About This Issue

Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this timeline come from the following: “A Pretext for War,” (Doubleday) by James Bamford; “Plan of Attack,” (Simon & Schuster) by Bob Woodward; “Rise of the Vulcans,” (Viking) by James Mann; “Against All Enemies,” (Free Press, Simon & Schuster) by Richard Clarke; “The 9/11 Commission Report,” by The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks against the United States; and “The Path to War,” an article that appeared in the May 2004 issue of Vanity Fair.


While the timeline was being constructed, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee released its 511-page report on why we went to war against Iraq. The report concludes that the major reasons the Bush administration gave to justify the war were baseless. Most of the blame is placed on the CIA, but, as Senator Jay Rockefeller noted, the report does not explain the environment of intense pressure in which intelligence officials were asked to render judgments on Iraq, when policy officials had already forcefully stated their own conclusions in public. This part of the committee’s investigation is expected later this year, most likely after the November presidential elections.

Our timeline aims to fill the gap left in the Senate Committee’s report. Recognizing that the information was wrong is one thing; acknowledging how and why it was wrong is quite another — and too important to leave for post-November 2 reading.


Bamford is the former Washington investigative producer for ABC’s World News Tonight with Peter Jennings. His book reads like a detective mystery. And, like all good detectives, Bamford follows the facts. He concludes that the Bush administration has co-opted the intelligence community for its own political ends, and that its Middle East policy, from overthrowing Saddam Hussein to unconditionally supporting Israel, is driven by long-held beliefs and goals of an elite group of conservatives inside and outside government.

As for how this can happen and why we Americans fail to see the centrality of the Palestinian cause, “Peace, Propaganda & the Promised Land” answers those questions better than any documentary I’ve seen.

John F. Mahoney
Executive Director
Timeline for War

The Timeline was written by AMEU executive director John Mahoney, with considerable input and editing from AMEU board members and staff.

March, 1992: The Pentagon. Paul Wolfowitz, under-secretary of defense for policy for President Bush, drafts an update of America’s overall military strategy called the “Defense Planning Guidance.” In it he argues that the U.S. might be faced with taking preemptive military action to prevent the use or development of WMD. The official ultimately responsible for the document is Bush’s defense secretary Dick Cheney. The draft is actually written by Wolfowitz’s protégé and top assistant Lewis Libby.

Sept. 1, 1992: New York. Ramzi Yousef, the nephew of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, arrives at JFK Airport. Born of a Palestinian mother, his goal is to punish the United States for its support of Israel, knowing that the U.S. government every year sends military and financial aid worth billions of dollars to Israel. Ramzi says that he and his uncle, an engineer who had studied higher mathematics and jet propulsion in the U.S., had been planning to bring down the towers of the World Trade Center, the ultimate symbol of America’s worldwide financial muscle.

Feb. 26, 1993: New York. Ramzi Yousef, with others, sets off explosives at the World Trade Center. Later in the day he flies out of JFK for Karachi, disappointed that both towers were still standing and determined to bring them down at another time.

Feb. 27, 1993: New York. A group calling itself the “Liberation Army” sends a letter to The New York Times saying the World Trade Center bombing was in retaliation for American support for Israel, and warning that if America did not change its Middle East policy, more terrorist missions would be carried out, some by suicide bombers.

April 15, 1993: Kuwait. Kuwaiti police say they have prevented an assassination attempt on former President George H. W. Bush, his wife, two sons, and daughter-in-law Laura. Most in the CIA promptly point the finger at Saddam Hussein; others, including investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, doubt the Iraqi president had any involvement in the plot.

Jan. 7, 1995: Manila. Ramzi Yousef and a colleague, Abdul Hakim Murad, accidentally set off an explosion in their apartment. Murad is captured and, under torture, tells the Philippine police of a plan to board an American commercial aircraft, hijack it, control the cockpit, and dive the plane into the CIA headquarters. The Chief of Intelligence Command for the Philippine National Police tells the Associated Press that its office shared the information immediately with FBI agents in Manila, along with the message they found on Yousef’s laptop explaining why they were doing it: “If the U.S. government keeps supporting Israel … then we will continue to carry out operations inside and outside the United States.”

April 18, 1996: Lebanon. Israel attacks a U.N. refugee camp at Qana, killing women and children. Israel says it was a mistake. The U.N. and Amnesty International say it was intentional. Shortly afterwards, Osama bin Laden moves to the mountains of Afghanistan, where he uses the Qana massacre to recruit fighters in a war against the U.S. and Israel.


July 25, 1996: Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia. A truck bomb rams a high-rise complex housing U.S. airmen. Nineteen are killed. The bombing is blamed on Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors, although the U.S. commission investigating the 9/11 attacks will later conclude that Osama bin Laden may have had an involvement — but not Saddam Hussein.

mastermind for worldwide operations, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, issues a call to action: “My Muslim Brothers of the world...Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia] are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy — your enemy and their enemy — the Americans and the Israelis...The horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qana in Lebanon are still fresh in our memory...They [Americans] are not exonerated from responsibility, because they chose this [their] government and voted for it despite their knowledge of its crimes in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and in other places.”


