Military Peacekeeping 
In The Middle East

By William E. Mulligan

As peacekeepers, the military forces assigned by various nations to trouble spots in the last 35 years have not been unequivocally successful. Often but less frequently of late the peacekeeping forces have been under United Nations sponsorship. At times extraordinary examples of international cooperation and idealism, these special forces have also been tragically impotent witnesses to repeated acts of violence and vengeance.

On occasion the United Nations groups have been referred to as international policemen, but, in the words of Lt. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Canadian commander of two different U.N. peacekeeping forces in the Middle East, "they were policemen without truncheons." When armed, they were enjoined to use their arms only for self-defense. Although they could report infringements of truce or armistice agreements to the United Nations, they were then dependent on world opinion and the Security Council or General Assembly to do something about the matter. Action was often hard to come by, in view of the Cold War conflict between the East and West, increasing friction between Third World countries and the major powers, vetoes in the Security Council and lack of consensus in the General Assembly.

Peacekeeping, as defined by the International Peace Academy, is "the

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In the turbulent spring of 1948, when Britain laid down its Mandate for Palestine and the State of Israel emerged, the United Nations called into being the first of many international military peacekeeping organizations. The Security Council established a Truce Commission for Palestine on April 23, and then, amid fierce fighting between the new state and the Arab nations, appointed on May 21 a Palestine mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, member of the Swedish royal family and president of the Swedish Red Cross. Bernadotte immediately formed a United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which included five Swedish Army officers, one of whom was Col. Thord Bonde, his first chief of staff. Bernadotte also sought and received in a few months several hundred officer-observers from the member states of the Truce Commission—Belgium, France and the United States—on duty in Palestine and neighboring countries.

When, on September 17, 1948, Count Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by Israeli terrorists, the Swedish officers were withdrawn. Dr. Ralph Bunche, a senior member of the United Nations Secretariat, became acting mediator with authority over the truce supervisory machinery. He named Gen. W. E. Riley of the U.S. Marine Corps to the position of Chief of Staff of UNTSO, a post Riley held for five years.

The first round of the Arab-Israeli conflict was fought intermittently between May 1948 and March 1949. During this time there were two periods of truce, which the Israelis used to increase their stock of arms and ammunition. Most came from Czechoslovakia, but sizeable quantities came from the West. Importation of this military equipment was, of course, in contravention of the truces. U.N. military observers were not permitted on the docks or at the airports through which the material was moved and, for the first time, were unable to be certain that neither side took advantage of the truce.

Eventually the United Nations helped to end the fighting and arranged for separate armistice agreements between Israel and the four adjacent Arab states: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. The agreements, classically ambiguous, and the armistice lines, hastily drawn without adequate attention to natural features, village-boundaries and water rights, all contributed to years of bickering, provocation, raiding and retaliation.

After the armistice agreements were concluded, the Truce Supervision Organization became a subsidiary of the United Nations. Each of the four armistice agreements established a separate Mixed Armistice Commission, charged with investigating border incidents and taking remedial action. Each commission included one or more delegates from Israel and from the adjacent Arab country. The chairman was selected from the ranks of the military observers. He inevitably cast the deciding vote on matters in dispute.

Meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commissions frequently dissolved into scenes of intemperate oratory in English, Hebrew and Arabic. These sessions, sometimes held in hotels then the site of the arms race, could be a stimulating experience for observers with a horror of boredom. At the UN headquarters in Geneva observers had a chance to meet and talk with the United Nations high commissioner for refugees. These sessions could be an eye-opener for the observer, something to remember back home.
Arabic and Hebrew. The Danish Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Maj. Gen. Vagn Bennike, complained to the Security Council in 1953: "The operation of the Mixed Armistice Commissions...would be improved if, instead of acting as lawyers defending a case in court, the delegates of the parties acted in conformity with the spirit and letter of the armistice agreements."

Israeli journalists and public figures kept score on the military men assigned to peacekeeping duties and especially to the Armistice Commissions. No matter what their nationality, most appeared to have been hazing "pro-Arab." The publications of several of these soldiers indicate that they came to the area with a "pro-Israeli" bias, tried exceedingly hard to act with judicial impartiality, became more and more exasperated by Israeli intransigence and, upon retirement from military duty, became advocates of Arab causes.

In 1949, 300 military observers, were in the Middle East, but by 1951 the number sank to 21 — a piece from Belgium, France and the United States. Later, officers came from, among other countries, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. The last two chiefs of staff have come from Ghana and Finland.

By the time of the Six Day War of 1967, UNTSO had grown to 140 officers and 400 U.N. staff. Equipment included a white-painted DC-3, a fleet of jeeps and other vehicles, and an excellent communications system, which gave them direct contact with U.N. headquarters in New York. Since 1949, UNTSO headquarters has been the former Government House, seat of the British High Commissioner during the mandate.

Often the military men would point to the virtual impossibility of supervising armistice lines extending some 600 miles. The border between Lebanon and Israel was relatively peaceful until after the Yom Kippur or Ramadan War of 1973, as were the borders between Israel and Egypt for periods of time. The border between Israel and Syria, however, crackled with gunfire all along. This is after all, an area containing fertile land, good water, even fish in Lake Tiberias, and the Golain Heights.

Both sides constantly violated the armistice lines separating Israel from the West Bank, particularly in and around Jerusalem, before they disappeared as a result of Israel's annexation of Eastern Jerusalem and occupation of the West Bank following the Six Day War of 1967. The demilitarized Mount Scopus area — which encompassed the Hadassah Hospital, the Hebrew University, the Augusta Victoria Hospital and the Arab village of Issawiya — was a troublesome spot for the U.N. observers. Completely cut off from Israel, this area dominated the routes to the north toward Ramallah and Nablus and the routes to Jericho and Jordan proper. Its military importance is obvious.

