AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by JOHN H. DAVIS

Israel's survival runs directly counter to America's self-interest in that it makes difficult the procurement of Arab oil and the doing of business with Arab states and people. Measured in economic and commercial terms America's commitment to Israel is a distinct liability and one that in the future can leave the U.S.A. stranded for enough energy to keep her industrial complex going, the homes of her people heated and her military defense strong. Even more serious, America's commitment to Israel may yet lead to greater power confrontation and near global devastation.

These things being so, peace in the Middle East is imperative for America. For the United States peace making can be defined as reconciling U.S. need for Arab oil and Arab business with America's commitment towards Israel's existence. To reconcile these factors is a big order, as the record of the past twenty eight years will testify.

The most logical thing for the United States to do would be to compromise Israel's existence. While for the U.S. could survive well without Israeli, she cannot survive well at all without both Arab oil and Arab business. But as America enters the year 1976 her commitment to Israel's survival is one that neither the President or Congress is prepared to comprise. Thus America's present Middle East policy places the United States in a real dilemma—one that conflicts with her basic needs for energy and that conceivably could lead to Soviet-American confrontation. The seriousness of this dilemma can hardly be overstated. How then is America to deal with it?

Sooner or later the United States must modify its policy towards Israel—there is no other way. The key to a solution is to be found in United Nations resolutions relating to Arab-Israeli conflict—particularly Security Council Resolution 242, passed in November 1967. This resolution calls for peace based on the principles of each state recognizing the rights of other states in the region to exist, uninhibited passage of the cargo of all states through public.
waterways, adequate international se-
curity force, and recognition of a reconstituted bor-
der, a just settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem and the withdrawal of Israel from territories seized and oc-
cupied in June 1967. The basic weakness of this resolution is that it does not recognize the existence of the Palestinian Arabs as a people or their right to a state of their own if this is their desire. This could be rectified either by amending Security Council Resolution 242 or interpreting it broadly to mean justice for the Palestinian people.

The American peace effort of 1974-75 was based on Security Council Resolu-
tion 242, but in the step-by-step ap-
proach nothing was done or even at-
tempted to resolve the Palestinian problem. If America in 1976 wants to
continue an effective peace initiative, it must promptly:

(1) Recognize the existence of the Palestinian Arabs as a people and their
rights to a state if they want one.

(2) Support participation by the Palestinian people at the peace table
through representatives designated by
them, choosing if necessary the most
representative of existing Palestinian
organization; currently this is the Pales-
tinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

(3) Work with the World Community of Nations for the implementation of the
provisions of Security Council Resolu-
tion 242, interpreting the Palestinian
refugees clause in terms of the Pale-
stinian people and their rights.

If America will take these steps, I believe she can lead the way to peace in
the Middle East. But this will not be
easy. For in the background of Arab-
Israeli conflict is a stubborn factor that
has never received adequate consider-
ation. This is the principle on which
Israel was founded; that of a Jewish
state for Jewish people, based on the
Law of Return. To create a Jewish state for
the Jewish people in Palestine, the
founders of Israel had to displace by
force the native Arab population, by
force block their return, and establish a
state in which Arabs in large numbers
were not wanted; Israel would not have
them. This is still the policy of Israel.
This is the basic cause of Arab-Israeli
conflict. This issue today is the major
block to Middle East peace.

While the International Community,
particularly the U.S.A., has been largely
silent on this subject, both the Arabs
and Israelis have understood it. It is
because Israel fears that recognition
of the Palestinian Arabs as a people
would place in jeopardy the very princi-
ple of a Jewish state for the Jewish peo-
ple and the Law of Return that she
refuses to recognize the Palestinians as
a people and it is because the Pales-
tinian Arabs see no way of rendering justice to the Palestinian people so long as
these policies prevail in Israel that they
have refused to recognize Israel as a
legitimate state. The Arabs are press-
ing for a secular state that will encom-
pass the West Bank, Gaza and Israel.

In December 1975, the issue of Jewish
exclusiveness in Israel did come before
the United Nations General Assembly,
in the form of the resolution that de-
scribed Zionism as racism. In my view
the Law of Return is itself a racist law in
that it admits Jews to citizenship in
Israel who during their entire lives lived
elsewhere and denies citizenship to
Arabs who were born in Palestine and
under international law have every right
to be there today. Hence, Zionism in its
support of Jewish exclusivism is in-
herently racist, of this there can be no
doubt.

It is my belief that Israel cannot per-
manently exist as a state if she insists
on being a Jewish state for the Jewish
people. In time Israel, with a population
of three million, must become part of the
region of the Middle East—a region
that encompasses one hundred twenty
million non-Jews, mostly Arabs—if she
is to survive. This she can never do so
along as she remains an exclusivist Jew-
ish state, refusing to render justice to
the Palestinian Arabs whom she ex-
cluded and exiled. If Israel adheres to her
present policy, time will be on the Arab
side.

