Palestinian Nationhood

In 1976 a report by the Brookings Institute of Washington, D.C. concluded that a comprehensive Middle East settlement had to include the establishment of a Palestinian political entity on the West Bank. The report was signed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, present head of the National Security Council, and William Quandt, now the NSC’s top security expert. For the incoming Carter Administration the report would form the cornerstone of a revised U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

Two months after his inauguration, President Carter told a town meeting in Clinton, Mass. that “there has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees.” He would repeat the statement in weeks to come. For the first time a high-ranking U.S. official had publicly endorsed a Palestinian homeland.

On October 5, 1977, President Carter delivered a virtual ultimatum to Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, at the United Nations Plaza Hotel in New York. According to a New York Times Magazine report of January 21, 1979, Carter told Dayan that Israel would eventually have to accept a Palestinian “entity” or “homeland” on the West Bank and Gaza; otherwise, said Carter, he would warn American Jews that “Israeli intransigence was holding up peace and endangering vital American interests.”

Major newspapers in the country broadened their coverage. In February 1978, the New York Times ran a series of articles on the Palestinians and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. [See the Link, Spring 1978.] In October 1978, the Chicago Tribune Magazine’s special report on the Middle East concluded that the crux of the Middle East conflict was “the Palestinian problem,” and it speculated that the “nationless Palestinians will one day finally have a state of their own.”

Television followed. Cautiously. ABC’s prime time documentary, “Terror in the Promised Land,” presented the rationale for Palestinian resistance without bias—and without paid commercials. CBS’s Sixty Minutes gave Palestinian Americans an estimated audience of 60 million viewers. In January 1979, the Public Broadcasting Service aired the first of its documentary trilogy, “Palestine,” of which New York Times TV critic John O’Connor wrote, “Never before has the Palestinian side been presented so thoroughly or directly on American television.” And O’Connor concluded: “A profound and doubtlessly significant change has occurred in this country’s televised coverage of Israel and the Palestinians.” [See New York Times, Jan. 14, 1979, p. D-31.]

Then, on January 9, 1979, Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, acknowledged during an interview that American diplomacy in the Mideast and at the U.N. is hampered by the lack of an “effective relationship with the Palestinian people.” The P.L.O. representatives at the U.N. are “very intelligent, decent human beings,” Young said, and he expressed the hope that they “would win out in a battle for the leadership of the Palestinian cause.”

Indeed, a new awareness, it appears, is entering America’s consciousness, besetting it with an international imperative: A nation, in exile, craves justice. Four million people, with unbreakable roots to Palestine, claim their rightful patrimony. And America, the honest broker in the Middle East negotiations, takes another look at Camp David, at “linkage,” and at the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.
About This Issue


Our book review selection, The Zionist Connection, is Dr. Alfred Lilienthal's latest and most comprehensive work. Author of many books and articles, Dr. Lilienthal also edits the monthly newsletter, Middle East Perspective. Our reviewer, Rev. David Noonan, is former Professor of Ethics at Emmanuel College, Boston, former chaplain at Harvard University, and presently on the staff of Framingham State College, in Massachusetts. Link readers can receive The Zionist Connection at a discount of 40 percent. See page 11 for details. The Link also announces the following items:

Special Offer to Teachers

During the past several months A.M.E.U. has noted an increase in the requests from elementary and high school teachers for classroom material on the Middle East. A.M.E.U. now offers a special packet of material, suitable for classroom use, which includes, among other items, an Arab world handbook for teachers, two handsome Middle East wall maps from the National Geographic Magazine, and Ray Cleveland's 1978 edition of The Middle East and South Asia. Aided by a special foundation grant, A.M.E.U. offers this collection to teachers for $1.00, the cost of postage and handling. Teachers wishing this material, however, must give as their return address the name of the school where they work. No packets will be mailed to private addresses. Because some of this material is geared to particular age groups, please specify grade level. Present quantity is limited.

Midwest Conferences on Palestine

Two major conferences are planned in the Midwest, both near enough to Chicago's O'Hare Airport for sponsors to meet airborne participants on arrival.

May 18-20, "Human Rights and Israeli-Palestine Responsibility for the Christian Church," at the La Grange Christian Life Center. Spearheaded by the Chicago Presbytery's Middle East Task Force, the conference features among its speakers: Father Daniel Berrigan, Dr. Ibrahim Abu-Lughad, Mr. Sami Esmail, Father Paul Terazi, and Dr. James Zogby. Cost for registration, five meals and two nights' lodging is $50. Further information may be had by sending a stamped, self-addressed envelope to: Rev. Donald Wagner, First Presbyterian Church, 1427 Chicago Ave., Evanston, IL 60201.