First there were disputes over maps of the Mount Scopus demilitarized zone, as well as problems involving the Issawiya villagers, who refused to refrain from cultivating their land near the Israeli hospital and university. But none of these raised a stir like the periodic con-

ways relieving the Israeli "garrison" and bringing in supplies. Despite the armistice agreement that military equipment should not be brought to Mount Scopus, the Israelis succeeded in limiting inspection by the observers. They later boasted of how they had outwitted the U.N. observers by smuggling arms and ammunition to Mount Scopus in secret compartments constructed in their vehicles.

Year after year the mutual hatred of Arabs and Israelis grew and gave rise to more and more border violations. Each side excused its own acts by pointing to previous contraventions by the other side. Eventually Israel adopted its policy of retaliation, which grew in time to full-scale military operations.

The First Peacekeeping Force—UNEF

It was on the border between Israel and Egypt that events were to erupt so convulsively in the second round of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt was getting arms from Czechoslovakia; Israel was getting fighter planes from France. Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser considered the Baghdad Pact a threat since that treaty, engineered by the United States in 1955, United Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran in a mutual defense organization. Nasser reportedly became involved in the removal of General Glubb from Jordan. Egypt effected a blockade of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel, and on July 26, 1956, not long after the United States announced it would not finance the Aswan Dam, President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.

Although shipping by all but Israel continued through the canal, Britain, France and Israel conspired to take control of the waterway by force. On October 29, Israel attacked Egypt, leaving the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization powerless to prevent the armistice violation, much less the subsequent air offensive and landings by Britain and France. President Nasser directed bridges to be destroyed and ships scuttled in order to block the canal.

Since Britain and France were able to veto proposals in the U.N. Security Council, the matter of the invasion moved to the General Assembly. There resolutions calling for a cease-fire received overwhelming support. And the concept of a second military peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), began to take shape. UNEF was in large part the brain child of Lester Pearson of Canada and the handiwork of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. General Burns was transferred from his command of UNTSO in order to get the new and much larger UNEF organized and functioning.

The UNEF, an international force established "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities," was to provide a buffer force along truce lines, achieved by consent of the parties concerned and not by direct military action. UNEF was considerably different from UNTSO; its predecessor. UNTSO, considered something of a police force, was basically a group of observers. UNEF, with a force of 5,000 to 6,000 men, was much larger and was instead a police and patrolling force. It was to be, in the minds of some idealists, "a weapon for peace."

The three occupying powers perceived the force as a means of pressing Egypt to concede some political settlements. The Arabs viewed the force's main role as that of overseeing the cease-fire and the withdrawal of the
British, French and Israeli troops. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion made it clear from the start that "Israel would not accept foreign troops on its soil." Egypt agreed to the stationing of the force on its territory after being convinced it would not become an occupying army.

Troops from Britain and France clearly could not be used, and it was equally clear that no organization would be workable if the United States, Russia and Eastern European countries contributed contingents. It was agreed that elements of the force would not come from nations which were permanent members of the Security Council, nor from Turkey, Greece and Italy, which held NATO membership.

UNEF contingents in the end were drawn from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Contingents from Finland and Indonesia were withdrawn in 1957 and those from Colombia in 1958. Brazil, Denmark, India, Norway and Sweden basically provided infantry. Yugoslavia contributed an infantry reconnaissance battalion. India provided signals and service units as well as infantry. Canada provided an air transport unit, and at the outset Canada and Norway manned hospitals. Later these were merged. The Swedish contingent was considerably reduced in 1961 and 1962 with the dispatch of the equivalent of two companies to peacekeeping duties in the Congo. Commanders and acting commanders were drawn from Canada, India, Brazil, Denmark and Yugoslavia.

The Secretary General thought that the UNEF should have its own uniform, an unattractive idea to the soldiers, who were understandably proud of their regular national uniforms. Troops not issued a regular summer-weight uniform, however, were outfitted in khakis modeled on those of the Indian army. Eventually UNEF troops were simply distinguished by a beret of U.N. blue. The plastic liners of the American helmet, spray painted blue, served admirably. The blue helmets and berets were later augmented by blue scarves and shoulder patches. After a while the U.N. military observer inspection prior to patrols
try battalion looked after the northern end of the frontier and the western part of the demarcation line in the Gaza Strip. Indian and Swedish infantry battalions patrolled the eastern part of the demarcation line. These troops remained on the Egyptian side of the frontier and the demarcation line because of Israel’s refusal to accommodate them on its side.

On the evening of May 16, 1967, UNEF Commander, Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye of the Indian Army, received a message from the Egyptian Chief of Staff demanding the withdrawal of all UNEF forces along the line. General Rikhye correctly pointed out that such a request had to be made to the Secretary General of the United Nations. When the request was made properly, Secretary General U Thant felt he had no choice but to instruct the UNEF to comply. Egypt had withdrawn its consent for UNEF to be on its soil. Israel, never enthusiastically cooperative in the eyes of the UNEF Command, was then and later very critical of this action. So also was President Eisenhower. Both suggested U Thant should have played for time and referred the matter to either the General Assembly or the Security Council.

On May 19 the UNEF ceased policing operations. President Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran, thereby denying the Gulf of Aqaba and the port of Elat to Israeli shipping. The Israelis, in turn, launched the “preventive” Six Day War on June 5, overrunning some of the UNEF units before they were evacuated. An Indian battalion suffered 14 dead and 20 wounded.

Although the United Nations subsequently directed Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in the war, Israel refused to leave the Golan Heights in Syria, the West Bank of the Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. By its occupation of the Sinai, Israel opened the Gulf of Aqaba to its shipping, but the Suez Canal was again blocked by mines and sunken vessels. This time it remained closed for eight years.