July 31, 1998: New York. David Wurmser meets with Israel’s permanent representative to the U.N., Dore Gold, in an effort to get Israel to put pressure on the American Congress to approve a $10 million grant to Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, an exile group based in London with a guerilla army based in northern Iraq, whose purpose is the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.


Aug. 20, 1998: Afghanistan and Sudan. President Clinton orders missile attack against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan said to produce nerve gas and to be linked to bin Laden. Bin Laden survives and doubts are raised about the pharmaceutical plant, which Sudanese say produced infant formula. Shortly after, bin Laden tells ABC News that, if the liberation of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and the Ka’aba in Saudi Arabia is a crime, he indeed is a criminal.

Feb.-March, 1999: Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden summons Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to tell him that his proposal to use aircraft as terror weapons against the U.S. has the full support of Al Qaeda.

Sept. 28, 2000: Jerusalem. Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, flanked by 1,000 armed police, visits site of the Al Aqsa Mosque. Bin Laden reacts by asking that the planned attacks against the U.S. be moved up.

Oct. 12, 2000: Yemen. The USS Cole is attacked; 17 sailors are killed and 39 wounded. Bin Laden, the suspected mastermind, praises the suicide attackers, then reads a poem he wrote in honor of Palestinian children killed in their struggle against Israel’s occupation of their land.

Jan. 1, 2001: Washington, DC. David Wurmser recommends to President-elect Bush that America and Israel join forces to “strike fatally, not merely disarm, the centers of radicalism in the region—the regimes of Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Tehran, and Gaza,” and he suggests that “crises can be opportunities” to implement this plan.

Jan. 30, 2001: The White House. President Bush holds his first high-level National Security Council meeting. Two topics are on the agenda: Israel and Iraq. He says he plans to “tilt it [U.S. policy] back toward Israel” and—in what turns out to be the prime focus of the meeting—he says he wants to remove Saddam Hussein. Condoleezza Rice explains: “Iraq might be the key to reshaping the entire region.”

Feb. 5, 2001: The White House. Rice chairs a principals’ committee meeting to review Iraq policy. All agree that the sanctions were only hurting the Iraqi people, not Saddam. Powell proposes stricter U.N. sanctions on Saddam’s military programs.

April, 2001: The White House. Cabinet deputies meet to review terrorism policy. Richard Clarke warns that the network of terrorist organizations called Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, presents an immediate and serious threat to the U.S., and that the U.S. had to target bin Laden and his leadership by reintroducing flights of the Predator drone. Wolfowitz replies that Iraq is just as much a terrorist threat. Clarke says he is unaware of any Iraqi-sponsored terrorism directed at the U.S. Deputy CIA
director John McLaughlin backs up Clarke. Wolfowitz tells Clarke he gives bin Laden too much credit and that he had to have a state sponsor. Clarke replies that bin Laden has made plain his terrorist aims and, as with Hitler in Mein Kampf, you have to believe these people will actually do what they say. Wolfowitz responds that he resents comparing the Holocaust to “this little terrorist in Afghanistan.” Clarke replies: “I wasn’t comparing the Holocaust to anything. I was saying that like Hitler, bin Laden has told us in advance what he plans to do and we would make a big mistake to ignore it.”

**June 21, 2001:** Afghanistan. Bin Laden aide Ayman al-Zawahiri announces over the Middle East Broadcasting Company that, “The coming weeks will hold important surprises that will target American and Israeli interests in the world.”

**Aug. 6, 2001:** Crawford, Texas. President Bush receives a President’s Daily Brief entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” It warns that the FBI has intelligence indicating that terrorists might be preparing for an airline hijacking in the U.S. and might be targeting a building in lower Manhattan. No action is taken.

**Sept. 4, 2001:** The White House. Counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke meets with the President to walk him through a proposed National Security Presidential Directive, whose goal is to eliminate bin Laden and Al Qaeda leaders. Clarke had asked for the meeting, calling it “urgent,” back in January, but only now is allowed to see him. He tells Bush that the use of minimum-wage rent-a-cops to screen passengers and carry-on at airports has got to stop. The President agrees.

**Sept. 11, 2001:** New York, Washington, DC, Pennsylvania. Nineteen Middle Eastern hijackers, 15 from Saudi Arabia, commandeer four commercial airplanes, crashing two into the World Trade Towers in Manhattan, one into the Pentagon in Washington, and one in a field in Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 are killed. Rumsfeld directs Pentagon lawyer to talk to Wolfowitz about Iraq’s connection to the attacks.

