area so vital to their geopolitical interests? The answers are similar for both countries, for despite their different political systems, striking parallels exist in the way British and American politicians handled the Palestine issue.

British politicians, like their American counterparts, were quite sensitive to Jewish-Zionist influence, but were torn between domestic interests which argued for a pro-Zionist policy and foreign interests which dictated a pro-Arab policy. Usually both countries responded to domestic interests when these interests served their own self-concerns.

Within British and American politics, the executive branch generally was more sensitive to the country's foreign interests than the legislative branch; consequently, in times of international crises, it was the executive branch which tended to have an even-handed Middle Eastern policy. Parliament, on the other hand, like the U.S. Congress, was far more susceptible to Zionist pressures. In both countries, the legislative body most often served as a pressure group to deter the executive branch from adopting policies that were mildly pro-Arab, not strongly pro-Zionist, or ones critical of Zionist politics.

In the British system, the House of Lords was far less susceptible to Zionist influence than the House of Commons. Appointed rather than elected, members of the House of Lords were experienced people who spoke their minds with a fierce independence. Members of the House of Commons were elected and therefore by open to influence. Arabs fared better in the upper house, where speeches were more objective, than in the lower house, where rhetoric and demagoguery abounded. [One thinks of Herbert Samuel, a British Jew and the first High Commissioner of Palestine (1920-1925) who helped bring about the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Yet, in the 1930's, Samuel defended the Arabs in the House of Lords and even opposed the creation of a sovereign Jewish state.]

The U.S. Senate is nothing like the British House of Lords. Indeed, within the American system, the Senate is the most pro-Zionist governmental body, more pro-Zionist than the House of Representatives and the White House. The reasons, again, are clear: the British upper house is not elected, its American counterpart is; the Senate has a smaller membership than either the British or American lower houses; and Senate members serve six years as opposed to four for the British House of Lords and two for the U.S. Congress.

Apart from these structural-procedural differences, however, both countries have essentially representative systems of governing. Because of this, Zionists could employ similar techniques in both England and the United States. By putting together an efficient organization and a constituency far more powerful than its numbers would indicate, they manipulated the democratic process to make it respond to the self-interests
of politicians. Party politics and the electoral system were the vehicles by which they reached politicians, rewarding their friends and punishing their enemies. And the media was the vehicle they manipulated to reach the public, believing that in the final analysis public opinion was the decisive arbitrator of politics and interests.

What follows is an account of how England and America got bogged down in Palestine.

### Broken Promises: British-Arab Agreements

During the First World War, the British sought to enlist Arab support in their fight against the Ottoman Turks. Beginning in 1915, eight letters were exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon, representing the British, and Sherif Hussein of Hejaz, representing the Arabs. In a letter dated August 30, 1915, Great Britain promised Hussein:

In earnest of this [Arab military support], we hereby confirm to you the declaration of Lord Kitchener [then British Secretary for War] as communicated to you through "Ali Effendi" in which was manifested our desire for the independence of the Arab countries and their inhabitants and our readiness to approve an Arab Caliphate upon its proclamation.

The McMahon-Hussein Agreement, based substantially on the August 30th promise, was concluded in 1916: the Arabs at once revolted against the Turks in a crucial military campaign made famous by the legendary Lawrence of Arabia.

Following the war, His Majesty's Government acted as though the agreement never existed. For 23 years, it lay buried in secret archives of the British Foreign Office. This action represented the second time the British had betrayed the Arabs.

The first instance occurred in relation to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The British Government, which wanted to enlist Russia and the United States in the war, sent a memorandum in 1915 to the Russian

...
cluded territory would not be subject to the policy of the Balfour Declaration. The territory, more than three times the size of Palestine, became known as Transjordan, later Jordan, and was granted nominal independence in 1928.

Another minor change that disturbed the Zionists related to their desire to insert in the agreement references to the “Jewish Commonwealth” and “the right of the Jews to reconstruction of Palestine as a National Home.” Obviously, the Zionists were trying to expand British commitments to Jews beyond the Balfour Declaration. The British insisted on the language of the declaration, however.

The Arabs considered the agreement most unfair. They felt the British were ignoring them almost completely, and they resented Zionist involvement in drafting an agreement to which they, the Zionists, were not legally a party. Furthermore, foreign born and non-Palestinians, the Zionists at best represented only a minority in Palestine.

Also, the Mandate Agreement contained no direct reference to the Arab people of Palestine. The Arabs were referred to as “the other sections,” an evasion similar to the Balfour Declaration’s “non-Jewish communities.” Such references were insulting to the Arabs as their spokesmen often indicated, for at the time the Arabs were a vast majority of the population of Palestine.

