The Shadow Government

By Jane Hunter

On April 6, 1986, the director of Israel's powerful Congressional lobby proclaimed: "We are in the midst of a revolution that is raising U.S.-Israel relations to new heights." Speaking before 1,000 assembled members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Executive Director Tom Dine said that during the Reagan Presidency Israel's solid support in Congress had been augmented by newly acquired friends throughout the executive branch of government. There were now, Dine said, officials sympathetic to Israel at every level in the State and Defense departments, the CIA, and the federal agencies dealing with trade, science and agriculture.

Privately, Dine said that Secretary of State George Shultz had told him of a desire "to build institutional arrangements so that ... if there is a [future] secretary of state who is not positive about Israel, he will not be able to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the U.S. that we have established." Few would dispute the fact that such a relationship has been achieved.

A 1985 Free Trade Agreement insulates Israel from a possible swing to protectionism. Aid to Israel—at $3 billion a year, roughly 25 percent of all the aid appropriated by Congress—has been converted from loans to outright grants. The money, paid yearly rather than quarterly, gives Israel the benefit of the interest and is earmarked for particular projects, unlike aid that goes to other countries. Israel simply uses its own discretion.

Israel also enjoys: unprecedented access to U.S. military technology; the unique privilege of spending part of its U.S. military aid in its own economy; NATO-like status when bidding on U.S. military contracts; and contracts in the Space Defense Initiative, "Star Wars."

Many of these concessions have come from a rather special group of Israel's executive branch friends: high-level officials in several departments who "operated a virtual parallel government outside the traditional Cabinet departments and agencies almost from the day Reagan took office."}

David Kimche, ex-Israeli spy, calls himself a "matchmaker" in orchestrating the U.S.-Iranian intrigue that led to the Iran-contra scandal.

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The names of some of them have become well known since the Iran-Contra revelations: national security advisers Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, National Security Council (NSC) staff member Oliver North, the late CIA Director William Casey, Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams and Michael Ledeen, sometime consultant to the Departments of State and Defense and to the NSC. These were the men who were involved in the Iran arms sales, directed the illegal contra resupply operation, instigated and guided the April 1986 attack on Libya, and masterminded the capture in 1985 of the hijackers of the Achille Lauro cruise ship. According to Iran-contra investigators, the same group, with its operational network of retired military and intelligence officials, was responsible for many other undisclosed operations.

Essentially, this shadowy group encouraged Israel to help them circumvent Congress and the law—especially in Central America. The Israeli Government played a major role in the Achille Lauro incident and a key intelligence role in the attack on Libya. Israel would also become an integral part of an autonomous covert action unit, spearheaded by William Casey and Oliver North and envisioned by Casey to outlast the Reagan Administration. With an ability to execute its own version of U.S. foreign policy, the shadow CIA was potentially a more permanent, institutional arrangement than anything envisioned by George Shultz.

The Shadow Government’s First Operation

The path to the crisis known as the Iran-contra affair was charted and paved during the 1980 Reagan Presidential campaign, when members of the secret government-in-waiting cut a deal with Iran which they hoped would insure the defeat of President Jimmy Carter.

In the final months of the 1980 campaign it was widely believed (especially at Reagan campaign headquarters) that the Carter campaign would win or lose according to the fate of the 52 hostages seized in the U.S. embassy in Teheran in November 1979. In early October 1980, Robert McFarlane, then an aide to Senate Armed Services Committee ranking minority member John Tower, set up a meeting at Washington’s L’Entant Plaza Hotel between top Reagan campaign officials and a man who said he represented Iran and who offered to delay the return of the hostages until after the 1980 elections.

Former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr has related that in September 1980 his government had been negotiating the return of the embassy hostages with the Carter Administration.

But in October, everything suddenly stopped. My aides found out it was because the group in charge of hostage policy, [Speaker of the Iranian Parliament] Rafsanjani, Mohammed Beheshti and Khomeini’s son, did not want Carter to win the election. There was a meeting in Paris between a representative of Beheshti and a representative of the Reagan campaign.

The shift was remarkable. The September 1980 contacts to negotiate the release of the hostages with the Carter Administration had been made, with some urgency, through the government of West Germany. (The U.S. had broken relations with Iran after the hostage taking.) According to Gary Sick, an Iran specialist on the NSC, the Iranians were concerned that Khomeini was
about to die, and their representative "insisted that the issue be resolved before the first anniversary of the hostage taking, i.e., November 4, 1980, the date of the U.S. Presidential election." 3

After Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, Iran became intent on taking delivery of weapons ordered from the U.S. by the Shah. The Carter Administration sent Teheran a list of items worth $150 million that would be delivered to Iran upon the release of the hostages.

 Sick reports that the Carter Administration was mystified when the previously forthcoming Iranians suddenly seemed to lose interest in negotiations and the matter of the hostages became the subject of extended debate in the Majlis, the Iranian parliament. At the time, Sick attributed the loss of momentum in the contacts to the full following the initial Iraqi attack and to the popular hostility in Iran to resumption of military relations with the U.S.

 However, Sick did note a sudden proliferation, beginning in mid-October, of baseless news stories about U.S. airlifts of weapons parts to Iran. And he tied these reports to revelations in 1983 that the Reagan campaign had mobilized a network of retired officers to watch U.S. military installations, apparently believing that President Carter would launch some form of military action against Iran in the final days of the campaign. 8

The Majlis debate ended on November 2. The day before, pro-Reagan columnists George Will and Evans and Novak had broken similar stories that the Carter Administration had struck an arms-for-hostages deal two weeks before, timed to affect the election. 9

It remains unclear whether the hostage negotiations, through the good offices of Algeria were cynically timed to bring about the release of the hostages immediately after Reagan's inauguration. This was a matter of at least casual interest to the incoming Reagan team: in mid-December Richard Allen, Reagan's designated national security adviser, asked Gary Sick, "Will the hostages be released before the inauguration?"