**Sept. 12, 2001:** Germany. Seven members of Rumsfeld’s brain trust meet at an airport in Frankfurt and board an Air Force refueling plane sent to ferry them back to Washington. Group includes Douglas Feith, now undersecretary of defense for policy. On the flight back they sketch out a plan for the defense secretary according to which the U.S. would first topple the Taliban government of Afghanistan, then go after other terror states, including Iraq. Feith appoints David Wurmser to put together a secret intelligence unit in his Pentagon office that will bypass the normal channels and report directly to him; called the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, its purpose is to find loose ties between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda in order to counter the CIA, whose analysts had found no credible links between the two. Later in the day, counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke attends White House meetings of the inner circle of Bush’s war cabinet and is stunned to learn that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to take advantage of the national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Rumsfeld specifically asks if the attacks did not present an “opportunity” to launch war against Iraq.

**Sept. 15, 2001:** Camp David. Bush gathers closest advisers. Much discussion is on Afghanistan, but Wolfowitz advocates attacking Iraq, maybe even before Afghanistan. He says there’s a 10 to 50 percent chance Iraq was involved in 9/11. Bush sends note to Wolfowitz saying he doesn’t want to hear more on Iraq that day. Cheney, Powell, Wolfowitz, and Rice vote against hitting Iraq first; Rumsfeld abstains. Powell, who is appalled at the idea of hitting Iraq, finds Rumsfeld abstention interesting. Richard Perle, who is also present, says Wolfowitz planted the seed.

**Sept. 16, 2001:** Washington, DC. Richard Perle and other neoconservatives send letter to Bush urging him to focus immediately on a war with Iraq, whether or not a connection with 9/11 can be shown.

**Sept. 17, 2001:** The White House. Bush signs a Top Secret order that lays out his plan for going to war in Afghanistan and directs the Pentagon to begin planning military options for an invasion of Iraq.

**Sept. 19, 2001:** The Pentagon. Perle convenes a two-day meeting of the Defense Policy Board, a group
that advises the Pentagon. He introduces two guest speakers: Prof. Bernard Lewis of Princeton, a long-time friend of Cheney and Wolfowitz, who says U.S. must respond to 9/11 with a show of strength, and must support such democratic reformers in the Middle East as Ahmad Chalabi. The second speaker, in fact, is Ahmad Chalabi, who tells the group that Iraq does possess WMD, although, as yet, there is no evidence linking Iraq to 9/11.


Nov. 21, 2001: The White House. At the end of a National Security Council meeting, President Bush secretly directs Rumsfeld to prepare for war on Iraq.

Nov. 27, 2001: Florida. Rumsfeld flies to see General Franks at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa and tells him to update the Top Secret Operation Plan on attacking and invading Iraq.

Dec. 4, 2001: The Pentagon. Franks presents a slightly revised plan on invading Iraq. Estimated force level is reduced from 500,000 to 400,000. Rumsfeld thinks fewer forces will be needed in light of the Afghanistan success. Franks agrees.

Dec. 12, 2002: The Pentagon. Franks returns with updated plan. Rumsfeld tells him he has to look at a plan that he could do “as early as April or May.”

Dec. 20, 2001: New York. The New York Times reporter Judith Miller has front-page interview with Iraqi defector Adnan Ishan Saeed al-Haidere, who says he has recently been working in Baghdad in secret facilities for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Miller secures the interview through Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, which has close contacts with Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, and Douglas Feith. Miller will later say that it is Chalabi who provided most of the front page exclusives on WMD to The New York Times.

Dec. 28, 2001: The White House. Franks tells Bush that, with support from other Muslim countries, Iraq could be invaded with an initial 105,000 U.S. forces, but 230,000 eventually would be needed.


Jan. 29, 2002: Washington, DC. Bush gives State of the Union address; he calls North Korea, Iran, and Iraq an axis of evil and pledges not to wait while dangers gather.

Feb. 1, 2002: The Pentagon. Franks tells Rumsfeld a unilateral U.S.-only invasion of Iraq could be readied in 45 days with an initial force of 105,000; ultimately, 300,000 would be needed to stabilize Iraq after it fell.

Feb. 7, 2002: White House Situation Room. Rumsfeld introduces notion of shock and awe, i.e., building up such a carrier force and bombing onslaught that it might, by itself, trigger regime change.

Feb. 12, 2002: Washington, DC. Powell tells the Senate Budget Committee there are no plans to go to war with Iran or North Korea, but U.S. is looking into ways of bringing about regime change in Iraq.


Feb. 20, 2002: Iraq. CIA survey team secretly enters northern Iraq to prepare for deployment of CIA paramilitary teams.

Feb. 28, 2002: Pentagon. Franks brings Rumsfeld a list of nearly 4,000 possible bombing targets in Iraq. Rumsfeld tells him to prioritize the list.

March 6, 2002: The White House. In preparation of his upcoming visit to the Middle East, Cheney is briefed by Franks, who tells him what the U.S. will need in its invasion of Iraq from other Arab and Muslim countries. When he does go to the Middle
East, the vice president is surprised to learn that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is seen by Arab leaders as a greater threat to the region than Saddam Hussein.

March 9, 2002: Washington, DC. CIA tells the White House reports that Niger was supplying Iraq with uranium were investigated by Ambassador Joseph Wilson and were found not to be credible.

March 14, 2002: The White House. The Joint Chiefs of Staff report that an invasion of Iraq “would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons.”