Certain Palestinian groups have op-
posed the creation of a Palestinian state
consisting of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip because they want Israel to be
in-the course of a secular Palestine now. It
is my belief that if the Palestinian Arabs
did accept a mini-state consisting of
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and then
worked within the general guidelines
set forth in Security Council Resolution
242, in time (less than twenty years)
Israel would be forced to abandon the
concept of Jewish exclusivism and be
come a secular state, even part of a
larger secular state. This would be so
because a small exclusivist state based
on the Law of Return could not remain
viable in the Middle East. The forces
militating against the survival of such an
exclusivist state would be too over-
powering.

Because peace in the Middle East is
imperative to the well-being of the Unit-
ed States—even to the future success
of her industrial complex and the mainte-
nance of her defense, the United States
must now modify her Middle East policy
to take into account the growing de-
mands of the Palestinian Arabs; that
their rights be restored, that they be
recognized by the PLO at the peace
table and that they have the right of self-
determination with regard to the es-
tablishment of a Palestinian state on the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Otherwise,
war will break out again between Arabs
and Israelis; the bloodiest war yet and
danger will arise of great power con-
frontation in the world of which oil to the
U.S. may again be embroiled.

For America to so modify her own
policy will be good for the people of
Israel as well. It will help them to do
what is in their long-run interest, i.e. to
redress the wrongs committed against
the Palestinian Arabs at the time the
state came into being. Without this
being done the Middle East will know
no enduring peace. Israel’s dilemma
today is that her government as pres-
ently constituted is impatient to take
such a step when acting alone, even
though to do so is in the long-run inter-
est of the three million Jewish people
living there. Thus Israel today needs
U.S. help to modify her own policy in
the interest of her own people.

Presently the Ford Administration has
taken no official step to recognize
the existence of the Palestinian Arabs or
the merit of their claims. Rather the Ad-
ministration vigorously opposed debate
of the Palestinian issue at the Security
Council in January of this year and veted
the resultant resolution. More-
over, neither the Administration nor the
Congress is likely to come to grips with
this issue in an election year, at least
not unless war develops and the Great
Powers themselves feel threatened with
confrontation.

The Great Powers possess a means of
heading off confrontation between
themselves even if a major war between
the Arabs and Israelis were to break out.
This would be for them to work together
to impose a peace on the Middle East that
might come about in a manner similar
to the cease-fire imposed by them in
October 1973. The next cease-fire would
be promptly followed by an imposed peace based on Security
Council Resolution 242 and related res-
olutions. If this were done, the resultant
peace terms might well be similar to those
that might result from a peace negotiated at Geneva. Justification for
an imposed peace would be that wars in
the Middle East have become too dan-
gerous to the world to be longer tolera-
ted. Considering the forces that have
blocked progress towards a solid peace
under conditions other than wartime, an
imposed peace implemented by the
great powers at a point of impending
危机 may be the most feasible and
practical road to peace.
THE LINK

Page 3

MYTH AND REALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

James S. Lipscomb

The author served as Representative of The Ford Foundation in Egypt during 1963-1968 and directed a broad-ranging program of technical assistance projects in that country. Since 1965, he has traveled in many Arab countries and Israel. In 1969, he became Executive Director of The George Gund Foundation (Cleveland, Ohio).

The following speech was presented in January, 1976, at the program of The Cleveland Council on World Affairs.

With varying degrees of intensity, problems in the Middle East resulting from Arab-Israeli conflicts of interest have been with us for 30 years and, unfortunately, have intensified sharply since 1967. With the exception of Soviet-American rivalry and Vietnam, no American foreign policy concern since World War II has persisted longer, been more costly to the United States, and appears further from solution. After four wars since 1948, little appears to have been settled, and a fifth war now seems inevitable in the near future, with consequences likely to be far more tragic for the countries directly involved and the Western World in general.

INEFFICACIOUSNESS OF AMERICAN POLICIES

In spite of its substantial commitment of resources and prestige in the Middle East, our country appears to have exercised little influence in advancing a lasting peace, even with the considerable efforts of our Secretaries of State in 1970 and 1975. How many more years should we be prepared to bear the substantial burdens and risks of instability and confrontation in this part of the world? And, perhaps most important, how can we contribute more effectually to a just and realistic settlement which, among other benefits, is most likely to insure Israel’s future? The answers to these questions are complex and difficult at best, but if they are to be determined in the best interests of all parties concerned, the American public’s understanding of the roots and nature of the Arab-Israeli impasse must be broadened. In other words, we must distinguish between the realities of these problems and the myths which have grown up around them.

I should like to preface this search for Middle East reality by reaffirming my long-held beliefs that the State of Israel, within approximately pre-1967 borders, must be recognized by her Arab neighbors, that a peace treaty which will determine secure boundaries for Israel and the contiguous Arab states must be reached, and that, in time, normal and mutually beneficial relations are possible between all nations of the region. In light of the past 40 years of Middle East history, these goals may appear naïve and visionary, but my views are based on over five years of work and residence during the 1960s in Egypt, travels in most other countries of the area, and many conversations and personal friendships with people in these countries.