June 24-27, "Holy Peoples, Holy Lands," the Midwest Forum's 36th Summer Conference on International Affairs at Aurora College. Keynote speakers are: Rabbi Schaalman, Dr. Muhammad Abdul-Rauf, Msgr. John Nolan, and Dr. H. Kenn Carmichael. Dean of the conference is Rev. L. Humphrey Walz, former Link editor. Cost for registration, eight meals and three nights is $65. Send inquiries, along with self-addressed, stamped envelope to: Rev. Gerald A. Krause, First Methodist Church, 511 Public Ave., Beloit, WI 53511.

A.M.A.A. in Lebanon

As a supplement to our winter issue on American relief work in Lebanon, the Link notes the work being done by the Armenian Missionary Association of America. A recent grant of $500,000 from A.I.D. was obtained by the A.M.A.A., the Armenian General Benevolent Union, and the Armenian Relief Society, with the Armenian Assembly as the catalyst in processing the application. A.M.A.A. also participates in two loan-granting funds in Lebanon to businessmen unable to reopen their businesses. A.M.A.A. offices are located at 140 Forest Ave., Paramus, NJ 07652.

ICARUS

ICARUS Middle East Film

Library was recently established to meet the educational and cultural needs of social studies teachers, college instructors and community organizations. ICARUS is currently promoting a membership program that offers reduced prices on all film rentals, an educational newsletter and a unique Middle East Cine Magazine, the collective effort of Middle Eastern filmmakers, artists and film critics. ICARUS is located at 200 Park Ave., South #1319, New York, NY 10003.

Spring Issue of Link

In recognition of 1979 as the "Year of the Child," the Link will devote its next issue to the "child in the Arab World."

John F. Mahoney, Executive Director
Young Urges New Palestinian Policy

U.N. Ambassador
Andrew Young

From the unedited transcript of Ambassador Young's interview with the staff of The Inter Dependent, January 9, 1979

Inter Dependent (ID): Speaking about the relationship between the General Assembly and the world, you mentioned that our role as an honest broker in the Middle East has given us some credibility in the third world and more respect. Yet the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a convening of the Geneva Conference; passed a resolution calling on the Security Council to cut off arms to Israel; passed a resolution, against the wishes of the U.S., which would make the P.L.O. a conduit for U.N. development assistance. Is the General Assembly out of touch with the world?

Young: No; maybe we are. Because while we are an honest broker between Israel and the Arab states, we don't have any effective relationship with the Palestinian people. Now, I'm not advocating a particular kind of relationship with the Palestinian people, but the U.N. is overwhelmingly a place which supports the underdog. And anybody that is perceived as the underdog is going to get the majority support of the nations of the U.N.

Senor Ribicoff came back from a meeting one time and said, "Gosh." He said, "You'd think that the U.S. and the Soviet Union should have some influence in the U.N. But they don't have nearly as much influence in the U.N. as the P.L.O." It's easy to disagree with that. And yet, I think that the relationship that the P.L.O. has had to the U.N. has been one of the things that has made it possible for there to be some moderating influences present in the whole Palestinian equation. That the people who are representing the P.L.O. at the U.N. are very skilled politicians and very intelligent, decent human beings. Hopefully, they would win out in a battle for the leadership of the Palestinian cause, and not those elements of the P.L.O. that feel that the only way for them to survive is through a sustained campaign of terrorism and leading to the destruction of Israel.

There has been a de facto recognition of the political process to liberation by those elements of the Palestinian cause that work with the U.N.

ID: The U.S. doesn't recognize, doesn't deal directly with the P.L.O. . . .

Young: That's right . . .

ID: . . . and in its attempt to work out a settlement in the area has not dealt with them. Hasn't the U.N.'s enhancement of the P.L.O. as a political entity given them a stature that has sort of frustrated the U.S. approach for working out a peace in the Middle East?

Young: I think realistically the P.L.O. not only has captured the imagination of the Palestinian people, evidently, but they also have a tremendous influence within Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria; certainly Iraq and Lebanon—well; Lebanon and Iraq not in the same category, but that is the reality. We may not like it; we don't recognize it. But it doesn't make it any less true.

ID: Should we recognize them?

Young: I think we should have some way of relating to the Palestinian people. How we do that, I think, is a matter for discussion. And we really haven't reached a conclusion on that. But I would say that overwhelmingly the reason for our not having relations with the P.L.O. is probably because of Israel. I don't necessarily quarrel with that, because I think that Israel is going to have to make the decisions about how it's going to relate to the Palestinian people. Now, it has made one attempt through the development of a political process on the West Bank and Gaza. It can evaluate the success or the failure of that. That may or may not be a satisfactory approach, according to the people there involved—the million and a half Palestinians essentially inside Israeli-controlled areas. But there are probably another two million or more Palestinians in other parts of the Middle East. And I think what we're seeing, and I think the frustration of the Camp David Accords is essentially being accomplished by Palestinians who feel as though it does not give them the kind of representation and guarantee they need to assure their future or any concept of self-determination. And that's what I think we're working on.