April 20, 2002: Camp David. Bush tells Franks he wants the invasion of Iraq done “right and quickly.”

April 24, 2002: Dohar, Qatar. Franks tells his major commanders to do whatever it takes to prepare for an invasion, no matter the costs.

May 11, 2002: Camp David. Franks presents a five-front war plan to Bush.

June 19, 2002: The White House. Franks tells Bush he could do the invasion within 30 days with a little over 100,000 ground assault troops.

Late Aug. 2002: The Pentagon. Office of Special Plans is set up at the Pentagon to plan for the war and its aftermath. Picked to head the OSP is longtime protégé of Richard Perle, Abram Shulsky. As part of its mission, the OSP forges close ties to a parallel intelligence unit within Ariel Sharon’s office in Israel, whose job is to provide key Bush administration people with cooked intelligence on Saddam’s Iraq. One Pentagon official, Air Force Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, later relates how she had escorted six or seven Israeli generals to Feith’s OSP office. The generals surged ahead of her, waved aside the required sign-in book, and entered the OSP office; seeing Feith’s office door closed, the generals demanded to know from his secretary who Feith was talking to.

Sept. 7, 2002: The White House. Bush tells reporters that an International Atomic Energy Agency report estimates that the Iraqis are six months away from developing a nuclear weapon. The new report, however, turns out to be an old IAEA document from 1996 that described a weapons program that the inspectors had long ago destroyed.


Sept. 16, 2002: New York. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan says he has received a letter from Iraqi authorities allowing inspectors access “without conditions.” Bush administration is livid because it did not say “unfettered access,” meaning “anytime, anywhere.”

Sept. 19, 2002: Washington, DC. Rumsfeld, speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, says current U.N. inspection team is weak. At the White House, Bush says if U.N. Security Council won’t deal with Iraq, “the U.S. and some of our friends will.” Bush also meets with 11 House members, telling them the biggest threat is that Saddam, with his WMD, “can blow up Israel and that would trigger an international incident.”

Oct. 1, 2002: Langley, Virginia. CIA prepares secret National Intelligence Estimate on the case for war with Iraq. NIE claims Saddam has chemical and biological weapons, including mobile labs, and that it is building nuclear weapons. Bush wants condensed version for the public in the form of a White Paper. The White Paper, however, distorts the facts to make the strongest possible case for war. (See the Vanity Fair article for specific examples of distortions.)

Nov. 8, 2002: New York. U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 1441, which gives Iraq a “final opportunity” to come clean on its WMD, adding that the council would meet again, following the inspectors’ report, to “consider the situation.” The French, who oppose war with Iraq, say off the record that they understand the resolution is enough to give America and Britain legal cover for going it alone, if they felt Iraq hadn’t complied to their satisfaction.

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A Reader’s Guide

Most of the participants in this timeline were or are members of either the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), the Center for Security Policy (CSP), or the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). JINSA was founded in 1976 to ensure that the U.S. provides Israel with adequate military supplies; today it is a $1.4-million-a-year operation, the bulk of which is spent on taking retired U.S. generals and admirals to Israel to meet with Israeli officials. CSP similarly maintains that U.S. and Israeli national security interests are one and the same and that the only way to assure safety and prosperity for both is through U.S.-Israeli hegemony in the Middle East. PNAC, which was founded in 1998 by The New Citizenship Project, which received nearly $1.9 million from the defense contractor Rockwell International, has long advocated the expansion of U.S. military influence around the globe, regime change in Iraq, and ending U.S. efforts to foster peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Top Washington power players affiliated with these three groups include:

**White House**

Dick Cheney. Former CEO of Halliburton until he became Vice President, Cheney served on JINSA’s board of advisors and was affiliated with PNAC. In 1992, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, then-Secretary of Defense Cheney issued a document called the Defense Planning Guidance. Drafted by his deputy secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Wolfowitz’s top aid Lewis Libby, with outside input from Richard Perle, the document argued that the U.S. must remain the planet’s one unchallenged superpower through its “full-spectrum dominance,” even if this means waging future wars alone.

Condoleezza Rice. After working two years for George H. W. Bush, Rice returned in 1991 to Stanford University, where she befriended former secretary of state George Shultz, then at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Shultz, a PNAC supporter, arranged to have Rice appointed to the board of Chevron which, within months, named one of its oil tankers after her, the Condoleezza Rice. In 1993, again on Shultz’s recommendation, Rice was appointed provost of Stanford. In 2001, within months of becoming President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Rice invited William Kristol, PNAC’s founder and chairman, to her office. In the first Bush administration Rice had been seen as the high priestess of arms control and containment. Now, after Kristol’s visit, she said she saw the historic mission of the U.S. more in terms of constructing a whole new political order.