It was, however, a matter of sorrow to Carter, who had stayed up the night before negotiating with Iran. A last-minute delay even robbed him of the opportunity to announce the hostages' departure; the planes bringing them out of Iran took off when the plane carrying him back to Georgia left the ground. 10

Whether willingly or not, Israel contributed to the Reagan campaign's undermining of President Carter. When the Algerian Government began acting as an intermediary between the Carter Administration and Iran in mid-October, U.S. arms ordered by the Shah continued to be a part of the negotiating package. At a delicate point in the process a message was received from Prime Minister Begin indicating that Israel had been contacted by the Iranians seeking military equipment and spare parts. He said that one plane load of material had already been dispatched and he sought U.S. approval to continue to provide spares for Iran's U.S.-built aircraft. At a time when every effort was being exerted by the United States on its allies to ensure the integrity of the embargo, this request was received with astonishment bordering on disbelief. 11

Secretary of State Edmund Muskie complained, and Begin promised to stop this interference with the hostage negotiations. However, Israel shipped ammunition and tank parts as well as aircraft spares to Iran throughout the embassy hostage crisis, without, in the words of then National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, "much concern for the negative impact this was having on our leverage with the Iranians on the hostage issue." 12 It can only be surmised whether Begin was aiding the Reagan electoral effort or just doing what Israel does whenever possible-selling the products of its largely state-owned arms industry, which employs 20 percent of its industrial work force. 13

In May and August 1980, two consignments of weapons worth $500 million, originally purchased by the Shah—until his downfall Israel's best arms customer—went to the Islamic Republic. Khomeini had asked for the money back, but Israel sent arms.

After the delivery Israel still held a balance of $300 million of the Shah's money, and, following the Iraqi invasion, it promised more arms if Iran would bomb Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak. The Iranians tried, but only damaged some laboratories. 14

Campaign Tactics

Sway Election

There are further indications that the Reagan Presidency was won by less than impeccable means. In addition to dealing with the Khomeini regime, "an intelligence operation inside the Reagan campaign" carried out other questionable activities under the direction of campaign manager and later CIA Director William Casey, and Richard Allen. 15 Some were carried out by future Reagan officials, some with particularly close ties to Israel (see Reagan Campaign Intelligence Operation, page 4), others by former FBI and CIA agents able to obtain information from still-serving former colleagues. Casey's team is credited, for example, with the acquisition of the Carter campaign's briefing papers. Those documents were being used to prepare President Carter for an October 28th televised debate with Ronald Reagan; access to them gave
Reagan Campaign Intelligence Operation

Fred Ike and John Lehman were members of a subgroup of the intelligence operation run by Casey and Allen during the Reagan campaign. Ike (whose initials appeared on a cryptic October 10, 1980 memorandum from Allen: “FCI—Partial Release of hostages for parts”) went on to become Under Secretary of Defense. He was the immediate superior of Richard Perle, who recently resigned his post of Assistant Secretary of Defense. In 1970 Perle was picked up on a FBI wiretap of the Israeli Embassy, discussing information. At the time he was an aide to Sen. Henry Jackson (D-WA).2

During his service on the Reagan transition team and in the DOD, Perle admitted taking a consultant’s fee through his firm Abingdon Corporation from an Israeli arms manufacturer which was trying to secure a Pentagon contract. Throughout his tenure, Perle continued to be controversial for his hardline opposition to nuclear disarma- ment negotiations with the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, for his stalwart defense of his immediate subordinate, Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephen Bryen. As a Senate staff member, Bryen had been investigated for passing classified information to an Israeli official.3 Ike and Perle are reportedly partners in a vacation home in France.4

Lehman, who recently retired as Secretary of the Navy, recommended Oliver North to Richard Allen, who brought the Vietnam veteran to the NSC.5 Lehman was also a partner with Perle in Abingdon Corporation.5 It is not clear whether during the Reagan Administration, Perle, Bryen, Ike and Lehman were members of the secret government, friendly to the secret government, friendly to Israel or all of the above. Similar uncertainty exists as to the role of Noel Koch, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Africa, who was called upon to price TOW missiles with the Israeli purchasing mission in New York, after Michael Ledeen bungled the job. Koch, a former employee of the Zionist Organization of America, also reviewed the schedule for a February 1986 sale of TOWs and sat on an informal intergovernmental counter-terrorism group headed by Oliver North.7

Reagan’s handlers the advantage of tailoring rebuttals to Carter’s arguments.10 Congressional aides have recently come to believe that Casey obtained the papers and passed them to James Baker, currently Secretary of the Treasury. 17 The involvement of a number of key players in the Iran-contra affair in attempts during the campaign period to rescue the embassy hostages raises suspicions about whether these operations might also have been targeted for foul play. Albert Hakim, an Iranian-born businessman functioning as an undercover agent, who would become well-known as the financial wizard of the Iran-contra operation, rented a garage in Teheran, to be used as a rendezvous point for “Desert One,” the Carter Administration’s hostage rescue operation. The exercise would end in disaster in the Iranian desert on April 25, 1980. Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North was part of a watcher team on the Turkish border. Robert McFarlane de-briefed some of those who took part in Desert One for the Armed Services Committee.18

Later that year, the Carter Administration planned, then dropped, a second rescue attempt. Air Force Brig. Gen. Richard Secord, Hakim’s partner in the private arms sales operations of the NSC junta, was deputy commander of the operation.19 Meanwhile, shortly before the election, Michael Ledeen, whose enigmatic shadow falls on much of the present Iran-contra scandal, broke the “Bilbgyae” story, revelations of President Carter’s brother’s ties to Libya, in a New Republic article which he co-authored with arch-right winger Arnaud De Borghgrave. Francesco Pazienna, a former Italian intelligence officer and a leader of the far-right secret Masonic Lodge P-Z, linked to the 1980 bombing of the Bologna railroad station and the Vatican bank scandal, has said that Ledeen used an Israeli secret service informer to obtain the material for his Bilbgyae article. Ledeen denies Pazienna’s allegations, but the Italian Government has indicted Pazienna for abuse of office in P-Z’s long campaign to destabilize Italy and Ledeen is an unindicted co-conspirator for his role in the Bilbgyae affair. President Carter’s Ambassador in Rome, Richard N. Gardner, told the Washington Post that he had been “shocked to learn that the Italian intelligence service lent itself to interfering in an American election.” Gardner said that after Reagan’s victory, Italian politicians told him that Ledeen and Pazienna were acting as unofficial contact points for the new administration, and arranging appointments with Reagan officials.20 It is not clear if the Reagan Administration’s dealings with Iran before it took office included an ongoing commitment to provide arms to the Islamic Republic, and, if so, whether Israel was the agreed-upon conduit or agent for those sales. There is considerable confusion on this point, even among former Reagan Ad-
ministration officials. Some describe a deliberately vague Administration position on Israeli arms sales to Iran, as far back as 1981, with an implicit understanding that

any time the Israelis sent anything anywhere . . . that they would be compensated. If they sent their own stuff, it was understood that we would replace it. Israel would never incur any costs or drawdowns of its own stocks, even if we hadn’t explicitly asked them to make the sales.21

Other former officials describe futile attempts to make Israel stop arming the Khomeini regime.