OBSTACLES TO UNDERSTANDING MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

Since returning to the United States in 1968, I have become increasingly convinced that one of the primary obstacles for most Americans is understanding the nature and history of problems in the Middle East is the difficulty and risk of raising reservations about policies of the Israeli Government or our relationships with Israel. In these areas, rational discussion of the most often leads to emotional rhetoric and the questioner being considered pro-Arab, anti-Israel, or worse. In effect, there has never been in our country any broad, significant public debate on the basic issues of Arab-Israeli relations and how our country might contribute most productively to improving them. About the only national attention to these subjects comes periodically when Congress and every four years when Presidential candidates and numerous Senators and Congressmen engage in a competition to see who can promise the highest level of American support for Israel.

Indeed, it is difficult to find books which present a balanced perspective on Middle East affairs, much less widely held Arab views. Only rarely does a newspaper writer or news commentator appear on the scene who might be considered unfriendly to Israel. And the relatively few prominent Americans who are directly knowledgeable about these matters do not feel the risks of criticism on such a sensitive subject are justified by the sense they might have as individuals in challenging emotional and long-accepted views. To illustrate this condition within your own experience, I suspect that few can name as many as three well-known Americans who have raised publicly serious reservations about Israeli Government policies or our country’s relationships with Israel. If you stop and think about it, most could not name two or even one.

Now what does this mean? Are the wisdom and justice of all Israeli policies vis-a-vis the Arabs, and our role in support of these positions, so clear that we have no alternative courses of action to serve better American national interests and Israel’s long-range security? My answer to that is one of strong exception, and you will find similar concerns expressed by most other governments of the world if you examine voting records on Arab-Israeli issues within the United Nations since 1967 and public statements made by numerous foreign government leaders. As the only supplier of significant military and economic assistance for Israel and most consistent supporter politically, the United States has stood alone since 1967 and borne the brunt of much suspicion and adverse world opinion. Our isolation in this regard and its significance is not recognized or understood by most Americans. Partially, this is due to the public’s tendency to be influenced by individual events without regard to their historic context. Thus, extremist Arab terrorism committed in Israel is unjustifiably disparaged, while failing to perceive the conditions which lead to such desperate and often suicidal acts. And, in general, far more attention is given in our news media to terrorists acts committed against Israelis than those which are usually far more destructive and described as retaliatory acts inflicted on Arabs. Other developments are largely symbolic, such as the 1975 United Nations General Assembly resolution describing Zionism as a form of racism. While the unfortunate and erroneous semantics of this resolution were only given wide attention in our country, the important message has been largely obscured, that is 72 countries, including some major nations such as Brazil, India, and Nigeria, are openly hostile to Israel’s policies and the Arabs and another 32 have serious reservations about them and abstained.

COMPASSION FOR JEWISH STATE

As part of the process required in reevaluating American policies in the Middle East, let us examine some of the myths and realities which have been broadly accepted in our country and have largely determined our relationships in this part of the world for 30 years. The first and most important reality is that we can all accept is the sense of obligation and compassion felt by my most Americans in responding to the unchallengeable tragedy of genocide committed against Jews in Europe during World War II. This factor, with its deep emo-
tional and practical consequences, led a majority of govern-
ments represented in the United Nations in 1948 to approve
the partitioning of Palestine and establishment of the State
of Israel. The United States was the single most influ-
ential power in this development, and there was wide public sup-
port in our country.

Unfortunately, however, there were some other realities at
this time in the Middle East, and these are little understood by
Americans and have increasingly challenged Israel's long-
range viability. The first of these was that Palestinian Arabs and
their ancestors had been the dominant population in this
territory for over 1300 years. Jewish representation had been
very small, probably less than 5 percent since the 7th Century A.D.
until it started expanding in the early years of the 20th
Century. By 1920 it was 12 percent, and the numbers grew
rapidly to about 35 percent in 1948.

Palestinian Arabs Become New Refugees

Of course, this large scale immigration occurred during
British rule of Palestine and was bitterly opposed by most in-
digenous Arabs, who foresaw themselves becoming a minori-
ty people in their ancestral homeland. With Israel's creation,
their worst fears were realized and 700,000 became exiled re-
ugees, most of whom have lived since in poverty and without
hope under restricted conditions in neighboring countries.
As Israel's original United Nation's determined borders have
expanded, first by 20 percent as a result of the fighting in
1948 and then by 30 percent in 1967, another 500,000 Palest-
inian Arabs have been added to the refugee camps, and
650,000 are living in territories occupied and governed by
Israel.