I. Lewis Libby. Currently Cheney’s chief of staff and national security advisor, as well as an assistant to President Bush, “Scooter,” as he is called, has been a strong PNAC supporter, endorsing major PNAC position papers. A former undergraduate student of Wolfowitz’s at Yale, Libby served as Wolfowitz’s aide during the Reagan and first Bush administrations. During the first Gulf War, along with Wolfowitz, he proposed putting Special Operations command teams into the west of Iraq in order to protect Israel. The proposal was never adopted.

David Wurmser. Now Cheney’s Middle East advisor, Wurmser co-authored a paper in 1996 for Israeli hardliner Benjamin Netanyahu entitled: “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” the centerpiece of which was the removal of Saddam Hussein and his replacement by a puppet leader friendly to Israel; the regime change could be accomplished, the paper suggested, by using a phony pretext to invade Lebanon, Syria, and then Iraq. Wurmser and his Israeli wife Meryav are strong supporters of the settler movement in Israel. His wife manages the right-wing Israeli website MEMRI.

David Frum. A Canadian, Frum is a former special assistant and presidential speechwriter, who wrote the “axis of evil” phrase for President Bush’s State of the Union address. He is the co-author with Richard Perle of the recent book “An End to Evil,” which argues that world peace will only come about through American armed might.

**Department of Defense**

Donald Rumsfeld. The current Secretary of Defense has been a strong backer of PNAC. In September 2000, he, along with Cheney, Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, and Lewis Libby, co-sponsored a PNAC “blueprint” for creation of a “global Pax Americana.” Entitled: “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Re-
sources for a New Century,” it called for unprecedented hikes in military spending, toppling non-complying regimes, abrogation of international treaties, control of world energy sources, militarization of outer space, total control of cyberspace, and the willingness to use nuclear weapons to achieve American goals.

Paul Wolfowitz. Presently Rumsfeld’s top deputy at the Pentagon, Wolfowitz, along with Rumsfeld and President Bush’s brother Jeb, co-authored a 1998 letter to President Clinton urging him “to enunciate a new global strategy that should, above all, remove Saddam Hussein from power.” In 1978, Wolfowitz was investigated for providing an Israeli official with a classified document on a proposed sale of U.S. weapons to an Arab government. In 1990, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney picked Wolfowitz for Undersecretary for Policy. In 1992, the Pentagon discovered that Wolfowitz’s office was promoting the export to Israel of advanced air-to-air missiles. Then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, cancelled the deal because Israel had been caught selling the earlier version of the missile to China in violation of a written agreement with the U.S. on arms re-sales.

Richard Perle. Perle, a JINSA/CSP advisor, and PNAC supporter, was a former Reagan Administration Defense Department official. In 1970, an FBI wiretap of the Israeli Embassy caught him discussing classified information with an Embassy official. In 1981, he received a substantial consulting fee from the Israeli arms manufacturer Tamares, Ltd. In 1987, he worked for Israel’s munitions manufacturer Soltam Ltd. Recently he chaired Rumsfeld’s Defense Policy Board, a Pentagon advisory group, until he was forced to resign amid charges of conflict of interest because he was representing a company seeking Defense Department approval of a sale to two foreign companies.

Douglas Feith. Presently under-secretary for policy at the Department of Defense, Feith was a member both of JINSA and CSP. In 1992, he wrote an article for Commentary magazine in which he argued that it is in the interest of U.S. and Israel to remove needless impediments to technological cooperation since “countries like Israel serve to deter aggression, enhance regional stability and promote peace thereby.” In 1986, he left government to form an influential law firm based in Israel. In 1996, along with Richard Perle and David Wurmser, he wrote the aforementioned proposal for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu entitled, “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.” It called for Israel to removal Saddam Hussein and to replace him with a puppet leader friendly to the Jewish State. Shortly after the “Clean Break” proposal, Feith’s CSP issued a paper titled “Israeli Settlements: Legitimate, Democratically Mandated, Vital to Israel’s Security and, Therefore, in U.S. Interest.” The document claimed “Israel is fully entitled to expand existing settlements or build new ones in the disputed territories.”

Department of State

Richard Armitage. Now deputy secretary of state, Armitage worked in the first Bush administration, but left government soon after Clinton was elected to open Armitage Associates, a private consulting business. For a time he employed Cheney’s daughter Elizabeth. The company attracted a number of clients, including defense firms and contractors, such as Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton. During this time he was affiliated with PNAC and co-signed one of its policy papers.

Outside the Government

Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi, who fled Iraq with his family, studied at the University of Chicago, where one of his teachers, Albert Wohlstetter, also taught Paul Wolfowitz. Following his studies Chalabi went to Jordan where he was convicted of bank fraud and sentenced to a 22-year prison term. He fled Jordan, then went to London, where he became head of the exiled Iraqi National Council. In 1985, Wohlstetter introduced Chalabi to Perle, who was then at the Pentagon. Chalabi later met Wolfowitz. In 1997, Perle and Wurmser wrote a Wall Street Journal column calling for all-out support for Chalabi to promote an insurgency in Iraq. Chalabi has said that Iraq’s next president should normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, thus removing one of Israel’s major Arab threats.
The Link

Dec. 7, 2002: Baghdad. Iraqi government delivers a 12,000-page document in Arabic to UNMOVIC. It is intended to account for the state of its weapons programs. The U.S. takes possession of it, has it translated, submits it to the Security Council with large portions deleted, then dismisses it as a “material breach” of Resolution 1441.