Israel had ample reason to sell Iran arms, whatever the administration’s attitude. In addition to the profits earned, Israel was eager to keep the Iran-Iraq war going, sapping the ability of Iraq to attack Israel. A March 1982 report in the New York Times indicated that Israel had supplied half of Iran’s weapons in the previous 18 months.22 In 1985, Israel was reported to be “Iran’s most reliable arms supplier,” selling the Islamic Republic between $500 and $800 million worth of arms a year.23 Most of the arms Israel seized during its 1982 invasion of Lebanon were sold to Iran.24

It is clear that, from the beginning, Israel sought an unequivocal U.S. endorsement of the sales. Sometime between Reagan’s election and the end of the year Morris Adinay, then head of AIPAC, approached Richard Allen and asked how the Reagan Administration felt about Israel shipping F-4 fighter aircraft parts to Iran. Adinay interpreted Allen’s response as an “amber light” to make the sales.25 [Recently Former Secretary of State Haig said that Israeli officials approached him about selling arms to Iran—once in 1981 and twice in 1982—and that he turned them down.26] In 1982 then Ambassador Moshe Arens said that Israel had supplied spare parts for U.S. weapons to the Khomeini Government “in coordination with the U.S. Government . . . at almost the highest levels.” Arens said that Israel’s purpose had been to “find some areas of contact with Iranian military, to bring down the Khomeini regime.”27 The following day the State Department denied any connection with Israeli sales28 and by the day after Arens was back to say that there weren’t enough arms to overthrow Khomeini and that “I caught a little flak from the State Department.”29

The previous year, after an Argentine aircraft returning from delivering U.S. M-48 tank parts from Israel to Iran had gone down in the Soviet Union,30 the State Department had written to Sen. John Glenn that “Israel has assured us that it would not provide any military items of U.S. origin or containing U.S. original components to [Iran or Iraq].”31 Rather than focusing on arms sales in exchange for delayed release of the embassy hostages, the primary undertaking of the Reagan campaign might have been in the area of political support for the Khomeini Government. In 1983 the Reagan Administration supplied the Khomeini Government with the names of Soviet contacts in Iran. In May of that year the Islamic Republic outlawed the Communist (Tudeh) Party, executed 200 of its members and expelled 18 Soviet diplomats.32

Former President Bani Sadr says that in 1982 Sadiq Ghotbzadeh, then foreign minister, the only high-ranking non-fundamentalist in the Iranian Government, sent the U.S. a message saying that a coup against Khomeini was in progress and requesting that Washington remain neutral. After a long delay, a message—that the U.S. was against the overthrow of the anti-communist Khomeini regime—came from Michael Ledeen. Shortly after that Ghotbzadeh was arrested and executed.33 Part of the confusion regarding Israel’s arms sales can be attributed to the existence of two governments: one, the visible, formal administration, with its hierarchical departments headed by Cabinet Secretaries, which maintained a neutral position on the Gulf war with sometimes a slight tilt toward Iraq, identified Iran as a “terrorist” state, and tried to stop arms exports from U.S. allies; the other, the hidden junta, directed by CIA Director Casey and Robert McFarlane, which tapped a network of “secret contacts throughout the government with persons who acted at their direction but did not officially report to them.”34

Michael Ledeen
Befriending
George Shultz

Almost immediately, the new Reagan Administration reached out to Israel, hoping primarily for help in Central America. When Israel bombed Iraq's reactor in 1981, its pilots went armed with satellite pictures "received from the United States within the framework of an appeal to Israel for help to the contras." Undoubtedly that was the first of many such appeals made to Israel to assist the Reagan Administration's efforts to bring down the Government of Nicaragua.

From the beginning, the Administration has wanted to tap Israel's excellent Central American arms distribution channels and its ties to military elites; it has also wanted Israel to play a visible partner's role in the region, for the political effect this might have on the Congress and the U.S. Jewish community. Unwilling to subject itself to the political criticism such an overt role might evoke, Israel has limited its involvement to discreetly aiding the contras and the pro-U.S. Central American governments. In 1982 Secretary of State Alexander Haig sent his aide, Robert McFarlane, to Israel to talk with David Kimche, director-general of Israel's foreign ministry, who had had a long career as a ranking officer in Mossad, Israel's external intelligence agency. McFarlane told the Congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair that he had known of Kimche for many years and that, having made his acquaintance, the two had established a close working relationship.

Haig wanted McFarlane to discuss with Kimche the formation of an alliance of Israel and conservative Middle East states. Instead, they established a dialogue about "the big picture," i.e., issues outside the Middle East. Before leaving for the White House to become deputy national security adviser, McFarlane established links between Kimche and senior State Department officials, formalized as the Israel-U.S. Political Military Committee which met twice a year, alternately in Washington and Jerusalem. At its first meeting in June 1983, the committee discussed "the intention of the U.S. Administration to get Israel to supply the armies of the pro-American regimes [in Central America]," with the funds "the U.S. cannot directly transfer to its allies in the region ... paid to Israel directly from the United States." Israel reportedly declined such an arrangement.

Following the April 1984 committee meeting in Washington, Israel began to funnel cash to the contras via South America and to increase its arms shipments. This was Israel's first known foreign operation with the secret government.

In 1982 George Shultz replaced Alexander Haig as U.S. Secretary of State. Regarded as "pro-Arab," Shultz had spoken of the "legitimate needs" of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. His longtime employer, the Bechtel Corporation, had been accused of honoring the Arab League boycott. Soon, however, the U.S. debacle in Lebanon soured Shultz on Arab governments. Shaken by losing a scuffle over a $200 million increase in Israel's aid with the pro-Israel lobby, Shultz was transformed into the administration's leading advocate of strategic cooperation with Israel. While Jewish organizations tore into Shultz, Israel's then ambassador Moshe Arens and his aide Benjamin Netanyahu befriended the secretary of state and won him to Israel's side. In the summer of 1983, four Shultz assistants started lobbying the secretary to establish stronger bonds with Israel. Armed with the position papers written by assistant Peter Rodman, in support of "strategic cooperation" with Israel, Shultz and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane persuaded President Reagan to adopt the new policy.

When the Iran-contra scandal was exposed, investigators found a curious reference to Rodman in Oliver North's files. Included on a February 27, 1986 memo (attributed to William Casey) for an arms-for-hostages meeting between McFarlane and Iranian representatives was a handwritten note by North listing "people who know." Presumably this referred to Israeli contacts with Iran that had been set in motion by an Israeli arms shipment in August 1985. Peter Rodman's name was on that list.