ID: Then is that really an adequate framework for a Middle East peace? Young: I think the framework is adequate. The problem is that people see in it different things. In any peace process, leaders are required to move toward each other to reconcile their differences. But in the process of moving toward their former adversaries and enemies, they find themselves moving away from their own people, so that every leader involved in any kind of peaceful negotiation has got to bring his own constituents along.

Now, the Palestinians, who feel left out, really don't see the move that Israel is making in the direction of peace. Not because it's not there, but because they hear the things that Prime Minister Begin may be saying to reassure his own citizens. And everybody has tended to look at the worst. The Arabs have felt that President Sadat sold out the Arab cause, or betrayed the Arab cause. It's obvious that Israel doesn't think so, because Israel doesn't even want to go along with what the Arabs are viewing as a betrayal of the Arab cause. So what you really have to deal with now is not something that is wrong with the document, with the negotiations, but you have to deal with the perceptions about the Camp David Accords that are coming from extremely opposite positions.
Trauma and Triumph of A Nation in Exile

Who are the Palestinians? What is the Palestine Liberation Organization? What is the relation of the one to the other in the transformation of the political sensibility and mass energies of Palestinian society? Why has it been proven yet again, in recent weeks, that the question of Palestine, at bottom, remains the fundamental one in the dispute in the Middle East? Above all, what are the factors contributing to the disjunction between image and reality in Western perceptions of the Palestinians and their movement?

A case in point would be the terminology and emphasis in the Camp David Accords on Palestine. These give the impression, in their concentration on the problems of the “inhabitants” of the West Bank and Gaza, that the only Palestinians around are these nameless, faceless “inhabitants” living in these two territories, and that the issues in the Palestine conflict are totally encapsulated there. The image of the Palestinians as a society, a people and a nation in exile is thus mutilated further.

From the outset, it is clear now that in the Western political consciousness—but more specifically in the United States—there is not a Palestinian people but a Palestinian problem. There is not, in other words, a people that is concerned with its national authenticity, that has a culture, traditions and social preoccupations; there is, instead, a problem, abstracted from its relation to human beings, defined with all the contrivances and conventions of political idiom. Ironically enough, the reverse is true when it comes to Israel.

Who the Palestinians are, and what body of self-definitions they have accumulated during the last six decades, is crucial to a meaningful understanding of the structural sources of tension in the Arab-Israel dispute.

Six decades of struggle, inside and outside Palestine, by Palestinians from all walks of life and all classes of society, had acted to form an enlarged repertoire of national consciousness among Palestinians, a permanent and evolving depository, on which all Palestinians drew, that cemented the Palestinian people’s national character and its aspirations. The Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip are not one iota different from Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, the United States and other places in the diaspora. These approximately four million Palestinians are not just united in a sense of national cohesiveness, but in an unyielding commitment to the same goals—to regain their rights as a people and as a nation in search of, and struggle for, freedom and statehood. Perhaps this is one of the most remarkable social phenomena of the 20th century in the Middle East, that a people that suffered expulsion from its homeland and fragmentation in various host countries nevertheless survived to retain its roots to the land and its national cohesiveness.

A settlement, then, that sets out to create dichotomies among this one people is adopting an adversary stance to the very structure of Palestinian society and the very ethos of its national consciousness.

Within this framework, it becomes easy to understand why the Palestinians, on masse, have always rejected all attempts to supplant the P.L.O. with an alternative leadership.

Dismemberment of a People

In the Camp David Accords, the Palestinians are segmented arbitrarily into various divisions, with a different formula dealing with each. One category of Palestinians, upon whom virtually all the attention of the Accords is focused, is described as “the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.” Another is that “displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967.” And yet another is dismissed contemptuously as the “refugee problem,” presumably referring to the two million Palestinians living in the diaspora. [Spare the indignity of this categorizing are three other types of Palestinians: those who were displaced or deported since 1967, those who have
lived in pre-1948 Palestine all along, known to some as “Israelis-Arabs,” and those many other Palestinians in the diaspora who are not defined or registered as “refugees.” Each of these three groups is assigned a political-social destiny independent of the other, permanently and distinctly severed from the national whole.