Along with these realities, there are a number of myths
which have been widely believed in this country about the
Palestinian refugees. The first is that most were misled by
Arab leaders in 1949 and left their homes voluntarily, with
the expectation of returning when Israeli military forces were
defeated by elements of neighboring Arab forces. Historical
facts simply do not support this contention, and there are
many unbiased observers today who were on the scene in
1948-49 with the British Foreign Service, the United Nations,
and relief agencies, such as the Quakers, and will attest to
this. While there may have been a small number of Palest-
inians who left under such an assumption, the vast majority
left in fear of their lives or were unwilling to risk the uncer-
tainties of life in a state governed by a people they then con-
sidered enemies and conquerors of their land. The high level
of terrorism committed by both Arabs and Jews during the
period following World War II was largely responsible for this
climate of fear. In addition, as a practical matter for Israel in
1949 with a population of only 650,000 Jews, the slightly
larger Palestinian Arab population who had lived in the land
then occupied by Israel would have posed an exceedingly dif-
icult obstacle to establishing a stable Jewish state, if most
had been permitted to remain on their land.

The second myth is based on the assumption that other
Arab countries could solve the refugee problem by resettling
them permanently within their own borders, and this solution
appears to be strengthened by the availability in recent years
of great oil wealth in the Middle East to bear the cost of such
an undertaking. This scenario, however, disregards certain
critical factors: 1) the Palestinian Arabs have close and tradi-
tional ties to their former land, and most have not been recep-
tive to permanent settlement in other Arab countries; 2) most
Palestinian Arabs are unwilling to lose their identity and
sense of nationhood by being distributed in a number of
countries, which, even though considerably larger, are still foreign to them
in many ways; 3) with the possible exception of Lebanon,
nearby Arab states are poor and would find the assimila-
lion of hundreds of thousands of refugees difficult and
costly economically and socially (the tragedy of Lebanon this
past year is, at least, partially related to the presence of a vol-
table group of 325,000 Palestinian refugees, 14 percent of its
total population, who have upset the delicate religious and
political balance which has enabled this admirable little
country to prosper since its independence in World War II); 4) Arab history and culture give a high priority to a sense of his-
torical justice and an acceptance of long-suffering in what is
believed to be a sacred cause; and 5) it must be recognized
that the existence of the Palestinian refugees has served as a
focal point and partial rationale for Arab unity in opposition
to Israel. While this factor can obviously not justify the
hardships of the refugees since 1948, it is an important and
sad human element in the political equation of the Middle
East and will likely remain so until a new Palestinian Arab
state is created in part of their former land which is now oc-
cupied by Israel.

Israel's Progress Admired in U.S.

Another reality often extolled and justifiably admired since
1948 is that Israel is the only democratic society and govern-
ment in the Middle East, with the exception of Lebanon.
These accomplishments, combined with the talents and in-
dustriousness of its remarkable people, 20th Century technolo-
gy, and unprecedented economic assistance from America
(on a per capita basis at least 30 times that provided for all its
Arab neighbors combined) have made possible in Israel an
extraordinary rate of growth and impressive prosperity in a
relatively brief time. Such qualities and progress are widely
admired by our people, for we view them as being some of the
same virtues which have molded our country and made it
worthy of emulation.

Along with this accurate perception of Israel, however,
come many myths about the Arabs. It is widely believed, as an
example, that Arab culture is undistinguished and decadent
when compared to that of the West; that the Moslem faith is
simplistic, emotional and historically belligerent in its prac-
tices; that most Arabs are not industrious and have not made
good use of their lands' natural resources; and that Arab gov-
ernments are unreliable in keeping commitments. How often
do we hear a comparison between Israel's wonderful achieve-
ments in "making the desert bloom" and the backwardness of
its neighbors, without any recognition that the part of Pal-
estine which became Israel included the most developed
areas and the larger part of the most productive agricultural lands of that territory.

Unfortunately, most of these myths are based on a limited knowledge of Arab history and because relatively few Americans have had a meaningful opportunity to become acquainted with Arab countries and their people. In a broad sense, the result of these partially emotional and often erroneous perceptions of the dynamics of Middle Eastern societies has been to align the United States with a small country of 3 million people, while alienating us from 20 Arab countries with a population of over 100 million. Were a similar strategy to be pursued by our country in other parts of the world, our national power and reputation would be much diminished and our ability to serve our few friends overseas, precarious.

**Soviet Influence Grows with U.S. Support for Israel**

With the serious consequences of Soviet-Arabian rivalry during the past 30 years, one of the most frequently advanced reasons for close cooperation between Israel and America is that Israel is our reliable friend in the Middle East and our main counterbalance to Soviet influence in Arab countries. In the context of the Cold War, this naive logic has been appealing but, I believe, represents one of the most deceptive and costly myths on which to base American strategy in that part of the world. At the end of World War II, no major power was held in as high esteem by the Arabs generally as the United States.勃然和法国人被视作有分歧, because of their colonial relationships with many Arab countries. The Soviet Union had only limited contacts with these countries, and the Western orientation and education of most influential Arabs, combined with a deep suspicion of certain features of communism, created serious obstacles for advancing Soviet influence.