In late October 1983 President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 111, establishing strategic cooperation with Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited Washington a month later for discussions on the new agreement, which gave Israel increased U.S. aid, short-term economic credits, concessions on the sales of Israeli weapons systems to the U.S., and the Free Trade Agreement. The agreement included what Shamir called, "a dialogue on coordinating activity in the third world." The pact was signed the following March. An Israeli military radio report on the strategic agreement said that a tendency had emerged in Washington toward increasing cooperation with Israel in the wake of deliberations in the U.S. capital after Robert McFarlane became the new national security adviser.

This agreement, which also committed the U.S. to closer military cooperation with Israel in such matters as training and medical facilities, replaced a November 1981 Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Cooperation. That agreement also contained: measures to help Israel's arms industry and for cooperation in the developing world; and a loose mutual defense pact, as well. But it was suspended when Israel annexed the Golan Heights the following month.
Shultz Is "Snookered"

"Snookered" (alternatively "sucked-ered"), as in "played for a fool," with the Israelis and the secret junta doing most of the playing, became the buzz word in the final week of the Iran-contra hearings, as witnesses described how the Reagan Administration got caught up in making arms sales to Iran. The term applied to no one as aptly—and as humiliatingly—as George Shultz, the Secretary of State, who had opened the door to strategic cooperation with Israel and gone out of his way to assist the group at the NSC who were intent on subverting the Boland Amendment.

Shultz, who made a point of testifying against his opposition to third country aid to the contras (because it would not help them regain Congress' support), said that on June 25, 1984 he asked McFarlane not to solicit other governments until a legal opinion was obtained. During that period McFarlane solicited a pledge of $1 million a month from Saudi Arabia and lied about it to Shultz’s aides.

Shultz was further annoyed with McFarlane’s lying to him about the solicitation of Israel for the contra cause. Testifying early in the Iran-contra hearings, McFarlane described a discussion with David Kimche about giving Israel a special dispensation to bid for contracts put out by the U.S. Agency for International Development in conjunction with the Caribbean Basin Initiative in exchange for helping the contras.

McFarlane said that when Kimche’s government declined the deal, the White House had sent a message via Howard Teicher, an Israeli-educated Middle East specialist on the NSC staff, who was a full participant in the Iran-contra junta. McFarlane testified that the message expressed disappointment and left open the possibility for an Israeli change of heart, but basically said "we understand; it won’t be raised again."

Testifying before the Iran-contra panel many weeks later, Secretary of State Shultz told a different story. Led by Counsel Mark Belnick, Shultz affirmed that on April 18, 1984 he had told McFarlane in connection with the approach to Israel that the State Department opposed such moves and that there was no way the U.S. Government could serve as a conduit for any third country aid.

In May Shultz learned from the U.S. Embassy in Israel that Teicher had approached the Israeli Government for contributions and said that the U.S. would serve as a conduit. When confronted McFarlane said Teicher was not operating on instructions, but "on his own hook." However, the U.S. ambassador in Israel said that Teicher had informed the embassy that he was under instructions. Shultz affirmed the counsel’s next statement: "And then McFarlane had sent Teicher back to make [yet] another approach."

Shultz justified his own solicitation of $10 million from Brunei two years later, with the passage of the Pell Amendment to the 1985 Foreign Aid Authorization Bill. The State Department had joined the White House in pressuring a House-Senate conference committee to rewrite the amendment. In its new form (passed by Congress without further debate) the Pell amendment was changed into a law "with the form of a restriction which actually was an authorization," as Shultz described it.

The secret junta hardly thanked Shultz for legalizing solicitation and offering to ask the Sultan of Brunei for a donation. When Shultz set out to do his duty, Elliott Abrams, the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, supplied him a bank account number which Abrams said was under the control of the contras. It was really the account number of one of the Second-Hakim companies—that is, it was supposed to be, only someone transposed two digits. Abrams, the son of leading neoconservative Norman Podhoretz, might have known the true ownership of the account. He was said to be a "close friend" of Oliver North, with whom he served on the "RIGLET." A rump version of the "Restricted Interagency Group," (RIG) which coordinated official Reagan policy, the RIGLET engaged in activities such as directing the Ambassador to Costa Rica to help the contras.

That ambassador was one of several that the junta subverted, or bypassed altogether. The shadow government further humiliated Shultz by sending arms dealer Albert Hakim to negotiate high policy matters with the Government of Iran.

There is even a question about the devotion of the State Department’s legal adviser, Abraham Sofaer. Sotaf is credited with blowing the whistle on serious lies in testimony CIA Director Casey was about to give Congress on the affair and with drafting a memo suggesting a connection between the arms sales profits and the contras on November 21, 1986 (four days before Attorney General Meese disclosed the diversion). Within days, Sotaf ordered that a scathing critique of President Reagan’s November 20 statement on the Iran arms sales be toned down. The paper had been prepared by State Department aides to brief Shultz prior to an attempt to change Reagan’s mind.

Sotaf is regarded as an extremely close friend of Israel, where he owns a home. He was the judge in Ariel Sharon’s lawsuit against Time magazine and he was sent to Israel to investigate the case of Jonathan Jay Pollard, the civilian naval intelligence analyst arrested for spying for Israel in October 1985. On that investigation Sotaf managed to miss finding hundreds of cubic feet of documents as well as the Air Force colonel who was later indicted as Pollard’s handler. Against this record, his perspicacity in uncovering the Iran-contra connection stands in stark contrast.

The Iran Initiative

In the spring of 1985, Michael Ledeen offered to go to Israel to set the stage for an elaborate selling campaign, which resulted first in U.S. approval for Israeli arms shipments to Iran and then in direct U.S. sales. The Iranian initiative was characterized by the same kind of effort to get Israel to take over the contras. Only this time the roles were reversed and the tactics somewhat less ad hoc, especially regarding the use of an Iranian intermediary, Manucher Ghorbanifar, who Oliver North and CIA Director Casey considered an Israeli agent. (See Manucher Ghorbanifar, page 4)

The initiative began in April 1985 when Ledeen approached McFarlane and told him he had just learned from a diplomat in Europe that the situation in Iran was increasingly "fluid." Ledeen persuaded McFarlane to send him to Israel to find out what the Israelis knew about Iran. Members of the National Security Council staff were also working in a parallel direction. Earlier, Graham Fuller, who chaired the CIA's National Intelligence Council, had produced a report using the "Soviet threat" in the Gulf to justify an "opening" toward Iran. Fuller's paper "strongly resembled" a think piece passed to the NSC by Adnan Khoshoggi, a Saudi arms dealer who has operated in close coordination with the Israeli Government on a number of occasions, and who later put up financing for some of the U.S.-Israeli arms transactions.