Add to all of that, of course, the direct consequence of such segmentation—the fact that the Palestinians are not to contemplate, in this scheme of things, the vision of freedom in statehood, a condition without which a people cannot establish real connections in the world around them or concern themselves with exploring their potential for growth, functioning institutionally as a national group, in a state, bound by a consciousness of kind.

Obviously, rejection of the Camp David Accords can be traced to the nature of the social fabric in Palestinian society, as it can to the shortcomings in the Accords dealing with the political question of Palestinian rights.

In like manner, the inability of outsiders to ignore the P.L.O. or isolate the Palestinians from it is rooted in socio-political forces in Palestinian society.

**P.L.O. and the Palestinians**

It is a source of bafflement to people in this country, or in Israel, why all efforts to create an alternative “leadership” to the P.L.O. have failed, why even “moderate” Palestinians, as they are called here, persist in declaring that the only leadership that represents them is the P.L.O. and no other. The reason for this bafflement can only be attributed to a lack of understanding of the dynamics of Palestinian nationalism and the collective national traumas of the Palestinian people, of which the P.L.O. is the organic outgrowth. In that sense, it can be said that the P.L.O. is not just an organization, nor is it just a leadership. It is, in sum, the very institutional structure of Palestinian society and a juncture in the evolutionary continuum of the Palestinian national movement, a movement that has been on the scene, with its own historical ebb and flow, since the turn of the century.

The attention that the Palestine Liberation Organization has attracted in the Western media has been almost exclusively the armed struggle of the guerrillas. Consequently, the political, social and cultural activities of the P.L.O. within the Palestinian community were totally ignored, as was the internal structure of the P.L.O. as the general organizational framework within which all Palestinian social systems, trade unions, professional associations, educational institutions, political councils and national groupings operate. Only an insight into this organizational structure would afford a glimpse of how the activities of the P.L.O. touch on the lives of virtually all Palestinians in the world. To divorce the P.L.O. from the Palestinians is an impossible task as it would be an unnatural state of affairs; as if a people, with a high level of national consciousness, are asked to isolate themselves from the national and political institutions that embody them, and that are the genuine and organic development of their socio-political experience. The United States does not recognize the P.L.O. and Israel rejects it. They are, however, the exception, since the rest of the world does not feel the same way.

The Palestine Liberation Organization is engaged in a great number of activities other than the national struggle for liberation of the Palestinians from Zionist occupation and from exile. The most important of these activities is embodied in the institution of the Palestine National Council,

U.N.R.W.A. maintains a supplementary food program designed to correct nutritional deficiencies.
functionally based on the quintessence of democratic practices. The Council, which is a parliament in exile, has a membership that is derived from all walks of life in Palestinian society, guerilla organizations, labor unions, professional groupings (writers, doctors, teachers, etc.). All of these members, coming as they do from Palestinian communities in the diaspora as well as under occupation, secure as representative a voice of the Palestinian people as any in the world where true democracy is practiced.

The Council is the supreme authority of the Palestinian people. It formulates policies and political programs for the P.L.O. executive committee. All major decisions affecting the political destiny of the Palestinians must be approved by the Council. During the Council’s ordinary sessions, usually once every two years unless the Chairman requests otherwise (in 1968 two sessions were held), reports are examined from the P.L.O. on its achievements and its organs; the Palestine National Fund and the P.L.O. budget are considered by various financial committees; and the major issues affecting the Palestinians are then debated and voted upon. In 1973, the National Council, in its 11th session, created a Central Council to follow up and implement its resolutions.

Another important institution of the P.L.O. is the Executive Committee of the P.L.O. itself, which is selected by the National Council from its own members and acts as a Cabinet. The Executive Committee is in permanent session, and elects its own Chairman. It is responsible exclusively to the National Council.

The Palestine National Fund is yet another body whose responsibilities touch on the lives of virtually all Palestinians and which is an integral part of the P.L.O. Managed by a board of directors and directly answerable to the Palestinian people through the Palestine National Council, the Fund supervises expenditures on educational, social, cultural as well as military activities in Palestinian society and the Palestinian national movement.

There are a great many other social, educational and political bodies involved in Palestinian society that are an extension of the involvement of the P.L.O. in the broad design of the human concerns of Palestinians in the diaspora and under occupation. Palestinian trade unions, an extension of the P.L.O. Department of Popular Organizations, are democratic bodies whose officials are elected by the membership and deal with the regular problems encountered by Palestinian workers and professionals. The Palestine Red Crescent Society (P.R.C.S.), a major medical institution of the P.L.O., renders medical services not just to the Palestinian community, civilian and guerilla alike, but to whomever needs it in the area where its clinics are located. The P.R.C.S. has participated in several international conferences and has signed agreements with the Red Cross and various Geneva Conventions on behalf of the P.L.O.