At the same time, there were unusually favorable opportunities for our country to build on the fruitful economic and cultural relationships established since the mid-1900's in many Arab countries. When, over the strongest objections of Arab leaders, we championed the creation of Israel in 1948 and have been the primary source of massive military, economic and political support since, our reputation and standing in the Arab World plummeted and has remained at a level far below what could have been. As has proven so often true in this kind of setting, the Soviets have capitalized on our estrangement from many Arab countries and established a variety of relationships which have served their strategic purposes.

When our policies in this area become more balanced, Arab reliance on Soviet assistance will decline, along with their influence.

**Importance of Arab Oil to U.S.**

That two-thirds of the world's known petroleum reserves are in Arab countries and American dependence on these sources is now about 20 percent of our needs and likely to rise to 40-50 percent by 1985 are well-recognized realities today. The costly consequences of politically inspired foreign oil price increases during the past 2-1/2 years and potential future embargoes have created critical economic problems for our country and the West in general now and likely for years to come. While many factors have contributed to the recent power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the emotional issue of Israel's occupation of Arab lands, including Jerusalem, in 1967 and apparent unwillingness to withdraw since strongly influenced a few key Arab oil-producing countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, to support OPEC in 1973 and enabled it to enforce its tough demands. While it had been widely believed in our country that Arab state rivalries and conflicting interests precluded the degree of Arab unity necessary for OPEC effectiveness, there has been a consistent, broad failure in the United States to recognize the basis and depth of Arab fears of Israeli military and conviction that its long-range goal is to dominate the Middle East. However unrealistic such reactions might seem to us, these factors have been dominant in Arab thinking and actions for the past 30 years.

In this respect, we should understand that the Arabs have never viewed Israel as a small country of 3 million Jews desperately working and fighting for its survival. Rather it is seen as a highly organized, disciplined, technologically advanced, 20th Century society supported to an unprecedented degree by World Jewry and the American Government. In other words, it has been considered from its inception as basically an outpost of Western influence and power in a part of the world that is justifiably fearful of and hostile to foreign domination and exploitation, a condition which had prevailed in most Arab countries for centuries prior to World War II.

The implications of our growing reliance on Middle Eastern oil for, at least, the balance of this century are all too clear and disturbing. We may denounce unreasonably high prices and embargoes as blackmail, but if the Arabs did not use this economic leverage to advance their national interests, they would, perhaps, be the first countries in history not to do so. The United States has certainly not refrained from such a strategy in dealing with some of our overseas problems during the past 200 years. Rather than the suspicion and even hostility which often seems present in our relations with oil producing Arab countries, I should think a far more prudent policy would be one of building and expanding beneficial relationships, economically, culturally and politically. Instead of viewing their investments in this country as a threat, how much better to encourage them as a source of much needed capital for strengthening our economy and an important contributor to our balance of payments. From our own extensive overseas investment experience, we should recognize, too, that substantial foreign assets in a country are likely to lead to closer cooperation and understanding between the countries involved and provide a strong rationale for the investors to pursue policies which would advance the general economic welfare of the country in which their investments must thrive.

**Broad Requirements for Arab-Israeli Settlement**

Now where does an understanding of the above realities and myths lead us? And what are the basic requirements for a long-term settlement which will promise peace and security for Israel and her neighbors? I have found no better over-all answer than the response in 1971 of David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first and, perhaps, wisest leader. In essence, he stated his conviction that peace is Israel's "greatest necessity," and "to get it, we must return to the borders before 1967. As for security, militarily defensible borders, while desirable, cannot by themselves guarantee our future. Real peace with our Arab neighbors - mutual trust and friendship - that is the only true security."

A current shifting of the balance of power in the Middle East gives added force to Mr. Ben-Gurion's words. This development has come, in part, from improved Arab military capabilities and morale, as demonstrated in the October, 1973 War. But even more important, it results from the present massive transfer to wealth to Arab oil-producing states and a growing sense of national identity and pride among the Arab peoples, especially the understandably embittered Palestinian. On the other side, the remarkable progress during the past 25 years has resulted primarily from the qualities of its people - dedication, competence, industriousness and discipline. It is difficult to see how these can be expanded significantly, without substantial Jewish immigration from the West, and overcome the fact that Israel is a small country. 
with limited natural resources, a budget heavily committed to military, and an economy largely dependent on the United States for viability.

The United Nations Security Council's Resolution 242 approved in November, 1967, appears to be the most promising basis for a negotiated solution. It is largely undefined in general content and con

vity with Mr. Ben-Gurion's recommendations. It could provide all of the important conditions which Israel had indicated prior to 1967 were necessary for peace and its own security. The broad provisions of an agreement on this basis are well known and should include the following elements:

1) a declaration of peace and formal treaty acknowledgment of Israel's Statehood within recognized, secure boundaries approximating those before the June 1967 War by the concerned Arab countries and the Palestinians;

2) the withdrawal by Israel to these borders and the placing of United Nations patrols in demilitarized zones on both sides of the borders;

3) a Palestinian state on the West Bank, either independent or in some form of association with Jordan;

4) special status for the old city of Jerusalem, providing free access for all and, perhaps, administered by the United Nations;

5) Israeli freedom to use the Suez Canal and other strategic sea passages; and

6) a guarantee of the settlement by the major powers, primarily the Soviet Union and the United States.