Jan. 13, 2003: The White House. The French call for a meeting that is held in Rice’s office. Attending are Chirac’s top adviser, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, and French Ambassador to the U.S., Jean-David Levitte. Both explain their country’s reasons for opposing the war, then Levitte says that if the U.S. was determined to go to war, it should not seek a second U.N. resolution, that 1441 arguably gave the White House enough cover, and that France would keep quiet if the U.S. went ahead. White House dismisses the offer because it has promised Tony Blair it would seek a second resolution. The French are angry. On the same day, Bush tells Powell in the Oval office, “I’m really going to do this.” Powell asks if he understands the Pottery Barn principle: if he breaks Iraq, he’ll own it. Bush says he understands.


Jan. 21, 2003: The White House. Franks delivers final war plan to Bush. He estimates fewer than 1,000 U.S. killed. No public pictures of returning coffins and no body count of Iraqis killed will be permitted, as both practices created bad PR during the Vietnam war.

Jan. 25, 2003: White House. Lewis Libby makes presentation on Saddam’s WMD and ties him to bin Laden. Much of the material comes from Feith’s Office of Special Plans. Richard Armitage, the second in authority at the State Department, sees it as drawing the worst conclusions from fragmentary threads; Wolfowitz finds it convincing. Bush aides Karen Hughes and Karl Rove think Powell should make the U.N. presentation. Powell agrees to do it.

Jan. 27, 2003: New York. Hans Blix delivers his first inspections report to U.N. He acknowledges that no WMD have been found but notes that Iraq has failed to account for undetermined quantities of the nerve agent VX and anthrax, and for 6,500 chemical bombs.

Jan. 28, 2003: Washington, DC. Bush gives State of the Union address in which he claims: “The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”

Jan. 29, 2003: The State Department. Powell gives his chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, a 48-page dossier that the White House wants Powell to use in his U.N. speech making the case for war with Iraq. The dossier is prepared in Cheney’s office by a team led by Cheney’s chief of staff, Lewis Libby, and his deputy assistant for national security affairs, John Hannah.

Jan. 30, 2003: Langley, Virginia. Wilkerson, with several staff members and CIA analysts, sets up shop at CIA headquarters to prepare Powell’s speech. Meanwhile the White House supplies 45 more pages on Iraq’s links to terrorism and human rights violations.

Jan. 31, 2003: Langley, Virginia. Wilkerson throws out the White House dossier, suspecting much of it originated with the Iraqi National Congress and its chief, Ahmad Chalabi, whose information in the past often proved suspect or fabricated. Powell is convinced that much of the material had been funneled to Cheney by the separate OSP unit set up by Rumsfeld. “We were so appalled at what had arrived from the White house,” says one staff member.

Feb. 5, 2003: New York. At 2 a.m., on the day of his U.N. speech, Powell receives a call from the CIA’s George Tenet, who says he wants another look at the speech. Tenet is afraid Powell has cut too much about Saddam’s supposed links to terrorism, especially the 9/11 attack. For days the White House and Cheney have pressed Powell to include a widely discredited Czech intelligence report that Mohamed Atta, the 9/11 ringleader, had met in Prague with an Iraqi intelligence officer. Powell had thrown out the Prague material as suspect and unverified. But Powell does keep much of what the White House wants, including mobile biological weapons labs, ties to Al
The Link

Feb. 8, 2003: The White House. President Bush, in his weekly radio address, says: “Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks. Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and Al Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990’s. Iraq has sent bomb-making and document-forgery experts to work with Al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided Al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training. And an Al Qaeda operative was sent to Iraq several times in the late 1990’s for help in acquiring poisons and gases. We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network headed by a senior Al Qaeda terrorist planner. This network runs a poison and explosive training camp in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad.”

Feb. 14, 2003: New York. Hans Blix goes before the U.N. Security Council. He contradicts Powell, saying the trucks Powell had described as being used for chemical decontamination could just as easily have been used for routine activity, and he contradicts Powell’s statement that the Iraqis knew in advance when the inspectors would be arriving. And he adds that Iraq is finally taking steps toward real cooperation with the inspectors, allowing them to enter Iraqi presidential palaces, among other previously prohibited sites. Disarmament through inspections is still possible, he concludes.

Feb. 15, 2003: Worldwide. Tens of millions participate in an unprecedented, antiwar demonstration. The biggest crowds are in the countries that support the war: Britain, Italy, and Spain.

Feb. 24, 2003: New York. Claiming Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in Resolution 1441, the U.S., Britain, and Spain propose the second resolution Tony Blair has been seeking.

Feb. 27, 2003: The White House. Holocaust survivor and author Elie Wiesel visits Bush and tells him Iraq is a terrorist state that should be invaded as a matter of morality, otherwise Saddam will unleash a weapon of mass destruction on Israel. Bush later remarks, “If Elie Wiesel feels that way, I am not alone.”