The Fuller paper was also partly based upon an assessment on Iran done by Pan-Heuristics, a California consulting firm whose chief executive, Albert Wohlstetter, acted as a mentor to Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle and NSC aide and secret junta member Donald Fortier. Wohlstetter was a proponent of U.S. approval of Israeli arms sales to Iran to counter Soviet moves to win favor with the Islamic Republic.

On Ledeen's return from Israel, McFarlane ordered a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Iran and NSC staff members Donald Fortier and Howard Teicher drafted a decision directive based on Fuller's paper. Fortier, now deceased, was, along with Adm. John Poindexter, McFarlane's deputy. Teicher, partially educated in Israel and a State Department protege of McFarlane, was NSC director of political-military affairs. It was this document that Defense Secretary Weinberger called "perverse" and "contrary to our own interests."
Ghorbanifar was an Iranian who now runs a rug business in Europe. Albert Hakim said he met Ghorbanifar in the early 70s right after the formation of "his new company," Star Line Shipping (a company headed by the deputy prime minister and run by about 15 Israelis). When asked by the Congressional Iran-contra panel counsel whether Ghorbanifar "was a Savak agent who had worked for the Israelis," Hakim said that was so. He also acknowledged seeing information connecting Ghorbanifar to the "intelligence services of Israel." Some CIA officials as well suspected Ghorbanifar had ties to Israeli intelligence, a point testified to severally times by Oliver North before the Iran-contra committees: [Ghorbanifar was widely suspected to be, within the people I dealt with at the Central Intelligence Agency, an agent of the Israeli Government or at least one of, if not more, of their security services."

And an unconfirmed report from both U.S. intelligence and Iranian sources say that Ghorbanifar ingratiated himself with the Khomeini Government by betraying a 1980 coup d'etat mounted by military officers loyal to the Shah. Seventy of those involved were said to have been executed.

Ghorbanifar is credited with the 1981 disinformation that Libyan "hit squads" were about to infiltrate the U.S. and kill President Reagan. The CIA thought his motive in this case was "to cause problems for one of Israel's enemies." Michael Ledeen recently denied claims that Ghorbanifar was an Israeli agent. Had they been true, said Ledeen, he would have been further encouraged as to the go-between's reliability.


Oliver North and the Israelis

As the Iran initiative continued through the autumn of 1985, McFarlane liked it less and less. In December, within days of resigning his post of national security adviser, he turned a deaf ear to the pleas of his Israeli counterpart David Kimche and advised that the operation be closed down.

At the end of 1985, when the Israelis were fighting hard to keep the Iran initiative alive, Oliver North's interests seemed to be synonymous with those of Israel. Where McFarlane had found Ghorbanifar despicable, North, while acknowledging Ghorbanifar's total failure of a CIA lie detector test and his habitually distorted translations of negotiations with the Iranians, took up the Iranian's case. A North memo to John Poindexter, McFarlane's successor, in fact praised Ghorbanifar's reliability.

Prime Minister Peres replaced David Kimche and arms dealers Al Schwimmer and Ya'acov Nimrodi, who had profited from their role during the first arms shipments to Iran, with his advisor Amiram Nir, who was particularly close to Oliver North. Nir came to Washington to urge President Reagan and Admiral Poindexter not to halt the arms-for-hostages exchanges with Iran. Meanwhile Richard Secord, who had straightened out a snarled Israeli arms shipment to Iran in November 1985, and his partner Albert Hakim were brought on "to establish a mirror image of what the Israelis had done in their first transactions" with Schwimmer and Nimrodi.

During January the prospect of using profits ("residuals") from the arms sales for the contras came into play. Oliver North, the NSC officer charged with supporting the contras while Congress denied them funds, told the Iran-contra panel how it was put to him.

So Mr. Nir is the first person to suggest that there be a residual, and that the residual be applied to the purpose of purchasing replenishments, and supporting other activities. Now, at that point in time in early January, he did not raise with me the specifics of supporting the Nicaraguan resistance. That proposal came out of meetings later in January, where I met with Mr. Nir and Mr. Ghorbanifar.

At another point in his testimony North said that Ghorbanifar had directly offered to use some of the arms sales profits for the contras. North had assumed that since Ghorbanifar was an Israeli agent, the offer came "with the full knowledge and acquiescence and support, if not the original idea of the Israeli intelligence services, if not the Israeli Government." According to an account which appeared last January in the Times of London, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, then investigating the scandal, had been given secret evidence strongly suggesting that the plan to divert money from the Iran arms
operation to the Nicaraguan con-
trast was first put forward by Mr.
Shimon Peres.

Arthur Liman, the Iran-contra panels' chief counsel, wondered, momentar-
ily, whether the benefit of the contra
diversion induced the Administration
to continue with the arms sales to
Iran.

On January 17, the President signed a
Finding authorizing arms sales to
Iran. Congress, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Secretary of State
were not to be informed. Through
1986, as Iran continued unwilling or
unable to release U.S. hostages,
Secord, Hakim, and the CIA officers
involved in the affray grew increas-
ingly unhappy with Ghorbanifar
and his Israeli controller Nir. (Follow-
ing the ill-fated trip to Iran made in mid-
May by McFarlane, North, Teicher,
and Nir; even North seemed to have
lost patience with Ghorbanifar.)

When a "second channel" located by
Hakim and a CIA translator finally
set Ghorbanifar aside, Oliver North
took pains to keep the Israelis in the
action. "When Prime Minister Peres
was in Washington last month, the
President assured him that we are go-
ing to continue this effort as a joint
project," North wrote to Secord in
early October.

As the dealings with Iran pro-
ceeded, more and more power ac-
crued to North, who handled the day-
to-day business of the operations and
also served as the NSC contact on
issues relating to "terrorism." North
had a line to CIA Director William
Casey, who regarded him as a pro-
teger. He also enjoyed "informal and
warm" relations with President
Reagan, and, according to two admir-
img reporters who got to know him
personally, the privilege of entering
the Oval Office, unlogged, through a
side door.