Along with practically all United Nations members, including Israel, our country has endorsed Resolution 242 but failed to create the dynamic required and within its power for implementation. As long as our over-all policy, 100 percent for support for Israel, is largely unmodified and we continue to provide the resources which will maintain for the near future Israel's clear superiority of military power, then facing the requirements of returning Arab lands occupied in 1967 can be avoided—at least for a few years, until the Arabs believe the shift of power has been great enough to risk the next war. By allowing emotional commitment to overshadow compelling evidence of this changing balance of power, the friends of Israel in America do both countries a disservice.

Priority of U.S. Interests in Middle East

And how does a continuation of this policy serve American national interests in the Middle East? To answer this question, we must first define the interests. Essentially, I believe most reasonable and informed people would agree they are: 1) the security and good health of Israel; 2) friendship and productive relations with Arab countries; and 3) access to Arab oil. But the critical issue here is the priority of these interests. The highly organized and heavily funded Israeli lobby in the United States would lead us to believe that our support of Israel overshadows all other objects and, indeed, is a requisite for maintaining influence and protecting our other interests in this region. As pointed out in my earlier evaluation of realities and myths in this part of the world, American policies in the Middle East have been largely determined on this basis since World War II, and it is difficult to conceive of more costly and counterproductive results.

How much more of our resources must be added to the over $8 billion in arms and $3 billion in economic assistance our government has promised to Israel just since 1967? To add perspective to the bias of our policies, during this same period our economic aid to all 20 Arab countries, with a total population of over 100 million, would not exceed $300 million. This is a ratio of 10 to one in favor of Israel, and on a per capita basis it is $330 for each Israeli citizen to one dollar for each Arab. The disproportion of military hardware committed to both sides would be even greater. Not only has this

myopic view of the Middle East led us to badly unbalanced relationships in that area, but it has, also, seriously undermined our ability to provide much needed economic assistance and to strengthen our relations with other developing countries with which we should be cooperating at a far more meaningful level. For instance, what justification can be made for a policy which has led our government since 1967 to commit twice as much assistance to the 3 million people of Israel than to all 28 Black African countries with their combined population of over 250 million?

Earlier comments have described my views on the importance of our other two Middle Eastern interests; normal, mutually productive relationships with Arab countries and access to oil. How much better all of these goals could be served if we were able to balance logically and dispassionately the priorities of our interests. This certainly does not mean the abandonment of Israel by the United States or the likelihood of its destruction, as Israeli partisans in our country claim, but rather I am convinced this balancing process would far better serve Israel's long-range interests and our ability to insure its security and progress.

American Politics and Middle East Policies

As a final reality in this complex equation, I believe that peace in the Middle East has and will continue to be significantly influenced by domestic political considerations within the United States. Within our country it is traditional and often commendable for people and organized groups to advance their interests by attempting to influence the legislative process and mold public opinion through the news media and in other ways. This type of activity, however, can lead to an inadequate public understanding and distorted perspective, when one side of an issue is clearly outmatched by the other in numbers, organization, wealth, influence, and Western sophistication. Until the President, Congressmen and Senators are willing to accept the political risks of highly organized pressures and reduced campaign contributions, the present, costly Arab-Israeli impasse will persist, with more terrorism, recriminations and new obstacles to a settlement.

Prospects for Future

Unless our country is able to pursue more realistic and productive alternatives to our policies in the Middle East since 1967, it is only a matter of time until the fifth Arab-Israeli war, probably within 2 to 4 years. And this tragedy is likely to bring far greater loss of life and destruction in all countries involved, along with the clear possibility of nuclear weapons being employed and a direct confrontation of our nation and the Soviet Union. The horror of a nuclear bomb unleashed on Cairo, Tel-Aviv, or Damascus is almost impossible to contemplate, but the longer a just settlement is delayed, the higher the risk of this kind of catastrophe. Perhaps most tragic of all following the next war will be the creation of conditions which will make a settlement in the Middle East even more difficult to achieve and Israel's future far less certain. How much longer will the American people allow the myths to outweigh the realities in the perceptions of the Middle East Only when this ends can we look forward with hope to the resolution of this sad conflict and a new era of mutual respect and peace in this troubled part of the world.