In addition to that, the P.L.O. runs schools, orphanages, summer programs, kindergartens and the like to oversee the educational needs of Palestinians in exile. The P.L.O. has a number of information offices, its own newspapers and magazines, a news agency as well as the Association of Workshops, an agency that offers vocational training for the children of fallen patriots and produces goods (clothes, furniture, embroidery, etc.) for the population of refugee camps at subsidized prices.

Another major institution of the P.L.O. is the Palestine Research Center, which possesses a huge library and extensive archives for the documentation and study of the Palestine conflict.

**Durability of the P.L.O.**

It is obvious that the Palestine Liberation Organization, contrary to the image held of it here, is a fact of political life in the Arab World, like the Palestinians themselves. It is equally obvious that it is not a military movement confined to the activities of Palestinian guerrillas (though that has a major positional value in Palestinian society), but is the reflection of the mass sentiments of all Palestinians, with strong roots among the Palestinians, in the Arab World and the rest of the world where Palestinians live. Were it not for that, the P.L.O. would have collapsed a long time ago.

Within the P.L.O., various political and ideological visions exist. That is simply because of the democratic nature of Palestinian society. Like every society in the world, Palestinian society is imbued with a great many ideological currents and political sensibilities. These are freely, democratically and openly operating within the institutional and guerilla structure of the P.L.O.

So long as the Palestinians are around, so will the P.L.O. Palestinian rights are well known as a constant, not a variable, in the struggle for Palestine. So are the indivisibility of Palestinian society and its functional manifestation, the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Anybody who ignores that, in seeking a resolution of the Palestinian problem is ignoring reality, standing remote from the political temper of the region and its immutable facts of life.
From America With Life

By William Gedeon

I was told to believe that there is a God, who is within us, around us, and who controls earth, sun and universe

I was told to believe that the prophets and saints were sent to save me, my soul and all the human race

I was told to believe that the earth is round and travels around the sun, that this earth is one of many planets of the sun, of many suns of the universe

I was told that man is human, that to be human is to love, to love is to have compassion for fellowman and life and I agreed

But then one day I said I'm a Palestinian, one of four million Palestinians living in refugee camps in the desert or under occupation or in exile

I said we Palestinians are human too, we deserve your love and compassion

I said in the name of God, the prophets and the saints, please help my people, for what is their crime?

they laughed

And I told my son to believe that there is a God who is within us and around us and who controls the earth, the sun and the universe

That the prophets and saints were sent by God to save him, his soul and the human race

That the earth is round and travels around the sun that this earth is a planet of many other planets of this sun of many other suns of the universe

And that man is human and to be human is to love and to love is to have compassion for one's fellowman and life

and my son cried

and I cried

And more of us cried, Palestinians cried, all of us cried, until our cry was heard in battle, on the fields, in prison camps, in occupied lands in the United Nations and in all the nations of this earth

My son told his son that once he was told to believe that there is a God who sent his prophets and saints to save the human race of this earth, which earth is not flat and travels around the sun of many other suns of the universe, that man is human, that human is to love and to love is to have compassion for your fellowman and for life

and my grandson fell asleep

with a rifle in his hand

Reprinted from AAUG Newsletter, June 1978
International Recognition of Palestinian Nationhood

An Address by John Reddaway, Director of the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding, delivered at the British House of Commons on December 5, 1977

As an historical footnote to what has been said about the need for the world to remind Israel that it was never intended that the Palestinians should be deprived of a homeland of their own on Palestinian soil, I would like to spend a few minutes dusting off the texts of the international promises which have been made from time to time to the Arab people of Palestine and which have been so zealously swept under the carpet by Zionists in their efforts to re-write the recent history of Palestine. The general point was well made by Andrew Faulds in his introductory speech at the recent seminar in London on “Peace and the Palestinians”:

It needs saying again and again that it was never the intention of the international community, including the United States, to turn the Arab inhabitants of Palestine into a “people without a land.” Whatever other sacrifices they may have demanded from the Palestinians in the interest of securing a national home for the Jewish people, neither the League of Nations nor, later, the United Nations ever intended that the Palestinians should be left without a land of their own on Palestinian soil. Even if there were not on record the specific undertakings embodied in the General Assembly resolutions, it would be a matter of natural and evident justice that the Palestinians should have a land of their own.