The UNEF existed for ten and a half years, far longer than its creators had contemplated. Although it did minimize border tensions and incidents, it did not have the capacity to enforce a final settlement on the Egyptians and Israelis. The removal of UNEF had much to do with the Six Day War, indicating that such peacekeeping forces have a value in excess of their size and strength.

Both UNTSO and UNIFIL provided trained leaders and cadres for other United Nations peacekeeping efforts. UNTSO provided the UNEF with its first commander. Both organizations were drawn upon for U.N. service in the Congo. The U.N. military observer group sent to Lebanon during the civil war of 1958 came in part from the UNTSO, and a somewhat similar group sent to Yemen in 1965 was led by Maj. Gen. Carl von Horn after his tour as Chief of Staff of UNTSO.

We now backtrack in time to describe the U.N. peacekeeping missions in Lebanon (1958) and Yemen (1963-64) and the first non-U.N. military peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East — those of the United States in Lebanon and Britain in Jordan in 1958.

Lebanon caused great consternation in his own country by indicating he would seek an unconstitutional second term. Civil war broke out in Lebanon in May between the supporters of President Chamoun (mostly Christians) and his political opponents (a melange of mostly Muslim and Druze elements and refugee Palestinians). The Lebanese Army stood aloof, neither taking sides nor dampening the strife. Gen. Faud Chehab, army commander, believed that religious differences among his troops were so pronounced that, if forced to take action against one side or the other, the army would be torn apart.

**First Observers in Lebanon—UNOGIL**

The year 1958, one of particularly murky political activity in the Middle East, was a time when the United States was concerned about filling a vacuum in the Arab world. What emerged was the time of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which proposed using American forces to protect the independence of Middle East nations requesting such aid. In February, Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic.* Jordan and Iraq responded by uniting in a federation with King Faisal of Iraq at its head. The Government of President Nasser was unhappy about the union of Jordan and Iraq and was furious with the Government of Lebanon for having failed to break relations with Britain and France during the Suez crisis and for having subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon complained to the Security Council of “massive infiltration” of support for his enemies from across the Syrian border. His opposition maintained that this was not so and that the matter was purely an internal one. After several days of hearing claims and counter claims, the Security Council on June 10 authorized a United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNO Gil) to investigate the complaint. Two days later the observers were named: Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador; Rejeshwar Dayal, the Indian Ambassador to Yugoslavia; and Maj. Gen. Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Air Force, who was appointed “executive member in charge of military observers.”

According to its terms of reference, UNO Gil was to “observe and report.” General von Horn of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine loaned the new mission some men and white U.N. jeeps. He welcomed General Bull with the message: “My job is impossible and insoluble. I dare say yours will be even more so.”

In his first request of the Secretary General, General Bull asked for 100 military observers who would be unarmed, in addition to light reconnaissance planes and helicopters. In
time he commanded some 600 personnel and had 8 light reconnaissance planes and 2 helicopters loaned by the United States and Sweden. His staff, drawn from 21 countries, included an Irish colonel as second in command, adjutants from Burma and later Afghanistan, and a French secretary.

In his first report to the Security Council, General Bull indicated he had no tangible evidence of massive infiltration. The Lebanese Government was strongly critical of the report, and many others felt UNOGIL probably was not yet equipped to obtain all the information necessary to reach valid conclusions. It was not yet able to patrol all of the border, and it was not working at night.

President Chamoun, however, appeared to have defused the explosive situation when he announced that he would abide by the Lebanese constitution, holding free elections in July and stepping down from his office in September.

Marines in Lebanon; Paratroopers in Jordan

An unexpected event recharged the Middle East political atmosphere on July 14. Gen. Abdul Karim Kassem staged his violent coup in Iraq, King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri es-Said, both pro-Western and anti Nasser, were murdered. President Chamoun of Lebanon and King Hussein of Jordan considered their governments threatened by these events. President Chamoun requested intervention by the United States, and King Hussein requested intervention by the United Kingdom. Both requests were honored, bringing two more military peacekeeping operations into being.

Within 24 hours of President Chamoun's request, the first contingent of U.S. Marines landed on the beaches south of Beirut and were greeted by men and women in bathing suits and by ice cream and soft drink vendors. By July 20 there were more than 10,000 U.S. troops on Lebanese soil (4,000 Army, 6,000 Marines) and some 75 U.S. Navy vessels stood off Beirut harbor.

Two days after the initial landing, Robert Murphy, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, arrived to attempt a political solution. As he met with Arab leaders throughout the Middle East, Murphy's toughest job was to convince them that the U.S. military action was not taken to assure Chamoun's reelection.

The UNOGIL triumvirate, understandably perturbed by the arrival of the U.S. force, did not feel it proper to establish any formal contact or working relationship with the Americans. The U.N. group did not withdraw and eventually a workable compromise was worked out. The U.S. military restricted themselves to Beirut, its harbor and airport. Adm. James L. Holloway, greatly admired by the U.N. officers, set up his headquarters on one of the Sixth Fleet vessels in the harbor, while the U.N. observers continued their operations in the rest of the country.

A new Lebanese President, General Chehab, took over on September 23. An armistice was arranged, and by October 25 the last American troops had left Lebanon. Despite sporadic flare-ups during the fall, by December UNOGIL's mission, considered complete, was disbanded. Toward the end, UNOGIL was patrolling some 10,000 miles a day in jeeps, supported also by foot, horse and donkey patrols, not to mention 24-hour air reconnaissance.

During the American landing in Lebanon, two battalions of British paratroopers arrived in Amman under the cover of more than 50 U.S. fighter aircraft. This British force augmented the loyal Bedouin core of King Hussein's army, enabling him to retain his throne.