March 1, 2003: Turkey. The Turkish government rejects U.S. request to move troops through its country.

March 3, 2003: The White House. Pope John Paul II’s envoy, Cardinal Pio Laghi, visits Bush and tells him war with Iraq would be unjust and illegal because it would cause so many civilian casualties, create a wider gap between the Christian and Muslim world, and overall would not make things better. Bush replies it would absolutely make things better.

March 7, 2003: France. The French announce they will veto a second resolution to authorize the automatic use of force. The U.S. begins lobbying the six undecided members of the Security Council: Pakistan, Chile, Mexico, Cameroon, Guinea, and Angola, having first wiretapped their offices. Chile and Mexico say they will not support a second resolution.

March 10, 2003: France. French President Chirac goes on TV and announces, “My position is that, regardless of the circumstances, France will vote ‘no’.” U.S. and Britain blame France for the diplomatic breakdown, and use it as the reason for not seeking the second resolution.

March 14, 2003: The White House. As a concession to Blair, Bush announces agreement on a road map for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

March 16, 2003: The Azores. Bush, Blair and Spanish prime minister Aznar meet. Bush says they need to start the war soon because antiwar sentiment will only get worse if they delay. He says he is going to give Saddam a 48-hour ultimatum to leave Iraq.

March 17, 2003: The White House. Bush reneges on his commitment to seek U.N. approval, claiming 1441 provides ample authorization. In a TV announcement he gives Saddam the 48-hour ultimatum. Prior to the announcement he calls Australian prime minister Howard and Israeli prime minister Sharon to tell them of his decision. Meanwhile, Cheney tells congressional leaders of the decision, noting...
that Israel will not be part of the coalition, “but we are working closely with them on their reaction.”

**March 18: 2003**: London. Blair wins a Commons vote for war, barely carrying his own party.

**March 19, 2003**: The White House. Bush gives Franks order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom. Around 4 p.m., CIA information is received that Saddam and his two sons are or will be in a bunker in Baghdad. Cheney advises Bush to strike at the target, effectively beginning the war. Bush agrees. At 7:30 p.m., Rice phones Israeli finance minister Benjamin Netanyahu, telling him the war had begun; he says he knows. Rice then summons Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar to come to the White House. Around 8:30 p.m. she tells him that, within a half-hour, all hell will break loose. At 10:10 p.m., Bush informs the nation the war has started.

**April 7, 2003**: Washington. Rumsfeld appoints Gen. Jay Garner to direct Pentagon’s new Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq. Garner, a JINSA advisor, says the first person he will invite to work with him is former Israeli defense minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer.

**May 2, 2003**: The USS Lincoln. President Bush tells nation, “In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.”


**June 5, 2003**: Washington, DC. The Washington Post reports that VP Cheney and his aide Lewis Libby paid multiple visits to the CIA in the months leading up to the Iraq war. Later, former CIA Counterterrorism chief Vince Cannistraro will tell a congressional hearing that prior to the war, the White House exerted unprecedented pressure on the CIA and other intelligence agencies to come up with evidence linking Iraq to bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

**June 8, 2003**: Washington, DC. David Kay, former chief weapons inspector for the U.N., is asked to take over the search for WMD in Iraq.

**July 6, 2003**: New York. Former U.S. ambassador Joseph Wilson IV writes column in The New York Times saying he was sent on a fact-finding mission to Niger by the CIA and that, well before the president’s State of the Union Address, he reported his finding that no uranium had been shipped to Iraq.

**August 27, 2003**: Washington. Newly available documents reveal that Halliburton, the company VP Cheney formerly headed, wins contracts for more than $1.7 billion out of Operation Iraqi Freedom and stands to receive hundreds of millions more under a no-bid contract awarded by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Bechtel Group, George Shultz’s company, wins contracts for one billion dollars.

**Sept. 17, 2003**: The White House. President Bush tells a reporter, “No, we’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September 11.”

**Oct. 2, 2003**: Washington, DC. Kay delivers interim report to Congress saying, “We have not yet found stocks of weapons.”

**Dec. 13, 2003**: Iraq. Saddam Hussein is captured.


**Jan. 28, 2004**: Washington. Regarding the existence of WMD in Iraq, Kay tells Senate Armed Services Committee, “We were almost all wrong.” His testimony forces White House to name a presidential commission to investigate the prewar intelligence on Iraq.

**Feb. 5, 2004**: Washington, DC. Tenet admits in a speech at Georgetown University that as far back as May 2002 the Defense Information Agency had issued a “fabrication notification” to steer clear of the Iraqi major who had attested to the mobile biological labs mentioned in Powell’s U.N. speech. Somehow the CIA never saw it.

**Feb. 24, 2004**: Washington, DC. CIA director Tenet tells the Senate Select Committee that, despite our invasion of Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq, the worldwide threat from bin Laden and Al Qaeda has grown, not diminished.
March 11, 2004: Madrid. Train bombs kill 200 people. Search leads to a widening web of organizations that may have few ties to Al Qaeda but share its goals.