The first of the international promises to the Palestinians was of course that contained in the Balfour Declaration—later to be incorporated in the Palestine Mandate. The Declaration, having promised the support of the British Government for the establishment in Palestine of a national home (not a national state) for the Jewish people, went on to qualify this promise with the words:

it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

The meaning is clear in spite of the odd, indeed offensive, circumlocution contained in the use of the term “non-Jewish” to describe the indigenous Arabs of Palestine. (Perhaps others besides myself were reminded of this when they heard Mr. Begin in the Knesset the other day referring to the Palestinians as “the Arabs of Eretz Israel!”) But leaving aside this oddity Arabs would be subordinate to the Jews, would not be in breach of the Declaration, provided the Arabs continued to enjoy freedom to practice their religion and to manage their own cultural and social affairs. But the historical record shows that this was not how the then British Government, who were after all the authors of the Declaration, interpreted this passage. In January 1918 (within two months of issuing the Declaration), they dispatched Commander D.C. Hogarth to Jeddah to reassure King Hussein. He conveyed a carefully worded message on behalf of the British Government, stating that they were determined that no obstacle should be put in the way of the realization of the return of Jews to Palestine “in so far as is compatible with the freedom of

It needs saying again and again that it was never the intention of the international community, including the United States, to turn the Arab inhabitants of Palestine into a “people without a land.”

Andrew Faulds

of language, no one can reasonably question the intention. The national home for the Jewish people was to be established in such a way as not to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the Arab population already present in Palestine. (They then numbered about 600,000 as against a total Jewish population of only about one tenth of that number.)

A typically disingenuous attempt has been made by Zionist propagandists to pretend that “civil and religious rights” meant something different from and less than political rights and that therefore the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, in which the the existing population, both economic and political. ” (See The Balfour Declaration by Leonard Stein, pp. 632-633.) It is true that the two principal authors of the Declaration, Balfour and Lloyd George, may have privately entertained the hope or even the intention that, in the course of time, the Jewish national home would develop into a Jewish national state. We are all familiar with Balfour’s contemptuous dismissal of the rights of the Palestinians in his memorandum of 11 August 1919:

Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future
hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.

Doreen Ingrams, in her book *The Seeds of Conflict*, quotes a minute from a senior official in the Colonial Office, dated 7 November 1921, recording a conversation with Weizmann in which he said that he had asked Lloyd George and Balfour what meaning the British Government had attached to the phrase "Jewish national home" in the Declaration and that they had replied: "We meant a Jewish state."

This report, at secondhand, of an oral exchange may or may not be true. But the views ascribed to Lloyd George and Balfour personally certainly did not constitute the official, approved policy of the British Government. In numerous written and oral statements—in White Papers, in parliamentary debates, in Sir Herbert Samuel’s speeches as High Commissioner for Palestine—the British Government made it abundantly clear that it was not their intention to deprive the Palestinians of their homeland or to subject them to Jewish rule. The classic statement of the British Government’s position was contained in the White Paper on Palestine issued by Winston Churchill in June 1922:

H.M.G. therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish state against their will.

On another occasion Churchill, speaking to an Arab delegation in Jerusalem, said:

If one promise stands, so does the other. We shall faithfully fulfill both. Examine Mr. Balfour’s careful words: Palestine to be "a national home," not "the national home," a great difference in meaning. The establishment of a national home does not mean a Jewish government to dominate the Arabs.

The Balfour Declaration was incorporated in the Mandate and so the dual promise—to the Palestinian Arabs as well as to the Jews—was sanctioned and confirmed by the League of Nations. But beyond that, the whole concept of the Mandate, as enunciated in the Covenant of the League of Nations, was based on the principle of the self-determination of peoples and on the provisional recognition of the people of Palestine as an independent nation. The Mandate for Palestine was what was termed a Class A mandate which was the category of mandate designed for the territories detached from the Turkish Empire at the end of the First World War. The relevant passage of the Covenant declared that:

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.

The clear implication is that the League of Nations recognized the people of Palestine (who were then in an overwhelming majority Palestinian Arabs) as entitled to independence and nationhood. The Mandate, like the Balfour Declaration, may have been unjust in its bias towards Zionism. It may have been impossible to administer, because no Mandatory could reconcile the Zionist movement’s interpretation of the "national home" with a proper respect for the national rights of the Palestinians. And Britain, as the Mandatory power, may have betrayed the "sacred trust" which it had undertaken towards the existing population of Palestine. But whatever criticisms may be made of the Mandate and of the Mandatory, these do not affect the point I am making, which is that the Mandate, in its concept and its terms, specifically recognized the title of the Arabs of Palestine to independence and nationhood.