As the British paratroopers withdrew from Jordan in late October 1958, the U.N. military observers were very helpful in making oversight arrangements with Syria and Lebanon. The British forces had been flown from Cyprus to Jordan over Israel without permission. Israel formally protested this violation of its airspace and was not disposed to grant overflight privileges for the evacuation of the troops. Damascus was exceedingly concerned about the routes and scheduling of the air transportation of large numbers of troops through its airspace.

General Bull, given a leave of absence from his post in UNOGIL, negotiated with the appropriate authorities in Damascus, Amman, Beirut and Nicosia the routing and control of flights and organized the participation of U.N. personnel in manning a special radio beacon and control post. The departing British troops were routed over southernmost Syria, Mount Hermon and Sidon to the Mediterranean, bypassing Israel and the more heavily populated centers of Syria and Lebanon. Eighty-six round-trip missions (Nicosia-Amman), from October 25-29, by transport aircraft and single flights of 6 fighter aircraft carried 2,106 passengers, 117 vehicles and 25 guns...
Observers in Yemen—UNYOM

On September 18, 1962, Imam Ahmad, the despotic ruler of Yemen, died and was succeeded by his son Imam Badr. Eight days later, a military coup led by Brig. Gen. Abdulluh Sallal drove Badr from the capital, Sana'a. Badr fled to the rugged mountains to the north, where he collected an army of supporters. Although Saudi Arabia restrained from sending troops across the border, it provided the Royalists with medical, military and other supplies, which increased as Egypt started providing Sallal's Republicans with both men and arms. In time there were more than 25,000 Egyptian troops serving in Yemen, and Egyptian fighter planes were flying across the border to bomb Saudi Arabian centers.

Out of the spotlight in Jerusalem, where his views and actions had greatly irritated the Israeli Government.

The presence of UNYOM actually made very little difference to the state of affairs in Yemen. The Royalists ignored the observers; Egypt did not withdraw its troops and, consequently, Saudi Arabia continued to supply the Royalists. General von Horn complained to the United Nations about the size of his force, poor supply and inadequate numbers of suitable aircraft. Helicopters, for example, shipped from the Congo to Aden, could not obtain enough lift to operate efficiently in the hot and thin air of the Yemeni highlands.

In August 1963, General von Horn resigned in exasperation. Three months later the entire Yugoslav component was withdrawn, leaving no more than 25 men to check on observance of the agreement in a vast and inhospitable land. Von Horn turned over acting command of the mission to Col. Branko Pavlovic, who was relieved by Lieut. Gen. Prem Singh Gyani of the Indian Army. He had been seconded from his post as commander of the U.N. Emergency Force in Gaza and Sinai.

In the last year of its existence, UNYOM reported to Pace P. Spinelli, special Representative of the Secretary General for Yemen and Head of the Yemen Observation Mission. His mandate was to accomplish by political negotiation what had not been possible by soldiers “observing, certifying and reporting.”

The mission, terminated in September 1964 after 15 months of life, was not a success. The three nations involved—Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt—had agreed to the U.N. mission, but soon showed they weren't interested in peace on U.N. terms. The fourth disputant, the Royalist force of the Imam Badr, did not feel bound by an agreement to which it had not been party. Saudi Arabia and Egypt were to fund the UNYOM, and in the end they did; but the life of the organization was extended by just two and three month intervals as the two nations expressed reluctance to make their contributions and dissatisfaction with aspects of the arrangement. Under the best of political circumstances, the tiny force was totally inadequate for its job in an area encompassing the crushing, humid heat of the Red Sea coast, the arid, dry desert of the inland desert, and the obstacles to movement and communication posed by the country's mountain massifs.
The Second U.N. Force — UNEF II

After considerable preparation, Egypt and Syria launched coordinated attacks on Israel in October 1973 in what came to be known as the Yom Kippur or Ramadan War. When the fighting broke out, the thinly scattered observation posts of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization, the only United Nations peacekeepers on the Suez Canal and on the Golan Heights, were quickly overrun or bypassed. (The United Nations Emergency Force had ceased to exist at the outbreak of the Six Day War of 1967.)

The United States and the Soviets — each with clients involved — threatened each other, but mutual fears of a confrontation encouraged them to engage in a unified effort to end the war. On October 31, they jointly presented a resolution to the Security Council calling for a cease-fire and for negotiations to start between the parties concerned. A few days later the Security Council created a new emergency force, UNEF II, to supervise the cease-fire and to act as a buffer between the Arab and Israeli soldiers. Within 24 hours of the Security Council decision, units seconded from UNTSO and the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cyprus were in the field.

Cyprus was and is a valuable staging area for the United Nations. Several peacekeeping units serving in the Middle East have been rotated in and out of the island for convenience. Although Cyprus may be considered in the Middle East, the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is not covered in this or in most other writings on Middle East peacekeeping. It should be noted, however, that the UNFICYP operation is generally considered one of the U.N.'s successes.

By the terms of a January 1974 agreement, Israeli troops withdrew from the west bank of the Suez Canal. Although the entire canal was now again in Egypt’s control, the Israeli Army was separated from the canal by only a narrow band of territory. The canal was, in fact, within easy reach of Israeli artillery. A year and a half later, in September 1975, another agreement between Egypt and Israel increased the distance between the Israelis and the canal and provided for a U.N.-supervised neutral zone. The agreement also stipulated that Egypt would permit non-military cargoes to pass through the canal to and from Israel. Return of control of the canal to Egypt had permitted the clearing of the canal to begin, and after 8 full years of idleness, the canal was reopened for the second time in 18 years.

UNEF II drew 7,000 troops from 15 countries (Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal and Sweden), and was more representative of U.N. membership than any of its predecessors. It had a budget of $60 million for its first year. Maj. Gen. Ensi Silvasuo of Finland, named commander of UNEF II, was a highly regarded officer and one of the observers in Lebanon in 1958, a company commander with UNEF in Gaza, and with a Finnish contingent in Cyprus. Silvasuo served as Deputy to General Bull in UNTSO, before taking over from him as Chief of Staff in 1970.