Moreover, there were other provisions that irritated the Arabs. A “Jewish Agency” was to be “recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home.” No comparable Arab body was recognized despite the fact that the Arabs were a vast majority in the country. In 1929, the Jewish Agency was allowed to tax Jews. No doubt, the small Jewish community in Palestine was, in the 1920’s, organizing itself as a quasi-government. Some believed it was a “state within a state.”

Article 2 of the agreement specified two responsibilities for the British Mandatory. The first required it to “place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home.” The second required “the development of self-governing institutions” in Palestine and the safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of its inhabitants.

Article 6 required “the administration of Palestine” to “facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage . . . close settlement by Jews on the land . . . .” However, this obligation was to be fulfilled “while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.”

Articles 2 and 6 became controversial in subsequent discussions of the Palestine problem. Briefly, Article 2 raises questions about the extent of British responsibilities in Palestine. Are the responsibilities stated in the article compatible? Are they equal? Article 6 raised the question of whether the development of the Jewish Home was compatible with the “rights and position” of the Arabs of Palestine. Also, did the guarantee of “rights and positions” include the majority “position” of the Arabs? For example, was the Jewish National Home limited by the Arabs’ majority “position”?

The Arabs believed both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Agreement violated their right to self-determination as guaranteed by Article 22 of the League’s Covenant, The Anglo-French Declaration of 1918, and President Wilson’s fourteen-point program. Self-government, in their opinion, was meaningless without recognition of their majority status in the country. A Jewish National Home could not be developed in harmony with the guarantee of self-government of Article 2, without violating their “position” as guaranteed by Article 6. Before the League of Nations could approve the Palestine Mandate, the House of Lords discussed it on June 21, 1922, during which Lord John Islington of the Liberal Party submitted an important motion stipulating:

That the Mandate for Palestine in its present form is unacceptable to this House, because it directly violates the pledges made by his Majesty’s Government to the people of Palestine in the declaration of October 1915 [McMahon’s pledges to Hussein] and the declaration of November 1918 [Allenby’s Proclamation], and is, as at present framed, opposed to the sentiments and wishes of the great majority of the people of Palestine; that, therefore, its acceptance by the council of the league of nations should be postponed until such modifications have been affected as will comply with the pledges given by his Majesty’s Government.

Islington believed that the establishment of the Jewish National Home on the basis of the present Mandate gives the Jewish minority in Palestine the power to dominate the Arab majority. He warned that the Mandate “if ratified . . . imposes on this country [Britain] the responsibility of trusteeship for a Zionist political predominance where 90 percent of the population are non-Zionists and non-Jewish.”

One of the most controversial issues involving Palestine had been the question of whether the Balfour Declaration contradicted British promises to the Arabs. Lord Islington believed it did:

I say that the proclamations of 1915 and 1918 constitute a definite undertaking to the Arab community by Great Britain, whilst Zionism, as embodied in the Balfour Declaration, as implied in the Palestine Mandate . . . cannot constitute other than a direct repudiation of these solemn and authoritative undertakings.

The House of Lords, by a vote of 60 to 29, accepted his motion, clearly agreeing with the Arabs who argued that a Jewish Home in Palestine was illegal and blatantly unjust. Strangely enough, this event was ignored by the British press, and, later, by most scholars. The action of the House of Lords should have resolved the controversial issue. As we shall see,
however, Zionist influence in the British press and the halls of power made this impossible.

During this same session of the House of Lords, Balfour, by now a member of the House, unwittingly resolved another controversy involving the meaning of the declaration which bore his name. Did the declaration protect and guarantee the political rights of the Arabs of Palestine? The Zionists argued that the declaration guaranteed only the civil and religious rights of non-Jews, not their political rights. Said Balfour:

I cannot imagine any political interests exercised under greater safeguards than the political interests of the Arab population of Palestine. Every act of the Government will be jealously watched. The Zionist Organization has no attributes of political powers. If it uses or usurps political powers, it is an act of usurpation.

For the Zionists, however, political colonization was paramount, so for the next 30 years the Balfour Declaration would harass the British until, in 1948, they opted to pull out of Palestine altogether.

U.S.-Arab Agreements

Initially, around the time of the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs had a strongly positive image of the United States. The U.S., unlike Europe, seemed anti-colonial, an image buttressed by their political elite’s knowledge of American history. That elite saw the United States as a country that won its independence from a colonial Britain. More to the point, Americans, once victims like themselves of colonial oppression, had won their independence through a glorious revolution. If the big powers wanted to set up mandates in the Arab east, and if the Arabs could not stop them from doing this, Arab preference was to have the anti-colonial and revolutionary Americans as their mandatory power.