James S. Lipscomb
One of the objectives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Second Development Plan is to diversify the economy by expanding the industrial base. American business can play a very important role in the implementation of our industrial plans. Many factors favor such a development. First, the United States is the most advanced industrial society; its contribution, therefore, can be more significant than that of other industrial nations. Second, Saudi Arabia and the United States have developed a warm and friendly relationship that has survived the most difficult international crises. Third, the qualities that made America great, ingenuity, private initiatives, the work ethic, are greatly admired in Saudi Arabia. Our industrialization effort is not based on central control exercised by unimaginative bureaucrats. Our vehicle to development is the encouragement of creative private initiatives. We are, therefore, anxious to learn as much as we can from the American experience.

Saudi Arabia is fully aware of the fact that its present prosperity is the result of the happy association which allowed American technology to develop Saudi natural resources. Both sides tremendously benefited from the arrangement. It provided the United States with attractive opportunities for investment as well as with access to an increasingly important source of energy. It gave Saudi Arabia, for the first time in its history, the means to raise the living standards of its people beyond the subsistence level.

Encouraged by this successful experiment, we look forward to increasing participation by American firms in our industrial programs. There are many opportunities for such participation. I shall outline a few:

1. Joint Venture in Hydrocarbon-Based Industries

Saudi Arabia, in view of its petroleum and gas resources and the availability of capital, is well equipped to develop an extensive and profitable hydrocarbon-based industry. Realizing this fact, a number of leading American companies showed interest in establishing joint ventures to produce petrochemicals, fertilizers, aluminum, and steel. Negotiations are proceeding smoothly and some of them are nearing completion. The Saudi Government is willing to consider further proposals in this area.

2. Joint Ventures in Non-Hydrocarbon Industries

In this field our development plan envisages the establishment of about 900 manufacturing units in the next five years. The plants would supply building materials, various agricultural inputs and outputs, and a wide variety of household and commercial items. Medium and small American companies can participate in some of the contemplated projects. I would like to take this opportunity to invite you all to take a closer look at the possibilities available. Our incentives package includes generous loans, free land, and cheap utilities. Our laws are flexible. An interested American industrialist has a wide range of profitable choices.

3. Consultancy and Management Services

While we endeavor to encourage joint ventures we realize that in some instances both sides prefer to limit the cooperation to consultancy and management services. We encourage such arrangements. American firms that are unwilling to invest in our industrial projects may yet profitably participate by providing management, engineering and marketing services.

4. Provision of Equipment

The factories and plants projected in the plan, require a wide variety of equipment and American companies can generate a large and lucrative business providing such materials. As Saudi Arabia progresses further on the road of industrialization its need for heavy machinery will grow. Thus the more you help us industrialize, the more you can sell plants and machines in our market.

These are only a few of the possibilities. To cite more examples American firms can contribute to our infrastructure development by managing projects and by participating in joint ventures. Other areas of mutual interest can be identified and expanded. Both sides recognize the inherent advantages in furthering economic relations. Today, the United States is the largest supplier of goods and services to the Kingdom. In fact, nearly 20% of the American oil import comes from Saudi Arabia.

However, this growing and mutually advantageous relationship is threatened by the present attempts to break the Arab boycott of Israel in the United States. Since these attempts, whether they succeed or not, have far-reaching implications for the future of the economic relations between this United States and Arab countries and since the boycott is not fully understood, I want to take this opportunity to explain the nature of the boycott and to clarify our position.

The reports that attempt to portray the Arab boycott as racial or religious discrimination are totally unfounded. The sole purpose of the Arab boycott is to prohibit transactions with any enterprise which fosters the economy of Israel or supports its wars efforts. The records of the Arab boycott do not yield a single case where a firm was subjected to the boycott for the sole reason that it is owned and controlled by members of the Jewish faith. Nowhere in the various resolutions of the Arab League since 1949 or in the detailed regulations issued thereunder can one find a reference to Jews or Jewish interests. Thus there are companies owned by Jews which trade with Arab countries; there are companies owned by Moamems and controlled by Jews. The Trading with the Enemy Act, the Battle Act, are all legal devices designed to promote the foreign policy interests of the United States. No body ever said that you deprived yourselves of the pleasure of Havana cigars because you hated the Cuban's race or disapproved of their religion. The Arab boycott is different from other boycotts only in so far that it has stronger political, legal and ethical foundations than most.

Breaking the Arab boycott will not contribute anything to the cause of religious and racial tolerance in the world. Those who are truly concerned about tolerance and justice, and not merely motivated by blind love or blind hate, should direct all their energies towards finding a just solution to the Pales thinlyan question. The Arab boycott is no more than a political response to a great political injustice. As long as the basic problem remains, it would be futile to deal with a minor symptom.

Saudi Arabia has a tremendous challenge in the years ahead. We are attempting in the next five years to increase student enrollment by over 200%, increase hospital beds by over 100%, and double our water supply and our road network. We want you to help us provide a better life for our people and in the process, through the generation of jobs and business opportunities, contribute to your own prosperity. Let me conclude by saying that I am confident that both Americans and Arabs are wise enough to continue on the road of cooperation, friendship, and common prosperity.
Use this CONVENIENT ORDER FORM for books, etc.