The Security Council excluded the five major powers from participation in this peacekeeping force, but did permit Russian and American personnel in the area as unarmed observers. Early in 1974 the Security Council reduced the strength of UNEF II from 7,000 to
4,500 men. However, the September 1975 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, with its creation of a neutral zone to be patrolled, necessitated the expansion of the force from some 4,000 to almost 5,000.

In August 1978 the White House announced that Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had accepted invitations to meet with President Carter at Camp David to discuss ways to resolve the Middle East conflict. Israel, at about the same time, reacted very coolly to a reported offer by President Carter to deploy U.S. forces on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, saying the Israeli Army should be the security force there.

In the accords reached at Camp David in September, Israel agreed to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and, among other things, to some sort of gradual return of autonomy to the Palestinians in Gaza and on the West Bank. The Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, based on these Camp David talks, was signed in 1979. That same year the United Nations withdrew UNEF II from Sinai and the U.N. moved a small contingent from the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization to the Sinai. Undoubtedly more important for preservation of the peace there for the next few years was the Sinai Support Mission of American technicians manning early warning systems.

At the end of the 1973 War, the Israeli Army controlled the Golan Heights, the high ground above Galilee, from which the Syrians had harassed the Israelis tilling land the Syrians considered Arab property. The Syrians and the Israelis eventually agreed not only to a cease-fire but also to a formalized disengagement providing for a buffer zone between the two forces to exist until a peace treaty was concluded.

While UNEF II was being created for service in the Sinai, the United Nations was forming the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the Golan Heights. UNDOF was to use its best efforts to maintain the cease-fire and to occupy and patrol the buffer zone. UNDOF, formed by seconding troops from UNEF II and military observers from UNTSO, became operational when the Interim Force Commander, Brig. Gen. Ganzalo Briceno Zevallos of Peru, established his headquarters in a building in Damascus occupied by the Syria-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission.

The first contingents of UNDOF, of Austrian and Peruvian origin, were shortly joined by Canadian and Polish contingents. Along with 88 military observers detailed from UNTSO, the force totalled about 1,225 in 1974, and it has only increased by some 50 to date. Commanders of UNDOF have come from Austria, Finland, Peru and Sweden.

Although the U.N. General Assembly found that Israel's decision of December 14, 1981, to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the Golan Heights constituted "an act of aggression," this conversion of a military occupation to one of civil administration has not affected the operation of UNDOF. It continued to maintain its patrol of the buffer zone, and the Secretary General was able to report in 1982 that it continued "to fulfill the tasks entrusted to it." UNDOF, originally funded for six months, was intended to demonstrate that this was a temporary arrangement, one not to prejudice the withdrawal of Israel nor the nature of a permanent peace in the area.

U.N. observation post on the Golan Heights
American Technicians
To Sinai

A specialized, non-military American peacekeeping mission, the Sinai Support Mission, was created to implement one facet of the September 1975 Second Sinai Disengagement Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Both sides insisted that American technicians man tactical early warning systems in the Mita and Gidi passes in the Sinai, a condition enabling the Israelis to withdraw behind the passes and the Egyptians to advance to the former Israeli line.

The 150-man mission was established in January 1976 to undertake the surveillance, and it continued to operate the early warning system until January 1980. Under the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, which grew out of the Camp David Accords, the mission closed down its technical surveillance but agreed to stay on to monitor adherence to the treaty's military limitations. What have been called "verification" inspections began in April 1982. When the mission formally went out of existence on October 1, 1982, some of its personnel and equipment were picked up by the new Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The Sinai Support Mission was neither a military peacekeeping operation nor was it the creation of the United Nations. It was staffed by American civilians, though many had received their training in uniform or under military auspices.

U.N. Force In Lebanon - UNIFIL

At midnight on March 14, 1978, ten thousand to twenty thousand Israeli troops, supported by air and naval units, entered southern Lebanon to "root out terrorist bases" used by the Palestine Liberation Organization. The military action went far beyond reprisal for the rash of raids by Palestinians from Lebanon which preceded it. Tyre and Damur were pounded. An estimated 100,000 Palestinians and Lebanese fled to Beirut. Israel announced it would occupy a four-to-six-mile "security belt" on the Lebanese side of the border.

After several days of debate, the Security Council adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling on Israel to observe a cease-fire and withdraw from Lebanon. At the same time the U.N. established another peacekeeping force, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), to help restore peace and to help reestablish legitimate Lebanese Government authority in the area. It was initially to number 4,000 troops and was to stay in Lebanon six months.

UNIFIL was first commanded by Maj. Gen. Emmanual A. Erskine of Ghana and had contingents from Canada, Fiji, France, Iran, Ireland, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway and Senegal. In May the United Nations authorized increasing the organization to 6,000. It now numbers about 7,000.

UNIFIL did not restore government control to southern Lebanon, because the Israelis did not hand over the area to the U.N. forces when they withdrew. Instead, the Israelis delivered the frontier zone into the hands of the dissident Christian militia led by Maj. Saad Haddad. This military group, equipped, supplied and directed by the Israelis, was not only able to control a narrow strip of territory along the southern border of Lebanon, but it also proceeded to harass the UNIFIL observers and to impede their work.

In May 1980, the Security Council president issued a statement condemning the "cold-blooded" murder of two unarmed Irish soldiers of UNIFIL by Major Haddad's irregulars. The death in 1981 of three UNIFIL soldiers brought to 57 the number of U.N. peacekeepers killed since their deployment in southern Lebanon. U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim admitted at the time that he was tempted to withdraw UNIFIL because of its harassment by Haddad's people, but the Secretary General told the Security Council that he feared moving the U.N. troops would only lead to still greater violence. In March 1981, Lieut. Gen. William Callaghan of Ireland replaced General Erskine, who took over as Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.