President Woodrow Wilson’s reputation as a moralist and a decent man enhanced this American image. His performance at the Paris Peace Conference confirmed the image Arabs had of America. Arab political leaders, particularly Prince Faisal, the leader of the Arab Revolt, knew Wilson was trying to limit the ambitions and greed of the European powers. Wilson’s self-determination policy appealed to them, raising their hopes at about the time Faisal felt he was being betrayed by the European leaders. [Of course, Wilson had his troubles in the U.S. and this probably prevented him from following up on his promises which the King-Crane Commission tried to live up to.]

Much later, during World War II, the United States became embroiled in Zionist politics. President Roosevelt was under strong pressure—from his wife, Eleanor, among others—to approve the Zionist plan to establish a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. What counted that pressure significantly, some would say, was a February 14, 1945 meeting between Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia aboard the U.S.S. Quincy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Roosevelt argued that because the Jews had suffered so much at the hands of the Nazis, they deserved a secure homeland in Palestine. King Saud observed that in his culture the criminal paid the penalty for his crime, not the innocent: if land should be set aside for Jews, it should be in Germany, not Palestine. Before the meeting ended, Roosevelt would promise the king that “he would do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people.”

"Your Majesty will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of the Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.”

President Roosevelt in letter to King Saud, April 9, 1945
President Harry Truman ignored his predecessor's promise to the Saudi monarch (and to other Arabs as well). Truman pushed hard for the idea of allowing 100,000 Jewish refugees to immigrate to Palestine, and he rejected the recommendations of an Anglo-American fact-finding committee—whose U.S. members he had nominated—that Palestine's government be placed under international guarantees, thereby according "to the inhabitants as a whole, the fullest measure of self-government."

This political game of supporting the Zionists while calming the Arabs in the most deceptive ways would continue to the present time. Only President Dwight Eisenhower refused to play the game. He, at least initially, attempted to follow a neutral policy, though pro-Zionists in Congress and Jewish organizations made it extremely difficult for him to stay neutral. Nevertheless, Eisenhower insisted, in the aftermath of the Suez war, that Israel withdraw behind its international borders in spite of Ben-Gurion's insistence to keep some of the land Israel had occupied during the war. During the 1960 elections, both Presidents Kennedy and Nixon were pro-Zionists in their efforts to win the support of American Jews and the powerful pro-Israeli lobby. Kennedy reneged on a promise he made to the Arabs in May 1961 to work towards "a just and peaceful solution" of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Israelis, already opposed to any mediation effort, preferred direct negotiations, knowing well that Arab leaders would be placed in jeopardy if they dared to do this. The American (and the French) members of the U.N. Conciliation Commission were too pro-Zionist to be helpful. The American Government had not been supportive of the commission's work, preferring quiet diplomacy to bring about peace. The Kennedy Administration did nothing to live up to its 1961 promise to the Arab heads of state. Not even "quiet diplomacy" was seriously pursued.

Further betrayal of the Arabs took place under President Lyndon Johnson. When, on June 27, 1967, Israel annexed Jerusalem and enlarged the city's boundary to include Arab areas not previously part of it, the United States—and, indeed, the rest of the world—rejected Israel's action. The U.S., however, failed to adhere to its official policy, refusing to pressure Israel without concessions from the Arab side. It also abstained on two U.N. resolutions declaring the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem invalid. On July 4 and July 14, Resolutions 2253 (ESV) and 2254 (ESV) were respectively approved by very large majorities with no opposition. U.S. abstention was tantamount to acquiescence to Israel's violation of international law.

Just before the June 1967 War, Johnson supported Israel on the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, promising that the U.S. would not allow the Arabs to invade Israel. On May 29, the New York Times reported that the President was extremely sympathetic to Israel's position. Despite Egypt's offer to make compromises on the Gulf issue, as evidenced by President Nasser's willingness to send his vice president to Washington for talks, Israel declared it would not accept any compromise. Fearing that Israel's image in the U.S. might be tarnished, Johnson advised Israel not to act hastily. The President was, however, against Israel's use of military measures against the Arabs, provided these measures were employed later.

After the war, the U.S. introduced a resolution (S/7952/Rev. 3), making Israeli withdrawal from conquered Arab territories conditional upon certain Arab concessions. The Johnson Administration had violated its own official policy, which it—and previous administrations—had accepted: namely, that the U.S. was committed to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East. (Clearly, Israel's concurrent attack on the U.S.S. Liberty (whose flag was clearly visible to Israel's war planes) and the killing of 34 and wounding of 75 of the ship's crew did not deter the Johnson Administration from its unwavering support for Israel's overt aggression.)