The Israelis who knew North held
him in high esteem. "He is more of
an Israeli than we Israelis," said Gen.
Uri Simhoni, Israel's former mili-
tary attache in Washington. One
Israeli intelligence officer credits him
with selling activism as well: "Ollie
North's biggest contribution to the
Western society was his ability to per-
suade American decision makers to
take active measures against interna-
tional terrorism."

When, during the June 1985 TWA
hostage crisis, the two countries
considered joint military and covert
operations, North was tapped as
point man in a secret channel of
communication between the U.S.
and Israel.

North would continue to collab-
orate following the interception of
the Egyptian passenger aircraft carry-
ing four Palestinians who had hijacked
the cruise ship Achille Lauro, killed
a U.S. citizen and then surrendered
to Egyptian authorities. Some credit
North with suggesting the intercep-
tion of the airborne Palestinians.
During that operation, North dealt with
then military attaché Simhoni, who
passed on updates of the location of
the Egyptian plane.

The Israelis jammed the aircraft's
communications and fooled the pilot
with an Arabic-speaking Israeli. U.S.
fighters surrounded and also jammed
the aircraft, forcing it down in Italy,
where Italian police prevented the
transfer of the hijackers to a U.S.
aircraft. An alternate plan during the
operation had been to force the plane
down on an Israeli Air Force base.

North said: "We could not have done
this operation without the very, very
real direct and immediate assistance
of the Government of Israel."

Israeli intelligence also played a role
in the April 1986 attack on Libya.
Oliver North and NSC staff member
Howard Teicher planned the opera-
tion with a select group of State and
Defense departments officials.

Although U.S. law strictly forbids
the assassination of foreign leaders,
Air Force officers were briefed in a way
that made clear "assassination was the
big thing." Khadafy's family was also
targeted after CIA officers argued that
his stature would be diminished if he
was shown unable to protect his
family. The Libyan leader's adopted
baby daughter was subsequently
killed by U.S. bombs, his wife and
other children wounded. According
to Oliver North, the Israeli intelligence
provided up-to-the-minute reports on
Khadafy's whereabouts.

When first reports of the raid in-
dicated Khadafy had been killed, a
flushed Howard Teicher offered to
tell everyone a quality lunch. Had
Khadafy been killed, State Depart-
ment legal adviser Abraham Sofaer
(see Shultz Is "Snookered," page 7) has
provided some language supporting
the legal right of the U.S. "to strike
back to prevent future attacks."

On May 13, 1986, a month after the
U.S. attack on Libya, Amiram Nir,
reportedly passing on a message from
Ghorbanifar, offered Oliver North a
meeting with Howald al-Homadi,
who he identified as Col. Muam-
mar Khadafy's second-in-command.
Ghorbanifar had passed word that
al-Homadi wanted to meet "with
Oliver North or an American official."
Poinder and North encouraged
Ghorbanifar to set up the meeting,
then cancelled it, after Ghorbanifar's
unsatisfactory performance during the
May 23 visit to Iran.

The Off-the-Shelf Entity

CIA Director William Casey wanted
to use the Second-Hakim welle of
dummy corporations and network of
former military officers as the basis of
a secret covert operations apparatus.
With its funds generated by arms sales
and donations, it would be beyond
the control of Congress. During Con-
gressional hearings, North told a
stunned panel

at various times [Casey] and I
talked about the fact that it might
be necessary at some point in the
future to have something, as he
would put it, to pull off the shelf
and to help support other activities
like [the contra]. Now, none of
those, aside from the ones that we
talked about in terms of coopera-
tion with Israel, the ones I
referred to in my notes.

Aside from those operations, he was looking forward to the possibility of needing to support other activities beyond that.75

When Congressman Ed Jenkins asked North if the “stand-alone” entity had been intended to continue after the Reagan Administration, North said, “That was the intention.”76

Although the nature of these operations remains obscure, it seems clear that Israel was to be a charter member of this autonomous force. It is also quite likely that Casey had planned a role for South Africa. He had developed a working relationship with the white regime, persuading Saudi Arabia to sell South Africa oil and receiving in return South African help with the contras and possibly arms sales to Iran. Albert Hakim had drawn up a structure for Africa and Middle East divisions to add to the entity’s already functioning Latin American branch, which resupplied the contras.

There were also several plans floated by individuals with sundry links to Casey, North and Israel to forge a “contra international,” which would supply arms and support to anti-communist guerrillas worldwide.77

The late CIA director’s animus toward Nicaragua was so strong that in 1981 he brought in a squad of Argentine military officers to organize the former soldiers of dictator Anastacio Sorroza into the contras. These Argentines had just won a “dirty war,” brutally eradicating thousands of “leftist subversives” and were eager to export their concept of the no-holds-barred national security state. They left after the U.S. backed Britain against Argentina in the Malvinas-Falklands War.78

It is chillingly relevant that Oliver North’s NSC assignment between 1982 and 1984 was with FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency. According to the Miami Herald, North collaborated in the drafting of a secret contingency plan for Presidential approval that called for suspension of the Constitution, turning control of the United States over to FEMA, appointment of military commanders to run state and local governments and declaration of martial law during a national crisis.

The plan did not define national crisis, but it was understood to be nuclear war, violent and widespread internal dissident or national opposition against a military invasion abroad.79

According to the Herald, portions of the 1982 plan resembled a 1970 paper written by FEMA’s then director. That paper advocated rounding up “at least 21 million ‘American Negroes’” and sending them to relocation camps.80

The FEMA plan bears a striking resemblance to a May 1986 “Contingency Plan” drawn up by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (an agency of the Justice Department.) Titled “Alien Terrorists and Undesirables,” the document details a series of measures to round up immigrants from Iran and seven Arab countries and hold them in a newly-opened internment camp in Oakdale, Louisiana.

The contingency is the prevention of Middle East-related violence in the U.S. The plan was leaked shortly after the arrest last January of seven Palestinian immigrants and the Kenyan wife of one of them on charges relating to their alleged membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Marxist group in the PLO. The charges were quickly dropped for immigration violations for all but two of the defendants who now face McCarthy-era charges of distributing subversive literature.81 The Justice Department says the plan is just a discussion document.

In an essay written in 1986, Michael Ledeen attacks the “pseudo-democratic theory according to which everyone is entitled to a say in policy, regardless of his or her qualifications.” He endorses the view, enunciated repeatedly by North and Poindexter during their appearances before the Iran-contra committees, that the executive branch of government has constitutional responsibility for foreign policy. And he calls for changing the law “that prohibits American officials from working with murderers” and the prohibition on assassinations (disregarded by the secret junta during the attack on Libya). Ledeen also blames Congress and the press for foreign policy problems.82

While many of the Republicans on the Iran-contra panel expressed support for North’s and Poindexter’s efforts to aid the contras, none openly endorsed their undemocratic views and methods. The Democrats roundly condemned their subversion of the Constitution. Yet because the Iran-contra committees studiously ignored the role of Israel in the whole affair, it is doubtful that the recommendations included in the committees’ final report will actually prevent a future hijacking of the foreign policy making process.