A very low point in the U.N.'s history came in June 1982 when Israeli tanks brushed aside the UNIFIL contingents, supposedly in Lebanon to keep Israel and the P.L.O. apart. General Callaghan had told his men, "to block advancing forces, take defensive measures and stay in their positions until their safety was seriously imperiled." Some units did in fact offer token resistance. A tough Nepalese outfit refused to move off a bridge across the Litani River, and a roadblock was thrown across the main coastal road. In both cases, however, the Israelis just bulldozed through with their tanks. While pounding Beirut with rockets, bombs and artillery, Israel refused to accept U.N. observers, and when the Security Council in September unanimously voted to have Israel pull out of Lebanon, the Israeli delegate walked out on the debate.

The Israeli Government gave two reasons for the invasion of Lebanon. The first was that it was in retaliation for the attempted assassination of Israeli Ambassador Argove in London. The second was the need to establish a 25-mile defensive zone to prevent artillery and rocket fire into Israeli settlements in the northern Gallerie.

Although a preliminary report by British authorities indicated a list taken from the unsuccessful assassins contained the name of the P.L.O. representative in London, subsequent investigation by the British revealed the assassination was the work of a Syrian group opposed to the P.L.O.

Not a single rocket or round of artillery was fired into Israel in the entire year before the bombing of Beirut, which preceded the actual invasion.
This was attested to by the UNIFIL commander in his report to the U.N. Secretary General. He went on to point out that between August 1981 and May 1982 Israel violated Lebanon’s airspace 2,125 times and its territorial waters 652 times. This was over and above land violations by Israel and the operations of Major Hadad’s militia. Israel, moreover, showed no intent to limit its military actions to a 25-mile zone.

Tri-National Force in Lebanon

At the conclusion of special U.S. envoy Philip Habib’s negotiating efforts in August 1982, Israel, the P.L.O. and Lebanon had agreed on the rapid removal by land and sea, and possibly air, of the bulk of Palestinian forces in Beirut under the protection of peacekeeping soldiers from three nations. There were 350 French paratroopers and 530 Italian troops joined the original French group along with more than 60 U.N. observers.

As soon as the P.L.O. forces were evacuated from Beirut, the multinational troops pulled out. Security in the Beirut area appeared to be in the hands of the Lebanese Army. Unfortunately, a violent explosion that took the life of newly elected Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel triggered a series of gruesome events. The Israeli Army returned to Beirut “to prevent bloodshed,” but then Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon decided to permit Lebanese militia into the refugee camps ostensibly to clear out Palestinian guerrillas left behind after the P.L.O. withdrew from Beirut. At least 479 Palestinian refugees were massacred in that mopping-up operation. The Israeli commission investigating the massacre has indicated: Sharon showed little concern over the danger of sending the militia into the camps; Israeli officials knew what was going on; and senior officers should have stopped the killings sooner than they did.

To help restore order again, 3,500 U.S., French and Italian troops headed back to Beirut. There followed a week of argument, as the Western governments refused to let their troops land until there were corresponding withdrawals of Israeli troops. In that same week two American officers attached to the U.N. observer group were killed when their jeep ran over a mine. Unlike the lightly armed marines who had helped oversee the evacuation of the P.L.O. forces from Beirut, this contingent of marines came equipped with heavy guns, tanks and guided missiles. President Reagan also indicated that this was no short-term operation.
The Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, which grew out of the Camp David Accords, called for a multinational peacekeeping force and observers. The two nations agreed to request the United Nations to provide the forces and observers necessary to supervise implementation of the treaty, and it seemed quite probable that UNEF II would remain on duty to perform this function.

Unfortunately, the U.N. General Assembly condemned the Camp David Accords as being in violation of Palestinians' rights, and the President of the Security Council had to report on May 18 that the members of the council were unable to agree on a peacekeeping force. The Soviets were threatening a veto. The United States then attempted to work out a compromise, by which UNTSO would take over in the Sinai, but the Israelis considered this a totally inadequate arrangement, with its security dependent on but a handful of observers.

The possibility that the United Nations could not agree on a peacekeeping force had been foreseen. President Carter had provided President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin with letters assuring them that in the event the United Nations could not provide the multinational force, the United States would take the steps necessary to do so.

Accordingly, Ambassador Michael Sterner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Department of State, led a delegation which negotiated over several months a protocol and related agreements with Egypt and Israel leading to the formation of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).

The protocols and other documents were signed on August 5. On the same day, Leamon R. Hunt, a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer, became Acting Director General. His appointment was made permanent later in the month. In October, Lieut. Gen. Frederick Bull Hansen of Norway was appointed commander of the force.

In August and September 1981, arrangements were made to obtain a battalion of soldiers each from the United States, Fiji and Colombia. By March 1982, 9 nations had contributed the following: United States, 800 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division; Fiji, 500 troops; Colombia, 500 troops; Great Britain, 40-45 Headquarters troops; Netherlands, 75-80 signals and 25 MPs; France, 3 fixed wing aircraft and 42 troops; Italy, 3 minesweepers and 100 sailors; Australia, 6 helicopters; New Zealand, 3 helicopters. In addition, 50-60 American civilians were recruited for "verification."

Two bases were constructed: one lay five miles south of Sharm el Sheik, at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba; the other at El Gorah, about 20 miles from the Mediterranean and not far from El Arish. El Gorah is the field headquarters of the force. A sophisticated communications network connects MFO with the capitals of Egypt and Israel and with the headquarters of the director general in Rome. Construction was under the direction of the U.S. Corps of Engineers and cost more than $100 million.