In the aftermath of the June War, the U.S. supported Israel's rejection of the United Nations' concept of total withdrawal from the conquered territories. Further, it introduced a resolution (A/L. 520) requiring settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a condition for Israeli withdrawal.

The draft resolution never came to a vote; it was clear that no other Western power—not even Britain and Canada—was willing to support Israel so unreservedly. France, for instance, condemned Israeli aggression very strongly and insisted on total withdrawal before other issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict were dealt with.

Johnson's extreme enthusiasm for Israeli gains in 1967 must be seen as an important factor in the 1973 war. His hawkish attitude towards the Arabs created an atmosphere of hopelessness on the Arab side, while the Israelis came to believe they could do whatever they wished to do without serious repercussion outside the Middle East simply because the U.S. would acquiesce.

President Richard Nixon did not help the situation either. Although quite aware of the strategic and economic importance of the Middle East, he remained too occupied with Vietnam to do anything constructive. Peace efforts in the Middle East were made, but the U.S. would not pressure Israel into making concessions. Then the 1973 war occurred, after repeated warnings from Egypt's Anwar Sadat and President Hafez al-Assad of Syria. Although Assad became the first Syrian leader to accept U.N. Resolution 242, the U.S., which helped bring about disengagement at the Sinai front, proceeded to neglect Syrian interest by allowing the Israelis to continue the status quo at the Golan Heights. This meant more Jewish settlements and a temptation to annex the territory. Also, the Nixon Administration thought of the Middle East as an adjunct to its Soviet policy. As such, it helped polarize the conflict along patterns of super-power global competition.

The best era, relatively speaking, in American Middle East diplomacy was the Carter years. More than his immediate predecessors, Carter yearned for peace in the Middle East, and out of personal conviction as well as national interest, Carter brought
about the Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt. As William Quant explains in his authoritative work on the agreement, however, Carter did not initially expect or want such an agreement,\(^9\) preferring instead a comprehensive peace that would include Israel, the Arab countries and representatives of the Palestinian people.

Zionist pressure deterred Carter from reaching his goal. Also, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's ideological zeal and Sadat's unpredictability were problems for Carter. Prof. Fred Khoury reports that Carter often complained about Zionist-Israeli influence, as did Cyrus Vance, his Secretary of State.\(^11\) Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, recalls Carter saying:

We are financing their conquest and they simply defy us in an intransigent fashion and generally making a mockery of our advice and preferences.\(^12\)

On October 1, 1977, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to a plan for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict that would, *inter alia*, recognize the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people and require Israel's withdrawal "from territories occupied" in 1967. Predictably, the pro-Israel lobby and its U.S. supporters, assisted by much of the American mass media, denounced the agreement, sending waves of protest throughout the American public. According to one analyst:

Carter was so shaken by the great furor aroused by the considerable political damage this could cause him domestically that he decided to make a hasty retreat by disassociating himself from the statement as quickly as possible.\(^13\)

Carter also made statements that the Palestinians should have a "homeland." But then came Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon, and all talk of a Palestinian homeland ended. [During the invasion Israel used American weapons, including the horrible cluster bombs, in a clear violation of American laws and U.S.-Israel agreements.]

The nadir in Arab-American relations has come during the Reagan years. Reagan's retreat from commitments made to the Arabs have occurred in the following areas:

1. Initially he allowed Secretary of State Alexander Haig to make the United States "hostage" to the policy of Israel, largely accepting Israeli policies as consistent with American interests. When Israel annexed the Golan Heights, in December 1981, the United States did not insist on Israeli withdrawal and took no serious steps to reduce the amount of aid to Israel. One cannot help but recall Israel's 1967 annexation of Jerusalem and Johnson's reluctance to do anything more than protest.

2. The Reagan Administration's role in Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon was more than that of a bystander or

"If America cannot demonstrate [to the Arab world] that we are a constant, effective, strong and responsive presence in the Middle East, those with the best inclinations inevitably will make their accommodations with those who bear the worst intentions toward us."

*Secretary of State George P. Shultz, New York Times, May 11, 1986*
neutral state. We now know that Secretary Haig encouraged the Israelis to pursue their disastrous Lebanese project. At no time did the U.S. "condemn" the Israeli action. Indeed, all U.N. Security Council resolutions that sought to condemn Israel were vetoed by the U.S.