If we now turn to the United Nations, the crucial text is of course that of the General Assembly’s partition resolution of 29 November 1947. That resolution is so often cited by Zionists as proof of the legitimacy of Israel’s creation that the world has tended to lose sight of the fact that, like the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, the partition resolution contained a double promise. It not only proposed the creation of a Jewish state; it also proposed the creation of an Arab, that is, a Palestinian, state. Whatever criticisms may be levelled against the United Nations for its action in purporting to partition Palestine against the wishes of the majority of the population—and there are indeed abundant grounds for condemning the resolution in both principle and substance and also for
the disgraceful way in which it was ger-
rymed through the General
Assembly—these criticisms do not af-
fect the point that in this resolution the
United Nations—again, like its
predecessor, the League of Nations—
specifically accepted and recognized
the title of the Palestinians to nation-
hood and a land of their own.
The other day in the Daily Tele-
graph, a senior Israeli diplomat—who
must surely rank as one of the most in-
volved to represent Israel at the Court
of St. James—celebrated the 30th an-
niversary of the partition resolution with
what purported to be an account of the
international decision to partition
Palestine and the events that ensued on
that decision. It was, to put it mildly, a
highly idiosyncratic account. In
the course of it he levelled against the
United Nations the one accusation I
would never have expected to hear
from the lips of a Zionist spokesman.
He actually complained that the U.N.
had “never lifted a finger in defence of
its own resolution”! Now it is of
course quite true that, having rashly
wiped Arab plot to encompass their
destruction. Then there would have
been an Arab, that is to say a
Palestinian, state consisting of three
quarters of a million Arabs and a
negligible ten thousand Jews. And
finally there would have been a corpus
separatum of Jerusalem with a popula-
tion of about one hundred thousand
Jews and the same number of Arabs.
Now whatever else may be said about
this plan, one thing is clear: The Pales-
tinian right to nationhood and their
own national state was conspicuously
acknowledged and made manifest.
Since 1947 a good deal of effort has
been expended by Zionist propagan-
dists to persuade the world that the
Palestinians forfeited any title they
may have had to an independent
national state by resorting to arms in
order to oppose the partition resolu-
tion and to prevent the dismemberment
of their ancestral land against their
wishes. It is further argued that, having
put the issue to the test of war and
having been defeated, the Palestinians
must accept that the slate has been
wiped clean and that any previous
recognition by the world of their right
to nationhood had been invalidated by
their own action. There is, I believe, no
basis of international law or historical
precedent for this argument. We can all
think of cases where national rights
have survived resort to war and
military defeat.
As a coda to this recapitulation of
the theme of international recognition
of Palestinian nationhood, I will
conclude by recalling that even Israel,
once upon a time, was prepared to
agree that General Assembly resolu-
tions, and in particular those concern-
ing the partition of Palestine into
Jewish and Arab states and the return
of the Palestinian refugees to their
homes, ought not to be "deprived of
all compelling force" but ought, on the
contrary, to be accorded "extremely
wide validity." Those were the expres-
sions used by Abba Eban, as the rep-
resentative of Israel at the U.N., in the
spring of 1949 when Israel's applica-
tion for membership in the U.N. was
under discussion. This admission
stands on record, even though Israel,
after it had secured its aim of interna-
tional recognition through membership
in the U.N., cynically threw aside the
assurances it had given and blocked
action on both the return of refugees
and the establishment of a Palestinian
homeland.
Finally, it may be worth drawing at-
tention to a curious fallacy which is far
too readily accepted nowadays. Not
content with denying that the
Palestinians have any national rights,
Israel now arrogates to itself a right of
veto over the establishment of a Pales-
tinian state. What is surprising is not
that Israel makes this claim, but that
anyone should take it seriously. What
conceivable right have the Israelis to
dictate to the Palestinians about their
nationhood? The other day our own
Prime Minister, in the course of some
admirably forthright remarks to the
British Board of Jewish Deputies,
seemed to endorse this fallacy:
There is no prospect of a lasting
peace coming about in the Middle
East unless the Palestinian problem
is solved. We believe the way to solve
it is by setting up a homeland of
some kind for the Palestinian Arabs.
It is not for us to say what form that
homeland should take. That is a
matter for the parties concerned.
I beg leave to disagree with Mr.
Callaghan if, as seems to be the case,
he includes Israel among "the parties
concerned" who should decide what
form the Palestinian homeland should
take. Israel, so long as America
honours itself by acquiescing, may
have the power to prevent the
Palestinians from enjoying their
undoubted right to nationhood and a
land of their own. But what Israel
certainly does not have is any right to
behave in this abominably dog-in-the-
manger way. Whether the Palestinians
should be accorded the rights and
status of an independent nation is not
for Israel to say, but for the interna-
tional community as a whole. And long
go the League of Nations and later the
United Nations answered that question
with a clear, unequivocal "yes."
On his arrival in London last Friday
Mr. Begin had the effrontery, perhaps
chutzpah is the right word, to call for a

In particular, Mr. Callaghan should remind his visitor
[Mr. Begin] that the Balfour Declaration contained a dual promise
—to the Palestinians as well as to the Zionist movement. And,
as Churchill said, if one promise stands, so does the other.