Virtually all MFO troops were on hand in the Sinai by March 20. They spent five weeks training for their operation, which commenced with the withdrawal of Israeli on April 25. Unlike U.N. peacekeeping forces, the MFO came into being without the agreement of the United States and the Soviet Union. It exists despite a lack of consensus about it among most U.N. members. The force, moreover, is not limited to contingents from relatively small and neutral countries.

Although UNEF II left the Sinai in 1979, a few UNTSO military observers continue to this day to check on conditions along the frontier areas.
The Role of Peacekeeping

There have been 13 United Nations peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world. They have involved some 370,000 military personnel from more than 50 nations. More than 600 soldiers serving as peacekeepers have been killed on duty. The service can be both violent and boring. It takes special training to keep good soldiers from showing their military prowess. They have to learn to work comfortably in situations in which they are always in the middle. As General Callaghan has said: "We have no enemies, only hostile friends."

One may ask how it is possible to keep morale high under such difficult circumstances and often under trying climatic conditions. To begin with, most soldiers serving in peacekeeping operations receive higher pay than they would in their barracks at home. And, as General Burns has commented, "Palestine and the Middle East are fascinating places to live in for anyone with a taste for history or archaeology, or religion, or just sunshine."

U.S. foreign policy and politics since World War II has stipulated that American troops would not serve or be based in the Middle East. The Middle East stood outside the sphere of influence of the United States and within that of America's great friend and ally, Great Britain. It is true that President Eisenhower sent the Marines into Lebanon in 1958, but that was only for a relatively short period of time and was, more than anything else, a signal to the Soviets of America's willingness to play rough. Today, however, an American battalion serves with a multi-national force in the Sinai and 1,200 U.S. Marines with French and Italian troops in Lebanon.

The United Nations has not abdicated its role in the Middle East to the United States and the other nations. UNTSO military observers are present in Israel and the surrounding states. UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNDOF in Syria still man their posts. As Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, however, acknowledged in September 1982, the U.N. peacekeeping forces have been increasingly defied or ignored by many nations. The relations of member states to the U.N. forces has been, admittedly, only one of a number of problems contributing to a general breakdown of the U.N. machinery for preventing war and encouraging peace, but it has been an important one.

Among the Secretary General's recommendations for improving the peacemaking record of the U.N. were the following:

1. bringing the influence of the Security Council members to bear on the countries concerned so that they would accept peaceful solutions
2. encouraging greater respect for and cooperation with U.N. peacekeeping forces
3. considering the increase of the military capacities of U.N. peacekeeping forces, or at least providing greater guarantees of individual or collective action if the peacekeeping forces are not respected.

Although the Secretary General did not specifically complain of sins of omission by the United States, it seems clear that one of his concerns was Washington's refusal to put teeth in a measure if it hurts a client. In 1982, for example, the United States joined the rest of the Security Council in demanding a pull-back of Israeli forces from Beirut and the acceptance of U.N. observers.

When, however, these injunctions were defied, the United States was unwilling to join the other Security Council members in prohibiting arms sales to Israel. The United Nations faces a number of problems in setting up and operating peacekeeping forces. It does not have a standing international force and must therefore scramble to obtain voluntary contributions of troops from nations acceptable to the countries where they will be assigned.

At one time U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed the creation of a standing force, but the idea has never obtained substantial support. Since U.N. peacekeeping forces are only lightly armed and limited to using their arms in self-defense, units can be assembled and moved into an area of conflict much more rapidly. The United Nations has also been unable to obtain appropriate and adequate funding of peacekeeping operations. Although some peacekeeping operations have been paid for by the parties to a conflict, more often than not, the United Nations members as a whole have been asked to pay the bill. Then certain members have refused to pay for one political reason or another. Russia, Israel and China are among the most prominent examples of this behavior, something manifestly unfair to the countries who do pay and who, moreover, make up the difference.

Despite the important role played by the United Nations in the creation of the State of Israel, recent Israeli Governments have shown no real respect for the opinions, resolutions and actions of the international body. Considering the number of times Israeli ac-

West Bank patrol with Palestinian refugee camp in background
Book Views

Palestinian Rights: Affirmation and Denial
Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, editor

By Stephen Menick

Written for United Nations seminars held in Austria, Tanzania and Cuba, these 16 essays address the Palestine question in the light of international law and United Nations attention since 1967. Among the uneven batch are several standouts: W. Thomas Mallison’s juridical examination of Palestinian identity and national soil; journalist Michael Adami’s piece on the “moral pollution” of military occupation; and Janet Abu-Lughod’s short, incisive history of Israeli settlements in occupied lands.

Perhaps the most interesting essays are the three that deal with the nonaligned countries and their support of the Palestinian national movement. As editor Ibrahim Abu-Lughod writes in his preface, not until the late 1960’s did the United Nations directly address the Palestine question. And though the emergence of the P.L.O. and the 1967 War made world headlines, in the diplomatic sphere it was the nonaligned countries that formed the groundswell for United Nations resolutions on the inalienable rights of Palestinians and their political representation. A.W. Singsham and Shirley Hune look at the work of the nonaligned countries in obtaining the P.L.O. observer status at the United Nations (Resolution 237). In another paper, Sulayman S. Nyang describes African perceptions of Palestinians. Of all the continents, writes Nyang, Africa has the largest number of independent states, many of which have “wiggled out of the colonial web” only in the past few decades. Such states might be expected to rally round a people seeking self-determination, and if African sympathies have indeed shifted toward the Palestinians, it wasn’t always so. Despite Nasser’s demonstration in the Suez crisis that an Arab leader could distinguish himself as an anticolonialist, the sub-Saharan states kept shy of the entire Arab world for quite some time. Israel was in many ways a pioneering country; it was perceived as an underdog and it still seemed to find the money to aid the economic rebirth of more than one fledgling African nation. Then again, Israel’s occupation of the Sinai in 1967 caused the Jewish state to appear to be nibbling at Africa. The House of Saud cast some of its fabulous wealth in an African direction. And in the long run the new African states could only have the most profound distrust of Israel, a country on such good terms with apartheid South Africa.