3. The U.S. gave P.L.O. leader, Yasir Arafat, a written guarantee that the U.S. and the Lebanese Government would protect the Palestinian population in Beirut. But when Christian forces, with the encouragement of Israel, committed the brutal massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on September 16, 1982, the United States did nothing to stop it. [Later, an Israeli commission would hold Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon and others indirectly responsible for the massacre, and the State of Israel legally responsible since it was militarily in control of the area when the savage attack took place.]

4. Reagan did not follow up on his peace plan which he announced in September 1982. Although the plan was defective because it did not include the P.L.O. or acknowledge the right of self-determination for the Palestinians, there was hope the United States could develop the plan further and pressure the Israelis into accepting it as a "working paper" for further negotiations. Arafat did not outrightly reject the plan, even though it seemed to imply that the P.L.O. somehow must disappear.

The Arab countries then came up with their own plan for peace without rejecting its Reagan counterpart, implying that there was room for give-and-take. King Hussein was willing to cooperate provided Israel stopped building settlements on occupied Arab land and got out of Lebanon.

Israel quickly rejected the plan. Begin left no room for negotiation, bluntly declaring that there would be no withdrawal from occupied territories. In fact, his government revealed plans to settle over a million Jews on these territories.

Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration ignored its own plan and allowed it to die out. Instead, the U.S. began to advocate "direct negotiations" as the only way to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even in the area of conflict resolution, the U.S. was now taking an identical position as that of Israel.

5. In November of 1983, Israel and the U.S. entered into cooperative agreement in the military and political fields. In 1985, they signed an agreement to phase out trade duties between the two countries, making Israel the first state to receive such advantages from the U.S.

5. Although the U.S. still does not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel nor Israel's annexation of Arab East Jerusalem, it has moved a few steps closer toward sanctioning both. Under pressure from Israel and its American friends, the U.S. decided to require its consulate in West (Jewish) Jerusalem to report directly to Washington. Previously its consulate was tied to the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, following the usual pattern in other countries where consulates reported to embassies.

The consulate in East Jerusalem, technically accredited to Jordan, remained separated from its twin sister in Western Jerusalem after the occupation. Its employees were American and Arab. No Israelis were allowed to serve in it and Israelis were required to go to either West Jerusalem or Tel Aviv to obtain services.

Today, the consulate in East Jerusalem has close relations with the consulate in West Jerusalem. It hires Israeli Jews as employees and provides the usual services to Israeli citizens. Since the Democratic Presidential candidate Walter Mondale promised in 1984 to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, it may not be long before Reagan or his successor will make the change.

6. The Reagan Administration also promised the Arab World that it would maintain neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. This promise too was broken. At the urging of Israel, the Reagan White House sanctioned arms sales to Iran. Even when Secretary of State George Shultz objected, pointing out that Israel's foreign policy aims are not identical to America's, the pro-Israeli voices within the Administration prevailed. The United States and Israel shipped vital armaments to the Persian state of Iran, while feeding false military information to Arab Iraq. And once again the U.S. Government had to send an official to the Middle East to reassure moderate Arab leaders of its continuing support.

The reassurances are wearing thin. Clearly, Israeli foreign policy—and now U.S. foreign policy—is to fragment the Arab World, setting Arabs against Arabs. Fragmentation, however, is not in the interest of the Arabs, nor of the United States. The worst victim of fragmentation is peace: a fragmented people fight back without considering the means or the consequences. That's why, with each broken promise by the West, moderate Arab leaders and states lose more credibility among their people and in the region as a whole.

Conclusions

1. Sooner or later the Arab World must react to President Reagan's belligerency, unless he or his successor make changes in America's Middle East posture—a highly unlikely prospect when we consider Zionist influence in the U.S. media.

In non-democratic countries the media is state-controlled and serves the political and ideological interests of those in power. The media in such countries is not free, although there are variations within the authoritarian models.
In democratic societies the media is considered free, and while to a large degree the media is free, there are serious constraints upon its freedom. In a private enterprise system the greatest limitation upon the media's freedom is the commercial interest. Wherever this interest is exploited by a well-organized group that can withhold advertisement, contributions, and subscriptions and hurt the financial interest of the media, freedom of the press suffers enormously.

The Zionists have always used this process effectively against British and American media considered unfriendly to their cause. The London Times often carried protest letters from international personalities when Zionists were criticized or in relation to a questionable policy. The Manchester Guardian was probably the most pro-Zionist British paper when the Balfour Declaration was being formalized.

Very few papers in the United States dare criticize Israel and the Zionists. Some, like the Christian Science Monitor and the Washington Post, two exceptions to the normal pro-Zionist posturing of the American press, are becoming less and less critical.