John Reddaway

adopted its partition resolution, the
U.N. then took no effective action to
carry it out. The partition of Palestine
was, in the end, effected not by the
United Nations nor in accordance with
any resolution, however, well- or ill-
conceived, of the General Assembly.
The Haganah and Irgun imposed parti-
tion on Palestine by force and terror,
without regard for the territorial
boundaries and demographic distribu-
tion envisaged in the U.N. plan.
But what if the U.N. had put its plan
into effect? What shape would parti-
tioned Palestine have presented? There
would have been a so-called Jewish
state consisting of about half a million
Jews and between four and five
hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs.
In other words, a binational state not
unlike the Palestinian vision which Is-
raelis nowadays anathematize as a
renewal of the Balfour Declaration, which he described in characteristically tendentious terms as "a covenant signed between the British and the Jewish people. It was of course nothing of the kind. It was a statement of intention by a British Cabinet towards two other parties—the Zionist movement (at that time by no means representative of the Jewish people as a whole) and the existing Arab population of Palestine.

But since Mr. Begin has thus chosen to invoke the past, our own Prime Minister would do well to take him up on this and to remind him of the historical evidence showing that the world recognized the Palestinian right to nationhood and independence long before the State of Israel was created and reaffirmed that recognition at the same time it called for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. In particular, Mr. Callaghan should remind his visitor that the Balfour Declaration contained a dual promise—to the Palestinians as well as to the Zionist movement. And, as Churchill said, if one promise stands, so does the other.

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As ignorance is the parent of arrogance, awareness is the parent of progress, and pursuit of progress is the parent of policy. The Zionist Connection, written by Alfred Lilienthal, catalyzes awareness of the often unspoken intricacies and injustices of the relationships among the nation of Israel, its neighbors and the international community.

While each of us writes or speaks from a limited point of personal prejudice, the truth is that facts cannot be denied when documentation of the facts is provided. Alfred Lilienthal has done his homework in this regard. His text deserves careful reading if the totality of the present Mideast chaos and confusion is to be understood with equanimity for all parties involved.

Israel’s leaders, in their determination to ensure territorial integrity as an entity, must preserve individual and institutional integrity as a people. The people of Israel, and the Jewish people around the world, must be able to understand that, despite the inhumanity inflicted upon them in the past, there are moments in history when the oppressed of the past become the oppressors in the present. Now is the time for the Jewish people to understand that a “home” for the Jews should not be synonymous with “hostility” to the Arabs in Palestine.

Dr. Lilienthal crystallizes the fact that the entire Mideast concern is multi-dimensional in this regard, and that the problem cannot be viewed independently or in isolation from the present political, economic, military, religious, national, and international context in which we live.

Crucial questions are raised relative to the programmed prejudice of America’s news media and the incapacity of its presidents, Truman through Carter, as orchestrators of silence rather than opposition. Central to the entire debate is the independence of the seemingly independent man from Independence, Mo. Was he owned or did he own? The author raises this question. And rightly so.

In chapter 5, Dr. Lilienthal examines the creation of the State of Israel and elicits response to the question of how Judaism as a personal religion relates to Zionism as a national religion or national entity. The total compatibility of the two must be worked out and negotiated. If this totality is achieved, then “home” for one will not mean “hostility” to another, i.e., the Arab community. “Home” must be for all.

On page 403, the author comes to the pivotal question: Is America a nation of sheep, i.e., uncritical, easily led, duped by deception, and accepting without challenge what is handed down from above by the makers of public opinion. Sad to say, but I think in many dimensions we are sheep, and this for the reason that we are scared to think or scared to confront the challenge which critical thought would present to us.

In chapter 17, Dr. Lilienthal, commenting upon the Liberty attack, proposes that silence does not mean that all is well. This is a uniquely important element in assessing not only that episode but in assessing the entire Mideast situation. Silence can mean support; silence can mean surrender. And we had better find out what this particular silence means.

No one individual, no one institution on no one state, no one leader possesses a monopoly on integrity or insight. We are part of one world, called by destiny to forge a united world order. Each nation is an entity of equality; expansionism is its cancer. This fact must be accepted by all. Commitment to that belief is the keystone for Mideast understanding.

Dr. Lilienthal, in The Zionist Connection, sheds much light on the less than understood realities of why we are where we are. This book becomes required reading for those unwilling to be sheep.

Reviewed by Rev. David F. Noonan