Commenting on the conclusion of the Congressional Iran-contra hearings, former Texas Sen. John Tower said that Israel’s role in the affair was one of two important aspects that had not been fully resolved (the other being the trail of the money from the arms sales to Iran). However, Tower commented, “If you think Congress is going to touch that political hot potato, you’ll be waiting for a long time.”83

Last winter when the House and Senate Committees were constituted, the members made clear that, in the words of House panelist Henry Hyde (R-IL), Israel’s role “will be looked at very carefully, very gingerly, or maybe not at all.”84

Following the publication by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report of its three-week investigation in December, one member of Congress, appalled at the gap between the evidence of Israeli aid to the contras it contained and Israel’s repeated denials of any such activity, said “Israel’s credibility has been shot. How can we believe anything they say any more?”85 But this voice was in the minority. Disciplined by many years of interaction with AIPAC and other components of the pro-Israeli lobby, members of Congress did not even express private interest in the details of Israel’s participation in the affair. Although several acknowledged
that U.S. and Israeli interests—in such areas as the Gulf, for example—were not always congruent. Committee members maintained that the U.S.-Israeli relationship was so important that the affair should not be allowed to come between the two governments. At one point Rep. Ed Jenkins accused Attorney Gen. Edwin Meese of giving the impression in his November 25 press conference, which broke the scandal, that the affair "was an Israeli operation." 49

In Israel, before the hearings began, Sen. Daniel Inouye, who chaired the Senate side of the joint panel, said he believed Israel's claims that it knew nothing about the diversion of funds to the contras. 50 Inouye, an unabashed admirer of Israel, told the New York Times in 1985 that "any Israeli Government that gives away the West Bank or Golan Heights 'deserves to be impeached'" and that administrations which pressure Israel might harbor "a residue of anti-Semitism." 51

Private interviews with witnesses prior to the televised sessions enabled the committees to exercise a great deal of control over what emerged during public testimony. When a witness ventured onto uncharted terrain concerning Israel, Committee members and counsels would routinely lead them away.

There were a few—memorable—exceptions to this practice, such as the visible astonishment of Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) when he determined that Admiral Poindexter's expression of concern for Iran's "deteriorating" position in the Gulf war was not a slip of the tongue. Apparently, Nunn's curiosity prevailed; he pressed the admiral until Poindexter conceded that the NSC staff and CIA Director Casey agreed with the Israeli position. "I was under the impression that our view was that the Israeli position was deteriorating," said a bemused Nunn. "There was a split over that," said Poindexter. 52

Nor was Israel pressed to cooperate in the gathering of evidence for the investigations. As early as February Rep. Lee Hamilton, chair of the House Select Committee, began negotiating with Israel to have its officials involved in the scandal give testimony during the Congressional investigation. Israel rejected that possibility out of hand. Well into the hearings a "chronology" based on its own investigation was delivered to the Israeli embassy, where it was closely guarded. Committee staff were allowed to look, but not to photocopy. For a time, special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh was not even allowed to look.

When Walsh subpoenaed David Kimche and the Israeli arms dealers involved in the affair, the Israeli Embassy went to court and eventually had Kimche's order temporarily quashed. It is likely that Walsh only wanted the Israelis' testimony to advance investigations into the criminal activities of U.S. citizens. A federal judge recently said he will screen the questions Walsh wishes to ask Israelis. 53

In a gesture that could only be perceived as contemptuous, Israel submitted another chronology just before the last week of the hearing, and said the last installment would be along soon. 54 It seems painfully obvious that then men like Oliver North, John Poindexter, Richard Secord, and the network of former military officers who ran his operations, can look beyond the end of the Reagan Administration and continue to count on Israel for the resources to conduct the covert operations of their choice. Fearing no Congressional censure, why should Israel not oblige?

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Notice
The Simmons College Program of In-
ternational Relations announces its
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ferable credit on “The Arab State
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mosques, and Coptic institutions,
as well as the Sound and Light per-
formance at the Giza Pyramids; and
a four-day cruise down the Nile to
Luxor. The program is open to under-
graduate American students who are
in good standing in their institutions.
The 1988 program will be led by Sim-
mons College professor Elaine C.
Hagopian. The dates are June 3 to July
16, 1988. Applications and further
details will be available in October
1987, and may be obtained by writing
to Ms. Jean Welch, Coordinator of
Summer School, Simmons College,
300 The Fenway, Boston, MA 02115.

Book Views

The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and
American Foreign Policy
By Edward Tivnan

Reviewed by Paul Findley

The Lobby, by Edward Tivnan, is remarkable for several reasons:

- It examines critically and thor-
oughly the American Israeli Public Af-
fairs Committee, an organization reg-
istered to lobby for the interests of the
State of Israel. It does so without a
tinge of bias.
- It is published by a major publish-
ing house, Simon and Schuster,
which gave Tivnan a contract before
the book was written.
- It is being reviewed broadly and,
for the most part, favorably.
- It can be found, at least until recently,
in major book chain stores.

These four points are noteworthy,
because, until The Lobby appeared, no
major publishing house had been will-
ing to publish a critical study of
Israel’s lobbying in the United States,
nor had any major bookstore chain.
been willing to handle one in normal fashion, despite the fact that Israel's lobby is broadly regarded as the most powerful lobby in Washington, D.C., that city of world class lobbies.

My book, *They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby*, was rejected by more than 20 major houses (including Simon and Schuster, Lawrence Hill and Company, a small but respected house, agreed to brave an expected firestorm by publishing my nearly-complete manuscript in 1985. Book chains, for the most part, ignored it and often gave inquiring customers false reasons about its unavailability. It began to get reviews and sell only when Arab American organizations and hundreds of individual citizens began to promote it aggressively.

Tivnan's book is also important because it is written by a professional journalist who approaches his subject in a lively, readable style untouched by any ethnic or political bias. (After being bludgeoned by Israel's lobby from 1978 until my involuntary retirement from Congress in 1982, I can hardly be expected to be devoid of bias.)