One recent exception is a January 15, 1986 Wall Street Journal article in which Alexander Cockburn openly admitted the mass media's strong bias in favor of Israel and the Zionists. On the question of Israel, the article states, the American media lacks the courage to tell the truth. Under the Reagan Administration, the Journal reports, American policy towards the Middle East follows Israel's lead.

In a democratic society a free press is essential, since the mass media molds opinion to a great extent. People are quite dependent on what they see on TV, hear on radio, and read in the newspapers. Consequently, they are vulnerable, and the entire political system is also vulnerable since public opinion is vital to the working of a democracy.

The problem is further complicated by public apathy, a tendency which characterizes highly advanced industrial society, where individuals are too busy pursuing their mundane interests. Within a heavily materialistic civilization, the individual ultimately becomes less attentive to public interest and more immersed in activities relating to self-interest. Consequently he or she becomes dependent on institutions at the same time he becomes more vulnerable, particularly in the area of information in which the mass media plays a crucial role.

Another consequence of apathy is the excessive reliance of people on the professional class in politics. The professional politician is likely to pursue his or her self-interest almost unabashedly in policy areas where the public shows no interest. Very often, private interests prevail while national interests suffer. It is in those areas that segmented interests find strong allies among the professional politicians. The powers of the private interests become far greater than their strength. In the democratic system of the Western World—especially in both Great Britain and the United States—the Zionists benefited greatly from these weaknesses.

2. Peace is impossible when the basic rights of an indigenous majority are denied. The British acknowledged this when they turned the Palestine problem over to the United Nations.

One of the first things the U.N. did was to appoint a special commission on Palestine (UNSCOP), which noted certain important statistical data regarding Arab and Jewish demographic positions. At the end of 1946, Palestine had an estimated Arab population of 1,293,000, including 90,000 Beduins, while the Jewish population was 608,000. The increase in the Jewish population was primarily due to immigration, from 12.91 percent of the total in 1922 to 32.96 percent in 1946. From 1920 to 1946, the total number of recorded Jewish immigrants was 376,000, about 8,000 a year. Most of this immigration occurred between 1931 and 1936, during Nazi persecution of Jews, when the number of Jews rose from 18 percent to nearly 30 percent.

In 1947, there was no doubt the Jews, most of whom were foreign born, were a minority in Palestine. Moshe Shertok [later Sharrat], first Foreign Minister of Israel, told UNSCOP that of the 640,000 Jews in Palestine, only 230,000 Jews were born in the country, largely of immigrant parents. He also told the committee that the Jews owned "a little over 6 percent of the land of Palestine," and that about 40 to 45 percent of all Jewish land ownership belonged not to individual Jews but to the Jewish National Fund, an organization financed by Jews from all over the world. On this point of ownership, Ben-Gurion, later the first Prime Minister of Israel, agreed with Shertok. David Horowitz, the Jewish Agency's financial expert, said that the land occupied by Jews was 6.9 percent of the total area of Palestine and that the area occupied by Arabs was about 94 percent.

The United States similarly ignored the rights of the indigenous majority (and the advise of the frustrated British). In November 1945, Great Britain invited the United States to participate in an Anglo-American committee to examine the Palestine problem in order to find a solution to the problem of Jewish refugees. The American Government accepted the invitation, and the committee was organized. However, when the committee finally made its recommendations, the United States dissented, primarily because the Zionists did not agree with the committee's report which did not propose the creation of a Jewish state. Until the present the United States has failed to acknowledge the basic rights of the Palestinians to self-determination. Even the Israeli colonization of the West Bank, which the world community—including past U.S. administrations—has denounced as illegal, the Reagan Administration now says is not illegal.

In 1939, the British issued their White Paper, which denied that Britain had ever promised a Jewish State in Palestine and acknowledged Arab rights to Palestine. As events unfolded, however, it was too late for the British. The Balfour Declaration effectively stirred up the Arabs of Palestine who felt that the development of the Jewish Home would ultimately expropriate their land and render them homeless. 1920 saw the first in a series of riots that vented
Arab resentment for and frustration with British policy and Zionist zeal. But nothing the British did could halt the cycle of violence.

Now Americans are reaping the same bitter fruit of their Middle East policy: the killing of 34 American naval personnel aboard the U.S.S. Liberty, the blowing up of 265 Marines in Lebanon, plane and ship hijackings and hostage taking—tactics which have made Americans afraid to leave home.

3. Religion and politics make a volatile combination. If any two democracies should know enough to eschew religious claims to land, they ought to be England and the United States.

Such is not the case when it comes to Palestine. Balfour, for example, said he was prompted by religious reasons to issue his declaration, and Ronald Reagan believes that the return of the Jews to Palestine is part of the Divine Plan.