☐ Robert B. Betts, CHRISTIANS IN THE ARAB EAST, 263 pp. Lycabettus Press, Greece. A comprehensive study of the Arabic-speaking Christians and the role they have played in the Middle East from the time of the Islamic conquest up to present day developments. Valuable demographic statistics included. A comprehensive bibliography in the appendix. Our price $16.00.

☐ Ray Cleveland, MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, 91 pp. $2.25 (paperback). Stryker-Post Publications. The author gives a short historical background on the early empires in these areas, followed by a treatment of each of the present countries. The treatment consists of a list of statistics, a short history, description of the culture, outline of economy and finally an analysis of the future prospects. Maps included. An excellent study book. Our price $2.00.

☐ Alistair Duncan, THE NOBLE SANCTUARY. 80 pp. 1.00. Longman Group, Ltd. A collection of beautiful color pictures of Jerusalem. The Dome of the Rock and details of Arab design, accompanied by an appreciative text giving the history and the various phases of construction and restoration of "The Noble Sanctuary." Our price $3.00.

☐ Fouzi El-Amar, TO BE AN ARAB IN ISRAEL, 215 pp. $1.95 (paperback). Frances Pinter, Ltd., London. Tells of the impact of the Arab-Israeli War on both Arab and Jew. In this biographical presentation the author gives a picture of the Israeli way of life and expresses his faith in the possibility of a bi-national secular state in the land of Palestine. Our price $1.50.


☐ A.C. Forrest, THE UNHOLY LAND, 178 pp. $3.95 (paperback). Devin-Adair Co. The author’s personal, informed and uncompromising stand against what he considers to be an perverted and distorted news coverage of the human tragedy brought about by the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Our price $2.50.

☐ Maxim Ghilan, HOW ISRAEL LOST ITS SOUL, 250 pp. $2.50 (paperback). Penguin Books, Ltd. Shows events leading up to the birth of the State of Israel in 1948. Illustrates the complexities in separating the international Jewish question from the Middle East question. He considers the possibilities of a multiracial secular state made up of all Middle East countries, but blames Israeli policy for destroying immediate hopes of peace. Our price $1.60.

☐ Norman A. Horner, REDISCOVERING CHRISTIANTY WHERE IT BEGAN, 110 pp. 5. Lebanon pounds (paperback). Heidelberg Press, Lebanon. The churches in the Middle East are presented from two standpoints — their historical origins and their present status. Appendices give valuable information statistically and list ecumenical centers at work in the area today. Our price is $1.00.

☐ Malcolm H. Kerr, ed., THE ELUSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 347 pp. plus maps. $6.95 (paperback). State University of New York. Widely diverging views of six knowledgeable writers — a Syrian, an Israeli, a Canadian and three Americans. Each presents aspects of the Middle East conflict as he sees them. The one point of agreement is that the conflict has reached a dangerously explosive point and that some solution is imperative. Our price, $4.50.


☐ Ray Vicker, THE KINGDOM OF OIL, 264 pp. $7.95. Chas. Scribner’s Sons. The author traces the shift of power from Western to Arab hands in the politics of oil and offers some suggestions for the future as far as energy is concerned. Contains a study of the history, politics, religions and social customs of the Middle East and its emergence into modern history via oil. Our price $5.00.

☐ Contribution to AMEU, tax deductible.

☐ Free Pamphlet Collection.

A check or money order for $ _______ is enclosed, payable to AMEU.

NAME _________________________________

ADDRESS _______________________________

ZIP ______

THE LINK aims at maintaining contacts among Americans who believe that friendship with the people of the Middle East is essential to world peace, who would contribute to this goal by spreading understanding of the history, values, religious, culture and economic conditions of the Middle East, and who would—in this context—press for greater fairness, constancy and integrity in U.S. policy toward that area.

It is published by M.E.U. (Friends for Middle East Understanding, Inc.) whose directors are: John V. Chapple, former CARE director, Gaza Strip Project; John H. Davis, former Commissioner General of UNRWA, International Consultant; Harry G. Doman, Jr., former Director, Middle East and Europe Department, National Council of Churches; Henry G. Fischer, Director in Istanbul, American Academy of Arts & Sciences; John H. Hurlbut, President of the Middle East Foundation of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences; Evan G. Landis, American Academy of Arts & Sciences; William E. Langer, National Executive, American Historical Association; J. C. van der Linde, Secretary General, International Academy of Jewish History; Robert E. Linn, National Trustee, American Academy of Arts & Sciences; John E. Mitchell, National Trustee, American Academy of Arts & Sciences; and Paul G. Hoffman, President, National Committee for U.S. Participation in the UN. The articles are written by experts in their fields.

John M. Sutton, Executive Director; Mrs. Kelly, Administrative Assistant; Miss H. C.L. Lord, Distribution & Travel.

The views expressed in THE LINK are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Americans for Middle East Understanding, Inc.

All correspondence should be addressed to Room 771, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, New York 10027.