The Lobby provides an exciting account of AIPAC's history and a close look at its present relationship to the Washington scene. What emerges is a chilling story of pressure tactics that effectively cow the entire Congress and most of the administration. His account of the skirmishing that led, after much Presidential arm-twisting, to the sale of AWACS equipment to Saudi Arabia is illuminating even to a person, like myself, who participated actively in the legislative process itself.

This book shows that a small group of determined citizens, utilizing the political system that is open to exploitation by everyone, can literally control U.S. foreign policy in a critical region of the world.

Readers will have to search deeply to find even the tiniest evidence of insensitivity to Jewish concerns. The worst that *Washington Post* reviewer Walter Reich could spot was a slip in which Tivnan referred to "U.S.-Jewish relations," letting Reich complain that this seemed to put the American Jewish community "outside the American body politic."

Tivnan does a splendid job explaining AIPAC and its role in manipulating U.S. politics and policies. But he gives little attention to other political forces—Christian fundamentalism and Jewish activities beyond AIPAC's realm—which help mold public opinion and political action nationwide. Tivnan makes only passing comment on the most powerful instrument of intimidation utilized by pro-Israel forces—the reckless charge of anti-Semitism, a tactic which effectively stifles most criticism of Israel.

Except for brief review of the activities of Jonathan Jay Pollard, now serving a life sentence as a paid spy for Israel, Tivnan shows no awareness of the routine leakage of classified documents and other secrets to Israel and the devastating effect this has on the morale and performance of U.S. career diplomats who would like to advance our own national interests, not just Israel's. His book, I believe, would have been stronger had it not focused so heavily on a plea just to U.S. Jews to speak out when they believe Israel does wrong. U.S. Jews, of course, could correct the excesses of lobbying for Israel by themselves, but there is almost no chance that this will occur, since U.S. Jews who speak out pay an even greater price than non-Jews. The remedy, if it comes, will arise from political action by mainstream Americans.

Nevertheless, the appearance of the *The Lobby* is cause for rejoicing. If Simon and Schuster continue to print and promote this fine volume—their intentions are presently unclear—Tivnan's book may emerge as an event of profound importance.

I am not holding my breath, however. I recognize that publishing houses react to pressure occasionally by letting a good book die on the vine, as did *Times Books*, publisher of Roberto Feuerlicht's excellent *Fate of the Jews*.

Paul Findley is the author of *They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby*. 

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![Image of book cover](image)
Books To Order

- Edward Tivnan, *The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, 314 pp., $19.95. A former reporter for *Time* magazine, Tivnan has thoroughly researched the history of the Zionist lobby in preparing this lively and cogent account on AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. He argues that by dominating U.S. Jewish opinion, as well as general American debate on the Middle East issues, AIPAC has damaged prospects for peace in the Middle East. Our price, $12.95. See review, page 13.


- Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israeli Connection: Who Israel's Arms and Why*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1987, 263 pp., $18.95. This carefully researched book exposes Israel as arms dealer and military trainer of the world's most brutal and repressive regimes. The author, an Israeli scholar, argues that Israel's war against third world independence movements reflects not only a need for exports markets and a desire to serve as a U.S. proxy but also reflects its own history as a Western imposition upon the hostile third world. Our price, $11.25.


- Paul Cossali and Clive Robson, * Stateless in Gaza*, London: Zed Books, 1986, 159 pp., $12.90. These cogent interviews with a diversity of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip give the reader a sympathetic understanding of the vitality and endurance with which they face exile in their own land under a harsh Israeli occupation. Our price, $8.75.

- Elizabeth W. Fernea and Basima Q. Beathizan, eds., *Middle Eastern Muslim Women Speak*, Third Edition, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1984, 452 pp., $12.50. This classic collection of autobiographical and biographical sketches, spanning 13 centuries, offers the reader a superb introduction into the diversity of experience of Muslim women and the commonality of many of their concerns. Our price, $7.50.

- Paul Findley, *They Dare To Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby*, Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1985, 362 pp., $8.95. The former eleven-term Congressman from Illinois discusses how Americans are victimized for opposing the Israeli lobby. Our price, $5.95.


- John Hayes, ed., *The Genes of Arab Civilization: Source of Renaissance*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983, 260 pp., $11.95 paperback, $35.00 hardback. With the aid of many excellent illustrations and essays, this handsome introduction to the achievements of the classical Arab world offers insight into its contributions to world civilization and offsets the demagogy of the Arab images held in the West. Paperback edition is normal book size, with black/white illustrations, while hardback is coffee table book size, printed on expensive paper with most illustrations beautifully reproduced in color. Our price, $7.95 (paperback), $20.75 (hardback).


- Ghassan Kanafani, *Palestine's Children*, Washington, DC: Three Continents Press, 1984, 185 pp., $8.00. These short stories present a child's vision of refugee camps and political struggle. The author, the premier Palestinian writer of fiction who was assassinated in a 1972 Israeli car-bombing, conveys a touching portrait of the suffering, dreams and hope of our people. Our price, $5.50.

- W. Thomas Mallinson and Sally V. Mallinson, *The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order*, Harlow, Eng: Longman Ltd., 1986, 504 pp., $39.94. This monumental study of international law analyzes Zionist political-legal objectives, the partition of Palestine, the legal status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements and Palestinian rights. Our price, $24.50.

Alifa Rifaat, *Distant View of a Minaret and Other Stories, London: Heinemann Education Books, 1985, 236 pp., $7.50. More convincingly than any other Arab woman writer, Rifaat lifts the veil on what it means to be a woman living within traditional Muslim society. These 15 short stories deal with such universal themes as sex and death within a context that vividly affirms the religious values of Islam. Our price, $5.50.


Juanita W. Swedenburg and Penny W. Yaqub, *Lands, Peoples and Communities of the Middle East: An Introductory Work-Study Text for Students in Intermediate Grades, Walnut Creek, CA: Middle East Gateway Series, 1981, 74 pp., $8.00. This exceptionally well-done introduction to the Middle East for children 8-11 years old combines simple, clear text, wonderful drawings and enjoyable activities, like maps and flags to color. An ideal gift for that child who would enjoy learning about the region. (Additional classroom material also available for an additional $17.50). Our price, $7.25.

Milton Viorst, * Sands of Sorrow: Israel's Journey from Independence, New York: Harper & Row, 1987, 329 pp., $18.95. Viorst, a liberal supporter of Israel, describes in sorrow how Israel turned its back on peace, preferring to dominate its neighbors and become a spearhead of U.S. policies which treat the Middle East as little more than a battlefield in the cold war. Our price, $11.75.

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