Surely it is part of the Zionist game plan. Speaking last year at the National Prayer Breakfast for Israel in Washington, D.C., U.N. Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu applauded Christian Zionist leaders, both British and American, "whose imagination was ignited by the dream of the great ingathering. And these were all men who had a crucial role in laying the political foundations, internationally, for the restoration of the Jewish State."

If peace is ever to come to the Middle East, it is incumbent upon responsible religious and political leaders to call for a negotiated settlement based on the principles of international law and the requirements of human justice. Otherwise, a nuclear-armed world may indeed be facing a Holy War in the Middle East of Armageddon proportions.

4. A peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot and will not be possible without the Palestinian people, who should be allowed to choose their representatives.

At this moment, no one can represent them except the F.L.O. The U.S. and Israel should recognize this fact and if they don't, they simply are not pursuing peace in good faith. These two countries should remember that if they continue their present course, the entire region will be lost for the Western World and Israel will be placed in serious jeopardy.

No nation, it should be remembered, is willing to kneel and beg...

While nations might go through a period when some of their leaders may seem to be doing so, eventually the people's will prevails. At the end of this century the world will have as many Arabs as there are Americans. Arabs presently occupy the whole of North Africa and most of the Near East. Behind them is a much larger number of Muslims who will support them, at least politically, against Israel and the U.S.

The history of British and U.S. relations with the Arab World shows strongly negative signs for the present and the future. It is up to the Western World to identify with the forces of unity and progress in the Arab World and not with the trend toward more fragmentation and greater weakness. Perhaps Britain and the U.S. should have listened to the advice of a great English Jew, Lord Samuel, who in the 1930's urged his country and his co-religionists not to fragment the Arabs but to encourage them to go in the direction of unity, to rebuild their past glory and recover their sense of dignity. Samuel warned the Zionists not to antagonize the Arabs and urged them to alter their political ambitions in favor of an Arab union and Jewish support.

Notes


2. "The provisional agreement of this draft resulted from discussion early in December 1919 between Mr. Forbes Adam and Mr. Malkin for the foreign Office and Mr. Cohen for the Zionist Organization." Draft Mandate for Palestine, December 11, 1919, in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1929-1939, Vol. IV, 1929, p. 571.


8. Ibid.


Book Views

Recent Link issues have been either based on newly released books or have been the basis for such books. A.M.E.U. now carries these books, which include:


Irani was the author of our August-September 1986 Link on "The Vatican, U.S. Catholics, and the Middle East," which, in addition to our regular 50,000 circulation, went to every Catholic pastor in the United States, a mailing of more than 18,000 copies.

Catholics represent 27 percent of the U.S. population, and now constitute the largest religious affiliation in the U.S. Congress. The importance of Irani's book was highlighted by the visit to the Middle East in January of this year by New York's John Cardinal O'Connell. The issues which engaged the Cardinal in public debate with apologists for Israel are carefully examined by Irani: the plight of the Palestinians, the Vatican's position on the status of Jerusalem, and the role of the Catholic Church in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon.
Irani also focuses on ecumenical relations among the area’s three monotheistic faiths in an effort to show the common perspective on the problems that Jews, Christians and Muslims share in the Middle East.

While obviously of specific interest to Catholics, this is an important book for all peoples concerned with peace in the Middle East.


Jane Hunter’s book will be of specific interest to American blacks. Her March–April 1986 Link, “The Israeli-South African-U.S. Alliance” was cited at length by the New York *Amsterdam News*, the largest black newspaper in the country, and was reprinted in its entirety by New York City’s black Metropolitan Weekly, *The City Sun*.

*Undercutting Sanctions* updates both the Link article and the author’s 1986 edition of the same title. In this latest edition she reports in greater detail on Israel’s nuclear relationship with Pretoria, a point which *should* be of interest to the U.S. Congress, since such dealings could lead to a cutoff in military aid to Israel, as congressionally mandated by Section 508 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.

Although only 75 pages long, Hunter’s book speaks volumes to all who are appalled by injustice in South Africa and apprehensive about nuclear proliferation worldwide.

In her August–September 1984 Link “Shrine Under Siege,” Halsell stunned many readers with her investigative report on the alliance between right-wing Christian fundamentalists and ultra-nationalist Zionist Jews. In Prophecy and Politics she explores in greater detail their sources of support in the United States. Some 40 to 60 million Americans are said to subscribe to some variation of Armageddon theology; that’s possibly one out of four voters, a statistic not lost on the Presidential aspirations of the Rev. Pat Robertson. Halsell’s book may be particularly relevant during the upcoming Presidential campaign.