In a talk in Bethlehem recently with Jamil Hamad, over cups of shat or sweet tea, I heard the Palestinian journalist say that trying to reach Americans was like trying to sugar the Atlantic Ocean. Edward Said, who has the last paper in Palestinian Rights, voices a similar frustration. Said’s paper is an offshoot of Orientalism, his study of traditional Western attitudes toward the Arab world; and of the acerbically titled Covering Islam, about American reportage of the Iranian revolution — known in America as a “hostage crisis.” Even at his most cerebral, Said writes with passion, and here he seethes. He gives the impression of having absolutely lost his patience with American journalism and American outlooks. Which is too bad, since Americans could really use a more controlled piece of writing on their collective psyche. Said is one of the few English-language writers around today who is capable of getting the Palestinian message across to a wider public; but that message is still waiting for its Francis Fitzgerald.

Stephen Menick, a freelance writer, recently returned from a fact-finding trip to the Middle East.

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Visitors to New York City are invited to visit the Holy Land Museum and Library in the Marble Collegiate Church, 5th Avenue and 29th Street. Museum is open Tuesdays, 10:00 A.M.; 4:00 P.M.; free personally escorted tours at 12:30 P.M., Sundays. Gift items from the Holy Land are on sale; all proceeds go to humanitarian centers in Palestine.

Correction: The last issue of The Link listed the book Battle of Beirud as being written in conjunction with Godfrey Jansen. A.M.E.U. has since been informed that Michael Jansen is its sole author.
Books To Order

New Selections

Ibrahim Abu Leghod. Palestinian Rights: Affirmation and Denial. Medina Press, 225 pp., $7.95. In this book of essays, seventeen distinguished international scholars examine, analyze and detail Palestinian national rights, including their right to national identity, sovereignty in Palestine, return, and representation. The international assessment and response to these rights and their violation by Israel are carefully probed and documented. Our price, $3.95 See review on page 14.


Dewey Beegle, Prophecy and Prediction. Pyry Peterbegg. 274 pp., $9.95 (paperback). Refutes the biblical claim of Zionism to the Promised Land by discussing what the Bible teaches about prophecy, especially concerning the predictions of events which already have occurred and those which are to come. Our price, $8.25.


Jonathan Dimbleby. The Palestinians, Quartet Books, 1979, 256 pp., $25.00. Explores the crisis of a people without a land, demonstrating that the "Palestinian problem" is not an abstract issue but an urgent human tragedy. Fully illustrated with moving, dramatic, often harrowing photographs by Donald McGillivray. Our price, $17.50.


James Ennes, Jr. Assault on the Liberty, Random House, 301 pp., $13.95. The author served as lieutenant among the officers of the U.S.S. Liberty on her fatal voyage. He was on watch at the bridge during the day of the Israeli attack. Our price, $9.95.

David Gilmour. Dispatches: The Ordeal of the Palestinians, 1937-1980, Sidlow and Jackson, 292 pp. Well-documented history of Palestinians, based in part on revealing quotations from Zionist sources. Author examines the status of Palestinians in exile, the complex inter-relationships of the P.L.O. and the Palestinians vis-a-vis the international community, particularly with the Soviet Union and the Third World. Our price, $5.50.


Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, University of Texas Press, 1980, 400 pp., $10.95. A systematic, scholarly analysis of the strikingly low level of Arab political activity in Israel. Author examines success with which Israeli authorities have cooperated Arab elites, maintained the backwardness of the Arab economy, and promoted parochial rivalries within the Arab sector. Our price, $8.50.

Donald Neff. Warriors at Sunset: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East, Linden Press "Simon & Schuster," 1981, 480 pp., $17.95. Reveals for the first time the bizarre nature of the Suez Crisis of 1956. This episode saw France, Britain, and Israel in collusion to overthrow the Nasser regime without the knowledge of the United States, until 24 hours before the attack. The author, an award-winning Time correspondent, reveals how Eisenhower duped Britain, France and Israel ultimately marked the end of Britain and France as colonial giants and the beginning of Israel's repeated aggression against the Arabs. Our price, $12.75.

Basheer Nijm, ed. American Church Politics and the Middle East, Association of Arab American University Graduates, 1982, 156 pp., $6.95. Examines the activities of the church and the political factors of American church and political factors in both the United States and Middle East. Our price, $5.25.

William Quandt. Saudi Arabia in the 1980's: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil, Brookings Institution. Washington, D.C., 1981, 190 pp., $8.95 (paperback). Dr. Quandt, who has twice served on the staff of the National Security Council, argues that the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia in the 1980's will depend on a marked degree on actions taken by the United States regarding the Palestinian cause. Our price, $7.95.
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Livia Rokach, Israel's Sacred Terrorism, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1980. 68 pp., $4.50 (paperback). Examines the 1953-57 diary of Moshe Sharett, founding member of Israel's Labor Party, his country's foreign minister and its second prime minister. Our price. $3.50.


Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine, Hoover Press, 244 pp., $14.95. Well-documented analysis of the six years leading up to the creation of Israel. Based on author's personal experience and on information made available by the United Nations and governments involved. Our price. $10.00.

Marion Woolson, Prophets in Babylon: Jews In The Arab World, Faber & Faber, London, 1980. 292 pp. 14 pounds ($58.00). Traces the story of the Jews through Babylon, Yemen, Spain, the Maghreb, and in the Ottoman era, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Palestine. Author points out that while the Jews were sometimes misused or persecuted, more often they enjoyed a privileged status, respected by Moslem and Christian alike as "people of the book." In the concluding chapters Woolson traces the growth of Zionism and its sometimes subversive consequences on Jews both inside and outside Israel. Our price. $17.50.

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