March 14, 2004: Madrid. Conservative prime minister José Aznar is defeated by Socialist challenger José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, who ran on a pledge to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq unless they were placed under U.N. sanction. The new prime minister calls the Iraq war an error, saying: “It divided more than it united, there were no reasons for it, time has shown that the arguments for it lacked credibility, and the occupation has been poorly managed.”

April 18, 2004: Madrid. Spain withdraws all its troops from the Coalition of the Willing.

April 19, 2004: Nicaragua. President Maduro says Nicaragua will withdraw its forces from Iraq.


April 29, 2004: Santo Domingo. The Dominican Republic withdraws its troops from Iraq, citing security concerns. Wolfowitz tells a congressional hearing that Iraq is still a combat zone, “and until it becomes peacekeeping, a lot of countries are probably going to stay on the sidelines.”

May 20, 2004: Baghdad. Iraqi police and U.S. military raid home of Iraqi National Council finance minister Ahmad Chalabi as part of an investigation into suspected fraud. CIA also charges him with informing Iran that the U.S. had cracked its secret codes and was eavesdropping on its intelligence messages. The Pentagon stops monthly payments of $340,000 to Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress.

May 29, 2004: Baghdad. Iyad Alawi, a longtime CIA operative, is chosen interim prime minister of Iraq.

June 4, 2004: Langley, Va. CIA Director George Tenet resigns.

June 16, 2004: Washington, DC. The 9/11 Commission investigating the September 11 attacks reports that there did not appear to be a collaborative relationship between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.

June 22, 2004: Washington. Wolfowitz tells a House Armed Services Committee that the Pentagon had underestimated Iraq’s postwar insurgency and that the U.S. may have to keep a significant number of troops in Iraq for years to come.

July 5, 2004: Former U.S. Army General Janis Karpinski, who had been in charge of the Abu Ghraib prison when Iraqi detainees were abused and humiliated, tells BBC radio that she knew of at least one Israeli involved in the prisoner interrogation.

July 9, 2004: Washington. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concludes in its report that the most pivotal assessments used to justify the war against Iraq were unfounded and unreasonable. Senator Jay Rockefeller, vice chairman of the committee, concludes: “We in Congress would not have authorized that war — we would NOT have authorized that war — with 75 votes if we knew what we know now.” The second part of the report on whether the White House and Pentagon tried to influence intelligence agencies is postponed until after the November election.

July 12, 2004: The Philippines. President Arroyo announces that her country will withdraw from the Coalition of the Willing in order to save the life of a Filipino hostage held by Iraqi insurgents.

Aug. 1, 2004: Number of U.S. killed in the Iraq war reaches 910. The media is barred from showing their returning coffins. Number of Iraqi civilians killed is not available from official U.S. sources; independent sources estimate the number to be between 11,305 and 13,315. (For updates on Iraqis killed and wounded, see: www.iraqbodycount.org.)
In the printed issue of this *Link*, Page 14 lists books that are available through AMEU. AMEU’s full catalog of books and videos is available elsewhere on this website.
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☐ DMZ, People and the Land (1997, VHS, 57 minutes). This documentary appeared on over 40 PBS stations before pressure was brought to ban it. (See our Dec. 1997 Link, v. 30, #5, now available on our website at www.ameu.org.) AMEU: $25.00.


☐ Jones, R., 500 Dunams on the Moon (2002, VHS, 48 minutes). Palestinians, expelled in 1948 from Ayn Hawd, see their village turned into an Israeli artist colony. AMEU: $25.00.

☐ Jordan S., Dispatches: The Killing Zone (2003, VHS or DVD, 50 minutes). British correspondent Sandra Jordan reports on the violence by Israeli occupation forces against international aid workers and reporters in the Gaza Strip. Includes the bulldozer killing of Rachel Corrie. Widely shown on British TV, this powerful documentary has been shown on only a few public access channels in the U.S. To promote its distribution, AMEU is offering it for $10.00. Please circle format choice above.


☐ Masri, M., Frontiers of Dreams and Fears (2002, VHS, 58 minutes). This documentary has appeared on several PBS stations across the country. It focuses on two Palestinian girls growing up in refugee camps in Beirut and Bethlehem. AMEU: $25.00.

☐ Masri, M., Hanan Ashrawi: A Woman of Her Time (1995, VHS, 51 minutes). Palestine’s articulate representative shows that Israel’s occupation is far from benign. AMEU: $25.00.


☐ Pilger, J., Palestine Is Still the Issue (2002, VHS or DVD, 53 minutes). Candid assessment by an award-winning journalist of why there has been no progress towards peace in the Middle East. AMEU: $25.00. Please circle format choice above.

☐ Studio 52, Checkpoint: The Palestinians After Oslo (1997, VHS, 58 minutes). Documents the post-Oslo situation, including suicide bombings and home demolitions, with historical insights provided by Palestinian and Israeli activists. AMEU: $25.00.

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