Rubenberg’s October–November 1986 Link article, “The Misguided Alliance,” proved to be one of our most acclaimed issues. In her book, the author goes on to trace in much greater detail the history of U.S.-Israeli relations from the partition of Palestine in 1947 through Israel’s 1982 war in Lebanon. Of her research, former Undersecretary of State George Ball has written: “She has skillfully peeled away the dark, heavy encrustations of mythology in which that [the Arab-Israeli] conflict is cloaked, disclosing realities that bear little resemblance to those confronting the average American newspaper reader.”

The Iran-contra affair has demonstrated that Israel’s foreign policy in-
Books To Order

See Book Vistas commentary, pages 11-14, for the first five publications listed.


☐ George E. Iraji, The Popacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1962-1984, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986, 218 pp., $22.95. This first major study of the role of the Catholic Church towards the Arab-Israeli conflict is the result of an examination of previously unexplored archival resources and interviews with church and political officials in Rome, Jerusalem and Beirut. Our price, $13.50.


☐ Jack G. Shaheen, The TV Arab, Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1984, 146 pp., interests are not the same as the United States and that to confuse the two can lead to serious blunders. *Israel and the American National Interest* provides ample documentation for that thesis.


Expanding on that research in his latest book, Shaheen, a professional journalist and professor of mass communications at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, studies more than 100 different popular entertainment programs, cartoons and major documentaries telecast on network, independent and public channels. Newscaster Ed Bradley has predicted that this work will become "a valuable passport to objectivity in the future treatment of the Arab." We agree.

For information on ordering the above books, see A.M.E.U.'s full list of books below.
$6.95. A study of television, cinema, cartoon and documentary stereotypes of Middle Eastern people. Our price, $4.95.

New Selections

□ Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989, 177 pp., $31.00. This groundbreaking anthropological field study of Bedouin tribes uses their private intimate poetry as the key to uncover the relationship between personal and sexual sentiment and Arab honor and modesty. The focus on the humanity of tribal women breaks through stereotypes regarding stereotyping of Arab women and society. A scholarly book that will excite and intrigue general readers. Our price, $18.95.


□ Uri Avnery, My Friend, The Enemy, Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1986, 340 pp., $12.95. A long-time Israeli peace activist gives an intimate record of the numerous secret meetings which he and a small group of “Peace Now” Israeli leaders have had with PLO leaders. Our price, $7.95.

□ Bishara Bahbah, Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986, 210 pp., $19.95. This lively collection of 130 folktales provides an intimate introduction to Arab attitudes about life and living. Our price, $10.95.


□ Isaac Dips, A Bedouin Boyhood, New York: Universe Books, 1983, 176 pp., $8.10. A natural story teller, this Palestinian Bedouin colorfully tells the story of his youth, highlighting such events as weddings, Bedouin legal proceedings and Ramadan festivities, and contrasts his early peaceful tribal life with the shock of modernity and the exile of his people. Our price, $7.00.

□ Paul Findley, They Dare To Speak Out: American Congressmen Confront Israel's Lobby, Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1985, 362 pp., $8.95. The former eleven-term Congressman from Illinois, who knows how Americans are victimized, for opposing the Israeli lobby. Our price, $5.95.


□ Yehoshafat Harkabi, The Bar Kokha Syndrome: Risk and Realism in International Politics, Chappaqua, N.Y.: Rossel Books, 1983, 206 pp., $15.95. In this study of the second-century Judean revolt against Rome, the former chief of Israeli military intelligence argues that Israel’s glorification of this past act of national suicide plays a damaging role in its relations with the Arabs. Our price, $12.50.


□ Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran, New York: Pantheon, 1985, 416 pp., $9.95. This brilliant narrative parallels the story of the education of a modern Iranian mullah with the history of Iran. A fascinating portrait of one of the most influential and influential of world civilizations. Our price, $6.95.

□ Lee O'Brien, American Jewish Organizations and Israel, Washington, DC: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1986, 238 pp., $24.95. This profile of major Jewish organizations delineates its structure and political agenda and assesses the effectiveness of their Israeli support work. Our price, $13.95.

□ Livia Rochak, Israel's Sacred Terrorism, Third Edition, Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1986, 63 pp., $5.95. This examination of the diary of Moshe Sharrett, Israel’s Prime Minister in the 1950’s, uncovers official Israeli policies aimed at terrorizing Arab civilians and sabotaging Arab attempts at peace. Our price, $4.50.

of startling photographs as a starting point for a rich synthesis of autobiographical reflection, social analysis and historical insight in this portrait of the Palestinian people. Our price, $8.95.


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